Contributions to the Sri Lankan Encyclopedia of Buddhism

First letter of the Devanāgarī alphabet in Lantsha script used by Buddhists in India and Tibet in the 8th century C.E. (Csoma Kōrōsi).

The sound represented by the first letter of many alphabets, Sanskrit, Roman, Greek, as well as of most modern languages of East and West, has served as a mystic symbol for the ultimate beginning or creation, as well as for the Absolute, e.g. I am Alpha and Omega.

It is the first of all sounds and, hence, the beginning of all knowledge which used to be communicated only by word of mouth. It is the first sound of the sacred syllable Aum (Om), which is said to be the essence of all the Vedas. It is from this that Indian mysticism has developed a cult, attributing to this initial sound a privileged position and function. This tradition was taken up by Buddhism, whereby it spread throughout East Asia.

It is the most elementary sound, produced by the mere opening of the mouth, and forms in most Oriental languages an essential part of the fundamental syllables: ka, ga, ta, da, pa, ba, ma, &c. These syllables are not built up from pure consonants plus a vowel (k + a), but form a concrete unit in which the vowel is inherent in the letter-symbol. The pure consonants, k, g, &c., would then be abstractions (ka minus a), making the sound incomplete. The vowel sound is, therefore, an essential constituent, and the vowel “A” is the beginning of such essence.

Moreover, “A” is in Sanskrit and Pali, as it is in Greek, a negating particle (alpha privans), whereby is symbolised the original non-entity of existence (an-ātmya, an-atta) and its non-permanent nature (a-nitya, a-nicca). In this denial of permanence it becomes a symbol of permanence itself, for “Whether a Tathāgata arises or not, all component things are impermanent”. Thus, the letter “A” symbolises, at the same time, the origination of the very essence of things, as well as the negation of the foundation thereof. This apparent contradiction is in fact an identity, for it is in the negation of the absolute nature of things that their origination and cessation is postulated.

Thus, the letter “A” is considered to be the most perfect letter, which is imperishable (akṣara), even though in its combination with other letters, e.g., in Auṁ (q.v.), the evolution, continuation and involution of this world of events is symbolised.

Further developments which were carried to far-away lands by Buddhist missionaries had their origin in India, where even to this day their equivalents are found with hardly any difference in the Tantric schools of Hinduism, which flourished particularly in Bengal and south India. Tibetan Buddhism has given much room to the development of such types of speculation.

According to the Mani bKah:ḥbum (fol. 31 b.) the sacred syllable symbolises the noumenal source, the absolute; and around this symbol is evolved the idea of creative sound in the theory of vibration. Well-known and far spread as this concept is in the mystic East, it was not unknown in the West either. Pythagoras, who himself was an initiate of eastern wisdom, and who was the founder of one of the most influential schools of mystic philosophy in the West, spoke of the harmony of the spheres, according to which each celestial body and each and every atom, produced a particular sound on account of its movement, rhythm and vibration. All these sounds formed a universal harmony in which each element, while having its own function and character, contributed to the unity of the whole. This idea of creative sound was continued in the doctrine of the Logos (the Word), partly absorbed by early Christianity, which thereby linked itself with the philosophy of the Gnostics and the traditions of the East, even though the link was not maintained by the later Church: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God ... And the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us” (John, I, 1, ff.).

The word, however sacred, being a repetition of a mere sound and an expression of a concept will not produce the desired effect, unless accompanied by perfect knowledge, pure attitude of mind and complete responsiveness on the part of the person using the mantra. Its power is truly sacramental, i.e., bestowing internal grace through an outward sign on the initiated, the spiritually cultured one. Such words, although self-evident (sandiṭṭhika), yet can be comprehended only by the wise (paccattaṁ veditabbo viññūhi). This is admitted by all schools of Buddhism, not excluding the Theravāda, who do not differentiate otherwise between exoteric and esoteric teachings of the Buddha, who is said not to have the closed fist of some teachers who retain certain teachings for select pupils only.

The sound-letter “A” signified, therefore, the void, creative existence and the permanent Taishō, 1796, vii., i.e., non-entity, becoming and being, all of which are descriptive terms of the actual and real nature of everything, impermanence itself being permanent.

Chinese as well as Tibetan authors have made frequent use of this symbol. In exoteric texts the letter “A” stands for negation, for the uncreated source (ādyanutpāda), for the beginning (ādi), for impermanence (anitya). A bodhisattva (a Buddha-to-be), by listening to this sound as a result of former meritorious actions, comprehends the uncreated source of all essences Ibid. 279, lxxvi; 293, xxi.. Essences, however, are not thought of as eternal (as in Greek philosophy), but as impermanent; and thus the same symbol can signify negation and essence, for the Void is the essence of All.

Just as the sound “A” as basic vowel is found with all pure consonants forming the root syllables of oriental scripts, without which sound no language would be possible, and for which reason it is called the “mother of all sounds” Ibid. 1796, xii., so it symbolises the origin of all essences, to know which is the highest wisdom.

Especially the Tantric masters of China and Japan, beginning with the Indian Subhakarasinha (Zemmui) who brought the most important Tantric text, the Mahā Vairocana-abhisambodhi, trom India to China in the beginning of the eighth century, have laid great stress on this learning. The letter “A” stands for the spirit of awakening. By means of mental application in the contemplation of this symbol one identifies oneself with the substance of the body-essence of Vairocana Ibid. 1796, x.. According to the system of Amoghavajra, the letter “A” represents the central Buddha, Vairocana, corresponding to the earth element, because the Vajrasattva, immanent in all beings as the creative spirit, is the substantial nature which produces the Buddhas, in the same way as the earth is the basis which sustains and maintains the substance proper to all beings. In the body it represents the spleen, the seat of anger; astronomically the Dog-star, and seasonally the Dog-days. It is coloured yellow Bukkyōdaijii III, pp. 27–29, Buddh. Univ., Kyōto, 1914..

Probably the first evidence of the mystical importance accorded to the three-letter syllable Aum is found in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (v. 32), where the celestial sphere is declared to be resolved in the three letters A-U-M, which are derived from the three Vyāhṛtis: Bhūh, Bhuvah and Svar, from the Ṛgveda, the Yajurveda and the Sāmaveda, from the gods Agni, Vāyu and Āditya, from the earth, the atmosphere and the air. This set of speculations is largely developed in the Upaniṣads.

Although the syllable was primarily characteristic of the Brahman, the force of its popularity is shown by the fact that it became an integral part of the mantra of Avalokiteśvara in Mahāyāna Buddhism A.H. Francke, JRAS, 1915, pp. 397–404.. Its final development is found in 16th century Tantric Buddhism in Orissa, the sacred sound (praṇava) being derived from the Void (śūnya), bringing it close to the principle of non-entity, and the original negative meaning of its first letter “A”.

(paṭinissaggānupassanā). The term abandonment (paṭinissagga, pahāna) does not contain anything of what is usually implied in the concept of renunciation, viz., abnegation, self-denial, austerity and self-mortification. It is rather a rejection, a letting go (nissajjana), the opposite of hanging on to (sajjana). Thus the term nissaggiya is used in the Vinaya (Vin. I, p. 196), 284, &c.) for an unauthorised possession by a monk, which ought to be abandoned. Such abandonment is an act of purification, like bathing, not based on methodical acquisition; it is based on the understanding of that which has to be relinquished. And so Buddhaghosa, quoting the Paṭisambhidāmagga, describes virtue as the abandoning (pahāna) of killing, of stealing, sexual misconduct, false speech; malicious words, harsh language, frivolous talk, of covetousness, of ill-will and of wrong views Vism. i, p. 40.. And again, abandoning is counted as virtue, through relinquishing (nekkhamma) in the case of lust, through non ill-will (abyāpāda) in the case of hate, through the perception of light (āloka-saññā) in the case of physical and mental sluggishness (thīnamiddha), through attention (avikkhepa) in the case of agitation (uddhacca), through determination of mental states (dhammavavatthāna) in the case of perplexity (vicikicchā), through insight (ñāṇa) in the case of ignorance (avijjā), and through gladness of heart (pāmujja) in the case of discontent (arati). Even the abandonment of a lower state of mental absorption (jhāna) for the higher state is the virtue of abandoning.

The Paṭisambhidāmagga (Ps. I, 47). describes in terms of abandoning 47 stages in the normal progress from ignorance to arahantship, through the abandoning of evil actions, of hindrances to contemplation, of gradual attainments in concentration, of successive stages of insight, and of steps on the path to sainthood. Although these 47 stages are induced, each in turn by abandoning the preceding one, there is one stage which requires further attention here under the heading of contemplation of abandonment (paṭinissaggānupassanā).

In the successive stages of insight (vipassanā, q.v.) by means of which both knowledge and vision are purified in respect of what is the path and what is not (maggāmaggañāṇadassana-visuddhi), there are eighteen principal ones (mahā vipassanā). In the seventh of these it is mentioned: “he who develops contemplation of abandonment, gives up craving” (paṭinissaggānupassanaṁ bhāvento ādānaṁ pajahati) Vism. xx, p. 540.. For, by the contemplation of abandonment the formations (saṅkhārā) of body, mind and volition are not grasped any more; it is their apprehension as permanent which is relinquished VismA. cp. Ñāṇamoli, Path of Purification, p. 706, n. 3. Further, it is this contemplation of the dissolubility of the formations (khayānupassanā) which leads to the abandoning of the perception or assumption of unity in continuity (ghanasaññā) Vism. xx, p. 540., one of the main stumbling blocks on the road to insight and enlightenment.

This contemplation of abandonment is called the abandonment of giving up (pariccāga-paṭinissagga) and also abandonment of entering into (pakkhandana-paṭinissagga) (Ps. I, 194), for, by substituting the opposites, it abandons karma formations (khandhābhisaṅkhāra) and mental defilements (kilesa, q.v.), and by seeing the shortcomings in whatever is conditioned (saṅkhata-dosa-dassana), it gives an inclination towards the unconditioned Nibbāna. It is also counted as a strength of insight (paṭinissaggānupassanā vipassanābalaṁ) Vism. xxiii, p. 605., because, owing to the contemplation of abandonment, insight does not waver in the face of grasping. It is one of the contemplations which should occupy the mind and thereby deliver and liberate it, whilst the meditator is engaged in the exercise of mindfulness in breathing Ibid. viii, p. 240; A. IV, p. 26). (paṭinissaggānupassī assasissāmi passasissāmi 'ti sikkhati).

Though not in the same orderly classification of various types of contemplation as have been set out in later compilations and commentaries, the living in contemplation which regards all conditions and feelings dispassionately and as something to be renounced (paṭinissaggānupassī vihāranto) is an ideal held up by the Buddha quite frequently. It is his answer to Mahā Moggallāna’s question: “How does a monk become free by the destruction of craving”? (taṇhā saṅkhaya vimutto) (A. IV, p. 88); (M. I, p. 251). “The monk who abides viewing all senses, sense-objects, their contacts and resultant feelings, cravings, reflections, etc., as objects of abandonment, he is worthy of offerings ... and becomes for others a field of merit, unsurpassed in this world” (A. IV, p. 146). It is one of the models of contemplative thought, when the exercise of mindfulness on inhalation and exhalation (ānāpānasati) is mentioned (A. V, p. 112).

On the other hand, it will not be possible for a monk to dwell in contemplation on abandonment (abhabbo paṭinissaggānupassī vihārituṁ) (A. V, p. 359), unless he has the eleven qualities which enable a cowherd to lead his herd and make it prosperous: he must know of any object that it is composed of the four great elements and derived therefrom; he must know that both the fool and the wise man are distinguished by their deeds; he must abandon all sensuous thinking before it develops into deeds, as the cowherd must remove the eggs of the flies; he must watch his senses, as the cowherd dresses the wounds of his herd; he should be able to expound the dhamma in detail to others; frequent the company of other monks of greater knowledge, as the herdsman takes his flock to the ford; and take delight in the proclamation of the dhamma; he should know the Noble Eightfold Path, and be skilled in resting his mind in the pastures of mindfulness and meditation; he should observe moderation in accepting gifts from his supporters, as a good cowherd does not milk his cows dry; and he should pay due respect to his seniors, the leaders of the congregation and the flock.

But the paramount importance of this contemplation of abandonment is shown by its inclusion in the advice given by the Buddha as to how a monk should meet his end and his appointed time (kālaṁ āgameyya), with mindfulness (sato) and self-composure (sampajāno) (S. IV, p. 211): Gelañña Sutta.): any feeling, whether pleasant, painful or neutral, should be approached with understanding that such feeling has arisen in dependence on his body which itself is impermanent, compounded and originated in dependence on certain conditions; hence such feeling too cannot be permanent. Contemplation of this impermanence should make the monk dwell on the transience (vaya) thereof, with disinterest (virāga), bent on cessation (nirodha) and abandonment (paṭinissaggānupassī viharati).

The prototype of this formula occurs in what is probably the earliest reference, the Ānāpānasati Sutta (M. III, p. 83) on the cultivation of mindfulness in breathing and the development thereof, in order to make it very fruitful and profitable (M. III, p. 83), sutta 118.).

Its importance is also evident from the frequent repetition of the formula in which it has become stereotyped. Throughout the Ānāpāna Saṁyutta S. V. x, pp. 311–341. this contemplation of abandonment appears as the culminating thought with conscious awareness of the entire process of breathing (paṭinissaggānupassī assasissāmīti sikkhati, paṭinissaggānupassī passasissāmīti sikkhati). Thus it conduces to the abandoning of the fetters (saṁyojana-pahāna), to the loosening of evil tendencies (anusayamugghāta), to thorough knowledge of the way out (addhāna-pariññā) and to the utter destruction of mental intoxication (āsavakkhaya) S. V, x, suttas 17–20..

Professor at Zürich University, author of Der Pretakalpa des Garuda-Purāṇa (Berlin, 1921), Der Messiasglaube in Indien und Iran (Berlin, 1928), Die Indiensammlung der Universität Zürich (Zürich, 1935), Die Berner Tafeln zur Krishna-Legende (Bern, 1935), Krishnas Geburt und das Indische Weihnachtsfest (Zürich, 1938), Indische Psychologie (Zürich, 1945).

He is quoted by M. Winternitz in A History of Indian Literature (II, pp. 273 and 289), with reference to the future life of Maitreya, and translations in German from the Sanskrit Maitreyeyākaraṇa and Maitreyasamiti; and with further reference to the Divyāvadāna, relating the advent of the future Buddha Maitreya, combined with the legend of king Praṇāda (Der Messiasglaube in Indien und Iran, pp. 132 ff. and 153 ff. respectively).

In his Indische Psychologie Abegg devotes several pages to Buddhism (ch. V, pp. 107–121).

He takes the doctrine of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) as the psychological basis in the arising of human personality, and compares the twelve links thereof with the four mental factors of vedanā, saṁjñā, saṁskāra and vijñāna. These are shown correctly as impermanent (anitya) and subject to constant change. Without an abiding substance, the concept of a soul is denied (anātma-vāda). The heresy of individuality-belief is compared with the Ahaṁkāra of Sāṅkhya philosophy. A doubt arising from the doctrine of soullessness in respect of moral responsibility is overcome by the teaching of karma.

Frequent resort is made to the Milindapañha, a post-canonical work, which, however, is greatly esteemed in Theravāda Buddhism. Comparisons are drawn with the Nyāya philosophy, especially in respect of the function of memory in dreams.

Thus Buddhism is presented as a psychology with a purpose of religious salvation, originating from a metaphysics already found in the Upanishads. Abegg has expounded in Der Messiasglaube in Indien und Iran auf Grund der Quellen dargestellt (Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1928) the Hindu notions concerning Kalki, the Buddhist conception of Maitreya and the Zoroastrian doctrines concerning the return of the founder of that religion (JRAS. 1932, pp. 447 ff.). The Buddhist doctrine is treated (pp. 145–202), and his main sources for this section are the Pali Cakkavatitsīhanāda Sutta (D. III, p. 58–79), the Anāgatavaṁsa, the Divyāvadāna, and a number of Maitreya texts existing in Tibetan and Chinese versions, all previously brought together and examined by Leumann in connection with his edition of the Saka-Khotanī Matireya-samiti. Abegg finds little evidence of interchange of ideas among the three religions. Only in some traits of the Buddhist Maitreya, his emanations of light and his supernatural power of vision, is he willing to recognise a borrowing from Zoroastrianism; he thinks that in central Asia the Mahāyāna Buddhism may have been affected not only by the Parsi religion but by Manichaeism, Gnosticism and Nestorian Christianity.

(vipatti). This technical term is found in various meanings and contexts, but could roughly be classified under two headings, as deviation from morality (sīla) and deviation from understanding (diṭṭhi).

As a failure of morality (ācāra-vipatti) it is frequently mentioned in the Vinaya (Vin. I, p. 171; II, p. 28; IV, p. 7; etc.). Such a lapse in good conduct, however, may also form an object of thought, and “it is well for a monk to review from time to time his own faults” (sādhu kālena kālaṁ attavipattiṁ paccavekkhitā hoti: (A. IV, p. 160). The fault of another (paravipatti) too can become useful food for thought, as long as this does not become faultfinding. For, faultfinding is one of the seven items which are considered aberrations (satta vipattiyo: (A. IV, p. 26), the other six items being: failure to keep contact with the monks, neglect to listen to the true dhamma, no training for higher virtue, little trust in elders, seeking for worth outside the Order and serving first outside the Order. The opposites are profitable attainments (sampatti).

As a deviation from understanding (diṭṭhi-vipatti) it becomes synonymous with heresy (Nett. 126). Both aberrations will go frequently together, for a deviation from right views will usually lead to a moral lapse; and vice versa (sīlavipattiyā codeti, atho cāradiṭṭhiyā: (Vin. V, p. 159). As a pair of aberrations (sīlavipatti ca diṭṭhivipatti ca) they are opposed by the pair of attainment of virtue and right understanding (sīlasampadā ca diṭṭhisampadā ca: A. I, ii, suttas 11 and 12).

In a group of three, we find the aberrations as failures in action (kammanta-vipatti) which are identical with the deviations from morality (sīlavipatti) or the transgressions of the moral code, which comprise the taking of life, stealing, sensuous misbehaviour, lying, slander, harsh language and idle talk; failures in living (ājīva-vipatti) by obtaining livelihood in a wrong way; and the aberrations of perverse views (diṭṭhi-vipatti), which include the views that there is no use in making offerings, that neither good nor evil deeds produce any result, that there is no world either here or beyond, that no recluse or brāhman has attained perfection or realisation through his own intuition, etc. (A. I, p. 270). In an earlier sutta we find mentioned a group of three aberrations, in which, however, the failure in obtaining a right livelihood (ājīva-vipatti) is exchanged for mental aberration (citta-vipatti) or a warped mind, which is explained as a mind full of covetousness and malevolence (abhijjhālu hoti vyāpannacitto hoti: (A. I, p. 268). Their opposites are reckoned as successes or attainments (sampadā) in the absence of these aberrations.

Like many other discourses, this is a double sutta dealing with its subject in two ways, the negative and the positive aspect. Much repetition is thereby introduced. The sutta occurs in the Aṅguttara Nikāya, in the Book of Tens (A. V, p. 148). Without any introduction as to place or occasion, the Buddha tells his monks that even the Buddha and his teaching are subject to dependent origination. For, “if there were not found in this world the phenomena of birth, decay and death, there would have been no occasion for a Tathāgata, a supremely enlightened Buddha, to arise, or to proclaim his teaching of truth and discipline (dhamma-vinaya)”.

However, it should not be thought that one is not capable (abhabba) of outgrowing those conditions. But without abandoning certain states one would not be able to overcome birth, decay and death. And these states are now collected in groups of three, each group depending for its continuation or cessation on the continuation or cessation of the preceding group. Thus the logical sequence in groups is as follows: shameless (ahirika), reckless (anotappa) and negligent (pamatta); disregard (anādariya), stubbornness (dovacassatā) and association with evil (pāpamittatā); disbelief (asaddhiya), stinginess (avadaññutā) and indolence (kosajja); flurry (uddhacca), lack of self-control (asaṁvara) and immorality (dussīlya); distaste for seeing people of noble character (ariyānaṁ adassanakamyatā), dislike for listening to noble teaching (ariyadhammaṁ asotukamyatā) and a faultfinding disposition (upārambhacittatā); forgetfulness (muṭṭhasacca), lack of intelligence (asampajañña) and mental derangement (cetaso vikkhepa); lack of thorough attention (ayonisomanasikāra), following the wrong path (kummaggasevana) and sluggishness of mind (cetaso līnatta); the wrong view of individuality (sakkāyadiṭṭhi), perplexity (vicikicchā) and attachment to ritualism (sīlabbata-parāmāsa); lust (rāga), hate (dosa) and delusion (moha). Then the sutta reverses the process, showing that by abandoning lust, hate and delusion one is capable (bhabba) of attaining to the destruction of birth (jāti), decay (jarā) and death (maraṇa), repeating the same order in full. The commentary says nothing by way of explanation.

An arahant therī who had earlier, during the lifetime of the Buddha Sikhī, been the chief queen of that Buddha’s father, Aruna. She showed her devotion towards the Enlightened One. Under the dispensation of the Buddha Gotama she was a playmate of Padumāvatī who later gave birth to a child by Bimbisāra, the king of Magadha. The boy, named Abhaya, became a monk and attained arahantship. The two friends, Padumāvatī (Abhaya’s mother) and Abhayā, listened to a discourse of the arahant and decided to renounce the worldly life, living thereafter together at Rājagaha. In her contemplation on the impure (asubhadassana) Abhayā became afraid when she saw the initial condition of a swollen corpse (uddhumātakādibhāva) before her. But the Buddha calmed her mind with the verses (35, 36) recorded in the Therīgāthā (also found in the Therī Apadāna, 8, ascribed to Uppaladāyikā), whereby she realised the “brittleness of the body, whereto the worldling’s happiness is bound”, and attained arahaṇtship.

This name is given to the monks residing in or connected with the Abhayagirivihāra in Anurādhapura, Ceylon, with special reference to their doctrinal and other differences with the orthodox monks of the Mahāvihāra, from the first century B.C.E. till the 12th century.

According to the Sinhalese tradition Mhv. xxxiii, 95. their heretical tendencies can be traced to a certain monk Mahātissa who had been expelled from the Mahāvihāra according to the Vinaya rules on account of his frequenting the families of laymen. A pupil of his, Bahalamassutissa, had come in anger to reside in the Abhayagirivihāra, where he formed a separate faction. The apparent welcome given to the angered bhikkhu suggests that even prior to this incident the relations between the two vihāras were certainly not intimate, if not actually strained. A sense of individual aloofness and superiority in Abhayagiri may well have been caused by the special provisions made for its inmates by a unique expression of the royal patronage of king Vaṭṭagāmaṇi Abhaya referred to in the preceding article Abhayagiri.

In the reign of Vohārika Tissa (209–301 C.E.) this faction, which had earlier received a body of Vajjiputta monks from Pallārāma in India led by their teacher Dhammaruci, is reported to have adopted some views belonging to the Vetulya-vāda, although there is nothing on record indicating essential doctrinal differences between them and the Mahāvihāravāsins. In the second century a variant reading of a Vinaya rule was contested in regard to a transgression of a bhikkhuṇī, named Mettiyā, which was decided by a brāhman scholar Dīghakārāyana in favour of the Mahāvihāra. But the subsequent adoption by Abhayagiri of Vetulya-vāda under the name of Dhammarucika, and the increase of their influence were the causes of an order for expulsion of sixty monks by king Goṭhābhaya, also known as Meghavaṇṇābhaya (early 4th century). The monks were not only expelled from the Saṅgha, but also banished from the country Ibid. xxxvi, 112.. Even this episode shows that there was still unity in doctrine, without which no disciplinary measures could have been taken.

Still, the seed of dissension had been sown, and the removal of the sixty monks does not seem to have entirely eradicated the supposed evil. For we find that notwithstanding this purge some three hundred bhikkhus led by Ussiliyātissa thera left the institution and joined Dakkhiṇagiri, i.e., the vihāra south of, and attached to, the Mahāvihāra, under the royal protection of Goṭhābhaya.

The monks who were expelled and banished to India seem to have reorganised their ranks and gained the support of a certain Saṅghamittā who was versed in the teachings concerning the exorcism of spirits. This Coḷa bhikkhu proved himself to be the evil spirit guiding them on from bad to worse. Coming to Ceylon he engaged in successful disputation with the leading thera of Thūpārāma who happened to be the king’s uncle. Saṅghamittā’s eloquence and logic so impressed the king that he appointed him as tutor to his two sons, Jeṭṭhatissa and Mahāsena. The elder prince did not take well to his teacher, but the younger one became the bhikkhu’s favourite.

After the death of king Goṭhābhaya, Jeṭṭhatissa succeeded his father and reigned for ten years, during which time the monk Saṅghamittā lived in voluntary exile. But when after that period the throne fell vacant again, Saṅghamittā returned from the further shore Ibid. xxxvii, 2. and made all the arrangements for the consecration of Mahāsena, the younger brother. Using his influence on the young king, he had all royal support withdrawn from the Mahāvihāra and gave as reason that those monks did not teach the correct discipline (vinaya). It is noteworthy that no accusation of heretical doctrine was professed. Soon it became impossible for the monks to continue to live in the Mahāvihāra, and after it had been deserted for nine years, its building material was removed to enrich the Abhayagirivihāra. “Some three hundred and sixty four colleges and great temples were uprooted and destroyed, says an ancient chronicle; and the spoils gathered from them went to enrich and adorn the home of heresy, the Abhayagiri, which, now splendid in ornaments and rich in possessions, stood pre-eminent over all as the greatest and wealthiest monastery in Laṅkā” Malalasekera: Pali Literature of Ceylon, pp. 60 ff..

Some palace intrigue, however, by a minister named Meghavaṇṇābhaya who turned rebel, and by one of the king’s wives, caused the murder of the monk Saṅghamittā and of one of his adherents, the ruthless minister Soṇa. Thereafter, several buildings were reconstructed within the premises of the Mahāvihāra.

But again, when in the years 412–414 Fa-hsien visited Ceylon, Abhayagirivihāra with 5000 resident monks had regained its supremacy over the Mahāvihāra with only 3000 monks. And during the reign of Dhātusena (455–473) we find the Mahāvihāra itself occupied by Dhammarucika bhikkhus Mhv. xxxviii, 75., a sect which branched off from the Theravādins during the reign of Vaṭṭagāmaṇī Abhaya, and which is usually identified with the Abhayagirivāsins Nikāya-saṅgraha, ed. Wickramasingha, pp. 11–13..

In the time of Silākāla (518–531) a Vaipulya Sutta (Mahāyāna text) known as Dhammadhātu was brought from India by a merchant of Kāsī, named Pūrṇa. This text was readily accepted by Abhayagiri and was honoured in the palace. Various Sanskrit works, such as the Dīrghāgama and the Saṁyuktāgama, and also the Saṁyuktasañcayapiṭaka together with the Vinaya-piṭaka of the Mahīsāsaka school, which were removed by Fa-hsien from Ceylon, and partly translated into Chinese by Guṇabhadra, a bhikkhu from central India (in 436), are supposed to have been obtained from Abhayagiri.

King Silāmeghavaṇṇa in the 7th century was made aware of complaints against the monks of Abhayagiri and he empowered one of their own number, named Bodhi, to lead an enquiry. This monk, however, was killed, whereupon the king had the hands of those responsible for the murder cut off. He sent a further hundred monks into exile. Having thus purified the Saṅgha, he endeavoured to bring the monks of the Theravāda school and “the others” together for the purpose of performing the uposatha but the former unyieldingly refused. The king lost his temper, abused everybody, left the city in a rage and died suddenly thereafter Mhv. xliv, 74 ff..

Here, the “other” monks referred to are the Abhayagirivāsins. They were not unworthy monks, as the king had just cleansed the Order. The refusal of the monks to co-operate must, therefore, have been based on doctrinal differences, which were still existing at this time, although there were no open clashes between them. Succeeding kings, such as Jeṭṭhatissa and Dāthopatissa II, befriended both parties with royal grants.

In the 9th century a member of the Vajraparvata sect in India came to reside in Abhayagiri from where he spread his teaching which is described as “secret teachings and popular with the foolish and ignorant”. Some granite slabs with Tantric formulae (see foregoing article) support the statement in the chronicles that Abhayagiri was friendly towards heterodox teachings periodically introduced from India. An inscription dating from the 11th century EZ. I, pp. 225–6. refers to the Abha-yaturāmahasā and the great literary works of the scholars dwelling there, versed in the scriptures, and endowed with the virtues of temperance, contentment and religious austerity.

The last is heard of them in the 12th century, when the “schism” appeared to be as wide as ever. As mentioned in the preceding article a conciliation was attempted by king Parākramabāhu I. In the beginning it proved to be “an exceedingly difficult task” Mhv. lxxviii, 14.. Many bhikkhus would hear nothing of reconciliation; and even to establish harmony among the bhikkhus of one school (Mahāvihāra), it became necessary to exclude the undisciplined elements from the Order and offer them lucrative worldly positions to prevent them from doing further harm. After the purification of the Saṅgha, the king set about bringing unity among the three different schools of the Mahāvihāra, Abhayagiri and Jetavana, divided by adherence to the Vetullapiṭaka.

Not a single work has been preserved as belonging to the Abhayagirivāsins. But the Chinese canon contains a sixth century translation of a work entitled Ciê-to-tao-lung or the Vimuktīmārgaśūtra by Upatiṣya, which, according to the considered opinion of P.V. Bapat IC. I, 3, pp. 458–9., belongs to the school of the Abhayagirivāsins. P.C. Bagehi Sino Indian Studies, II, p. 113. also is of the opinion that the Vimuttimagga of Upatissa represents the Abhayagirivāda version and the Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa the version of the Mahāvihāra. There is no fundamental difference in doctrine between them sufficient to warrant the stigma of heresy. Yet the dissimilarity of certain doctrinal points, as well as their manner of treatment, would be sufficient to form a basis of divergence which would allow for co-existence without the merging of one school into the other, unless compelled by royal decree. Several of the dissimilarities touch on the method of mind control in the process of meditation. The Abhayagirivāsins accepted only 38 objects of concentration (kammaṭṭhāna), leaving out the objects of light (āloka) and of limited space (paricchinnākāsa). The form or shape of the concentration device may be not only circular, but even quadrangular or triangular. Upatissa recommends, but Buddhaghosa vehemently opposes, the developing of the after-image (nimitta) of the sublime mental states (brahma-vihāra). In character classification the Abhayagirivāsins accepted not only the six basic classes of lust, hate, delusion, confidence, wisdom and investigation, but also various combinations thereof, making a total of fourteen classes.

It is not only in the process of development of the mind but also in the philosophical analysis of material phenomena that the Abhayagirivāsins differed from what was considered orthodoxy. For they added two further phenomena to the list of 28, namely the physical phenomenon of origination (jāti-rūpa) and that of inertia (middha-rūpa). This view is rejected by Buddhaghosa Vism. xiv, § 71. on the grounds that birth is included in integration and continuity (upacaya-santati), and that inertia is non-existent; and his commentator Dhammapāla emphasises that these views are held by the inmates of Abhayagiri monastery at Anurādhapura VismA. 455 (Ñāṇamoli: The Path of Purification, p. 502, n. 31).. In this connection it is interesting to note the logical consistency of the Abhayagirivāsins. The material inertia (middha-rūpa) which is produced by the weather (utuja) is to be found even in an arahant; and hence only mental languor (thīna) is mentioned as a hindrance (nīvaraṇa), whereas the usual Theravāda enumeration of the five hindrances speaks of the combination of sloth and torpor (thīna-middha).

Another view, which according to the commentator Dhammapāla is that of the adherents of the school of Abhayagiri (Abhayagirivāsike sandhāyāha) Ibid. 87., is that ascetic practices (dhutaṅgāni) can be also unprofitable (akusala), as they are concepts consisting in a name (nāma-paññatti).

On essential points of doctrine, however, there is perfect harmony with Theravāda, e.g., the acceptance of one single unconditioned (asaṅkhata), while clear-cut differences with the Abhidharmapiṭaka of the Sarvāstivādins, with the Sāriputrābhidharma-śāstra and the Satyasiddhi-śāstra make it evident that the Abhayagirivāsins cannot be treated as doctrinal heretics.

Although the Abhayagirivāsins are frequently said to have embraced the heresies of the Vetulyaka, there is no evidence that they went so far as to deny the actual personality of the Buddha, which is the heretical transcendentalist view (lokottaravāda) that the Buddha did not dwell in the human world, but that he created a material body (nimitta-rūpaṁattaka) to appear in this world, whilst residing in Tuṣita heaven Kvu. xviii, 1.. Neither does the fact that some disciples of a teacher called Dhammaruci, belonging to the Vajjiputra Sect in India, were received at the Abhayagiri monastery Nikāya-saṅgraha, p. 10. prove that all the heterodox views of that school were adopted by the Abhayagirivāsins. Certain theses of these Dhammarucikas were taken over, but essential doctrinal points against the accepted Theravāda of anatta did not find favour with the Abhayagirivāsins. The relationship between the two rival sects may be summed up as one between the conservative Mahāvihāravasins and the liberal Abhayagirivāsins.

“The Abhayagiri monks seem to have kept up constant contact with various Buddhist sects and new movements in India, from which they derived inspiration and strength. They were liberal in their views, and always welcomed new ideas from abroad and tried to be progressive. They studied both Theravāda and Mahāyāna and ‘widely diffused the Tripiṭakas’,” W. Rahula: History of Buddhism in Ceylon, p. 85, quoting Hsüan-tsang, II, p. 247.. The Dhammarucikas of Abhayagiri are supposed to have accepted the Vetulya-piṭaka. The Vetulyas or adherents of Vetulla-vāda are well known by name both in the Sinhalese chronicles and in the commentary to the Kathāvatthu. They are said to have believed that the Buddha did not live on earth as a real personality, and that the Dhamma was actually preached by Ānanda. The word “Vaitulya”, however, is unknown in Sanskrit lexicons; but H. Kern has found the word as an alternate reading of “Vaipulya” in the sūtra of that name, the Sūtra of Great Development, in some Kaṣgar fragments of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. And hence the Vetulyas (Vetullakas) may not have constituted a separate sect or school, especially as they are not named among the eighteen schools; and the designation then merely stands as a kind of nickname for “those of the developed doctrine” H. Kern: Verslagen on Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen en Letterkunde (Amsterdam), 1907, pp. 312–319., or Mahāyāna in general, in a way similar to the sobriquet “Hīnayāna”, the Small Vehicle, derisively given to the Theravāda.

In the commentary on the Great Chronicle of Ceylon we find a more plausible explanation of the separation of the two communities without either of them becoming heretical in the doctrine. The community of Abhayagiri established themselves in the Abhayagiri-vihāra which was constructed by king Vaṭṭagāmaṇī. They assumed the name of Dhammarucikas 217 years after the establishment of the Dhamma in Ceylon, rejecting the Parivāra section of the Vinaya which, according to the orthodox view, had been recited by the Buddha MhvA. v. pp. 175–6.. It must not be forgotten in this connection that the commentator is here explaining the historical facts from the viewpoint of the Mahāvihāra. The name Dhammaruci itself is already open to different interpretations, one deriving the name from the supposed founder, another indicating the nature of the seceders: those who delight in the Dhamma, or who cause the Dhamma to shine A. Bareau: Les Sects bouddhiques du petit Véhicule, p. 242; H. Kern: Histoire du Bouddhisme dans l'Inde, II, p. 367 (AMG. XI)..

As regards their non-acceptance of the Parivāra, the fifth book of the Vinaya, this too can be interpreted in various ways. One is the interpretation of the Mahāvihāra, given above. But a different view will be obtained when it is noted that the Parivārapāṭha is “an abstract of the other parts of the Vinaya, in fact, a very much later compilation and probably the work of a Ceylon thera. In some stanzas which are found at the end of the Parivārapāṭha, it is stated to have been composed by ‘the highly wise, learned and skilful Dīpa, after he had inquired here and there into the methods (literally, the way) followed by former teachers’,” T.W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg: Introduction to Vinaya texts, I, p. xxiv, SBE. XIII.. Moreover, we know that the canon of the northern schools distinguishes only four and not five divisions of the Vinaya, notwithstanding the natural tendency to increase rather than retrench in the course of the years. In this light the refusal of the Abhayagirivāsins to include this work in the Vinaya-piṭaka, whereby it would receive the undeserved authority of the Buddha’s word, seems more like a cleansing reform than a schism, based on differences in interpretation and texts (atthantara-pāṭhantara-karaṇa-vasena bhedaṁ). But it would appear that in the course of centuries the original zeal for reform lost its keen edge and when finally a reunion of the Mahāvihāra, Abhayagirivihāra and Jetavanavihāra was proposed by the great Sinhalese king Parākramabāhu I, he succeeded, where so many others before him had failed. After this the school of the Abhayagirivāsins ceased to exist in the history of Buddhism.

It is interesting to note a somewhat similar, although much less pronounced, difference of attitude rather than of doctrine between two of the foremost Oriental universities in present day Ceylon. Both derive their monastic ordination (upasampadā) from the same source (Siam–-Thailand); both subscribe to the fullest extent to the orthodox Theravāda; both are equally recognised and patronised, even by the government. And yet one emphasises more the classical Pali of the traditional texts and commentaries and appears to have become somewhat constricted in its home island of Ceylon; the other is visibly influenced by Sanskrit texts and translations, thereby assuming a wider outlook, if not from doctrinal aspect, certainly so in practical daily life. The slight difference between them in the manner of wearing the monastic robes and in the attitude of one in actively participating in certain secular movements might be taken as reflecting these points of view. No stigma, however, can be attached to either.

A contraction of abhihū āyatana, meaning a stage of mastery over the senses. This power of having conquered (abhibhavati) is frequently detailed in the canonical texts of the Dīgha-, Majjhima-, and Aṅguttara Nikāyas as comprising the following eight stations or stages (āyatana), not to be confused with the twelve spheres of perception of sense organs and objects for which the same term āyatana is used.

“When anyone, being conscious of the material qualities of the body in his own person, sees forms exterior to himself–-be they limited, fair or foul–-and when he has mastered them with the thought: ‘I know, I see’, and when he, conscious thereof, enters into a state of mental absorption, that is the first stage of mastery” (A. IV, p. 305); (M. II, p. 13), &c.).

The second stage differs from the first in that the forms exterior to himself are known and seen to be immeasurable, fair or foul.

The third and fourth stages of mastery refer equally to exterior forms, respectively known and seen to be limited or immeasurable, but in these two stages one is unaware of the material qualities of the body in one’s own person, consciousness being confined only to external forms.

The four remaining stages of mastery over the senses are identical in that one remains unconscious of the material qualities in one’s own body; they differ in that the external objects appear in various hues of blue, of yellow, of red, and of white. And with this conscious thought one enters into a state of mental absorption.

These states of mental absorption (jhāna) are thus called: “positions of mastery”, because the sphere (āyatana) in which they arise is one of overpowering (abhibhū) knowledge. Though they are similar in object to the various devices for concentration (kasiṇa), they are dissimilar in culture (DhsA. 187: samāne pi ārammaṇe bhāvanāya asamānattāya). Except for the first two stages, there is no perception of material qualities in one’s own body, because that is not the object of mastery. Here the external objects are to be mastered. And these objects are known and seen as either limited, through initial application of mind (vitakka), or immeasurable, through delusion (moha); the beautiful is suited to a predominantly hateful character, and the ugly to a character ruled by lust (ibid., 189; cp. Vism. pp. 82 f.).

Thus the earth device (paṭhavī-kasiṇa) for purpose of attaining mental absorption (jhāna) is mentioned as the basis for the acquisition of the first four stages of mastery by the limited and measureless methods, while the four colour devices are given as the bases for the acquisition of the final four stages of mastery by the methods of fairness and ugliness, all according to one’s particular character (Vism. pp. 92 f.).

The stages of mastery then become bases for transcendence of both boredom and delight, fear and dread, cold and heat, hunger and thirst, contact with insects and creeping things, abusive and hurtful language, painful, miserable and even deadly feelings–-all these are but the beginning of ten blessings (ānisaṁsa) which may be anticipated by him who cultivates mindfulness, and which culminate in the extinction of the mental intoxicants (āsavānaṁ khaya) and the deliverance of heart and mind (cetovimuttipaññāvimutti: (M. III, p. 97), 99).

Enumerating the eight spheres of mastery (abhibhāyatana, (A. IV, p. 305). With slight variations the formulae are also found in the Mahā Sakuludāyi Sutta (M. II, p. 13) and in the twentieth chapter of the Eka-nipāta (A. I, p. 39) where they are ranked among 192 practices of development of mental concentration, which will not be empty of gain, even if they are pursued for so short a duration as the snapping of one’s fingers. It is not the body which is to be mastered, but the material objects of one’s contemplation, whereby the required state of mental ecstasy is brought about. These material objects, external to one’s self, are: limited (fair or foul), or boundless (lovely or ugly), either experienced while being personally conscious of the corporeal process of experience, or experienced while being unaware of the physical process. These four categories slightly differ in the Abhidhamma exposition (Dhs. 204) where consciousness of any part of the corporeal process is excluded from all spheres of mastery (arūpasaññi is not “perceiving the immaterial”, but “not perceiving the material”). The commentary hereon emphasises: “a person devoid of the perception of the preparatory process (of mental absorption) in his own bodily frame” (ajjhatte-rūpe parikamma-saññā virahito: DhsA. 188 ff.).

The four other stages of mastery refer to the coloured appearance of form seen exterior to one’s self: blue, yellow, red and white. There is no personal awareness of the bodily function at the time.

The spheres of mastery (abhibhāyatana) consist in mastering the various concentration devices (kasiṇa) thereby leading to attainment of concentration (appanā samādhi) and complete mental absorption (jhāna), which final stage is expressed in the words “I know, I see”, indicating that he “has arisen from, and is not still within the attainment” (appanā; DhsA. 188).

(Skt. Abhidharma) The present article has been compiled from three articles, written separately, by Dr. W.S. Karunaratne and Mr. H.G.A. van Zeyst of Ceylon and Dr. Kōgen Mizuno of Japan. Broadly speaking, the former two give an account of Abhidhamma from the point of view of Theravāda, the latter from that of Mahāyāna. As these accounts are largely complementary, the greater portion of each article has been reproduced here, credit being given to each author for his contribution. Though not quite successful, an attempt has been made to avoid undue overlapping.–-G.P.M.. The title given to the third (and last) collection, or Piṭaka, of the Buddhist canonical books; it is also a name for the specific method in which the Dhamma, or doctrine, is set forth in those books, the subject-matter thereof and the literature connected with it.

Both historically and logically, the Abhidhamma represents a development of the Dhamma or the doctrine of the Buddha. It enjoys equal canonical authority with the Dhamma and its texts have been compiled into a separate Piṭaka. Traditionally, the Abhidhamma Piṭaka is mentioned after the Vinaya and Sutta Piṭaka. It is probable that each of the early Buddhist schools had its own Abhidhamma texts, if not a whole Abhidhamma Piṭaka, but only two of them have handed down their complete Abhidhamma Piṭaka. Of these the Abhidharma Piṭaka of the Sarvāstivādīns is preserved to us only in its Chinese and Tibetan translations. The Theravādins, who have actively flourished to the present day in south-east Asia, alone have been able to preserve their Abhidhamma Piṭaka in its original Pali version.

The Abhidhamma, which expounds the word of the Buddha in terms of an ethical realism, is a philosophy with an essentially religious basis. Especially among the Theravāda Buddhists it is venerated as the finest flower of Buddhist philosophy, and both monks and laymen assiduously study and practise it throughout south-east Asia, more keenly in Burma than in any other country.

There is reason to think that each of the early schools of sectarian Buddhism possessed at one time what corresponded to the Tipiṭaka of the Theravādins. In the Buddhist texts which now exist in Chinese translation, we find most of the triple texts of the Sarvāstivāda School. According to Hsüan-tsang’s itinerary, he learnt the Abhidharma of the Sammitīya School in the Parvata country, in north-west India, and that of the Mahāsaṅghika at Dhanakaṭaka, in southern India. And when he returned to China he took with him the sacred Buddhist texts of various schools from India. They included 14 books of the Theravāda, 15 books belonging to the Mahāsaṅghika, 15 to the Sammitīya, 22 books to the Mahiṁsāsaka, 19 books of the Kāśyapīya, 42 books belonging to the Dharmaguptaka, and 67 books of the Sarvāstivāda. Of these books, what he translated were mainly the philosophical books of the Sarvāstivāda; all the others remained untranslated and the original texts have been lost. Again, according to the introductory remarks prefaced to I-tsing’s Travels on the South Seas (Taishō, 2125) there were in India at that time four schools (the Mahāsaṅghika, the Sthaviravāda, the Mūlasarvāstivāda and the Sammitīya) which represented the eighteen schools, and all four of them had the Tripiṭaka. They consisted of either 300,000 or 200,000 verses.

In this case, what were called the Tripiṭaka of various schools were the fundamental books. The commentaries and the manuals were, as a rule, excluded. As for the philosophical books, the fundamental philosophical books (mūla-abhidharma) regarded as sacred were the seven Abhidhamma books of Pali Buddhism and the corresponding seven books of the Sarvāstivāda. The commentaries, &c., of later production were not regarded as sacred literature. That was the proper arrangement and Pali Buddhism followed it. As for the scriptures in Chinese translation, however, there is no such discriminatory arrangement. There we find that the commentaries and manuals, produced later than the fundamental books, and their sub-commentaries are equally ranked with Philosophical texts (Abhidharma-piṭaka). Sometimes, we find later schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism, such as the Yogācāra School, using the name Abhidhamma for books belonging to the school, without consideration of their contents, e.g., the Mahāyāna-abhidharma-sūtra or the Mahāyāna-ahdhidharma-samuccaya.

The term “Abhidhamma” is a prepositional compound formed out of “abhi” and “dhamma” and the fact clearly suggests that its origin and emergence are subsequent to that of Dhamma. The term has obviously been coined to indicate a difference between what it denotes and the Dhamma. According to the commentator Buddhaghosa abhi when prefixed to dhamma conveys the sense of “supplementary Dhamma” and “special Dhamma” DhsA. p. 2, kenaṭṭheṇa abhidhammo? dhammātirekadhammavisesaṭṭhena. Atireka viṣesatthadīpako hi ettha abhisaddo. Elsewhere in the same work (DhsA. 19–20) Buddhaghosa, says that the preposition abhi conveys as many as five meanings: ayaṁ hi abhi-saddo vuḍḍhi-salakkaṇāpūjita-paricchinnādikesu dissati.. This well accords with what we know about the nature and character of the Abhidhamma texts. Tradition itself has recognised a distinction in style between the Dhamma and the Abhidhamma VbhA. 366.. Thus, the suttas embodying the Dhamma are said to be taught in the discursive style (sappariyāya-desanā) which makes free use of the simile, the metaphor and the anecdote. This is contrasted with the non-discursive style (nippariyāya-desanā) of the Abhidhamma which uses a very select and precise, and therefore thoroughly impersonal, terminology which is decidedly technical in meaning and function. The same distinction is clearly implied in the separate mention of the two modes, Suttanta-pariyāya and Abhidhamma-pariyāya DhsA. 224; 72, 330; VbhA. 132–9; DA. III, p. 991; (Dhs. 1061.). Buddhaghosa tells us DhsA. 21: Eṭṭha hi Vinayapiṭakaṁ āṇārahena bhagavatā āṇābāhullato desitattā āṇādesenā, Suttantapiṭakaṁ vohārakusalena bhagavatā vohārabāhullato desitattā vōhāradesanā, Abhiḍhammapiṭakam paramatthakusalena bhagavatā paramatthabāhullato desitattā paramatthadesanā ti vuccati. how tradition recognised the distinctive character of each Piṭaka. The Vinaya is the discourse on injunctions (āṇā-desanā); the sutta is the popular discourse (vohāra-desanā), while the Abhidhamma is the discourse on ultimate truths (paramattha-desanā). The term Abhidhamma, used both as a neuter Ap. 44; A. IV, p. 26); DhsA. 3; Vism. 320. and as a masculine DhsA. 2; VinA. I, p. 20; AA. III, p. 366., is already attested in the Vinaya Vin. p. I, 14; V, p. 181. and in the Nikāyas (D. III, p. 267); M. I, p. 214), 218; II, 239; (A. I, p. 288), 290; III, 107; IV, 398.) and much more frequently in the post-canonical works (Miln. 344); DhsA. 2; AA. III, p. 366; Dpv. v. 37.). In its earlier usage, it refers largely to the subject-matter of the special doctrine and sometimes possibly to the distinct techniques employed by the latter (M. I, p. 472); (A. I, p. 214); (Vin. I, p. 98). In some of the later works included in the Sutta-piṭaka Ap. 44: Suttantañca Abhidhammañca Vinayañcāpi kevalaṁ. and in the commentaries DhsA. 3: Abhi-dhammo ti sattappakaraṇāni. and chronicles Dpv. v. 37; Abhidhammaṁ chappakaraṇaṁ. the term Abhidhamma is increasingly used in its literary sense to refer to the text or to books of a special collection. The derivative Ābhidhammika DhsA. 29; MA. II, p. 256. refers to one who is skilled in the doctrine pertaining to ultimate truths. Abhidhamma, itself a technical term, has given rise to a number of other compounds which perform a conveniently useful technical function in the discussions relating to the special doctrine. Thus, Abhidhamma-mātikā DhsA. 36; (A. IV, p. 26). subject-head of the special doctrine; Abhidhamma-tanti DhsA. 11. Abhidhamma-pāli MA. I, p. 222. text of the special doctrine; Abhidhammanaya UdA. 177; Ap. 550. method or technique of the special doctrine; Abhidhamma-bhājaniya Vbh. 61. analysis on the basis of the special technique; Abhidhamma-kathā (A. III, p. 107); Miln. 16); Vism. 391.) discussion pertaining to special doctrine; Abhidhamma-desanā (Miln. 350). exposition of special doctrine; Abhidhamma-virodha VinA. III, p. 521; AA. III, p. 317. contrary to special doctrine, and so on.

The occurrence of the word abhidhamma in the Mahāvagga (Vin. I, p. 64), connected with instruction in the rules of monastic life (abhivinaye vinetuṁ) deprives the word of the special meaning given to it in later works. In the Vinaya text abhidhamma and abhivinaya do not refer to anything deeper than “what pertains to the dhamma and vinaya”, the capability of teaching which is considered to be an essential requisite in any teacher-monk, and which, therefore, cannot be taken as a profound study and exposition of psycho-analysis. As Oldenberg says Vinaya Texts I, Introd. xii, n. 2.: “The only passage in the Vinaya which really presupposes the existence of an Abhidhammapiṭaka is one in the Bhikkhuṇī-vibhaṅga Sutta-vibhaṅga: 95th pācittiya.: ‘If a nun, having asked for permission to put a question regarding the Suttanta, would do so in regard to the Discipline or the Abhidhamma, there is an offence of expiation’,”. This view is supported by I.B. Horner Introd. to the Book of Discipline, III, xii. who says: “Yet the very presence of the word gāthā In connection with suttanta and abhidhamma: A. IV, p. 26). is enough to preclude the term abhidhamma from standing for the literary exegesis of that name, for no reference to the third Piṭaka as such would have combined as reference to part of the material, verses, which one of the Piṭakas finally came to include”. The “only” passage in the Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga quoted above is then “unhesitatingly assumed to be an interpolation” by Oldenberg.

The earlier uses of the term abhidhamma do not, therefore, convey any suggestion of transcendentality, although the translation of the term as title of an entire collection of psychologico-eschatological treatises naturally will have to emphasise the special meaning of the prefix abhi.

Abhidhamma then has been translated as “special dhamma” both by E.J. Thomas History of Buddhist Thought, p. 159. and G.P. Malalasekera DPPN. s.v. referring to the mode of teaching found in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka which is so different from the method employed in the suttas. The translation by F.L. Woodward Gradual Sayings, I, 267. as “extra doctrine” is not warranted owing to its connection with abhi-vinaya which can only mean “pertaining to the discipline”. And this applies also to his translation of abhidhamma as “further dhamma” Ibid. V, pp. 19, 139, 217. in its connection with “further discipline”. E.M. Hare’s translation Ibid. IV, 267. “More Dhamma” is also joined to the “More-Discipline”, and cannot, therefore, refer to the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, even though the commentary tries to explain it in that way. Here also, therefore, the reference is not to more dhamma but just to “being questioned on what pertains to the dhamma and what pertains to the discipline”.

At another place, however, abhidhamma is used together not with abhivinaya, as in all the previous instances, but with vedalla, which are suttas in the form of questions. These catechetical suttas are usually mentioned as one of the nine classes of Buddhist texts (navaṅga-vatthu-sāsana) and cannot, therefore, be taken as a general name for the whole dhamma in opposition to abhidhamma. The Anāgata-bhaya-sutta A. III, v, sutta 79., speaking of abhidhammakathaṁ vedallakathaṁ, only gives two instances: “a talk pertaining to teaching, a talk pertaining to questioning”.

Again, the word is used in the Citta (Hatthisāriputta) Sutta Ibid. vi, sutta 60. and in the Mahā-gosiṅga Sutta (M. I, p. 214). where Elders are said to have “a talk pertaining to the doctrine” (abhidhammakathaṁ). There is nothing in these suttas to indicate that the word is being used in the specialised meaning of the system of philosophy, collected in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka; whereas its use in the Gulissāni Sutta Ibid. I, 472. is once more linked with that “pertaining to the discipline” (abhivinaya).

It has, therefore, been suggested by Horner IHQ. XVII, p. 299. that the word abhidhamma occurring in the suttas and Vinaya, although not indicating a complete and closed system of philosophy, “had been intended to stand for something more than dhamma and vinaya, perhaps in the sense of some more than usually complete grasp and mastery of them due to further study and reflection”. The prefix abhi- has been compared to that other prefix adhi- in combination with sīla, citta and paññā, higher morality, i.e., more than the five precepts, higher thought and higher wisdom, which are related to the spheres of existence above the world of sense-pleasures AA. II, p. 345–6..

In China, Abhidharma is translated as “great dharma (law)”, “peerless dharma”, “excellent dharma” and “the study about dharma”, or “facing dharma”. According to the commentary of the Ekottara-āgama, “Abhidharma is the great dharma. It is called great because it is great knowledge of the four truths and destroys wrong views, ignorance and delusion. And the eight forms of intelligence, ten forms of wisdom and the right view of purity help to surmount the obstacles of the three realms of sentient beings. Therefore it is called the peerless dharma”.

Another source says, Abhidharma is called “excellent or peerless dharma” because it reveals wisdom. Again, it is called “proceeding dharma” because cause proceeds to effect, and it is called “dharma-confronting” because wisdom confronts its objects. Further the Mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra gives various theories as to the verbal meaning of Abhidharma, namely, (a) The ābhidharmikas give the following reasons: it is able to investigate and discriminate the characteristics of phenomena thoroughly well; it is able to reflect on the various natures of phenomena and penetrate into them; it is able to perceive and realise phenomena its dharma is very profound and reaches the very foundation; various sacred eyes of wisdom are purified by this Abhidharma; it is able to reveal the hidden and subtle nature of things; the expounded dharma is not inconsistent; it can conquer all heretic doctrines. (b) Vasumitra gives the following reasons: it is always able to investigate the nature and characteristics of phenomena, expounded in the sūtra, &c.; it explains the twelve-member causal law and the inherent nature of phenomena; it helps us to understand the Four Noble Truths thoroughly; it studies and practises the law of the Noble Eightfold Path; it enables one to realise Nirvāṇa; it arranges phenomena in various ways by means of profound doctrines. (c) Bhadanta’s theory: it is called Abhidharma because it collects, arranges and discriminates such problems as defilement, purity, bondage, emancipation, degeneration and elevation, by means of sentences, phrases and words. (d) Pārśava’s: theory: it is called Abhidharma because it is ultimate, excellent and infallible wisdom. (e) Ghoṣaka’s theory; it is called Abhidharma because, through it, one who seeks emancipation, following the right practice, gets clear insight as to suffering, cause and cessation of suffering, the path, the preparatory process, the penultimate path, the process of emancipation, the special higher process, the noble paths and the noble fruits. (f) The Dharmaguptakas' theory: it is called Abhidharma because of the predominance of dharma. (g) The Mahiṁśāsakas' theory: it is called Abhidharma because its wisdom ably illuminates the phenomenal. (h) The Dārṣtāntikas' theory: Nirvāṇa is supreme amongst all things and the Abhidharma is next to it and therefore it is called Abhidharma. (i) The Śabdavāda theory: a designates removal and bhi designates discrimination. It (Abhidharma) abandons fetters, bad predispositions, trivial stains, the outburst of bias, and discriminates aggregates (skandha), sense organs and perception and their objects (dhātu and āyatana), causal law, truth (satya), material and spiritual nutriment (āhāra), the fruition of the path (śrāmaṇyaphala), factors of supreme knowledge (bodhyaṅga), &c., and therefore it is called Abhidharma. (j) Buddhapālita’s theory: abhi means appearance and this Abhidharma draws all the good and causes various factors of supreme knowledge to appear. Therefore it is called Abhidharma. (k) Buddhadeva’s theory: abhi means predominance and this Abhidharma is called Abhidharma because it is predominant. (l) Vāmalabdha’s theory: abhi means veneration and this Abhidharma is called Abhidharma because it is venerable and honourable.

The above are verbal definitions of Abhidharma given in the Mahāvibhāṣa-śāstra. Vasubandhu defines and explains it in a nutshell in his Abhidharmakośa-śāstra, “Abhidharma” means “facing the dharma” and dharma designates Nirvāṇa and the four truths as the law of the ideal. That which confronts this dharma is Abhidharma and in its primary sense it is pure and immaculate wisdom, but in its worldly sense, preliminary wisdom, anterior to pure immaculate wisdom, and abhidharma books themselves are called Abhidharma. This maculate wisdom includes innate wisdom, wisdom consisting in learning and hearing, wisdom consisting in thought, wisdom acquired by practice.

A critical study of the texts of early, medieval and modern Abhidhamma leads us to the conclusion that the origin and development of the Abhidhamma extended over a considerable period of gradual and systematic historical evolution. Reasons of orthodoxy, however, prevented the early Buddhists from cultivating or approving a strictly historical view of this development. The traditional claim, shared alike by the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins, ascribed the Abhidhamma, both in regard to its historical origin as well as in regard to its literary form, to the Buddha himself. According to the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā of the Sarvāstivādins, the Buddha himself taught the Abhidharma on a variety of occasions Part I, 12: evam abhidharmo hi dharma-laksaṇopadeśa-svarūpo vinayavaśāt tatra tatra bhagavatoktaḥ.. The Atthasālinī of the Theravādins, which describes the Buddha as the first Ābhidhammika DhsA. 17: Sammāsambuddho va paṭhamataraṁ Ābhidhammiko., goes to the length of claiming that the seven treatises of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka were themselves uttered by the Buddha DhsA. 3, 5, 21.. This text, in an interesting and valuable passage, speaks of a twofold origin of the Abhidhamma DhsA. 31, i.e., origin pertaining to its realisation and that pertaining to its exposition (Abhidhammo dve nidānāni: adhigama-nidānaṁ desanā-nidānaṁ).. In this connection it answers as many as seventeen questions pertaining to the origin, purpose and continuity of the Abhidhamma. According to these answers, the Abhidhamma was inspired by the earnest aspiration for enlightenment, matured through five hundred and fifty births, realised by the Buddha at the foot of the Bodhi tree, in the month of Vesākha. It was reflected upon by the omniscient Buddha, while he was on the seat of enlightenment, during his week’s stay at the Jewelled Mansion. It was taught in heaven, that is, in the realm of the thirty-three gods, for the benefit of the latter, that is, for the purpose of enabling them to get across the four floods of life. It was received by the gods, and is studied by the venerable seekers after perfection as well as by the virtuous worldly folk. It has been mastered by those who have extinguished their depravities, and is held high by those to whom it was meant. It is the word of the Buddha, and has been handed down by the succession of teachers and their pupils. Through Sāriputta it has been successively handed down by Bhaddaji, Sobhita, Piyajāli, Piyadassī, Kosiyaputta, Siggava, Sandeha, Moggaliputta, Visudatta, Dhammiya, Dāsaka, Soṇaka, Revata and others up to the time of the Third Council and thereafter by their pupils DhsA. 32.. Through the traditional succession in India it was brought to the island of Ceylon, that is, by Mahinda, Iṭṭhiya, Uttiya, Sambala and Bhaddasāḷa and again it was handed down in its new home by their pupils Ibid..

This traditional account no doubt contains valuable historical information, especially with reference to its latter part. The orthodox view is, as already mentioned, that the Buddha not merely inspired the later growth of the Abhidhamma but was himself responsible for the literary form which the seven treatises have assumed within the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. There is, however, internal evidence in the Buddhist texts themselves which militates against such a claim. It is very significant, for instance, that there is no reference, even nominal, to the Abhidhamma in what are generally regarded as the earliest authentic texts of early Buddhism such as the Sutta-nipāta and the verse portions of the Jātaka tales. And, as has been mentioned already, even in those places in the Dīgha, Majjhima and Aṅguttara Nikāyas where the term Abhidhamma occurs, the reference is not to a literary compilation or composition but to a distinct technique of analysing the Dhamma or to a literary classification based on this technique See also (D. III, p. 267); (M. I, p. 214), 218; (A. I, p. 288), 290; III 107.. There is also a more positive kind of evidence which tends to confirm the critical opinion of modern scholarship in regard to the origin of the Abhidhamma. Buddhaghosa himself records that the ascription of the Abhidhamma to the Buddha had been questioned even in the early days of Buddhism DhsA. 28.. The monk Tissabhūti of Maṇḍalārāma held the view that the Buddha did not preach the Abhidhamma and cited the Padesavihāra Sutta as supporting him, while, on the other hand, the monk Sumanadeva tried to persuade his listeners about the Buddha’s authorship of the Abhidhamma by citing the orthodox tradition DhsA. 30, 31.. Critics raised the same question at a later date in respect of the Kathāvatthu. Buddhaghosa quotes the Vitaṇḍavādins (probably meaning cynical sophists) as saying that the Kathāvatthu was composed by the older Moggaliputtatissa two hundred and eighteen years after the death of the Buddha, and that, therefore, it ought to be rejected as having been spoken by the disciples DhsA. 3.. While being constrained to admit the truth of this historical event, Buddhaghosa, however, forestalls the objection by holding that in the case of this book the Buddha had laid down the list of subjects and the appropriate technique for their elucidation on the part of his disciple who was destined to be born over two hundred years after his own death DhsA. 4. Iti sattārā dinnanayena ṭhapitamātikāya desitaṭṭā sakalaṁ petaṁ pakaraṇaṁ Buddhabhāsitaṁ eva nāma jātaṁ..

It is generally accepted that the Abhidhamma originated and developed out of the Dhamma. The term Dhamma, in its normative aspect, bears the widest meaning and comprehends the entire teaching or doctrine. The Dhamma was taught to composite audiences as and when occasion presented itself to the Buddha, and the language used was largely non-philosophical with a fair admixture of the colloquial. As the understanding of the disciple became deeper the necessity arose for a more precise statement of the nature of reality. The Dhamma was capable of being understood and grasped only by the wise even though it was presented frequently in popular discourse. Hence there were occasions when the doctrine was not well grasped by some disciples even after the Buddha had taught the sermon. On such occasions, as the suttantas themselves record, it was customary for these disciples to betake themselves again either to the Buddha or to one of his initiated disciples, who thereupon undertook a further detailed exposition of the knotty problems involved. This detailed exposition and explanation actually took the form of a commentary and the beginnings of the Abhidhamma can be partly traced to it.

Especially because of the fact that the greater part of the Dhamma was taught in a free style, the rich and varied contents of the suttas lent themselves to a wide variety of interpretations. As the word of the Buddha gradually grew into religion and philosophy professed by an increasing number of people, the necessity arose for a precise and more categorical presentation of the doctrine. This was all the more necessary in view of the fact that other contemporary schools of religion and philosophy were turning out their own literature in which they attempted to present the doctrines precisely and systematically. The richness of the philosophical content of the Buddha’s discourses allowed for the possibility of divergence of opinion even among the Buddhist monks themselves.

That this was actually so is indicated by the early history of the emergence of the Buddhist schools. Each school tried in its own way to render explicit what was only implicit in the earlier discourses of the Buddha. This process was probably accelerated after the Council of Vesālī which was exclusively devoted to the discussion of ten points of monastic discipline. It was at the Council of Pāṭaliputta, in Asoka’s reign, that controversial points were settled and incorporated in the canonical texts under the name Kathāvathuppakaraṇa. It would appear, therefore, that the various schools with schismatic tendencies had their origin between the two later Councils. In the Pāṭaliputta Council the dispute was no longer about rules of discipline, as at Vesālī, but about the finer points of psychology and logic. These divergences were naturally reflected in the Abhidhamma works that were in process of being compiled or composed at the time.

This also explains the reasons that led to the convention of many assemblies and councils for the purpose of determining the exact meaning of “points of controversy”. The differences came to be more exaggerated when each school held its own closed sessions to decide the import of the doctrine. The earlier life of eremitical mendicancy gave place gradually to one of settled monasticism and, as a result of the geographical expansion of early Buddhism, monasteries came to be established in scattered places, remote from each other. The life of leisure thus secured induced the monks to engage themselves in philosophical and literary pursuits and the geographical isolation of the monasteries resulted in the growth of independent schools of thought. This explains at once many of the disparities between the various schools in regard to the Abhidhamma. This also contrasts with the position relating to the Dhamma. Whereas there is a remarkable degree of agreement among the early schools on the interpretation of the early teachings included in the Dhamma, there is a marked lack of such agreement in regard to the doctrines contained in the Abhidhamma. The Dhamma was shared in common by all Buddhists prior to their secession into schools and their geographical separation from one another. In view of the differences among the schools on the subject of the Abhidhamma each felt the need for the compilation of a separate Piṭaka for the special and elaborated doctrine. Even from the point of view of literature, we see the contrast between the Dhamma and the Abhidhamma. There is an almost complete correspondence between the Sutta Piṭakas of the early schools, as the available versions in Pali, Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan show. But in the case of the Abhidhamma Piṭakas, there is not even correspondence in name in regard to the titles of the canonical Abhidhamma texts, let alone agreement in doctrine. This disparity in literary works is especially clearly illustrated by a comparative study of the Sarvāstivāda and the Theravāda. We can, therefore, say that while the Dhamma belongs to the period of undivided Buddhism of the earliest days, the Abhidhamma belongs to the period of divided Buddhism. Thus alone can we account adequately for the wide measure of divergence in regard to the Abhidhamma Piṭakas and their subject matter. From its very inception and throughout the medieval and modern periods, the Abhidhamma evolved and developed in the isolation of the separate schools.

The method of the Abhidhamma (Abhidhammanaya) is distinguished from that of the Suttanta. The difference between the Dhamma and the Abhidhamma consists precisely in the distinction between two methods. This method assumes the form of a special kind of analysis called Abhidhamma-bhājaniya, to be distinguished again from the Suttanta-bhājaniya. In the suttas there is frequent reference to loose and, therefore, vague and unscientific popular designations such as the term puggala for an individual. In the Abhidhamma, on the other hand, an impersonal technical terminology has taken the place of popular names. The individual, for instance, is considered here only in terms of so many categories such as khandha, dhātu and āyatana, in a more detailed and thorough way than is to be found in the suttas. Mrs. Rhys Davids (ERE. I, 19) speaks of the Abhidhamma as a recount of suttanta doctrines, with analysis and elaborations and comment: hence, not a positive contribution to the philosophy of early Buddhism, but an analytic, logical and methodological elaboration of what was already given in discourses.

The analysis in the Abhidhamma proceeds with the aid of the method of induction. The progress from the particular to the general is always to the advantage of the Ābhidhammika. The observation of the nature and function or behaviour of particular objects and events and persons leads naturally to the statement of fundamental characteristics common to all phenomena. In the ultimate analysis, this method yields us knowledge about the first principles that govern the whole universe. It is this knowledge, elevated to the level of immediate intuition through the systematic purification and development of the human mind that finally results in the realisation of full enlightenment. This explains why the Ābhidhammika shuns the method of deduction which only breeds endless speculation to becloud the purity and openness of the mind of the truth-seeker.

The method of the Ābhidhammika is not, however, confined only to the analytical. The Abhidhamma denies the competence of mere analysis to yield us a comprehensive statement of the nature and function of events and objects. Hence the Ābhidhammikas have recognised the importance of synthesis as a method that supplements analysis. In the Abhidhamma Piṭaka of the Theravādins the method of analysis is illustrated in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, while the Paṭṭhāna is wholly devoted to the application of the method of synthesis. Analysis helps us to know the participial nature of phenomena. Synthesis, on the other hand, gives insight into the dynamic function, as well as the cause for the separate identity, of the same phenomena.

The method of the Abhidhamma has given us a description of phenomena as they are made available to perception. This attempt to undertake only a descriptive analysis of empirical reality has eliminated the possibility of the intrusion of speculative matter into the Abhidhamma. The purpose of the Abhidhamma is solely to understand the world around and within us and the only function of the Ābhidhammika, which can be both ethically edifying and practically useful, is to describe the data as they are actually presented to perception. This invests the facts stated by the Abhidhamma with a scientific character.

Buddhist philosophy is not a mere speculation on mental analysis. It is no doubt analytical through and through, so much so that the Theravāda school, whose system of philosophy is now under discussion, was earlier known as Vibhajjavāda, the Analytical School. But it is analysis with a purpose, and the purpose is ethical. And thus we have a psychology of conduct as well as a moral code based on mental analysis. Will (chanda), volition (cetanā), adjustment of attention (cetaso abhiniropanā) or aspiration and intention (saṅkappa) show the working of the mind as it inclines with craving to either unwholesome or the so-called good. And that is exactly the content of that Compendium of Mental States, the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, the first book of the seven which constitute the collection of philosophical works, the Abhidhamma Piṭaka.

It is obvious that the Abhidhamma as a whole and the Dhammasaṅgaṇī in particular are works of serious study. And in this is found the great difference in style and composition, in method of exposition and argument, and even in the basic approach to the subject between the Sutta-piṭaka and the Abhidhamma-piṭaka. For the suttas are expositions in the form of discussions and discourses, giving details of circumstances and of the people taking part therein, whereas the Abhidhamma teaching is entirely devoid of explanation (nippariyāya). It is certainly not a handbook for beginners and a fair amount of at least acquaintance with the subject matter is presupposed. Neither does it essentially add to the knowledge of the Buddha-dhamma which could be gleaned from the suttas. But whereas this doctrine is found scattered, incoherently, throughout the many thousands of suttas, this same doctrine is methodically arranged and systematically explained in the various books of the Abhidhamma, without historical detail regarding persons or occasions, frequently in the academic form of question and answer. A summary at the end of a chapter adds to its scholastic appearance. Thus we have a plan (uddesa), an exposition (niddesa) in question and answer, rounded off with a summary (appanā).

In the suttas the doctrine is given with a practical purpose, the development of morality, of insight, the attainment of realisation. In the Abhidhamma the preacher has been replaced by the scholar, whose main interests are definitions, technical determinations, analytical knowledge and synthetic logic. Yet the goal is the same for both. The suttas will preach of altruistic love and selfless virtue, of mental absorption in meditative exercises, of purity of living, leading to clarity of thought. The Abhidhamma will analyse the process of thought, the components of corporeality and mentality, and thereby prove that there is no abiding entity which could be called a soul. And thus the two meet again in the realisation of soullessness (anatta) through self-renouncing virtue and self-renouncing wisdom.

In a preceding section we gave verbal definitions found in early literature. These are definitions either of Abhidhamma in its final and perfected form or of Abhidhamma as it should be. They do not denote the actual or historical Abhidhamma in its various stages of development. In this section, we shall give the characteristics of Abhidhamma as seen in the existing Abhidhbamma literature of various stages.

The original Abhidhamma was a sort of commentary on the sutta which was the Buddha’s teaching, as is seen in the juxtaposition of the pair (abhidharma and abhivinaya) found in the Nikāyas. Gradually, annotation and explanation on the teaching (dhamma) and precept (vinaya) began during the Buddha’s lifetime or immediately after his parinibbāna. These were called abhidhamma and abhivinaya respectively. In the early period, they were included in the writings as commentary, sutta and systematised sutta. They are the oldest form of Abhidhamma. Their characteristics were: (1) They annotated and explained the sutta texts and gave definitions and explanations of terminology. (2) They arranged and classified numerical doctrines according to numerals. (3) They systematised the doctrines preached in the suttas and established a consistent method of practice. These were the distinctive characteristics of the earliest Abhidhamma. These abhidhammic suttas were attributed to the Buddha or to his famous disciples. They are now included in the sutta collection. These Abhidhammic suttas developed into independent Abhidhamma which may be called the fundamental Abhidhamma. They were products of growth during a long period. In accordance with the various stages of development the methodology too underwent some changes. The early fundamental Abhidhamma had the above-mentioned three qualities in common with the abhidhammic suttas which preceded it. The only difference was that in the former the qualities were more developed. Accordingly, they still consisted of explanations and interpretations of the suttas or their arrangement or organisation. But in the next stage, Abhidhamma gradually deviated from the suttas and came to have contents of its own. The methodological characteristics of this (second) period were: the subjects of discourse were classified by some abhidhammic standards, by arrangement into various branches (P. Pañhapuccha); consideration of the subordination of concepts of the objects of discourse according to their connotation and denotation (P. saṅgaha, Skt. saṅgraha); consideration of concurrence and correspondence of various mental functions, &c., (P. sampayoga, Skt. samprayoga).

By means of these three methods, the conceptual definition of the objects of discourse became very exact, and mind and matter were considered as a whole. In early Buddhism they were explained only as far as they had any connection with practice and emancipation. But here they came to be examined as a whole and objectively. Consequently, the method of classification used by original Buddhism and the early Abhidhamma proved to be inadequate. And there arose the method of classification unique to the Abhidhamma of this period.

Let us explain it concretely. In original Buddhism and the early Abhidhamma, matter and mind were synthetically classified by such categories as five skandhas, twelve āyatanas, eighteen dhātus. But in Abhidharma of, e.g. the Sarvāstivādins from the middle period onward, all forms of existence were classified into five categories, namely: matter (rūpa); mind (citta); attributes of mind (cetasika); that power which belongs neither to matter nor to mind and yet activates matter and mind (citta-vippayutta-dhamma); and, the unconditioned (asaṅkhata-dhamma).

But this classification varies more or less with schools. On the other hand, in the late Abhidhamma, all things, from temporal and local relations, are considered in terms of conditions or causes of their birth, rise, decay and extinction. Again, some schools consider the accomplishment or non-accomplishment of some phenomenon by the influence of matter and mind. Hitherto, we have stated the characteristics mainly common to all schools of Abhidhamma.

Our knowledge of the internal and external worlds is obtained through sensory perception. This world of sense experience is comprehended by mind and matter. Reality, however, is not exhausted by the data of the six sense organs. Ultimate reality transcends the empirical world of relativity. The totality of life is, therefore, fully exhausted by mind, matter and ultimate reality. These precisely define the scope and limit of the subject-matter of the Abhidhamma. The data of sensory perception are either corporeal or psychological. Every datum of corporeality or psychology is found to be an instance of contingent existence. The contingent is that which is subject to change and evolution. All corporeal and psychological data are, therefore, of the nature of phenomena, for the non-contingent noumenal nature said by speculative philosophers to underlie them is not yielded to sensory perception. The fundamental generic term which comprehends all phenomena is dhamma. The Abhidhamma is largely devoted to the discussion of dhamma or phenomena. In so far as the empirical world is concerned, the Ābhidhammika is wholly interested in the modal view of reality. In the view of the Ābhidhammika, there is nothing in all the data of sensory perception which does not admit of the nature of dhamma, for all phenomena are evanescent, non-substantial and lacking in perfect harmony and consistency. As a result of the application of this test of reality, the discussion of a priori categories such as God and soul are not found in the Abhidhamma.

This leads to the Abhidhamma definition of what is real in the fundamental sense. This is none other than paramattha. There are four types of this reality, namely, mind (citta), co-efficients of mind (cetasika), matter (rūpa) and ultimate reality (nibbāna). Of these four types the first three are empirical and mundane, while the fourth alone is transcendental. The reality of the first three consists in their capacity for change and evolution. Paramattha means fundamental category. The four types of paramattha are based on a distinct theory of degrees of truth and reality. Although all four types of reality are commonly called paramattha, there is a vital difference in the levels of reality as between the first three and the fourth. The former belong to the realm of empirical reality, while the latter belongs to the transcendental realm of the unconditioned absolute. Mind and its co-efficients and matter, although called paramattha are not unchanging entities enduring and perdurable in character. They have no underlying permanent nature, while the fourth paramattha, namely, ultimate reality, being of a transcendental nature, does not lend itself to verbal predication. The four types of ultimates comprise, according to the Theravāda Abhidhamma, a total of eighty-two categories. The mind is one ultimate, the co-efficients of mind divide themselves into fifty-two ultimate forms, matter is analysed into twenty-eight distinct forms and reality (nibbāna) constitutes one ultimate from the transcendental point of view.

The Buddha asserts the supremacy of the mind in the direction and determination of life. The world is led by the mind (cittena nīyati loko). This truth leads to the recognition that the proper study of man is his own mind. If the realisation of the truth is possible only through the development and purification of the mind, it then follows that the proper understanding of its nature and function must necessarily precede any serious and successful attempt at such purification and development. Since the Abhidhamma teaches the path to the realisation of truth, the study of the mind has been given the foremost attention and consideration throughout its discussion of reality. The content of the Abhidhamma is thus predominantly psychological. Herein we have the first serious attempt in the history of human thought to place the study of psychology on a scientific footing. It is a system of descriptive and critical psychology which “psychologises” without the aid of a metaphysical psyche. It claims only to describe and analyse psychological situations as they actually occur. The value of the Abhidhamma in this regard lies in the fact that it gives us an insight into the mainsprings of psychological life in the individual.

The thoroughgoing psychological analyses of the Ābhidhammikas reflect the heights to which the science of the mind had attained among the Buddhists at a very early date in the history of intellectual progress. The classical Abhidhamma term for the mind is citta. It has other synonyms such as mano, viññāṇa and ceto. The mind is no abstraction. It is participial in formation. Given the necessary conditions, there is origination of consciousness of one sort or another. Hence the mind is always a specific instance consisting of particular characteristics.

The mind, itself considered as a sense-door, is surrounded by five other external sense-doors, the eye, ear, nose, tongue and body. Perception is described and explained on the basis of the stimuli which impinge on the one or the other of the sense organs. Sensory contact comes about as a result of the coming together of a sense organ and its corresponding object. This sensory contact then leads to the birth of sensations of one sort or another (visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile and, in the case of the mind, the sixth sense organ, conceptual), which in their turn generate situations which are pleasant, unpleasant or hedonistically neutral. Pleasant sensations conduce to the growth of craving which makes one attach oneself to objects of one sort or another. This attachment provides the motive impulse which keeps a-going the stream of becoming, which is nothing other than the continuity of life in all its manifestations.

The Abhidhamma deals in detail with the process of perception. According to the Theravāda analysis, this is marked by seventeen distinct stages of cognitive and conceptual activity. From the stage of bare awareness up to the point when there is an indelible registration of the cognised object there are seventeen thought-moments involved. According to this theory it would appear that one moment of physical change is co-extensive and co-eval with seventeen moments of psychological change. Hence, the Abhidhamma says that the mind changes sixteen times as fast as matter. The co-efficients of mind are the various non-cognitive elements and the Theravāda lists them as amounting to a total of fifty-two. These are separately listed, probably on account of their importance for the psychology of human conduct.

The Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, which analyses all reality into seventy-five ultimate dharmas, adds to the analyses of the Theravādins in many important ways. Their extensive classifications are summarised in the Abhidharmakośa and the commentaries thereon, just as those of the Theravāda are summarised in the Visuddhimagga and other commentaries on the books of the canonical Abhidhamma.

The analysis of matter in the Abhidhamma is significant especially in view of the modern scientific researches into the subject. Matter, according to the Abhidhamma, is considered as a function and the Theravāda enumerates as many as twenty-eight forms of it.

Perhaps the most important single contribution of the Abhidhamma to the history of thought is its fully developed and thoroughly comprehensive theory of causality and relativity. Being a thoroughly consistent attempt at explaining the dependent origination of all phenomena, it is, in its widest empirical sense, a gigantic theory of cosmic dynamics. The most voluminous work of the Theravāda Abhidhamma, namely, the Paṭṭhāna, is wholly devoted to the consideration of this theory from the point of view of its application to the facts of sensory perception.

The Abhidhamma deals at length with the mechanics of mind control and with the techniques of psychic development of the mind. The primary aim here is to indicate the path to the realisation of wisdom or paññā. The Abhidhamma concludes with the discussion of the ultimate reality of Nibbāna. The latter is more frequently defined in ethical terms and more rarely as the unconditioned Absolute which transcends all antinomies. Throughout this discussion the Abhidhamma avoids the subtler metaphysics of the later Buddhist Absolute Idealists.

Abhidhamma developed, as we saw above, from the attempt at clarification of what is preached in the sutta. The subject-matter treated there was the teachings of the Nikāyas, especially their creed and doctrines. Let us take as an example the Paṭisambhidāmagga, a source literature which existed before the fundamental Abhidhamma. In the book thirty items concerning doctrine are treated. They are (Section A) knowledge (ñāṇa), wrong views (diṭṭhi), mindfulness regarding respiration (ānāpāna), controlling principle (indriya), emancipation (vimokkha), sphere of existence (gati), karma theory (kamma), perversion (vipallāsa), path (magga), excellent drink (maṇḍapeyya); (Section B) association of quietude and insight (yuganaddha), truth (sacca), factor of supreme knowledge (bojjhaṅga), love or amity (mettā), absence of desire (virāga), analytic insight (paṭisambhidā), wheel of law (dhammacakka), transcendental world (lokuttara), spiritual power (bala), void (suññā); (Section C) great wisdom (mahāpaññā), psychic power (iddhi), clear understanding of truth (abhisamaya), detachment (viveka), behaviour (cariyā), marvels (pāṭihāriya), “equal-headed one”, who simultaneously attains an end of craving (samasīsa), application of mindfulness (satipaṭṭhāna), insight (vipassanā), tabulated summary (mātikā).

These 30 items are in most cases given in the Nikāyas. But some show further progress. At any rate, these 30 items exhaust the important problems of Buddhist doctrine. But systematisation is not complete. Their arrangement and organisation is seen in the Pali Vibhaṅga and the Dharmaskandha of the Sarvāstivāda school, treatises representative of the early fundamental Abhidhamma.

To begin with, the Pali Vibhaṅga arranged the subjects of study into the following 18 items: aggregates (khandha), sense-organs and sense objects (āyatana), elements (dhātu), truth (sacca), controlling principle (indriya), mode of causes (paccayakāra), application of mindfulness (satipaṭṭhāna), right exertion (sammappaddhāna), psychic power (iddhipāda), factor of supreme knowledge (bojjhaṅga), path (magga), meditation (jhāna), the illimitables (appamañña), set of precepts (sikkhāpada), analytic insight (paṭisambhidā), knowledge (ñāṇa), miscellaneous vices (khuddakavatthu), and essence or summary of dhamma (dhammahadaya). They include the important problems of Buddhism, such as five khandhas, twelve āyatanas, eighteen dhātus, four saccas, twenty-two indriyas, twelve-member causality, four satipaṭṭhānas, four sammappaddhānas, four iddhipādas, seven bojjhaṅgas, the Noble Eightfold Path, meditation of four jhāna and four āruppa samāpatti, the five precepts of the householder, four analytic insights, various types of wisdom, and various evil desires.

The Dharmaskandha of the Sarvāstivāda deals with the following 21 items, which are in the main the same as those mentioned above. They are: sets of precepts (sikṣāpada), four phases of conversion (śrotāpattyaṅga), perfect faith (avetyaprasāda), fruition of the path (śrāmanyaphala), practice and knowledge (pratipad-abhijñā), noble lineage of recluses (arya-vaṁśa), right exertion (samyak-prahāṇa), psychic power (ṛddhi-pāda), application of mindfulness (smṛti-prasthāna), noble truth (ārya-satya), meditation (dhyāna), the illimitable (apramāṇa), formless meditation (ārūpya), practice of other meditation (samādhi-bhāvanā), factor of supreme knowledge (bodhyaṅga), miscellaneous vices (kṣudraka-vastu), controlling principles (indriya), sense-organs and sense-objects (āyatana), aggregates (skandha), many elements (bahu-dhātu), and law of causation (pratītyasamtpāda).

The twenty-one items are a little more than the 18 items of the Pali Buddhism, and roughly speaking, many items of those two sets coincide with or resemble each other. And all of them are relevant to the primary doctrines of Buddhism. But Buddhism treats worldly problems besides the doctrinal ones. So the Abhidhamma of the early period also dealt with these worldly problems. The section which dealt with them is called the prajñāpti-śāstra (Skt.), paññatti (P.). In Pali Buddhism, individual persons of various kinds, ranging from the unenlightened layman to the enlightened saints, are dealt with in the Puggala-paññatti. In the Sarvāstivāda, world (loka), action (karma), causes (upādā), &c., are treated from the worldly standpoint in the Prajñapti-śāstra (Taishō, 1538). These worldly conceptions (temporal questions, issues) were dealt with only superficially in the Nikāyas. The Paññatti gleaned and arranged the discussions which had been scattered.

When the above-mentioned contents of the early Abhidhamma came to be studied by the method adopted in the Abhidhamma from the middle period onward, they were studied in the abstract and objectively, and the study for the sake of practice which had been traditional since original Buddhism, became the study for the sake of theory, detached from practice. Consequently, the classification of the contents was, as has been mentioned before, made into matter (rūpa), mind (citta), mental attributes (cetasika), the unconditioned (asaṅkhata), &c. These studies were made in various schools and in some cases various theories arose in the same school. Some discourse books collected these different theories. The Pali Kathāvatthu is a book of this kind and the book contains 217 items of difference. Though not a fundamental discourse-book, the Samayabhedoparacana-cakra describes the history of the divisions into schools and their divergent theories. Among others, the Mahāvibhāṣa-śāstra also gives many divergent theories.

When the age of manuals followed the age of fundamental Abhidhamma, the practice of Buddhism came to be discussed again. For example, the form which the Pali Visuddhimagga chose was to set up seven stages of purity as the grading of Buddhist discipline and to expound the doctrines according to them. The Abhidharmakośa-śāstra and the Satyasiddhi-śāstra of the Sautrāntika line systematise doctrines according to the order of the four truths (sorrow, origin of sorrow, cessation of sorrow and the path). Again, Skandhila’s Abhidharmāvatāra and the Mahāyāna-pañcaskandhaśāstra, of Vasubandhu of the Yogācāra School, and other discourse books arrange the doctrines and theories in the order of five aggregates. But on the other hand, some, based on purely objective theories, discuss doctrines by classification into matter, mind, mental attributes, &c.

1. The method of the early Abhidhamma: By what methods was the subject-matter mentioned in the preceding chapter studied? As has been referred to earlier, the methods also underwent changes as the Abhidhamma developed. First, let us look at the method of the early Abhidhamma. It had three distinctive features. There were: (1) the items concerning the conditions by which evils arise and those concerning practice and emancipation are systematically expounded. This method can be seen in the Pali Paṭisambhidāmagga and the Vibhaṅga and the Dharmaskandha of the Sarvāstivāda; (2) various doctrines are arranged in numerical order. This can be seen in the Puggala-paññati and in the theory of evils expounded in the Vibhaṅga and the Saṅgītiparyāya; (3) exposition of doctrines and definition and explanation of the terminology. This is seen everywhere in the early Abhidhamma and is typical of it.

These three distinctive features in rudimentary form could be seen before the establishment of the fundamental Abhidhamma, in the suttas and other literature of abhidhammic tendency. More particularly, in the Paṭisambhidāmagga and the Niddesa the features are nearly the same as in the Abhidhamma.

2. The method of study adopted in the Abhidhamma of the middle period and after: The methodological characteristics of the Abhidhamma of the middle period and after were, as has already been mentioned: § 1. Consideration according to abhidhammic standards (P. pañha-pucchā), § 2. Consideration of the subject matter from the point of view of connotation and denotation (Skt. ṣaṅgraha, P. saṅgaha), § 3. Consideration of the concurrence and coexistence of mental action (Skt. samprayoga, P. sampayoga). § 4. Consideration of the conditional relations of phenomenal succession and coexistence (Skt. pratyaya, P. paccaya), § 5. Consideration on maturity and non-maturity of the phenomena (Skt. samanvāgamana). These will be surveyed below.

§ 1. Questioning (Pañha-pucchā): In the Pali Abhidhamma, 22 triplets (tika) and 100 doublets (duka) are established as standards of consideration. The total of 122 standards are called the “abhidhammic table of contents” (abhidhamma-mātikā). They are the standards applicable to the whole Abhidhamma. Other schools have no such fixed standards and the kinds and numbers vary with the convenience of the occasion. To begin with, the 122 standards of the Pali Abhidhamma are as follows:

A. 22 Triplets (Tika): (1) Good (kusala), bad (akusala), indeterminate (avyākata); (2) Associated with pleasant feeling (sukhāya vedanāya sampayutta), associated with painful feeling (dukkhāya v° s°), associated with neutral feeling (adukkhamasukhāya v° s°); (3) Result (vipāka), that which has resultant quality (vipākadhamma), that which is neither result nor a thing having resultant quality; (4–6) That which has the act of applied and sustained thinking (savitakka-savicāra), the act of sustained thinking only (avitakka-vicāramatta), the act of neither applied nor sustained thinking (avitakka-avicāra); (7) State of being accompanied by zest (pitī sahagata), state of being accompanied by happiness (sukha sahagata), state of being accompanied by indifference (upekkha sahagata); (8) Removability by vision (dassanena pahātabba), removability by culture (bhāvanāya p°), irremovability either by vision or by culture; (9–10) Going to degeneration (ācayagāmi), to purification (apacayagāmi), to neither degradation nor elevation; (11) The trainee (sekhiya), the adept (asekhiya), the one who is neither trainee nor adept; (12) Limited (paritta), sublime (mahāggata), infinite (appamāṇa); (13–4) Low (hīna), of medium worth (majjhima), excellent (paṇīta); (15) Fixed wrongfulness as to consequence (micchattaniyata), fixed rightfulness as to consequence (sammattaniyata), undefined (aniyata); (16–18) Past (atīta), future (anāgata), present (paccuppanna); (19–20) That which belongs to one’s self (ajjhatta), what is external to one’s self (bahiddha), what is both inside and outside of oneself (ajjhatta-bahiddha); (21–22) What is visible and reacting (sanidassana-sappaṭigha), what is invisible and reacting (anidassana-sappaṭigha), what is neither visible nor reacting (anidassana-appaṭigha).

B. 100 Doublets (Duka): (1) Moral roots (hetu), what are not moral roots (na hetu); (2) Concomitance with moral roots (sahetuka), non-concomitance with moral roots (ahetuka); (3–7) Causally related (sappaccaya), not causally related (appaccaya); (8) Conditioned (saṅkhata), unconditioned (asaṅkhata); (9) Visible (sanidassana), invisible (anidassana); (10) Reacting (sappaṭigha), not reacting (appaṭigha); (11) Having material form (rūpī), immaterial (arūpī); (12) Mundane (lokiya), supramundane (lokuttara); (13) Being cognised (kenaci viññeyya), being incognisable (kenaci na viññeyya); (14) Stain (āsava), no stain (na āsava); (15) Having stains (sāsava), having no stains (anāsava); (16–55) Having objects of thought (sārammaṇa), having no such objects (anārammaṇa); (56) Mind (citta), non-mind (na citta); (57) Mental attribute (cetasika), not mental attribute (acetasika); (58) Conjoined with mind (cittasampayutta), detached from mind (cittavippayutta); (59–66) One’s own (ajjhattika), external (bāhira); (67) Derived (upādā), not derived (na upādā); (68–75) Vices (kilesa), non-vices (na kilesa); (76–77) Vitiated (saṅkiliṭṭha), not vitiated (asaṅkiliṭṭha); (78–93) Realm of sense (kāmāvacara), not realm of sense (na kāmāvacara); (94) Realm of form (rūpāvacara), not realm of form (na rūpāvacara); (95) Formless realm (arūpāvacara), not-formless realm (na arūpāvacara); (96) Included (pariyāpanna), unincluded (apariyāpanna); (97) Leading onward (niyyānika), not leading onward (aniyyānika); (98) Fixed (niyata), not fixed (aniyata); (99) Having a beyond (sauttara), having no beyond (anuttara); (100) Strife (saraṇa), non-strife (araṇa).

The Sāriputra-abhidharma-śāstra, in its Chinese translation of an unknown school, gives 36 doublets and 7 triplets, a total of 43 standards. The Jñānaprasthāna of the Sarvāstivāda gives 50 standards, most of them can be found in the 122 standards of the Pali Buddhism, but some are different from those of the Pali Abhidhamma, owing to the differences of sectarian Buddhist theories.

§ 2. Classification (Saṅgaha). Aided in investigations by means of the standards listed above, the attributes of concepts became defined more and more minutely and exactly. Consequently, the identity, resemblance and difference of the doctrines and items under examination became clear and distinct. Accordingly, it was natural that the contrast or comparison of the conceptual connotation and denotation led to the subordination of one to another.

§ 3. Mental association or combination (Sampayoga). Mental function was examined with reference to perception, good and evil deeds, the practice of the path, the realisation of the fruit, meditation and various psychic powers. And the concrete mind in these cases was analysed and mental substance (citta) as an agent was distinguished from mental attributes (cetasika). The coexistence of the mental substance and its attributes was considered as combination (sampayoga). This theory, too, varied with schools. For example, with the Sarvāstivāda, the conditions which regulate combination are: (1) Equality of support (āśraya-samatā). Mental substance and its attributes should have the same sense organ for support. (2) Equality of sense object (ālambana-s°). Mental substance and its attributes should perceive the same object. (3) Equality of mode (ākāra-s°). Mental substance and its attributes should work in the same manner when perceiving. (4) Equality of time (kāla-s°) synchronism. Mental substance and its attributes work at the same time. (5) Equality of substance (dravya-s°). As each mental attribute associates with mental substance at the same time, so two or more agencies of the same attribute cannot associate simultaneously with one mental substance. This is called the Theory of the five-aspect Equality of the Sarvāstivāda. Pali Buddhism also sets out much the same theory.

§ 4. Theory of Correlation (Paccaya). This theory is intended to make an exhaustive survey of the spatial and temporal relation of phenomena with one another as they appear and disappear and change. Mental association is, of course, one of those relations. As for conditions, the theory of correlation may have developed from the consideration of the twelve-member causal law (paṭiccasamuppāda). The law which originally ruled moral actions only was extended and made applicable to all physical and material phenomena as well as to moral actions. The Pali Abhidhamma gives 24 relational conditions, the Sāriputrābhidharma-śāstra 10 kinds, and the Sarvāstivāda 6 or 4 kinds. These theories of various schools show some resemblance or similarity with each other, but probably there had been no direct relation among the various schools.

To begin with, the 24 kinds of relational condition of Pali Buddhism are the following: (1) Condition of cause (hetu-paccaya). Immediate cause, principal cause; (2) Object (ārammaṇa-p°). Objects which cause cognition; (3) Dominance (adhipati-p°). Various auxiliary conditions, mediate or indirect cause; (4) Contiguity (anantara-p°). The same as the next one; (5) Immediate contiguity (samanantara-p°). The immediately preceding mental state performs the function to give place to the immediately following mental state; (6) Coexistence (sahajāta-p°). Coexistential relation of concurrent material or mental things; (7) Reciprocity (aññamañña-p°). The reciprocal relation of concurrent mental and material things; (8) Dependence (nissaya-p°). Sensations or perceptions depend on the corresponding sense-organs or seats of perception; (9) Sufficing condition (upanissaya-p°). Object and contiguity become sufficing condition in order to become more powerful; (10) Antecedence (purejāta-p°). Sense organs and sense objects become condition by antecedence; (11) Consequence (pacchājāta-p°). Succeeding mind becomes condition to preceding body; (12) Succession (āsevana-p°). The relation in which powerful apperception lasts; (13) Kamma (kamma-p°). The relation of good or evil karma with material and mental things; (14) Effect (vipāka-p°). The relation of the karmic result with concurrent material and mental things; (15) Nutriment (āhāra-p°). The relation of material and spiritual nutriments with body and mental experience; (16) Controlling power (indriya-p°). Relation of twenty-two controlling powers with material and mental things; (17) Meditation (jhāna-p°). Relation of the constituents of meditation, such as applied thinking (vitakka) and sustained thinking (vicāra), with concurrent phenomena; (18) Path (magga-p°). Relation of the constituents of the path, such as right view, &c., with concurrent phenomena; (19) Association (sampayutta-p°). Relation through association of mind substance and mental attributes; (20) Dissociation (vippayutta-p°). The case where there occurs no association; (21) Presence (atthi-p°). Dependence of matter and mind on each other for existence; (22) Absence (natthi-p°). Relation of the preceding mental state to the succeeding one; (23) Abeyance (vigata-p°). Relation similar to item (22); (24) Continuance (avigata-p°). Relation similar to item (21).

Some of these 24 items resemble or overlap some others. They are not adequately arranged. This is not a strict and logical classification. The ten relational conditions expounded in the Sāriputrabhidharmā-śāstra seem to correspond to those of Pali Buddhism, as given here in parentheses: 1 (1); 2 (4.5); 3 (2); 4 (8.9); 5 (13); 6 (14); 7 (6.10.11); 8 (7); 9 (12); 10 (3). The four relational conditions expounded by the Sarvāstivāda are: (1) Condition of cause (hetu-pratyaya), (2) Condition of object (ālambana-p°), (3) Condition of immediate contiguity (samanantara-p°), (4) Condition of dominance (athipati-p°). These correspond to the first 4 or 6 items of Pali Buddhism. The six causes expounded also by the Sarvāstivāda are: (1) Cause of co-existence (sahabhū-hetu), (2) Association (samprayukta-h°), (3) Relation between the similar (sabhāga-h°), (4) Cause of all-pervading evils (sarvatrāga-h°), (5) Cause of effect (vipāka-h°), (6) Various causes (kāraṇa-h°). Comparison with the 24 conditions of Pali Abhidhamma gives the following table of approximate correspondence: 1 (6); 2 (19); 3–4 (12); 5 (13); 6 (3).

§ 5. Samanāgamana. As to the possessing and non-possessing of something, we have the discussion by the Sarvāstivāda, but its exposition is omitted here.

It was a distinctive merit of the Abhidhamma that it systematically unified various doctrines of original Buddhism into a consistent system and gave exact definitions of all Buddhist terminology, clarifying all Buddhist concepts. But it carried with it some shortcomings. The definitions of concepts and the exposition of doctrines were too formal and uniform, with the result that the profundity and sublimity of the early doctrines were lost. For, it is impossible to grasp the stream of concrete practice by uniform and abstract definitions. In original Buddhism, the same terminology conveyed various meanings as the hearers' understanding and ability varied. The abhidhammic definitions deprived the words or concepts of their nuance and flexibility, and the abhidhammic studies gradually deviated from the practice of the path and became mere theories for their own sake, subtle and complicated. The religiosity and practical nature proper to Buddhism were lost. It was to rectify these shortcomings that Mahāyāna Buddhism arose.

To the religious consciousness human life is essentially ethically conditioned. The meaning and significance of human conduct can be made intelligible only from the standpoint of ethics. Culture and civilisation, whether of the individual or of the group, are inconceivable without the motive force of an ethical ideology. Morality is the sense of value that the mind attaches to human behaviour, in thought, word and deed. All ethics, therefore, is psychological. Ethical action is fully conscious, purposive action. Human action, if it is to be ethically significant, has to originate always from volitional impulse. Psychological behaviour is not a mechanical process. The laws of the mind are fundamentally different from the laws of physics. Since the Buddha asserts the supremacy of mind over matter, what is essential for the seeker after ethical and spiritual perfection is to understand the nature and functions of psychological processes. In the view of the Abhidhamma, the study of ethics and psychology is not an academic pursuit but something that is essentially relevant to the progress and harmony of individual and social life.

The Abhidhamma marks a consistent and highly successful attempt at the harmonious integration of ethics, psychology and religion. This fact gives the Abhidhamma its distinctive religious character. The discussions in the Abhidhamma are charged with a thoroughgoing ethical earnestness springing directly from the religious consciousness of the Abhidhamma. It is only in the light of the intense interest in ethics and religion that we can make sense of the seemingly unending and remorselessly monotonous classifications and enumerations that keep on occurring in the pages of the Abhidhamma, both canonical and commentarial.

The Abhidhamma constitutes the results of an inquiry into the nature of human experience, both sensory and extra-sensory. Since the results are stated and interpreted in terms of language and logic, it allows the Abhidhamma the justification to be considered as philosophy. The function of philosophy, if the latter is to be practically useful and ethically edifying, is not to indulge in speculative cogitation or mere intellection but to understand nature. This understanding cannot be obtained or developed without reference to the observation of the world within and around us in the way it actually functions. The principles that govern nature are not made available to sense-perception directly except through instances and illustrations in one’s daily experience, such as seeing falling mangoes and decaying bodies. They can be discovered only through the philosophic method of analysis and synthesis. If we are not to remove ourselves further away from reality it becomes imperative that we first describe rather than re-interpret the data of our perception. In this regard the Abhidhamma can be introduced as a critical and descriptive philosophy. The greater part of the content of the Abhidhamma is an analysis and synthesis of phenomena, but it does not stop at a mere phenomenalism or realism. Towards its latter part the Abhidhamma describes the unconditioned absolute, but it does not claim to be a thoroughgoing monism that altogether denies the objective reality of the world which is received and confirmed by the sensations. Realism that denies the world of spirit is false materialism, while idealism that denies the reality of the phenomenal world removes the very possibility for ethical striving and religious and spiritual development. In the interests of ethics and religion the Abhidhamma avoids both extremes and follows the middle path of sanity and common sense.

(On the canonical texts of the Abhidhamma: B.C. Law: A History of Pali Literature, II, pp. 303–42; J. Takakusu: On the Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāstivādins, JPTS. (1905); L. de la Vallée Poussin: Documents d'Abhidharma, trad. et annotés, BEFEO. (XXX); Nyanatiloka: A Guide through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka (Colombo, 1957). On the doctrines of the Abhidharma Schools: Mrs. Rhys Davids: A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics; S.Z Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids: Compendium of Philosophy, PTS. Translation Series; T.I. Stcherbatsky: The Central Conception of Buddhism; L. de la Vallée Poussin: L'Abhidharmakośa, trad. (Paris, 1923–5); J. Kasyap: Abhidhamma Philosophy, I & II.)

Or, to give this work its proper title, Paramatthappakāsinī, or Sattābhidhammagandha-aṭṭhakathāya mūlaṭīkā (Gv. 60), is an exegesis on the entire Abhidhamma-piṭaka. As it was the first born (ādibhūtattā) of all sub-commentaries, it became known as the Mūla-Ṭīkā (Sāsv. 33). It stands apart from the individual commentaries on the seven books belonging to this collection (piṭaka). The work is ascribed to a certain Ānanda (Vanaratana Tissa), who, like other commentators, Mahā Kaccāyana, Buddhaghosa, Buddhadatta, Dhammapāla, was an Indian by birth. He joined the Order of monks in Ceylon and stood at the head of the Araññavāsī brotherhood, which was founded at the beginning of the 6th century, during the reign of Aggabodhi II, and which was devoted to a more secluded hermit’s life. He is said to have composed this work at the request of a senior monk, Buddhamitta (Gv. 69). Although there are occasional dissents, e.g. the rejection of a static phase of thought, apart from its arising and cessation Shwe Zan Aung: Comp. of Phil., Introd. Essay, p. 26., the work which is the oldest extant sub-commentary on the Abhidhamma De Z. p. 3., is evidently based on Buddhaghosa’s commentaries.

An interpretation (anuṭīkā) on the Mūla-Ṭīkā and named the Līnatthavaṇṇanā, was compiled by Culla Dhammapāla, although sometimes this work is included in the list of commentaries and sub-commentaries attributed to Dhammapāla Acariya (e.g., Gv. 60 and Sāsv. 33). This Acariya Dhammapāla, however, lived before the 7th century, when the famous Chinese traveller of that time, Hsüan-tsang, referred to him. Dhammapāla Junior (Culla Dhammapāla), on the other hand, was a senior pupil of Ānanda Vanaratana Tissa referred to above. As he was already the author of the Saccasaṅkhepa it is more likely that it was he who compiled the explanatory notes to his teacher’s Mūla-Ṭīkā.

Various schools had in the course of time composed their own sub-commentaries, and when conflicting expositions had become too obvious, they were reviewed by Mahā Kassapa, the author of the Saddhammasaṅgaha and his band of scholarly monks at Jetavana Vihāra in Pulatthipura (Polonnaruwa, Ceylon), after the reconciliation of opposing schools during the reign of Parākramabāhu I. The outcome of this revision was the Pañcappakaraṇaṭṭhakathā in three parts concerning the Abhidhamma works, exclusive of the Dhammasaṅgaṇī’s Atthasālinī and the Vibhaṅga’s Sammohavinodanī.

The author of the Mūla-Ṭīkā, therefore, probably lived in the 8th or 9th century, and should not be confused with another Ānanda, who also belonged to the Araññavāsī brotherhood and who was a disciple of Udumbaragiri Medhaṅkara, the pupil of Sāriputta, in the early 13th century during the reign of Vijayabāhu III at Jambuddoṇi (Dambadeniya, Ceylon), although to this latter Ānanda is frequently ascribed the authorship of the Abhidhamma-Mūla-Ṭīkā.

Palm-leaf manuscript copies of this work are extant in many temple libraries in Ceylon, according to K.D. Somadasa: Laṅkāvē Puskolapot Nāmāvaliya, a catalogue of palm-leaf MSS, in Ceylon (Colombo, 1959).

This work is a summary (saṅgaha) of the sense or meaning (attha) of Buddhist philosophy (abhidhamma). It is a manual compiled in Pali not earlier than the 8th century C.E., but it came into use as a text book for students of Abhidhamma in the 12th century only. It is a treatise excessively condensed, yet extremely popular as a handbook. “Even at the present day this manual is still held in the highest possible esteem in Ceylon as well as in Burma, and has been more frequently commentated and translated in Burma than any other text of the Abhidhamma” Winternitz: History of Indian Literature (Calcutta University publication, 1933) II, 222.. The author’s name is always given as Anuruddha, who, according to Burmese tradition, was a senior monk (thera) in Ceylon residing in Polonnaruwa in the Mūlasoma Vihāra. Nothing more is known of him, except that he was the author of two other books, Paramatthavinicchaya and Namarūpapariccheda, and, perhaps, of the Anuruddha Śataka DPPN. p. 90..

Four sub-commentaries have been written on this compendium, two in Ceylon, Porāṇa-ṭīkā by Nava Vimalabuddhi thera, and Abhidhammattha-vibhāvanī by Sumaṅgala thera, and two in Burma, Saṅkhepa-vaṇṇanā by Saddhamma Jotipāla and a recent work, Paramṁatthadīpanī Ṭīkā, by Ledi Sayadaw For further details, see Pali Literature of Ceylon, pp. 168–172..

Although the Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha covers in its final chapter more or less the same range of subject-matter as Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga, the two works can hardly be compared otherwise. For, where the Visuddhimagga treats its subject with an amplitude of interpretation and critical explanation with the assistance of numerous legends and a wealth of historical and mythical detail, the compiler of the Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha is so severely concise in his subject-matter, that one can hardly speak of him as the “author” of the compendium, the work being much more in the nature of an extensive table of contents. Buddhaghosa, moreover, has given us in his Visuddhimagga a practical standard work on the method of developing sainthood by means of virtue and meditation. It is ethical in its end, even when he treats his subject psychologically. Anuruddha in his Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha has given a purely theoretical analysis with a conciseness bordering on the laconic.

The work could be called a Digest, but for the fact that the summary is so compact that it might easily cause some mental indigestion. For here we find in one small volume the whole subject-matter of the Abhidhamma which is contained in seven books on psychological ethics, dealing with consciousness both moral and immoral, as experienced in the various spheres of sense, form, formless and transcendental; its concomitants or mental properties (cetasika), analysed and distributed according to the mental states in which they occur; the process of cognition detailed in its seventeen thought moments; the process of becoming or life in the various realms of karma and rebirth; the many aspects, origins, groups and qualities of matter which may be so subtle that it is mere form (rūpa); the laws which govern conditional origination and inter-relationship; and the various stations of mental exercise and spiritual development.

All this is condensed in less than 50 pages of print. Its very terseness does not make it easily intelligible to lay readers, but it should not be forgotten that this book is not one of exposition. The composer himself says in the opening verses:

“Now will I speak in summaries concise of things in Abhidhamma-lore contained” Compendium of Philosophy, p. 81..

And he continues to enumerate the four categories dealt with in this compendium: consciousness (viññāṇa), mental properties (cetasika), material qualities (rūpa) and emancipation (nibbāna). Further, we find that every chapter and section, in which each of these four chief divisions is sub-divided, is rounded off with a verse giving the barest outline for purpose of memorising the contents. Thus, the twelve classes of unskilful thought (akusala citta) are to be memorised as follows:

Aṭṭhadhā lobhamūlāni dosamūlāni ca dvidhā
mohamūlāni ca dve'ti dvādasākusalā siyuṁ.
(Eight there are with roots in greed,
Twofold those from hateful seed,
Two are in confusion caught,
In all twelve types of sinful thought).

Having dealt summarily with the eighty-nine classes of consciousness (which may be expanded to one hundred and twenty-one by resolving each of the eight kinds of transcendental consciousness into five, thus obtaining forty kinds in place of eight), the Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha passes on to the classification of fifty-two mental properties (cetasika) seven of which are common to each and every thought, six contingent ones, fourteen always linked with unskilful thought and twenty-five common to all aesthetic states of mind. The various combinations of these mental properties constitute a rich variety of mental states or thought processes which makes one admire the keen sense of psychoanalysis at such an early date. For fuller explanation of these mental properties, see cetasika.

The next part of the book treats of the concomitants particular to the various states of consciousness. Thus, sense-impressions may be divided according to the six senses and according to the nature of the impression of pleasure, pain, joy, grief and indifference, which again results in a large variety of combinations and mutual exclusions. Thus “among the sense-impressions which are the result of moral deeds (done in a former birth), there is only one kind that is accompanied by pleasurable feeling (kāyika-sukha), and that is tactile impressions” (III, 2).

Another classification of thoughts is shown according to the roots from which a thought originates: greed, aversion, ignorance, disinterestedness, affection and intelligence; although eighteen kinds of consciousness are mentioned which are not conditioned by any of these roots, i.e., when a thought is not full-grown.

This is followed by summaries regarding consciousness under the aspect of function (kicca), of sense-doors or organs (dvāra), of sense objects (ārammaṇa), of sense-bases (vatthu).

Part IV of the Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha deals with the process of cognition and mentions how a single unit of mental activity or thought-moment consists of three time phases, to wit, nascent, developing and breaking off. Seventeen such thought-moments constitute the normal duration of a material phenomenon. It is interesting to note that “Buddhists have come to speak of matter as lasting for seventeen thought-moments” Shwe Zan Aung: Introductory Essay to the Compendium of Philosophy, p. 26.. It is not the thought which lasts that long!

Following the analytical process of the birth and the passing of a thought is the next section, dealing with rebirth, i.e., the various planes of life, four types of rebirth, and sixteen kinds of karma resulting in rebirth.

All the distinctive states set forth in this work up to this stage are now in Part VII categorised in different groupings. Here we find first various categories of evil, mixed categories and all that pertains to enlightenment (bodhi).

Part VIII deals with relations, first with the arising and ceasing of relations according to the law of dependent origination (paṭicca-samuppāda) as this is frequently found in the Sutta-piṭaka, and then with the system of correlation, which constitutes the subject-matter of the Paṭṭhāna, the last or “Great Book” of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka.

The concluding part treats of mind culture, the forty exercises for meditation (bhāvanā), the states of mental absorption (jhāna), and supernormal intellection (abhiññā), which all lead to pacification (samatha) of the mind. Real insight (vipassanā), however, is attained along the path of purification of morals, of thoughts, of views, of doubts, of discernment, of knowledge and of insight, by concentration on the salient marks or characteristics of impermanence (anicca), conflict (dukkha) and egolessness (anatta).

Emancipation (vimokkha) can be attained through realisation or insight following any one of these three contemplations, which thereby become the cause of emancipation (vimokkhamukha).

As a compendium of the vast literature of Buddhist philosophy comprised under the name Abhidhamma, there has been no more useful and used handbook than the Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha, which for more than eight centuries now has occupied a unique position as primer and manual for students of psychology and philosophy in Burma and Ceylon. Its excellence as a handbook for further study, and a compendium for ready reference, brought about a considerable amount of exegetical literature, which became all the more necessary owing to the extremely condensed nature of the compendium.

The earliest known attempt in compiling an interpretation of the compendium, without making its reconstitution of a condensation, is the Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha-ṭīkā which is called the Poraṇa-ṭīkā and ascribed to Vimalabuddhi Thera (Sāsv. 34; Sāsanavaṁsa Dīpa, v. 1223). In Burma this author is also called Nava Vimalabuddhi, but he is better known in Ceylon as Sāriputta Mahāsāmi. His pupil too wrote a sub-commentary on the Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha, entitled theAbhidhammattha-vibhāvanī, “which still remains in favour both in Burma and in Ceylon” (Pali Literature of Ceylon, 178), whereas the Poraṇa-ṭīkā “is considered quite superannuated” (Compendium of Philosophy, ix) and so little used, that “this work is not known to exist in Ceylon at present” (De Z. p. 4). Even the very exhaustive Laṅkāvē Puskolapot Nāmāvaliya (K.D. Somadasa) has failed to discover a single manuscript. The Gandhavaṁsa, or History of Books (Minayeff ed.), although far more detailed than either the Sāsanavaṁsa or Sāsanavaṁsadīpa and mentioning names of authors and works of several abhidhammasaṅgaha-anuṭīkās, such as the Dasagaṇḍhivaṇṇanā by Vepullabuddhi and the Maṇisāra-mañjusā by Ariyavaṁsa, has no reference to the oldest interpretation of the Compendium of Philosophy, the Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha-Poraṇa-Ṭīkā.

A dictionary of Pali synonyms, compiled by Moggallāna thera who resided in Jetavana Vihāra in Polonnaruwa (Ceylon) during the reign of king Parākramabāhu the Great (1153–1186 C.E.). The work enjoys the highest authority, holding in Pali literature the same place as the well-known Amarakośa in Sanskrit.

Thus we find 32 epithets of the Buddha, 46 of Nibbāna, 20 of Sakka, the king of the gods, to mention only three of 179 entries of the first book on Heaven (sagga-khaṇḍa). The second book on earth (bhū-khaṇḍa) is divided into six chapters on earth as soil (bhūmivagga); on township (puravagga) which contains, e.g., 24 synonyms for house; a chapter on humans (nara-vagga), giving, e.g. 10 synonyms for man, 15 for woman, but 24 for a wise one, with many details of their anatomy, clothing and household articles; a chapter on the social order of the four castes (catubbaṇṇa-vagga) with the greatest number of sobriquets (19) reserved for one’s enemy; a chapter on forest-gardens (araññādi-vagga) and one on the underworld (pātāla-vagga) which includes all that is not solid earth, e.g., hells, oceans and water-lilies. The third book is miscellaneous (sāmañña-khaṇḍa) and has four chapters on distinctive features (visesyādhīna-vagga), on mixed items (saṅkiṇṇā-vagga), on manifold aspects (anekattha-vagga) and on indeclinable prefixes (avyaya-vagga).

A commentary thereon, the Abhidhānappadīpikāṭīkā, was composed by Caturaṅgabala of Vijayapura, a Burmese explanation by Ñāṇāvāsa, and a complete index with grammatical notes, the Abhidānappadīpikā-sūci, by a Ceylon Buddhist monk, Waskaḍuwē Subhūti in 1883.

Covetousness, mentioned as the last item in a long list of 100 synonyms of lust (lobha: Dhs. § 1059), the root of all evil (akusalamūla), although many items of this list are more descriptive than synonymous, e.g., that which ensnares (jālinī), that which leads to renewed existence (bhavanettī), while other items are more general than specific, e.g., craving (āsā), thirst (taṇhā), hindrance (nīvaraṇa), all of which include many other kinds apart from covetousness.

Abhijjhā is an intensification of burning up (jhayati), consuming, wasting away through longing; although, etymologically, through the Sanskrit form abhidhyāna, it is derived from abhi + dhyā, i.e., from dhyāyati, “to search for”, “to hunt after”.

Whenever the term is explained, frequently, if not always, identical descriptions are found for abhijjhā, covetousness, and lobha, greed (e.g. Dhs. §§ 389 and 391), when the two terms are identically described as greed (lobha), lust (lubbhana), lustfulness (lubbhitatta), infatuation (sārāga), feeling of infatuation (sārajjanā), passionate prepossession (sārajjitatta), covetousness (abhijjhā), the root of evil (akusalamūla).

But, although the descriptions are identical, it will be seen that lust (lobha) is grouped with two other causes of evil (akusalahetu), viz., hate (dosa) and obtuseness (moha), whereas covetousness (abhijjhā) is grouped as a bodily tie (kāyagantha) together with ill-will (vyāpāda), the contagion of ritualism (sīlabbata-parāmāsa) and the inclination to dogmatise (saccābhinivesa: Dhs. §§ 1059 and 1136). Thus if one is intent on differentiation, one might say that lobha is greed considered as a cause from which further evil arises, whereas abhijjhā is covetousness considered as an inherited tendency. For, the classifying term: bodily tie (kāyagantha) is explained as that which binds to physical existence in repeated rounds of birth, by way of birth and death (DhsA. pp. 49, 377).

Covetousness (abhijjhā) would appear to be a more advanced state of greed (lobha), for we are told that “covetousness means coveting: a process of inclining towards another’s property when confronted with it. It has the characteristic mark of thinking, ‘Ah! would this were mine’! As offence it is small or great, as in the case of theft. Its two constituent factors are: another’s property, and the bending over of oneself. Though greed for an object which is another’s property has arisen (lobhe uppanne), it does not receive the distinction of being a full course of action so long as one does not bend over it saying, ‘Ah, would this were mine’,”! (DhsA. 101). It is thus the bending over of oneself (attano pariṇāmana) which gives to greed (lobha) the full grown state of covetousness (abhijjhā).

A more obvious parallel could be drawn between the groups lobha-dosa-moha and abhijjhā-vyāpāda-micchadiṭṭhi, where both sets are analogous with this slight difference, that the lobha-dosa-moha combination appears to be more general: greed (lobha) as against lust (abhijjhā); hate (dosa) as against aversion (vyāpāda); delusion (moha) as against wrong views (micchadiṭṭhi). Thus covetousness (abhijjhā) is more specified, more intensified, perhaps.

A decisive distinction between greed (lobha) and covetousness (abhijjhā) is found in the Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta, where covetousness is mentioned as “unskill” (abhijjhā akusalaṁ) and greed as the root of “unskill” (lobho akusalamūlaṁ: (M. I, p. 47).

In the Nikāyas we find covetousness very frequently mentioned together with distress (abhijihādomanassa), e.g., in the Kandaraka Sutta (M. I, p. 340), sutta 51) and the Gaṇaka Moggallāna Sutta (M. III, p. 2), sutta 107). In the Padhāna Sutta (A. II, p. 16), sutta 14), covetousness and distress are shown as results of lack of control of the senses, and an effort to restrain (saṁvarappadhāna) is given as the remedy thereto, which elsewhere is called “the mode of progress that tames” (damā paṭipadā: (A. II, p. 152), sutta 164) the senses which, untamed, will cause coveting and distress, evil and unprofitable states to flow in.

The well-known and oft repeated Sutta on the Foundations of Mindfulness (Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta: (D. II, p. 290), with its fourfold method of contemplating the body, feelings, consciousness and mental objects, describes such a contemplative monk as ardent, clearly comprehending and mindful, having overcome in this world covetousness and distress (vineyya loke abhijjhā-domanassaṁ).

That in this combination with abhijjhā we find so persistently a preference of domanassa over other types of dukkha, is significant, and the specific type of mental conflict as distress (domanassa) sheds its peculiar light on abhijjhā in preference to lobha, the more general, greedy attachment.

This is all the more remarkable, as there are only two mental states which are accompanied by distress (domanassa-sahagata), and they are, according to the Abhidhamma view, rooted in or associated with aversion (paṭigha-sampayutta: Dhs. § 413).

Thus, when covetousness (abhijjhā) is mentioned in the suttas side by side with distress (domanassa), it would appear as if they in their specific fields cover the same ground, as greed (lobha) and hate (dosa) respectively do in a more general way.

The absence of covetousness (vigatābhijjha) is the peaceful state of mind required for a monk who, after his round of alms-gathering, has seated himself at the foot of a tree to engage himself in mindfulness (M. III, p. 3). And with this, we seem to arrive at the moral implication of covetousness as an act of coveting, while the philosophic implication as a general root of evil is reserved for greed (lobha): “Although others may be coveting, we will not covet” (pare abhijjālū bhavissanti, mayaṁ ettha anabhijjālū bhavissāma: (M. I, p. 42).

Covetousness is mentioned as the first in a series of five which, in addition, includes aversion (vyāpāda), sloth and torpor (thīna-middha), excitement and worry (uddhacca-kukkucca) and perplexity (vicikicchā), with the identical formula: “Putting away covetousness for the world, he lives with a heart that hankers not, and purifies his mind of covetousness” (so abhijjhaṁ loke pahāya vigatābhijjhena cetasā vihārati, abhijjhāya cittaṁ parisodheti: (D. I, p. 71): Sāmañña-phala Sutta). “By getting rid of these five hindrances–-which defile mind and weaken intuitive wisdom–-aloof from pleasures of the senses, aloof from unskilful states of mind, a monk enters on and abides in the first stage of mental absorption” (M. I, p. 181), Cūḷahatthipadopama Sutta, No. 27).

This series of five, in which the term covetousness (abhijjhā) is frequently replaced by the identical sensual lust (kāmacchanda: (M. I, p. 60), is collectively referred to as the five hindrances (pañca nīvaraṇāni), for they prevent the arising of good thoughts by way of obstructing mental absorption (jhāna). The interchangeability of covetousness (abhijjhā) and sensual lust (kāmacchanda) brings into further relief the specific difference of covetousness (abhijjhā) from the more general greed (lobha). Thus we find lust mentioned as a fetter (saṁyojana: (S. V, p. 61), but greed as a defilement (kilesa) which is more general than a specific obstruction, and which appears as such only in the later canonical books (Dhs. § 1548).

As a specific act of immorality we find covetousness mentioned among the ten unskilful ways of acting (dāsa akusalakammapathā): three bodily evil actions: killing, stealing, uncontrolled sexual indulgence; four oral evil actions: lies, slander, harsh speech and gossip; three mental evil actions: covetousness (abhijjhā), aversion (vyāpāda) and wrong views (micchā diṭṭhi). These ten are very frequently referred to merely as the ten unskilful actions (dasa akusalāni), whereas the abstinences therefrom are the ten skilful actions.

What appears to be a mere corruption of tradition occurs in the substitution of avidyā, ignorance, for the usual abhidyā, covetousness, in its Sanskrit form (Mhvu. II, 99, 5–12). In the complete series of ten, ignorance is, of course, already represented by wrong views (micchā diṭṭhi), and one may wonder whether the similarity of sound (abhidyā-avidyā) was the cause of the substitution at a time when tradition was still not committed to writing.

The absence of covetousness (anabhijjhā) together with good-will (avyapāda), right attention (sammā-sati) and right concentration (sammā-samādhi) are called collectively the four bases of the Dhamma (cattāri dhammapadāni: (D. III, p. 229); (A. II, p. 29), “reckoned as ancient, of long standing, traditional, primeval, pure and unadulterated now as then, neither confounded, nor despised”. In this context, dhamma should be taken to stand for moral righteousness rather than doctrine, for the factors constituting it are the opposites of the evil roots of greed (lobha), hate (dosa) and delusion (moha).

How covetousness arises from the sight of splendour and wealth is told by the Buddha in the Brāhmaṇa-dhammika Sutta (Sn. II, 7), when describing the self-controlled lives of the brāhmans of old: But Translation by Lord Chalmers, HOS. XXXVII, p. 73.

“then corruption came. Bit by bit, they saw the monarch’s splendour, women richly dight, steeds yoked to chariots, gay coverlets, stately abodes, and chamber'd palaces, girt round with crowded byres, and graced with troops of women fair to view;–-vast mundane wealth those brahmins saw, and seeing, coveted”.

Of his own experience the Buddha related to Jāṇussoṇi, the brāhman, how without covetousness even before his enlightenment he used to dwell in lonely places in forest and jungle “braced with great confidence” (lit. with fallen hair: palloma, the opposite of the hair standing up in fear: (M. I, p. 17), whereas recluses who take to a life of solitude in the wilds with strong passionate desires and covetousness, call upon themselves but fear and dread.

Covetousness indeed is bred by the evil disposition of the heart, hidden in the pleasures of the senses and the perception thereof, be it here and now, or in some after-life. It hampers progress but can be overcome by concentration of thought, when through awareness it can be prevented from arising (M. II, p. 262): Ānañja-sappāya Sutta).

Obviously an intensification of māna (q.v.) pride, which is derived from māneti, to honour, to think highly of; and the prefix abhi, out, over, all-round. Abhimāna, therefore, is an all-round high opinion of one’s self.

Although the Cullaniddesa (505) gives ten groups of forms (vidha) of pride (māna), each group consisting of one kind of pride more than the previous group, bringing the total to 55 kinds (including, however, several repetitions in different groups), yet the term abhimāna does not occur there. It would not be difficult, of course, to identify this term with one of those, most of which merely indicate certain degrees of intensity. Moreover, the prefix abhi is sometimes taken for the prefix ati, as in abhikkanta and atikkanta.

The term atimāna is very frequently used with other compounds of māna, atimāna, mānātimāna, omāna, adhimāna, asmimmāna, micchamāna. Other combinations such as kodhātimāna, vaṇṇātimāna, saggātimāna, anatimāna, occur, but discussing these terms would not serve any purpose here, unless the interchange of abhi- and ati- is firmly established.

The word is found, however, in post-canonical works. Thus the word abhivadati, used in the Pañcattaya Sutta (M. II, p. 237), 102) when someone declares it as his idea that Nibbāna is a mere beneficial or useful mode of progress (nibbānaṁ sappayam eva paṭipadam abhivadati), has been paraphrased in the Papañcasūdanī (IV, 27) as “speaks of it with arrogance” (abhimānena upavadati). In Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit the term occurs as an adjective in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka (380. 1), meaning proud, conceited (abhimānika), whereas the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra (146. 13) uses the same adjective in the meaning of holding an erroneous view. As a noun it is found in the Gaṇḍavyūha (527. 10), indicating pride of birth (jatyā-bhimānikā).

Finally, the term occurs twice in the Abhidhānappadīpikā, a dictionary of Pali synonyms, where we are given (item 171) the following equivalents: pride, arrogance, self-conceit (gabba, abhimāna, ahaṅkāra) and pride of wealth, insolence, pedantry (dhanādi-dappe paññayaṁ abhimāna; ibid. 860).

Although the term is derived from the material abode or house (nivesa), its significance has become entirely psychological in the sense of a tendency for settling down in the mind, an adherence to a view, an inclination to a belief. Thus, when it is said that “all things ought not to be adhered to” (sabbe dhammā n'ālaṁ abhinivesāyā: (M. I, p. 251); (S. IV, p. 50) the commentary explains that whatsoever belongs to the three worlds of existence is not to be adhered to with a mental obsession. The term is then used in juxtaposition to parāmāsa, a contagion, and gāha, a mental possession. It is, thus, a mental fixation (cetaso-adhiṭṭhāna), a prejudice and a bias (abhinivesānusaya: (S. II, p. 17); (S. III, p. 135). It is frequently used to describe the attachment to the wrong views of eternalism, annihilationism, &c. (diṭṭhi-saññojanaṁ gāho paṭiggāho abhi-niveso parāmāso kummaggo micchāpatho ... Dhs. §§ 381, 1003, 1005, 1117, &c.); and it is by the destruction and surrender of this foothold that the mind becomes fully freed (S. III, p. 13).

There are two suttas of this name, both occurring towards the very end of the division on the Aggregates (Khandha Saṁyutta: (S. III, p. 186). The difference is in one word only. The first sutta deals with the bondage of depending upon the fetter of clinging to the five aggregates of existence. This bondage of depending upon the fetters (saññojanābhinivesa-vinibandha) is intensified in the subject of the second sutta of this name by attachment to the bondage of depending upon the fetters (saññojanābhinivesa-vinibandhājjhosāna). The fetters referred to here are not the usual ten fetters (dasasaṁyojana) on the breaking of which depends the gradual progress on the path towards arahantship. The fetters under consideration in these two suttas are fetters of clinging to the body (rūpa), to sensations (vedanā), to perceptions (saññā), to mental formations (saṅkhārā) and to consciousness (viññāṇa). Dependence (abhinivesa) on those fetters is a bondage (vinibandha), but attachment (ajjhosāna) to such bondage makes deliverance well-nigh an impossibility. It is the reflection that these five aggregates of existence are not permanent, that the impermanent is not satisfactory and is subject to change; it is by such reflection that no bondage of dependence thereon can arise and no attachment to such bondage. For him who views things thus there is also the knowledge that for him there will be no further rebirth in this present process of becoming (nāparam itthattāyāti pajānāti).

The normal state of consciousness in which takes place most of our thinking, planning and reasoning with more or less lucidity has, like the colour spectrum with its flanks of infra-red and ultra-violet, two adjoining spheres of infra-conscious perception and ultra-conscious insight. All three spheres are types of knowledge (ñāṇa), but perceptive knowledge (saññā) may be without full conscious awareness (viññāṇa), whereas the intuitive knowledge of insight (abhiññā) dispenses with the perceptive and formative types of thought.

Perception (saññā), even if it leads to awareness (viññāṇa), merely tells us what things look like and, being further guided on to consciousness by ideations or mental formations (saṅkhārā), it is necessarily influenced by those earlier acquired leanings. Abhiññā, on the other hand, is a kind of direct knowledge which has left behind the physical world of space and time, of perception, of ideation, of causality, of logical reasoning, and is, therefore, psychic in the fullest sense. It is not knowledge of composites, but insight into their nature. Such a complete knowledge becomes an experience which can bring about a total transformation in the relationship between the subject and object of this knowledge. It consists ultimately in seeing things as they are (yathā bhūtaṁ), and that is realisation (abhisamaya).

Realisation can come along different paths, which, however, have this in common: the subjection of the wandering and distracted mind in concentration of thought (samādhi). Various methods to achieve this goal are outlined in many discourses and have been amplified by later commentators, in particular by Buddhaghosa in the Visuddhimagga. In short, it is the way to peace of mind (samatha), quietude of heart and calming of the passions by means of a process of, sublimation whereby a state of trance, or mental absorption (jhāna, q.v.), is induced. It is an attempt to bring both body and mind into an intensive alertness or watchfulness (satipaṭṭhāna) through a purified receptivity. Through mindfulness (sati) is reached mental calm, insight (abhiññā), enlightenment, and Nibbāna (S. V, p. 179). It is in this state of the truly open mind that there might be developed psychic powers, which would appear to the average man as supernatural, but which are as yet only supernormal. They are, however, only the by-products of that intuitive understanding through insight (abhi-ññā) which forms the subject of this present article.

The acquisition of these intuitive powers is then one of the aims of concentration (samādhi) through the manifold methods of meditation (bhāvanā) which is, more literally, mental development or culture. This intuition itself, however, is not the goal, but one of the steps leading to the deliverance of Nibbāna.

The essence of the Buddha’s teaching is embedded in the Four Noble Truths (cattāri ariya-saccāni) of what is conflict (dukkha), the cause of conflict (dukkha-samudaya), the solution of conflict (dukkha-nirodha) and the way towards solving the problems of conflict (dukkha-nirodha-gāminī-paṭipadā). These Four Noble Truths are said to be declared by the Buddha expressly “because they are profitable (attha-saṁhita), because they belong to the essence of existence (dhamma-saṁhita), because they are the foundations of a pure life (ādi-brahmacariyaka), because they are conducive to complete dispassion (ekanta-nibbidā), to cessation of desires (nirodha), to peace of mind (upasama), to direct knowledge-insight (abhiññā), to enlightenment (sambodha) and deliverance (nibbāna)” D. III, xxix, Pāsādika Suttanta, p. 137; A. IV, p. 26). Abhiññā is placed in this formula towards the very end, only to be followed by enlightenment itself, thereby indicating its high position of importance.

Satisfaction and happiness (veda-paṭilābha somanassa-paṭilābha) can be obtained even in conquest of war, as admitted by Sakka the ruler of the gods, but that is not conducive to peace, to intuitive knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nibbāna (na upasamāya, na abhiññāya, na sambodhāya, na nibbānāya saṁvattanti) D. II, xxi, Sakha-pañha Suttanta, p. 285.. It is only through peace of mind that intuition can germinate and develop into full enlightenment. This peace of mind, however, should be well understood. For the Buddhist aspirant (yogāvacara) to an intensely deep, spiritual life there is no divine spirit with whom he could desire spiritual union, as is the case of the Christian mystic or the Hindu yogi. His striving for a divine consciousness or celestial vision (dibbacakkhu) as a momentary substitution of his earthly process of consciousness is never an end in itself, but only a means to spiritual growth and mental culture, to be discarded almost as soon as acquired, to prevent it from taking root or forming a source of attachment. Even the fixation of thought in one-pointedness of mind (citt'ekaggatā) is desirable only as a means to overcome the distractions of a wandering mind. For here lies a very actual danger as in the temporary extinction of the fires of lust (lobha) and aversion (dosa) there is much opportunity for self-complacency in mental fixation. And that would not be conducive to further development of spiritual effort, as it would thereby leave room for stagnation, long before the goal is in sight. The goal is a total extinction of those fires, a complete eradication of those roots of all evil, the attainment of arahantship and perfect enlightenment, which cannot be achieved during an actual state of mental absorption (jhāna). The search, therefore, is not for blissful union with the One, but for the Void. It is not in peaceful concentration (samatha), but in the contemplation of insubstantiality (anatta) and of emptiness (suññatā) that the channel of emancipation is open (anattānupassanā attābhinīvesaṁ muñcanti suññatānupassanā nāma vimokkhamukhaṁ hoṭi) Abhs. JPTS. 1884, p. 45., which frees the mind from the idea of self, an ego, or a soul.

In the same way as the lower stages of mental absorption (jhāna) are steps leading to deeper concentration, gradually discarding their individual characteristics of discursive thinking (vitakka), sustained application of thought (vicāra), zest (pīti) and well-being (sukha), so the various forms of spiritual achievement on mundane levels (lokiya) are to be considered as mere stepping stones to that supramundane power (lokuttara), which, in discarding concentration (samādhi) and mental absorption (jhāna) altogether, reaches out to penetrating insight (vipassanā) into the characteristics (lakkhaṇa) of all existence, namely, impermanence (anicca), conflict (dukkha), and insubstantiality (anatta). It is this insight alone that can solve the problem of life and its ever repeated cycle of birth and death, by the total annihilation of all greed (lobha), aversion (dosa) and delusion (moha).

Abhiññā, therefore, falls naturally into two main divisions, mundane (lokiya) and supramundane (lokuttara). The first is attainable through perfection in mental concentration (samādhi) and consists of five kinds (pañc'abhiññā) as follows:

1. magical powers (iddhividhā) of

(a) determination (adhiṭṭhāna iddhi),
(b) transformation (vikubbana iddhi),
(c) creation (manomaya iddhi),
(d) penetrating knowledge (ñāṇavipphāra iddhi),
(e) penetrating concentration (samādhivipphāra iddhi),
(f) remembrance of former existences (pubbenivāsānussati);

2. divine ear (dibbasota);

3. penetration of the minds of others (ceto-pariya-ñāṇa);

4. divine eye (dibbacakkhu) and

5. remembrance of former existences (pubbenivāsānussati).

The second type is the supramundane (lokuttara) power of intuitive knowledge, which is attainable through penetrating insight (vipassanā), viz. the extinction of all mental intoxicants (āsavakkhaya) which is the realisation of arahantship.

The two divisions taken together, therefore, constitute the six kinds of psychic attainments usually referred to as chaḷ-abhiññā Vbh. 334..

One more kind of psychic power is referred to, in which case there are seven (sattābhiññā), the additional one being knowledge of the future (anāgataṁsa-ñāṇa) Abhvt. 103..

Har Dayal in The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature (pp. 108 ff.) has thrown some light on the process of growth of the formula of the abhi-jñā (abhiññā). Although it is generally accepted that āsavakkhaya-ñāṇa is the additional sixth item to the earlier group of five (pañcannaṁ abhiññānaṁ: (S. II, p. 216), §§ 16–28), which is omitted from the Dharma-saṅgraha (xx, p. 4) the Daśabhūmika Sūtra (pp. 34–35, J. Rahder, Paris, 1926) and the Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha (trsl. p. 209), Har Dayal makes it his point that insight into the destruction of the mental intoxicants belonged to the original set of five super-knowledges, but was relegated to the sixth place by the intruder ṛddhi-vidhā-jñāna (iddhi-vidhā), supernormal powers.

According to the Mahāvastu (chapter on enlightenment, I, 228–9) and the first Avalokita Sūtra (II, 283–4) only the celestial eye (divya-cakṣu), remembrance of previous lives (pūrvanivāsānusmṛti) and destruction of the cankers (āśrava-kṣaya) are mentioned, so following the tradition of the Sutta-piṭaka (M. I, p. 22–23). This tradition is also recorded in the Lalitavistara (pp. 344–5), but there is nothing to indicate in these works that this group of three is either comprehensive or even collectively called abhijñā. Neither does the fact that the Kassapa Saṁyutta (S. II, p. 212–3) mentions these three last in order of the six abhiññā provide any evidence of the earlier three having been added on later, nor does it prove that these three were “borrowed from the schools of wonder-working ascetics or impostors, that have always flourished in India” (op. cit. p. 110).

Here follows a slightly more detailed exposition of these various types of intuition and psychic power. The first division is called mundane (lokiya) as the types falling under this category are associated with a mental development which has now risen above the mundane level, whereas the second division is called supramundane (lokuttara) because of its exclusive connection with the Path of Holiness (ariya-magga).

The psychic powers called iddhi-vidhā are frequently referred to as magical powers, for they include most of those claimed for modern mediums. The Buddha is represented as saying: “It is because I see danger in the practice of these mystic powers that I loathe and abhor them and am ashamed thereof” (D. I, p. 23).

The possession of such magical power is in itself no sign of virtue, for even Devadatta was able to make use of such power in order to win over prince Ajātasattu in his scheming against the Buddha (Vin. II, p. 185); DhA. I, 139.). A display of such powers is reckoned as an offence against the regulations laid down for Buddhist monks (Vin. II, p. 112), while the claiming to possess such powers without basis of truth is even so serious an offence (pārājika) that expulsion from the Order is involved (Vin. III, p. 91).

These psychic or magical powers (iddhi) are treated in detail in the Visuddhimagga, Paramattha-mañjūsā and Vibhaṅga. In the sense of attainment of the supernormal they are called “modes of success” (iddhi-vidhā) Vism. xii, §§ 20–26, pp. 318–9.. And they are distinguished by the various kinds of success, such as the following:

Adhiṭṭhāna-iddhi is success by resolve, because by a resolution or an act of will phenomena are produced outside one’s body which are mind-made, projected images of oneself; being one, one becomes many (S. III, p. 15). Bilocation or multilocation, although not yet acknowledged as possible by modern physical science does not involve an intrinsic contradiction, as there is no absolute impossibility in the same body being at once circurmscriptively in one place and definitively elsewhere. In such a case, however, as local extension (paṭhavī) is an inherent and essential quality (bhūta) of matter (rūpa), the replications will lack the essential material qualities and will be, therefore, phantasmal replications, or projected images.

Vikubbana-iddhi is the power of transforming one’s body into some other form, such as a boy or a serpent, thereby abandoning and altering one’s normal form without the duplication of personality. It is this power which was used by Devadatta to win over the young prince Ajātasattu (Vin. II, p. 185); DhA. I, 189.). Mahā Moggallāna referred to this power in particular, when saying:

“... I can instantly innumerable times
Create a living shape; skilled to transform myself
As other, yea, all magic power have I at will” Thag. verse 1183..

Manomaya-iddhi is the power of creating phenomena produced by the mind in resolution Vism. xii, § 135, p. 341.. Such a created visible form has no sensitivity and there is no sex or life faculty in it either VismA. 398.. If the possessor of this supernormal power walks up end down, the creation walks up and down there, too. But, if the possessor of such magical power wishes to make his creations different in appearance, he should emerge from the basic state of mental absorption and make a corresponding resolution before re-entering and attaining once more this supernormal field of power Vism. xii, § 67, p. 327; VismA. 390..

Ñāṇavipphāra-iddhi is the power of pervading through knowledge (ñāṇa), thereby intervening in the natural course of events, such as the prevention of death in the case of Bakkula who otherwise would not have reached the path of arahantship MA. IV, p. 190; Vism. xii, § 27, p. 319..

Samādhivipphāra-iddhi is the power of radiating through concentration (samādhi), whereby whilst in this state of concentration no pain will be felt and death cannot occur before emerging from the state of mental absorption (jhāna). Thus, no harm came to Sāriputta when he received a blow on his shaven head from a wicked spirit, as at that time he was absorbed in concentration (Ud. 39).

These two powers of pervading through knowledge and radiating through concentration, are thus means of preventing the normal course of action from taking effect, wherefore they are rightly grouped as supernormal powers: (iddhi). When the Buddha enumerated to Ajātasattu the fruits of the life of a monk (D. I, p. 78), in the Sāmañña-phala Sutta, he elaborated the supernormal power of determination (adhiṭṭhāna-iddhi) which elsewhere (S. III, p. 15–18).) also is illustrated in great detail: “Being one he becomes many, or having become many, he becomes one again; he becomes visible or invisible; without let he passes through walls, through fences, through mountains, as if they were but air; he penetrates up and down through solid earth, as if it were but water; he walks on water without parting it, as if it were solid ground; cross-legged he travels through the air, as a bird on the wing; he touches and handles the moon and the sun, though they be so potent and mighty; even in this body of his, he scales the heights of the world up to the heaven of Brahma; just as a clever potter could succeed in making out of clay any shape of vessel he wanted to have”.

But although among the kinds of supernormal power only adhiṭṭhāna-iddhi is mentioned, the other powers of transformation (vikubbana) and creation (manomaya) are equally to be counted Vism. xii, § 45, p. 323.. The powers named iddhi are grouped as one item of supernormal intellection (abhiññā) and this one item usually comprises the five powers mentioned so far. But we find further elaborations as follows (Ps. I, p. 112); II, p. 205; Vism. xii.):

Ariyā iddhi is the power of the Noble Ones, i.e., of those who have entered the Path of Holiness, who can look upon agreeable objects as disagreeable, and who can view the repulsive with equanimity. It is attained only by those who have mastered their mind.

Kammavipākaja-iddhi is the inherent or inborn power which is the result of past action, such as the power of birds to fly through the air without supernormal power.

Puññavato iddhi is not inherent as a power in one’s existence, but is acquired subsequently as a result of meritorious deeds in a former life. Thus, abundance and prosperity are “successes” of this kind; so is the power of levitation in humans, &c.

Vijjāmaya-iddhi is also an acquired power, not as a result of merit, but through knowledge or science. Aviation is a power typically representing this class; so hypnotism, incantation, &c.

Tattha-tattha-sammappayoga-paccayā pajjhānaṭṭhena iddhi is the power which brings success as the result of the correct use of opportunities. It is the ordinary power which can be exercised by men in ordinary walks of life. Thus the right application of renunciation leads to success in the abandoning of lustful desires.

All these powers (iddhi) would constitute the first of the five types of intuitive understanding or direct knowledge-insight (abhiññā). But it would not be complete to speak of the various psychic powers (iddhi) without referring also to the four bases of psychic power (iddhi-pāda) which, if cultivated and developed, do not contribute to so-called further progress either here or beyond (S. V, p. 252), but lead to the annihilation of all becoming. They are the wish-to-act (chando), energy (viriya), thought (citta) and investigation (vīmaṁsa). Each of these four bases is said to be accompanied by concentration and struggle (samādhi-padhāna-saṅkhāra-samannāgata) with the intention to be neither sluggish nor overstrained, without being inwardly cramped or outwardly distracted, with mind alert and thoughts unhampered (S. V, p. 264) ff.). As guides, they indicate the road; as precursors of success and prior causes thereof, they prepare the path Vism. xxii, § 36, p. 583. that goes on to the utter destruction of woe (S. V, p. 255).

Iddhi then constitutes the first type of intuitive understanding (abhiññā).

The second type of this intuitive understanding or direct knowledge-insight is called the celestial means of hearing (dibba-sota-dhātu). It is called celestial or divine, as it is a sensitivity to perceive sounds, consistent with the refined nature of deities, acquired by them through their good karma Vism. xiii, § 2, p. 343.. As a type of direct knowledge (abhiññā) it can be produced through the development of energy and is called an ear-element (sota-dhātu), because this type of intuition does not manifest itself in forms and is thus more like the perception of sound. By this means then is acquired the understanding of things, purified and surpassing that of men, sounds both of devas and mankind, both far and near (D. I, p. 79); III, 281; (A. III, p. 15). It is sometimes translated as clairaudience. Being the capacity to hear sounds not belonging to the physical world, it is another psychic faculty. The hearing can be either external or internal. Tones are heard externally even though arising within the head. When voices are heard they seem frequently to make suggestions. But many times, a careful scrutiny of such communications makes it evident that the recipient is self-deluded and is dramatising the contents of his own unconscious mind Phoebe Payne: Man’s Latent Powers, p. 153.. The more developed or positive psychic knows that the sounds or words heard by him are only his own natural method of translating the knowledge acquired intuitionally.

The third type of intuitional knowledge (abhiññā) may be called “thought-reading” for it is the knowledge of the thoughts of others (paracitta-vijānana). “With his own mind he encompasses and knows the thoughts of other beings, other persons (parasattānaṁ parapuggalānaṁ cetasā ceto paricca pajānāti) (D. I, p. 79); III, 281; (A. III, p. 16). He knows the passionate mind as such; and the mind free therefrom; the malignant mind; the infatuated mind, and the minds free therefrom; the cramped and the scattered minds; the lofty and the vulgar; the better and the inferior; the controlled and the dissipated; the liberated mind and the mind not free”. It is truly penetration of minds (cetopariya) and penetration of hearts (cetaso pariya), and is directed exclusively to the thoughts of other beings, i.e., “of the rest of beings, himself excluded” (parassattānaṁ ti attānaṁ ṭhapetvā sesasattānaṁ) Vism. xiii, § 8, p. 344.. Buddhaghosa continues to explain the method of developing such knowledge. From the attainment of mental absorption by means of the light (āloka)-device one should observe with the celestial eye (dibbacakkhu) the colour of the blood in the physical heart (hadaya-rūpa). The various colours indicate the different kinds of mental states. Thus joy (somanassa) is shown to be like the red colour of the fruits of a banyan tree; while grief (domanassa) darkens that colour like that of a rose-apple fruit; and equanimity (upekkhā) gives the golden hue of sesamum oil.

The fourth type of intuitional knowledge is called the celestial eye (dibbacakkhu). This purified vision, which surpasses that of ordinary men, sees “beings faring on and being reborn, some low, some lofty, some beautiful, some ugly, some happy, some miserable” (D. III, p. 281); (A. III, p. 17). It is with this supernormal vision that people can be known to pass away from this life according to their works (yathākammūpage satte pajānāti), those given over to evil ways in deed, word and thought to be reborn in hell and those who acted rightly in deed, word and thought to be reborn in a happy place of bliss. Thus, it is the kind of knowledge by means of which is known the passing away and the rebirth of beings (cutūpapātañāṇa) Vism. xiii, § 72, p. 357.. This type of knowledge is a cause of purification of view (diṭṭhi), for he who sees only the passing away of beings and not their reappearance assumes an annihilationist’s point of view, while he who is aware only of the appearance of beings might conclude therefrom that this existence is their original and only life Ibid. § 74..

In the same chapter Buddhaghosa makes also certain introductory remarks about the preliminary and the requisite conditions for the development of this faculty. Only three meditation devices (kasiṇa) are said to be suitable in this connection: the fire device (tejo-kasiṇa), the white-coloured device (odāta-kasiṇa), and the light aperture (āloka-kasiṇa) Vism. xiii, § 95, p. 361.. Complete mental absorption (jhāna), however, should not be entered upon, as in such a mental state intuitive knowledge will not arise. But, during neighbourhood- (or access-) concentration (upacārajjhāna) the meditation device should be made the basis of the development of this supernormal intuitive knowledge of celestial vision. This preliminary work of access-concentration, however, is of short duration, and, if full absorption is not allowed, it will quickly lapse. Hence, this basic meditation for further introspective development (pādakajjhāna) has to be repeated again and again, till the light gets gradually consolidated and remains in a predetermined area. Then, physical objects which are not within the focus of the physical eye (maṁsacakkhu) will come into the focus of the eye of knowledge (ñāṇacakkhu).

Celestial vision may be followed by yathā-kammūpaga-abhiññā which is supernormal insight concerning event-according-to-deed, by which a particular event in the past history of a particular individual is discerned; or by anāgataṁsa-abhiññā, which is intuitive knowledge by which a particular event of his future history is discerned.

This last one is not to be confused with the power of prophecy (anāgataṁsa-ñāṇa), confined to the Buddha, who alone can take every possible condition into account. This power of prophecy is sometimes counted as an abhiññā, in which case there are seven: sattābhiññā Abhvt. 108.. The Buddha, while relating his own experiences during the days before his enlightenment Upakkilesa Sutta: A. IV, p. 26–162, remarked on the fading away of apperception, which he found was due in turn to doubts arising in him and disturbing his mental concentration, then to intellectual shortcomings, to flurry and worry, to fear, to excitement, to unchaste thoughts, to excessive effort, or to slackness. Only after he had got rid of each and everyone of these blemishes (kilesa), was he able to develop mental concentration in various degrees of observation.

The remembrance of former existences (pubbenivāsānussati) is the fifth and last of the five mundane types of intuitive knowledge (lokiya-pañcābhiññā). With this supernormal power one can call to mind previous existences through many an \ae on of progression (saṁvaṭṭakappa) and many an \ae on of destruction (vivaṭṭakappa), and in each existence remember one’s name, clan, caste, experiences of happiness and sorrow, and the full span of life in all detail and circumstance (D. I, p. 81): III, 281; (A. III, p. 16). This psychic faculty, although certainly supernormal, is not special to the followers of the Buddha. Even the commentator admits that this power is found with other sectarians (titthiya) Vism. xiii, § 15, p. 346., although with certain restrictions and limitations. To develop this a beginner has to trace in reverse order the actions performed in the course of each day. His normal consciousness, being thus trained in the observance of what is evident, will become more sensitive after this preliminary work; and, developed into this intuitive type of knowledge, thought can be brought back beyond the link of rebirth by adverting to “mentalised form” (nāma-rūpa) arising at the moment of death. For this reason it is also called knowledge of an individual’s death and (subsequent) rebirth (sattānaṁ cutūpapāte ñāṇa) Vbh. 334., in which case it is the same as the celestial eye (dibbacakkhu), but with this difference that remembrance of previous existence applies to one’s own past in the round of rebirth (saṁsāra), whereas the divine eye scans the rebirths of others at that present moment only.

Four rates of progress (paṭipadā) are enumerated, depending on whether progress is difficult (dukkhāpaṭipadā) or easy (sukhāpaṭipadā), whether direct knowledge-insight comes slowly (dandhābhiññā) or swiftly (khippābhiññā) D. III, xxxiii, Saṅgīti Suttanta, p. 228; D. III, xxviii, Sampasādanīya Suttanta, p. 106.. This progress is explained in the Atthasālinī as referring to progress of development of mental absorption (jhāna). Insight which occurs from access-concentration to full absorption is called direct knowledge-insight or intuition or supernormal insight (abhiññā). This insight is sluggish, weak and of slow occurrence in some, while in others it is quick, strong and swift. The first take long to attain to the manifestation of the jhāna-factors, while the latter attain them quickly Expositor, I, 244.. “It is not a mere intellectual process, but one cultivated in accordance with a certain system of concepts objectively valid” C.A.F. Rhys Davids: Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, pp. 17–18, note 2.. In this process there is more wisdom than reason, more insight than knowledge, more understanding than learning, more assimilation than information, and hence more application than speculation.

Positive psychism is part of the make-up of the spiritually developed person. But it is only part of that make-up. The pupil is rightly warned against seeking to develop psychic powers as an end in itself. Psychic powers are incidental to the greater quest of truth. There have been instances where the summit of holiness had been reached without any development of these psychic powers. The blind arahant Cakkhupāla is the classical example thereof DhpA. I, p. 1., whereas Devadatta is the classical example of one who having been in possession of those powers lost the “magic touch” by his lack of self-control.

But the attainment of the summit of perfection through the extinction of all mental intoxicants (āsavakkhaya) is a knowledge of insight (abhiññā) which is not only supernormal, but which may also be called supernatural in so far as it has transcended all the limitations and weaknesses of human nature. Thus this knowledge-insight of the total destruction of all mental intoxicants (āsavānaṅkhaye-ñāṇa) Vbh. 334. is frequently included in the list of six supernormal intuitions (chaḷ-abhiññā). Such intoxicants (āsava) are usually enumerated as four: the intoxicants of sensuous delight (kāma), of lust of life or desire for rebirth (bhava), of speculative views (diṭṭhi), and of ignorance (avijjā) Dhs. § 1448.. The extinction of these intoxicants leads immediately to arahantship which is the supreme fruit of the supramundane path (lokuttara-magga). Hence, this sixth kind of intuitive knowledge belongs to the second type of supramundane intuition (lokuttar-abhiññā). “Having destroyed the intoxicants one enters and abides in the emancipation of the mind, in the emancipation of insight which is free of the intoxicants and which is realised by one’s own knowledge even in this very life” (āsavānaṁ khayā anāsavaṁ cetovimuttiṁ paññā-vimuttiṁ diṭṭhe va dhamme sayaṁ abhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja vihārati) (D. III, p. 281); (A. III, p. 19). This spiritual intuitive knowledge gives comprehension of the five factors of grasping (pañcūpādānakkhandha), i.e., of existence as craving; it leads to abandonment of ignorance and craving for rebirth; it develops calm (samatha) and insight (vipassanā); it gives the realisation of wisdom and freedom (A. II, p. 246).

Among the forty subjects of meditation, it is especially the ten recollections (anussati) of the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Saṅgha, virtue, renunciation, devas, breathing, death, bodily composition and tranquillity, which have been declared by the Buddha to be conducive to intuitive knowledge (abhiññā), to perfect enlightenment (sambodha) and Nibbāna (A. I, p. 30). The six forms of intuition (abhiññā) constitute also part of the eight modes of vijjā, the other two being knowledge born of insight (vipassanā-ñāṇa) and the potency (iddhi) of the mental image. Together they form the states which partake of and which are the associates of wisdom (vij-jābhāgino) Dhs. § 1296., because they arise as parts and portions of wisdom DhsA. 50., although only knowledge born of insight is sometimes referred to, instead of the entire series of eight (D. I, p. 76).

Mention is sometimes made (e.g., in (A. III, p. 334) of six associated states of wisdom: the conception of impermanence (anicca-saññā), of conflict in impermanence (anicce dukkha-s°), of insubstantiality of conflict (dukkhe anatta-s°), the conceptions of renunciation (pahāna-s°) of dispassion (virāga-s°) and of cessation (nirodha-s°). These form a completely different set from the Abhidhamma formula and make no reference to abhiññā.

The importance of the development of this intuitive knowledge can he gathered from an oft repeated list of virtues, which are described in terms of abandoning even the various stages of spiritual progress, resulting from the gradual abandoning of mental absorption (jhāna), and leading up to supreme deliverance through complete dispassion (ekanta-nibbidā), fading away (virāga), cessation (nirodha), peace (upasama), direct knowledge-insight (abhiññā), to enlightenment (sambodha) and to Nibbāna D. III, xxix, Pāsādika Suttanta, p. 132: A. IV, p. 26).

Occurs frequently in combinations, e.g. gamiyābhisaṅkhāra (A. IV, p. 179) an inclination or preparation to set out on a journey, iddhābhisaṅkhāra (D. I, p. 106), the working of supernormal powers, which, although strongly censured in the code of discipline (Vin. III, p. 80), is yet mentioned in several instances even with the sanction of the Buddha himself (S. V, p. 270). The term, as it is employed, is more than an intensification of saṅkhāra, which originally would have indicated a preparation or disposition for action. It is the cumulative effort stored up in the preparation for action and released in the act. Hence the term is used for the kamma formations in the past which condition rebirth. Such formation may be wholesome and meritorious (puññābhisaṅkhāra) or the opposite (apuññābhisaṅkhāra), and a corresponding rebirth will result. They may even be “of no significance” (āneñjābhisaṅkhāra) without disturbing the smooth continuum of the process of becoming (bhavaṅga-sota). According to the teaching of dependent origination (paṭicca-samuppāda), these kamma formations are always conditioned by ignorance (avijjā). And “once all ignorance and craving are extinguished, no karma formations, good, evil or neutral, are produced and no further rebirth-consciousness will arise” (S. II, p. 81).

An essential distinction seems to be made between kamma and saṅkhāra, whenever in a discourse on causal bases (nidāna) preference is given to the latter term to indicate the formations of kamma, as planned action. This is brought out clearly in the following passage: “A man who is ignorant plans an act (of merit, demerit or of no significance), and consciousness is on its way; but when ignorance is banished and wisdom has arisen he does not plan action. Not planning, not willing, he does not grasp, is unperturbed and entirely freed” (S. I, p. 82).

Abhisaṅkhāra, then, is the planning of action, and is used synonymously with the willing or volition thereof: anabhisaṅkharonto anabhisañcetayanto na kiñci loke upādiyati: not planning action, not willing, he does not cling to anything in the world (ibid.).

It is used also in connection with consciousness (abhisaṅkhāraviññāṇa) by Buddhaghosa (DhsA. p. 357) as that which prepares new birth, not to be confused with relinking consciousness (paṭisandhi viññāṇa) which is a kamma resultant type of consciousness, arising at the moment of conception.

The religious significance of an ablution is a spiritual cleansing, symbolised by a physical washing which is sometimes a complete ritual of bathing or a mere token thereof, as in baptism by sprinkling. The efficacy of such an ablution is not so much in the medium, water, &c., as in the spiritual value attached to this medium and the ritual. An ablution then becomes a purification of the inner nature through the washing of the outer.

In tropical countries, where water is scarce, sometimes sand, but more frequently ashes, have been used for ablution. Especially the sacred ashes, remaining from a sacrificial fire, are even now in great demand and applied on the forehead and upper arms by the followers of the rites of Śaivism, “a bath sacred to fire” Colebrooke: Miscellaneous Essays II, p. 154.. But whatever the medium or the ritual, religious ablutions indicate a vicarious purification.

Now, one of the essential tenets of the teaching of the Buddha is that each one has to be a lamp (or island) and refuge for himself (attadīpa attasaraṇa) (S. V, p. 162). Reliance on ritual (sīlabbataparāmāsa), moreover, is one of the lower fetters (saṁyojana) which prevent an individual from entering into the stream (sotāpatti) or path of holiness (ariya magga). It is not surprising, therefore, that the Dhovana Sutta A. V, x, sutta 107, p. 216. censures the occasion of a cleansing ceremony in the southern districts, accompanied by eating, drinking, dancing and singing, as being “low, common, vulgar, ignoble and useless”. But the commentarial description of this “bone-washing ceremony” (aṭṭhidhovana) seems to be open to doubt. “In those districts people do not cremate the dead bodies of their relatives, but they dig a pit and bury them in the ground. Later, the bones of the putrefied mass are dug up, washed, then one by one raised, honoured with perfumes and flowers, and set aside. At the auspicious time these bones are taken up and a festival is celebrated with weeping and lamenting” AA. V, p. 71..

Here, the washing does not seem to be so much a ceremonial ablution, as a necessity for disposing of decomposing matter; for the washing does not form part of the celebrations at the auspicious time. Further, whereas the text of the sutta refers to a cleansing ceremony with eating, drinking, singing and dancing, the commentary mentions only weeping and lamentation. Moreover, in the commentary no reference is made to the supposed efficacy of the ritual. But that the ceremony was considered to be useful is clear from the Buddha’s condemnation thereof on this very score (anattha-saṁhita).

Not content with mere destructive criticism, the Buddha continues his discourse Dhovana sutta: A. IV, p. 26–7). with his view of a noble ablution (ariya-dhovana) which conduces to disgust with worldly life (nibbidā), waning of passions (virāga), ending of desires (nirodha), tranquillisation (upasama), comprehension (abhiññā), insight (sambodhi) and deliverance (nibbāna). This noble ablution consists in the practice of the Noble Eightfold Path (ariya aṭṭhaṅgika magga), for it is only through right understanding (samma-diṭṭhi) that wrong views can be expunged together with all their evil consequences and unprofitable states; likewise it is only correct thinking (sammā saṅkappa) which can purify all evil intention; right speech (sammā vācā) corrects the evil of lying words, slander, harsh language or frivolous talk; right action (sammā kammanta) can undo the evil effects of so-called sin; right living (sammā ājīva) cancels the destruction of wrong methods of livelihood; right effort (sammā vāyāma) can cleanse the unwholesome effects of either fanatical zeal or criminal negligence; right mindfulness (sammā sati) and right concentration (sammā samādhi) obliterate the undesirable effects of directing the mind to unsuitable objects of awareness and contemplation. To these eight sections of the Noble Path are added two more noble ablutions through right knowledge or insight (sammā ñāṇa) and right release (samma vimutti), all of which lead to various profitable conditions (aneke kusalā dhammā) and the fulness of culture (bhāvanā-pāripūrī). This, indeed, is the “ariyan” ablution whereby beings whose nature it is to be reborn, to decay and to die, are released from birth, decay and death with all the accompanying conflict and woe.

That “inner cleanliness comes first”, was well understood by Nandaka, a minister of the Licchavī whose conversation with the Buddha was interrupted by an attendant, reminding him that it was time for his bath. “Enough of this outward bathing. This inner cleansing (ajjhattaṁ nahānaṁ) through adherence to the Buddha shall be enough for me” (S. V, p. 390) Sotāpatti Saṁyutta.). Unfortunately, the sutta ends with this remark, and so we shall never know whether Nandaka was persistent in his refusal to see to his physical needs.

Even pleasure, when overdone, can become hardship. And so a daily bath, when practised by going down into the water even for a third time in the evening (sāya-tatiyakam pi udakorohanānuyoga) D. I, vii, p. 167., irrespective of the seasonal changes, was rightly counted as a form of self mortification (nijjhāmā paṭipadā: the practice of burning away) (A. I, p. 296). It was thought that evil deeds done in youth or old age could be annulled by such frequent ablutions. But even a domestic slave girl, Puṇṇikā, was able to point out to a brāhman, who believed in purification through bathing, that in such a case all fishes, tortoises, frogs, water-snakes, crocodiles, and all that live in water would go straight to heaven (Thig. v. 241). The brāhman saw the point, gave up his practice, became a monk in the Order of the Buddha, and not long after became truly cleansed (nahātako) Ibid. v. 251.. Another brāhman, Saṅgārava, believing in purification by water, washing off his evil deeds of the day by his evening bath and his evil deeds of the night by his morning bath, was shown by the Buddha himself a purification by means of the practice of his teaching, compared to a clear and undefiled lake with virtue as its shore, where wise men come to bathe and cross over to the other shore unsoiled (anallīnagattā va taranti pāraṁ) (S. I, p. 183).

This consistent refusal to have anything to do with external ablutions to symbolise or to effect a moral purification is a clear indication of an evolution of moral refinement. As long as morality, perfection and sanctity are supernatural and depending on divine influence or grace, the means to perfection will have no proportionate relation to the desired effect: water can cleanse the body, and, by the grace of God, even the soul. But in Buddhism, which has outgrown the belief in God as the absolute creator, and in soul as the eternal principle of human life, we find the development of morality solely dependent on the individual, and perfection becomes an individual quality. An arahant is not a saint saved by supernatural grace, but an individual who has realised the truth for himself, by himself and in himself, that, as he had become enslaved to worldly possessions and sensuous pleasures through his own actions of greed and lust, so he is set free from these bonds through understanding their true nature. Understanding (sammā diṭṭhi), insight (paññā), release (vimutti), enlightenment (bodhi) are the keynotes of individual purity. It is not a goal of perfection or an ideal of holiness which is aimed at, but comprehension of actuality (yathābhūta-ñāṇa-dassana). For the understanding of an action and its effect will prevent evil action (akusala kamma) to arise, and thereby true virtue (sīla) will grow. This growth (bhāvanā) is, therefore, a mental process and not a ritualistic cult. Mind culture (samādhi) then will follow the development of virtue (sīla) and blossom out in true insight (paññā). These are the three stages of virtue (sīla), concentration (samādhi) and insight (paññā) which constitute the path of purity (visuddhi-magga), along which all impurity, defilements (kilesa) and fetters (saṁyojana) are naturally discarded. It is a mental awakening to the nature of defilement. The perfect one is, therefore, not so much the purified one, as the enlightened one. A purified mind is a free mind (cetovimmutti). A comprehending mind will naturally abstain (virati) from what it sees as evil and unwholesome (akusala) and will avoid all hindrances (nīvaraṇa) in its way to purity and perfection.

(sattāvāsā) of sentient beings are usually enumerated as nine, and described as stations of consciousness (A. IV, p. 401), i.e., places of rebirth-consciousness (D. III, p. 263). The first sphere in which beings differ in body as well as in perceptive power includes human beings, some celestials (devā) and some who are destined to suffering in purgatory (vinipātikā).

The second abode is reserved for celestials of the Brahma world who are reborn there as a result of having practised here concentration with mental absorption (jhāna) of the first degree and who, although differing in body, are similar in perceptive power.

The third abode is for the so-called radiant devas (Ābhassara devā), who differ as regards their power of perception, but are similar in body form. Those who are similar both in body and in mind live in the fourth abode, and are called the “lustrous celestials” (Subhakiṇṇā).

Then, there are beings without feeling or perception. These unconscious beings (asaññāsattā) abide in the fifth sphere. The sixth abode is inhabited by beings concentrating on the infinity of space, by transcending all perception of form, by the annihilation of the perception of sense-reactions and by turning their attention away from the manifold distinctions in perception. Transcending this perception of infinite space, the dwellers of the seventh abode appear to realise the boundlessness of consciousness. But even this is transcended in the eighth abode, where the thought occurs: “there is nothing” (n'atthi kiñci). This thought, too, can be transcended and the process of the mind become so subtle that perception becomes imperceptible (nevasaññā-nāsaññāyatana), which constitutes the ninth and final abode of conscious thought.

Of monks fall into several categories and will be dealt with at greater length under their separate headings.

The general name āvāsa or dwelling place appears to focus the attention more on the fact of residing, while the term vihāra indicates the type of habitation for a Buddhist monk. Thus, we have an abode in the forest (arañña-vihāra), a remote dwelling or hermitage (dūra-vihāra: (A. IV, p. 26), or even single rooms in a monastery, one for each monk (yathāvihāra; (A. III, p. 299).

While originally huts for monks were built outside the town limits in quiet places like parks belonging to wealthy citizens, such residences obtained their names from the owners of the parks, e.g., Jetavana-ārāma. Cave-dwellings (kandara) have always been favoured by those seeking solitude for meditation, physical seclusion (kāya-viveka) being a great help to singleness of mind (citta-viveka), leading to detachment from all clinging (vikkhambhana°), the equivalent to Nibbāna (Vism. 113). But even they were considered a luxury by those who undertook the various practices, akin to asceticism, although vastly different in purpose. According to the Visuddhimagga, they are means of shaking off mental defilements. Of these 13 dhutaṅga, living in a forest (āraññikaṅga), living under a tree (rukkha-mūlikaṅga), living in the open air (abbhokāsikaṅga), living in a cemetery (susānikaṅga), refer to dwelling, which is one of the four standard requisites (paccaya) or necessaries of the bhikkhu’s daily life, viz., clothing, food, dwelling and medicine.

Just as the acceptance of an invitation for a complete meal was allowed, although the ideal practice was the gathering of alms-food from house to house, so it was allowed to reside in buildings, huts made of palm leaves and in caves, although the ideal dwelling wherewith a monk should be content was the foot of a tree.

In meditation. The English word “abode” is singularly apt to connote the various types of “abiding”, physically, metaphorically and mentally, which on different occasions are expressed by the Pali word vihāra. For the word connotes not only the physical dwelling place of a monk (vihāra, āvāsa), neither does it merely describe a mode of living, synonymous with behaviour (iriyā), continued existence (vattana), living (pālana), sustenance (yāpana), conduct (caraṇa: Vbh. 94), but also the mental or spiritual abiding states in the process of meditation. Especially when concentration has surpassed the initial efforts of discursive thinking (vitakka) and when sustained application of thought (vicāra) makes the mind dwell on its object (kammaṭṭhāna), these stations of concentration become actual abodes of mental rest, a supreme condition of emotional quiescence, which is so humanly supernormal that it is called heavenly (dibba-vihāra: (Miln. 225); Vism. vii, sec. 63, p. 175). There are, however, certain “divine abodes” which have acquired this name not only descriptively, but which are also formally and collectively known as the divine abodes or brahma-vihāra. These four divine abidings are loving kindness (mettā), compassion (karuṇā), sympathetic gladness (muditā) and equanimity (upekkhā) which, when developed to become all-embracing, lead to various stages of mental absorption (jhāna q.v.) (Vism. iii, sec. 105, 107, p. 89 f.). Apart from these divine abodes (brahma-vihāra) and the heavenly abodes (dibba-vihāra: ibid. vii, sec. 63, p. 175) which refer to the states of mental absorption (jhāna) acquired by reflection on one or other of the concentration-devices (kasiṇa), we have the noble way of abiding (ariya-vihāra) which is the name given by the Buddha to intense concentration on in-breathing and out-breathing (ānāpānasati samādhi), when he related the experiences of his three months' residence in the jungles of Icchānaṅgala, not allowing anyone to visit him except a single person to bring him food (S. V, p. 326). It is the “abiding” of a Buddha (Tathāgata-vihāra).

The three types of abode are found together in the Saṅgīti Suttanta (D. III, Sutta 33) and referred to as deva-consciousness (dibba-vihāra) or the conscious experience of the “eight attainments” (samāpatti), divine states (brahma-vihāra) or the four concentration-exercises in sublime emotion, and the Ariyan state (ariya-vihāra) or the attainment of the fruitions on the Path of Sainthood (ariya-magga-phala). The attainments (which are abidings of the celestial type) comprising the four states of mental absorption (jhāna) and the four immaterial realms of infinity of space, of infinity of consciousness, of nothingness, and of imperceptible perception, together with the ninth attainment of cessation of perception and sensation, are collectively called the gradual attainments (anupubba-vihāra), ascending stages by means of which the highest aim of meditation is attained, and which are also called the successive stages of “fading away” (anupubba-nirodha). The opposition between abiding (vihārati) and ceasing (niruddhati) is only apparent as the development of one leads to the cessation of the other, as follows:

The attainment of the first stage of mental absorption with its initial and sustained application of thought (vitakka-vicāra) leads necessarily to a cessation of sensuous perception (kāma-saññā). The second stage with its chief characteristic of zest (pīti) overcomes all discursive tendencies of the mind. This is followed by the third grade of absorption, characterised by ease (sukha) which has calmed the enthusiasm of the former grade. The fourth stage recognises ease (sukha) and disease (dukkha) merely as different aspects, and thus surpassing joy and sorrow the mind is fixed in equanimity (upekkhā) which seems even to cause a cessation of the process of breathing (catutthajjhānaṁ samāpannassa assāsa-passāsā niruddhā hontu: (D. III, p. 266), No. 33, 3. 2. vi). The fifth abode is that rapt ecstasy which is prevailing in a sphere of awareness of infinite space (ākāsānañcāyatana) and which leads to the cessation of the perception of material things (rūpa-saññānaṁ samattikkamā), the annihilation of the perception of sensory reaction (paṭigha-saññānaṁ atthagamā) and the non-attention to the idea of multiformity (nānatta-saññānaṁ amanasikārā: (D. III, p. 262). The sixth abode is that state of mental absorption which is an awareness of the infinitude of thought itself (viññāṇañcāyatana), whereby one passes entirely beyond the consciousness of the infinitude of space. The seventh abode is that state of ecstasy, which regards thought itself as nothing (ākiñcaññāyatana), thereby surpassing wholly the sphere where consciousness was thought to be limitless. The eighth abode is a rapturous state which is so subtle that it cannot be called perceptible, although it is not inconceivable (neva-saññānāsaññāyatana), when even the concept of the nothingness of thought has been surpassed. And finally the ninth abode is a state which cannot be called rapturous or ecstatic, as mental absorption is so complete that both perception and sensation have fully ceased (saññā ca vedanā ca niruddhā honti). These nine successional abodes (anupubba-vihāra) are the mental states which should be known or mastered through experience (dhammā abhiññeyyā), while the nine successive cessations (anupubba-nirodhā) are the mental states which should be realised by oneself, and, as it were, seen with one’s own eyes (dhammā sacchikātabbā: (D. III, p. 290), No. 34).

Thus the abodes (vihāra) successively lead to cessation (nirodha), which in stages produces the various emancipations (vimokkha) in the ultimate attainment (samāpatti) of Path and Fruition (magga-phala) of Perfection and Deliverance.

Is medically defined as the expulsion of a not yet viable f\oe tus, i.e., in the human species, before the end of the seventh month of pregnancy, during which period the f\oe tus is not capable of maintaining an independent existence. It is synonymous with miscarriage, the more colloquial term for premature delivery.

There are various types to be distinguished, all of which do not fall, however, within the scope of this article, which is primarily interested in the Buddhist ethical viewpoint. Thus, abortion may be accidental, i.e., caused by an accident, for which reason it will have no moral implications. It may be even contagious, due to a disease. This too, of course, is outside the field of ethics. An incomplete abortion is that in which the placenta is retained, irrespective of the cause of abortion, which alone can determine its moral value; whereas a missed abortion is in the true sense not an abortion at all, as the dead f\oe tus is retained in toto.

Here we are concerned only with artificial abortion, deliberately induced, and with the moral aspect of such action, whether it is an intentional therapeutic production in order to save the mother’s life or an illegal action with criminal intent.

Buddhism, both as a philosophy and as an ethical system, being entirely devoid of supernaturalism, it is almost obvious that we should find more than a fair amount of agreement between the Buddhist ethical code in this respect and the natural law as observed in social habits among primitive communities throughout the ages. The destruction of the human embryo does not appear to have ever had a social appeal, even when such practice was dictated by abject poverty rather than by degenerated sexual morality. The most frequent ground for inducing abortion will be a conception outside regular wedlock, together with a comparatively easier disposal of a partly developed f\oe tus than of a full-grown child. The concealment of the woman’s shame will also be less embarrassing if confined to the earlier stages, whereas once the child is born in the natural course of things, the mother’s affection is bound to play a predominant part in the abstention from the crime of infanticide.

Although abortion by artificial means has always been considered unnatural, as any interference with the working of nature must be, it has not always been thought of as criminal. Plato recommends (Republic, V, 460) that no child be allowed to be born, once the parents have passed the age-limit fixed for procreation.

Throughout the ages there has been plentiful speculation as to the biological value of the embryonic life. The Romans regarded, with some basis of factual truth, the unborn child merely as part of the mother, as the fruit is part of the tree until it falls; and they distinguished, therefore, between foeticide and infanticide in much the same way as modern gynaecologists view the matter. In this distinction much is dependent on the views and theories of embryonic animation. Aristotle, whose speculations form the general background of medi\ae val Thomian philosophy and theology, was of opinion that the fertilised ovum at the time of conception was endowed with a vegetative soul only, to be informed by an animal soul after some days, and only later by a rational soul. This theory was further detailed by his followers who held that the male embryo was animated forty days after conception, the female eighty days. Although this fanciful discrimination has been abandoned, the general distinction between the animate and the inanimate f\oe tus is clearly upheld by Canon Law even in modern times.

But according to the aphorisms of the Sacred Law of the Aryan Hindus, the Dharmasūtra of Āpastamba (I, 7, 21), no such distinction is made; and the causing of abortion, being of equal criminal value with homicide and incest, is enumerated as an act which causes loss of caste, a penalty more severe in its implications than capital punishment. Also in the Institutes of the Sacred Law, the Dharmaśāstra of Gautama (xxi, 9) a woman becomes an outcast by procuring abortion.

In the teachings of the Buddha a similar stand can be observed as in the Vedic literature where one single term bhrūṇahan describes the killing of an embryo as well as the killing of a learned brāhman, i.e., any mean murder. For, according to the Vinaya (Suttavibhaṅga: III, 72), the existence of a human being (manussa-viggaha) is counted from the mind’s first arising, i.e., from the first moment of the reinstatement of the mind (paṭhamaṁ paṭisandhicittaṁ: VinA. 437), from the time of consciousness becoming first manifest in the f\oe tus in a mother’s womb until the time of death. This re-linking consciousness is the very first thought in a new existence, immediately following the expiring last thought of a dying individual (cuti-viññāṇa). Hence there is no doubt about the Buddhist view of the starting point of life in an individual life span. The deprivation of life being defined as the cutting off and destruction of the faculty of life, harming its duration (Vin. III, p. 72), there is, therefore, no ethical distinction between foeticide and infanticide, or any other intentional killing of a human being. As in all moral transgressions the full weight of responsibility for an action is on the intention.

Among the four transgressions of rules of discipline for Buddhist monks involving excommunication (pārājika) from the Saṅgha is the intentional taking of human life, even as regards the destruction of an embryo (antamaso gabbhapātanaṁ upādāya) Mahāvagga: A. IV, p. 26). A certain women whose husband was living away from home became with child by a lover (jāra) Suttavibhaṅga: A. IV, p. 26). From a monk who was dependent for alms on her family she asked and obtained an abortive preparation, with the result that the f\oe tus died. Although the monk was remorseful thereafter, he was declared defeated (pārājika) as regards the object of the monastic life, and was therefore excommunicated (asaṁvāsa), i.e., placed outside the rule, training and communion of the Saṅgha (eka kammena, ekuddesena, samasikkhātāya n'atthi) Ibid. p. 74..

The importance of the intention is brought out clearly in a similar case, in which, however, the abortive preparation resulted in the death of the mother–-which was not intended–-whereas the life of the f\oe tus was preserved. Although from a disciplinary viewpoint the offence of the monk was ranked as grave (thullaccaya) Ibid. p. 84., yet there was no offence involving excommunication (pārājika), as the mother’s death was incidental and not intended.

Other incidents in connection with the procurement of abortion (gabbhapātana) are of interest in so far as methods other than medicinal preparations are mentioned. When the queen of Bimbisāra was with child, she developed a chronic longing to drink blood from the right knee of the king. As this was interpreted by the court astrologers to mean that the child would kill his father and seize the kingdom, the queen lost her affection for the unborn child, and endeavoured several times to bring about a miscarriage by causing her womb to be massaged and heated by steam (kucchiṁ maddāpeti sedāpeti) J. III, p. 121–122.. Notwithstanding all her efforts the child was born in due course, and according to the forecast he grew up, killed his father, and thus succeeded to the throne with the name Ajātasattu, i.e. “enemy while still unborn”.

Methods of abortion through crushing (madditvā) and scorching (tāpetvā) are elsewhere mentioned as successful operations and the monk who gave advice was excommunicated, although he does not appear to have taken any active part in the operation Suttavibhaṅga: A. IV, p. 26).

Hence, there is no doubt about the unequivocal attitude of the Buddha’s teaching in respect of life from the very inception of conception, i.e., from the moment of penetration of the ovum by the spermatazoon, thereby placing artificial and intentional abortion in the same category as wilful murder. Although modern legislation adheres to much the same view, it is less severe upon foeticide than upon infanticide, while medical practice is on the whole in favour of sacrificing the f\oe tus, “whenever the interests of the mother demand such a sacrifice” (H. Ellis) Studies in the Psychology of Sex: vi, 605.. In Buddhism, however, “he who transgresses this law is no disciple, is not a follower of the Buddha” (assamaṇo hoti asakyaputtiyo) Mahāvagga: A. IV, p. 26).

In view of the importance of the subject, contributions were invited from more than one scholar. Their contributions are being presented more or less as received, without much attempt at editing, so that each writer could develop his theme without undue restriction.–-G.P.M

(Meaning and nature.) Whatever is absolute is free from any kind of restriction. Hence in philosophical terminology the Absolute stands for that which is complete in itself and which exists without the support of any condition. This indicates at once the dual aspect of the Absolute: the positive aspect of internal coherence and self-sufficiency, and the negative aspect of the absence of relationship and dependence. It is interesting to note in connection with the following observations that the word absolute has itself etymologically a negative meaning of detachment, hence, transcendence and exclusiveness, while its positive aspect would be of inclusiveness and self-sufficiency which, however, are notions derived from the original concept. A negative qualification would seem to imply a positive ground, but as the Absolute does not require a raison d'étre the negative aspect of being without qualification is always more satisfactory from the purely philosophical viewpoint. Pure philosophy, however, with its natural, abstract view of things has no appeal to human emotions on which most relationships are built. For the satisfaction of such emotions, therefore, the Absolute-is viewed positively, which necessitates its being seen in relationship–-the very opposite and denial of the Absolute.

Its true nature is the absence of relationship and of any supplementary factors. This can be understood (or misunderstood) in two ways. Hither the Absolute is all-inclusive, in which case no relationship is possible because there is no existence outside the Absolute, or the Absolute is entirely self-sufficient and does not require any supplement in its existence. The all-inclusive absolute leads direct to pantheism: all is God and God is all; nature and God are identical; reality is one and divine. This again shows a dual aspect and approach. If the foundation is a religious belief, the thought moves from God to all, God becomes the only reality and the cosmos becomes an illusion. This view is perhaps the oldest religious view known to us; it is the view of the Vedas as expressed in many sayings of the Upaniṣads such as “Thou art that” (Tat tvamasi) which we may term immanent pantheism, where the absolute transforms itself into the universe which is an appearance, God’s “play” without meaning or purpose. Thus the individual ātman is the delusive form which hides the all-pervading paramātman. God does not exist in the universe, but God is the universe. God is absolute, in the truest sense: God is not immanent in the world, but the world is immanent in God; there is none but him; he is one, without a second. It is the unqualified, unrelated, unconditioned Absolute: the unconceived and inconceivable, apart from which all else is but a wrong concept.

This is indeed the only consistent form in which the term can be used, although common usage has less rigorously employed other ways.

In Vedānta terminology it is the Brahman, the all-pervading Reality apart from which all is illusion or Māyā, or appearance of the Real. Only when the veil of illusion is lifted, the Absolute shows itself in its true nature and all distinction between subject and object disappears.

This doctrine of Vedānta philosophy in so far as it does not admit any form of dualism is called advaita. From this non-dualistic standpoint, which is still negative, to a monistic positivism is but a short distance, although the two appear as opposites. And from monism to theism (be it pantheism or monotheism) it is again but a few strides of development.

Buddhism, however, has withstood the impulse towards the positive, and has preserved its unconditioned and negative standpoint.

The historical basis of Buddhism can be found in the discovery by prince Siddhattha of human suffering, old age and death, for this discovery set him on the path of thought. And although he employed originally the wrong method of self-inflicted mortification, the solution of the problem of sorrow remained the goal of his search, till he attained supreme enlightenment in the realisation of the cause of woe and conflict. Then he formulated his Four Noble Truths, and the fact of suffering (dukkha-sacca) has remained ever since the cornerstone in the fundamental structure of his teaching.

One thing only do I teach:
Woe, and how its end to reach!
dukkhañceva paññāpemi
dukkhassa ca nirodhaṁ (M. I, p. 140).

There is no philosophic speculation in those essentials, but the religious world which his teaching was to encounter was thriving on speculation, debates, theorems and views of hair-splitting subtleties, and losing sight of the actual problems of human life. It is obvious that for him, to whom the solution of the inner conflict in man was the chief concern, all conflicting theories about the creation of the world and the nature of its creator were as so many escapist theories, merely adding to the prevailing confusion. Absolute non-being as well as absolute being, the eternity and perfection of reality, were so inefficient in solving the problems of human suffering and conflict, that the concept of a first cause of both good and evil was completely discarded in Buddhism. Conflict, frustration, opposition, sorrow, suffering, woe, cannot appear as a matter of choice or creation on the part of any entity, be it called Brahma, God, or Absolute. For there can be no co-existence between the absolute and the relative, the eternal being and the continuous process of conflict of opposites. Thus, having taken his standpoint on the facts of life rather than on the speculations of the transcendental, the very concept of an absolute God-creator was rejected by the Buddha from the beginning Brahmajāla Suttanta, A. IV, p. 26).

Various schools in Buddhism have gone to different lengths in their exposition of the Absolute till even a philosophy of the Void (Śūnya-vāda) was developed. However, it has been constantly maintained by all schools that this should not lead to annihilationism.

Only that which is, can cease to be, and thereby be annihilated. But, in a process of change, where there is no being (entity), but only becoming, the cessation of the process of becoming is not an annihilation. Where there is no being, the question of non-being does not arise. Existence is a process of becoming (bhava) and non-existence would, therefore, merely be the cessation of the process of becoming (bhavanirodha) which is the most concise and precise definition of Nibbāna. But annihilationism (ucchedadiṭṭhi) is emphatically denied and condemned by the Buddha, as this would presuppose the existence of an entity to be annihilated.

The term absolute can perhaps best be understood from the use of contrasting terms, such as relative, comparative, conditioned. The contrast between relative and absolute is that between what expresses a relationship and what does not. Thus when a function indicates some definite relationship in which the object stands to some other object, the term must be described as relative. The term Creator, therefore, is a relative term as a relationship is indicated with creation. Consequently a term which indicates no relationship is called absolute.

This raises an immediate objection as to whether any term can be called absolute, for first of all, the terming or determination of an object (be it material or ideal, factual or conceptual) would in itself already constitute a relationship between the termed “object” and the determining “subject”. If the object is absolute, the fact of its being termed would make it subjective and relative. Therefore, from a relative viewpoint the Absolute is unknowable, which is the conclusion arrived at by Kant, for whatever is known and as soon as it becomes known, also becomes relative.

It is at this interesting stage that the Buddhist doctrine of becoming (bhava) reveals its importance. All existence is in a process of becoming (bhava) which includes, of course, the process of unbecoming or ceasing (a-bhava). As this process is not self-sufficient it is dependent in its arising and cessation on other factors which are equally subject to the same process. This process of dependent simultaneous origination (paṭicca-samuppāda) includes the conditions as well as the effects. It is only when the effects cease to become further conditions, that this process of becoming ceases. Whatever is ruled by this process is therefore conditioned (saṅkhata) and the cessation thereof would be the unconditioned (asaṅkhata) or the Absolute. And that is Nibbāna.

There is not, and there cannot be, any knowledge of this Absolute, for knowledge is of particulars and hence relative. Comprehension, however, is of essentials and need not relate to particulars, and hence is absolute.

Thus the knowledge of conflict (dukkha) leads to sorrow, suffering and craving to be free therefrom. But the comprehension of the nature of conflict is the perfect understanding or comprehensive insight into the nature of the cause of conflict, which is the fictitious opposition of self and other-than self. Once the unreality of this opposition is comprehended, the cause of conflict ceases to be, and all conflict has come to an end. Not only this or that particular conflict but all conflict, because the essential nature of conflict, which is opposition, has been absolutely dissolved. And thus, comprehension is absolute.

This comprehension is not a thought process in the sense of mental action, for mental action binds, whereas comprehension is full awareness and sets free. This liberating full awareness is the absolute comprehension of the ultimate reality. But when this ultimate reality is conceived as a positive entity it becomes a subjective relation dependent on mental conditions within the process of becoming in dependent origination.

Hegel’s logical wholeness, Hamilton’s metaphysical completeness, Bosanquet’s aesthetic completeness, Royce’s moral perfection, are but new terms describing Plato’s substance and the Aristotelian-Thomistic view of the soul as the vital principle or essence, as the formal cause of action. They all come round to the reality of the ego-centre, be it the individual or the cosmos, be it the incomplete substance which needs phenomena for the purpose of expression, or the total human nature, composite of matter informed by the soul.

All these are the outcome of the various positive aspects of the Absolute which were all carefully avoided by the Buddha, who only speaks of the unborn (ajāta), the unproduced (abhūta), the uncreated (akata), the unconditioned (asaṅkhata), the unrelated (appaccaya), the non-transient (accuta), the unaffirmed (animitta), the cessation of becoming (bhava-nirodha), the cessation of delusion (nirvāṇa). Yet, the positive aspect cannot be entirely excluded, as the negative to a certain extent includes the positive. Thus Nibbāna, being the stilling of all conflict (dukkha-nirodha), is also described as the highest bliss (paramaṁ sukhaṁ). But, this notion of bliss definitely excludes all blissful feeling (sukhavedanā) and experience, which would make it relative.

Without relation, without opposition, the Absolute must mean the whole. And that is, in fact, the Buddha’s position, since all conceptual opposition to this Absolute (asaṅkhata) is declared a delusive composition (saṅkhāra). This delusiveness of all compounds or conditioned things does not affect their nature, in so far as they have no nature of their own, having merely a conditioned existence. Thus, it may be said that this conditioned existence which is actuality, i.e., nature in action and reaction, is delusion as long as its conditioned existence is not comprehended. In the comprehension of this actuality is Reality, which is deliverance from delusion; Nir-vāṇa, the Absolute.

This comprehension of Reality appears to bring the Absolute within the range of experience as seen from certain utterances, in the Theragāthā and Therīgāthā, of those who are said to have attained Nibbāna as arahants. This conclusion would certainly be justified. The expressions of the experience of relief and freedom are found almost everywhere:

The careful avoidance of any self-reference in these statements of experience, however, is revealing. It is not a self or soul which has escaped prison, but the prison bars have gone. In other words, the fettering delusion of an individual self has disappeared “as flame in water”. In the awakening from a nightmare it is not the waking state which is important but the cessation of the dream. To see things as they are (yathā-bhūta-ñāṇa-dassana) is this falling away of delusion, the cessation of seeing permanency and an abiding entity in that which is but change and appearance. The relief experienced, when escape from everlasting and unchanging boredom is realised, cannot be related to anything particular, cannot even be truly expressed: it is absolute, it cannot be cultivated, it cannot be made to grow, it cannot cease.

It is not death, nor annihilation, but life in the purest and highest sense, unaffected by attachment (lobha) or by opposition (dosa) or by lack of comprehension (moha). It is absolute reality in which things are what they are, whether they be material or mental phenomena in the constant flow of life, in which there is neither birth, nor death.

There is no denial of the sum total of experience, commonly known as Saṁsāra, for although all experiences (sensations, perceptions, ideations) are conditional and without independent existence, they are certainly not purely imaginary. Knowledge, however, gathered through experience, is actual and reactionary, i.e., it reflects the individual’s reaction (parikappa) DhsA. 308.. But the object of this reaction does not possess absolute independence either, for its real nature, apart from its activity on reactionary sense organs, is a process of dependent origination and cessation in its own material sphere. From the point of view of the sense sphere, however, as long as there is no contact, there is no interdependence either. This absence of actuality in respect of the senses constitutes a kind of reality, or functioning of its own, which, however, is never entirely independent or absolute. This conditional reality (paratantra) forms the basis of all relative knowledge, and in this relativity it becomes actuality, coloured by the figment of imagination (parikalpita-lakṣaṇa). The usual comparison is the one of the snake and the rope. When the latter is mistaken for a snake, the surmise is entirely fictitious, although the two may have some external resemblance. It is not abiding by an assumption A. I, iii, p. 197: parikappe ne saṇṭhati, puggalo akachcho hoti. which makes a person incompetent to discuss matters. But when a person realises his mistake and sees the actual rope, divested of imaginary colouring, the object contributes to his relative knowledge by revealing its particular process of momentary existence. It is concrete, factual, but, of course, not independent, and hence not absolute. The rope is seen as a rope, as it actually contacts the sense organs; but this knowledge remains relative and, therefore, reveals only the relative nature (paratantra-svabhāva). The insight into absolute nature (pariniśpanna-svabhāva) Laṅk. 67.15: Mhvyut. 1662–5. with its completely perfected characteristic as it is in itself, without dependence or relation, is the accomplishment (nipphanna) of Nibbāna. It is this last perfection which has been frequently misunderstood. The Andhakas held that causality was thus absolute (parinipphanna) or predetermined in respect of each term in the chain of dependent origination (paṭicca-samuppāda) but this was refuted by the Theravādins Kvu. xi, 6.. The Uttarāpathakas and the Hetuvādins held that everything was relative (aparinipphanna), except ill (dukkha), for which thesis they quoted the verses of the bhikkhuṇī Vajirā:

“Nought beside ill it is that doth become,
Nought else but ill it is doth pass away” (S. I, p. 135).

But they too were refuted by the Theravādins. And thus the term which was used for accomplished, perfected, determined, absolute (nipphanna) acquired the further meaning of determined as conditioned, which is the very opposite of the unconditioned (asaṅkhata), absolute Nibbāna.

Admitting the fact that any “concept” of the Absolute is intrinsically a misconception, and that therefore the Absolute cannot be defined, determined or even described in any positive terms–-which leaves us with no other alternatives than negations such as the absence of delusion, the absence of conflict–-yet this very negation of ill is so real, so absolutely real, that a positive transition from relative consciousness to pure insight into the real nature of things (yathā-bhūta-ñāṇa-dassana) is the closest “approach” to a “concept” of “reality” All these nouns are placed within quotation marks to indicate our difficulty in trying to express the inexpressible..

From this it will be evident that the Absolute is real but not actual, that Nibbāna, although a negation of all values, yet is not annihilation.

Thus the Buddha said: “There are some ... who misrepresent me ... falsely saying: ‘The recluse Gotama is a nihilist, he lays down the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of the existent’. But this is just what I am not, this is just what I do not say ... Formerly as well as now I teach the fact of sorrow and the annihilation of sorrow” (Alagaddūpama Sutta: (M. II, p. 22).

The Absolute then, being unconditioned and unrelated, cannot be a standard of goodness, of beauty, of truth. And yet we may say that whenever a thing, a mental state, an action, or a process acts, i.e., expresses itself, according to its nature, such an action would be good and true. Here no judgement can be passed on whether such an act is a perfect expression of such nature, for this would be a subjective judgement and hence of no value. It is the nature of fire to burn, and such action would be a good and true action, without implying any moral value thereto. Similarly speaking, the truth cannot be wrong, although of course an individual’s idea of actual truth may be based on a misconception.

It should be clearly understood that there is not and cannot be any relation between the Absolute and Morality. Morality postulates moral values and therefore indicates relationship. Good and evil are relative concepts, and both should be transcended in the realisation of the Absolute. “Not only evil but even good should be left behind in order to cross the flood”, said the Buddha (dhammā pi vo pahātabbā pageva adhammā; (M. I, p. 22), Alagaddūpama Sutta). Moreover, the concept of good has no immediate connotation of morality, and whereas a good man may indicate a morally well-behaved gentleman, a good meal indicates far different values. Thus goodness means the perfection in relation to some particular nature, and hence absolute goodness is meaningless. Goodness cannot be absolute, and the Absolute cannot be good. The Absolute is without attributes, which are always limiting and conditioning.

In this sense it could be said also that there is no relationship between the Absolute and truth. If the Absolute is without attributes, it cannot be true either, which seems rather paradoxical. Yet, it will be obvious that if truth is thought of as a correspondence between a “view” and a “fact”, it cannot be absolute, as the Absolute is unconditioned by and independent of the relationship of correspondence. There are no “views” in the Absolute, and the expression “absolute truth” has no more meaning than “absolute goodness”

Views are factors of the mental process and they arise and cease, dependent on a multitude of conditions of which environment and education are two of the more prominent ones. They play their part in the process of thinking and thereby contribute to the nature of the mind. In any search for truth by speculative means a discussion on the nature of mind is usually involved, an analysis of the process of discursive thought, of the character of what is universal, of thought in activity, contrasting the process of perception and conception with feeling or sensation.

This is indeed a narrow view which assumes that thought is activity of the mind, thought being the actuality and mind the reality. If there be any truth at all, we must begin with the mind in action without idealising about the mind when inactive. The actual is the thinking mind, it is the beginning of all investigation, and it is also the ultimate beyond which thought cannot go. This does not mean that mind has no capacity to reach final truth, or to penetrate beyond appearance, for the mental process is not limited to relational or discursive thinking. And thus, creative art in its endeavour to express that which is sensed by intuition is as much a striving for the ultimate comprehension of the absolute as a discursive process of ratiocination reaching for truth, and again as the absorption in contemplation for the attainment of good. That which is capable of raising a problem should also be capable of solving it, for the comprehension of limitations contains the possibility of transcending them, although perhaps in a different sphere.

If in the thought process it is understood that the distinction between the self-subject and the object is made by itself and that it falls, therefore, within the thought process, the metaphysical supposition of the reality of universals remains an unproved hypothesis, and the thought process will see in this differentiation but a phase in the process of evolution through receptive sensation (vedanā), perceptive assimilation (saññā) and conceptive differentiation (saṅkhārā) leading to conscious awareness (viññāṇa). This understanding is not a process of reasoning. Reasoning would lead to the acceptance of a self-subject as the ultimate reality in which all objects are contained; the mind will then be the substance or soul, the “absolute soul” (paramātma). This epistemological or metaphysical solipsism obviously leads to moral or practical solipsism: from self-regard to self-love, self-satisfaction and self-conceit.

On the other hand, the understanding of the thought process, which obviously cannot be achieved through a process of discursive thinking that would only contribute new material to the process without analysing the actual process–-the understanding of this process can be achieved by mindfulness, awareness, alert watchfulness of the process itself. This method of mindfulness (satipatṭhāna) does not contribute to the process, but slows the process down by reflection, whereby the contributing factors are laid bare, actuality ceases to act and reality reveals itself. This reality cannot be communicated as it does not belong to the “self”. Actuality is the domain of the “self”, of delusion. It divides, it isolates, it creates opposition and conflict, and hence where actuality is slowed down, is understood and finally ceases, there will be the cessation of conflict (dukkha-nirodha) which is the real and the absolute cessation of delusion (nir-vāṇa).

In so far as it is connected with the idea of forgiveness of sin, has no place in Buddhism, as each one is ultimately responsible for his moral actions only to himself. The idea of sin is, therefore, foreign to Buddhism. An action may have an unwholesome effect (akusalavipāka), but there is no offence apart from the transgression of the laws of nature, which will vindicate themselves by an unwholesome reaction, such as indigestion as a result of eating unripe fruit.

Life in society, however, is so interrelated that it is practically impossible to perform any action which will not affect somebody else to some degree at least. Thus, while an evil thought works out its undesirable consequences, it is the sower who will reap the fruits; and unless by counteractive karma (upapīḷaka kamma) he prevents those seeds from germinating, the unwholesome effect will be experienced in due course. That this experience might be shared by other individuals living in close contact, physical or mental, forms an actual part of that other individual’s process of karma.

Even so, there is room for restoration of proper relationship which would require admission of the wrong deed. A wrong deed is not a sin in the meaning of offence, but a failure to succeed (aparādha) in doing the correct thing. In so far as this failure has upset the balance or smooth working of the entire process, one might crave for the indulgence of those affected thereby.

Among Buddhist monks this is done in a most general way: “Please, endure all my shortcomings (sabbaṁ aparādhaṁ khamatha me bhante)”, is the confession; whereupon he will be asked: “Do you see where you failed”? And, on his admission, he will be told not to do it again.

This applies only to transgressions of the rules of monastic discipline, and hence evil thoughts do not form part of this confession and absolution, another indication that moral failures are as much an individual’s property as his acquired virtue.

(abhisajjanī vācā) is a form of harsh speech (pharusā vācā). This last term is explained by the Buddha to Cunda: “Whatever speech is rough, cutting, bitter, abusive, provoking wrath and conducive to dissension, is called harsh language” (A. V, p. 265). And this harsh language in turn is classed among the fourfold defilement by speech, elsewhere called “un-ariyan” modes of speech (D. III, p. 232). It is, thus, the very opposite of the speech of the Tathāgata, who was “gentle in his words which were pleasant to the ear, amiable, heart-stirring, polite, agreeable and charming to the masses” (D. I, p. 4).

As an example of abusive language may be given the remark made by the brāhman Ambaṭṭha, taking offence at a number of Sākiyas who, in their own hall amusing themselves, failed to pay respect and offer a seat to him. He complained to the Buddha and called the Sākiyas a “rough and rude breed”, “mere menials” (D. III, p. 90–91). But the Buddha pointed out to him that it was not worthy of him to feel abused by such a trifle. The meaning of the word abhisajjati in this text is clear enough from the context. Yet Buddhaghosa found it necessary to provide some compromise explanation “to hang on to (such a trifle) under the influence of anger” (kodha-vasena laggati: DA. I, p. 257), following the derivation abhi + sañj < abhisaṅga: adhering to; although in the Khaggavisāṇa Sutta the word abhisajjanā is preceded immediately by vācābhilāpo: “objectionable speech and abusive language” (A. IV, p. 26).

Less frequent spelling of Avyākata, the unexplained, unanswered, undeclared, undecided, indeterminate, undefined, with special reference to karmic action which is not determined as regards its effect (vipāka), which is neither wholesome (kusala), nor unwholesome (akusala), and therefore neutral or a-moral. Also certain questions, whether the world is eternal or not eternal, whether the Tathāgata exists after death or not, &c., were left unanswered (abyākata) by the Buddha, because they were not connected with the goal of a life of renunciation (M. I, p. 431).

Death. As with all (ancient) religions and philosophies the teaching of the Buddha, too, is greatly concerned with the problem of death. Sometimes death is personified, generally, as Māra; but most often it is described as a phenomenon, as part of the process of life, the cessation of the natural functions of life. According to the Buddha, to a human being life is the most precious possession and also the most difficult to obtain (dullabha) Kosala Saṁyutta, A. IV, p. 26). Yet old age and death are moving along like a great mountain high as the sky, crushing every living thing in the way. What is there that one could do in the face of such mighty destruction but to live righteously and justly and work good deeds?

None can evade, or play the truant here
Th'impending doom o'erwhelmeth one and all Kindred Sayings, I, p. 127..

The inevitability of death, however, is never shown as an event externally imposed as punishment but as a necessity forming an integral part of the process of existence.

“Even the Blessed One’s life was suddenly quenched by the avalanche of death, as a great mass of fire is extinguished by a downpour of water ...,

Not due to fear, nor due to shame
Did death hold over him his sway.
For, all, though free from guilt and dread,
Are crushed (and none can stay)” Vism. viii, § 23, p. 193..

Death is the end of the present life, but not a complete cessation of everything. It is a going beyond (accaya) certain limits, hence a fulfilment of time (kālakiriyā: (M. II, p. 108); (A. I, p. 22), a dissolution of the combination which constituted life (jīvitakkhaya: J. I, p. 222) or a laying down of the bodily form (deha-nikkhepana: Vism. 195), the ending of this physical existence (maraṇa). When birth is seen as manifestation (upapatti), death is considered as a falling-away (cuti: (D. I, p. 162); (S. II, p. 3), 42). It is the end of a season, like the end of the rainy season (vassānaccaya) or of the winter (himaccaya), holding within its folds the promise of a new spring. For, as birth leads to death, so death is the condition for new life. There is no punishment, but only a loss, which for many may be greater than the loss of wealth (atthaccaya: (J. III, p. 158), 25), but for some, very few indeed, the solution of the problem, the laying down (nidhāna) of a burden at the completion of the task (kataṁ kattabbaṁ), for those “who in cessation have found deliverance, in victory leaving death behind” (nirodhe ye vimuccanti, to janā maccuhāyino: (A. IV, p. 26). The solution of the mystery of death lies in the solution of the problem of birth. For death is as natural to anything that is born, as disintegration is to whatever is composed (sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā). It is the inherent nature of the process of existence to arise and to cease. “Death is inevitable for what is born ... Just as the risen sun moves on towards its setting and never turns back even for a little while ... so a living being travels on towards death from the time he is born” Vism. viii, §§ 10–11, p. 190.. And once the process of becoming (bhava) has been set in motion through the functional activity of the mind (kamma-bhava), the ensuing process of rebirth (upapatti-bhava) is but the conditional result. The cessation of this resultant process (bhava-nirodha) will be final only if the flame of passion is not being fed anew. Without the addition of new karmic activity the process of existence will run its course to its natural end, when death indeed will be a vanishing (cuti). Death, therefore, is but a natural function of life. But as long as life is being revitalised by its own reproductive activity, death will be the ending of this physical existence (pāṇaccaya), only to become the threshold of a new lease of life, a passing over, but not a final passing away.

The last thought of a living being is considered to be of very particular importance in respect of the immediately following life-span, for it is this last dying thought which provides the rebirth-condition to its successor. Hence, if the last thought lingers over a wholesome object, its effect will be felt in the new thought-process, inaugurating the new life, in a wholesome (kusala) manner. The reverse, of course, also holds good: a dying thought clinging to an undesirable object is the condition inducing an occasion for the arising of undesirable circumstances in the resultant, immediately following life-span. This does not mean that only the last thought of a dying man is effective, for previous actions of intentional commission and omission retain their accumulative power, awaiting the opportune occasion to produce their effect.

Life, existence, is so full of activity that it cannot be viewed as static; it is always a coming into being, a process of becoming, without a finality of attainment in existence. The fullness of life is in living, not in being, but in becoming. It is dynamic actuality. And within that process, the aspect which is called death is but a phase of becoming; it is the passing over, the transition of a series of phenomena. At death this transition is more phenomenal, but in actuality the same passing over occurs at every thought. “It is the continually repeated dissolution and vanishing of each momentary physical-mental combination, and thus it takes place every moment” BD. p. 90.. “In the ultimate sense (paramatthato) the life moment of living beings is extremely short, lasting just for one single moment in the evolution of a thought (ekacittappavattimatto). Just as a cart-wheel, whether rolling or standing, touches the ground only at one point of its circumference, so the life of living beings is measured by only one conscious moment (ekacittakkhanikaṁ sattānaṁ jīvitaṁ). And when that thought has ceased, that being also is said to have ceased (tasmiṁ citte niruddhamatte satto niruddho 'ti vuccati). In a past conscious moment a being lived; in a future conscious moment one will live; but it is only in the present conscious moment that one does live ... When consciousness dissolves, the world is dead” (cittabhaṅgāmato loko: Vism. viii, § 39 p. 197). In the ultimate sense, when a process of thought reaches its dissolution after the vanishing of the impulsive moments (javana-citta) in the process of consciousness (citta-vīthī) it has the same position as death-consciousness (cutiviññāṇa). And hence, in the ultimate sense, life lasts but for the duration of a thought.

But, as regards the major change in the process of existence, which involves the breaking up of the body (kāyassa bheda) and the abandonment of the mental aggregates of clinging (upādinnakkhandha-pariccāga), death is the termination of a life, a dissociation of the constituent physical and psychical elements. Because their previous association, which formed a so-called individual, was of an impermanent nature, for “every composition is decomposable” (sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā), this dissociation is a natural phenomenon, not produced by any external agency, but by the inherent nature of any compound. “For the born there is no such thing as not dying” (n'atthi jātassa amaraṇaṁ). And so death comes about as the natural exhaustion of a life-span (āyukkhayena maraṇa), i.e., through termination of the destiny attained (gati-) or through expiry of the time-limit (kāla-) or through termination of the process of nutrition, etc. (āhārādi-sampattiyā abhāvena). Life will also cease, when the moral conditions of reproductive action (janaka kamma) which brought forth this particular existence are running out, i.e., through cessation of moral force (puññakkhayena). All this is a natural or timely death (kālamaraṇa). But, although death is always a natural result of being born, it may occur prematurely. Such an untimely death (akālamaraṇa) comes about through karma interrupting other life-producing karma (kammupacchedaka kammavasena), i.e., karma cutting off the prevailing vitalising karma. Thus a life-process (santāna), which still has sufficient energy and vitality to make one move and act, may be cut off through some external exertion which overtakes one in consequence of former actions cp. Vism. viii, §§ 2–8, p. 189.. Accidents, homicides, suicides, fatalities in war are cases of such untimely death. In all cases, however, it is the breaking up of the aggregates which is known as death.

It is this contemplation that “only formations break up; it is the death of formations; there is nothing else” Vism. xxii, § 118, p. 598: saṅkhārā va bhijjhanti, saṅkhārānaṁ maraṇaṁ, na añño koci atthi. which leads to insight and ultimate deliverance.

No study of the concept of death can be complete without a contrasting study of the concept of life. This faculty of vitality has nothing in common with a principle of life or soul, for it is one of the seven general mental properties (sabba-citta-sādhāraṇa-cetasika) which, together with contact (phassa), sensation (vedanā), perception (saññā), volition (cetanā), one-pointedness of mind (ekaggatā) and attention (manasikāra), are common to every class of consciousness and every single act of thought. It is the dynamic principle without which no thought-concept could evolve, in a similar way as no evolution of matter could take place without the constituent physical element of caloricity (tejo). But, in Buddhist terminology, death is the opposite not of life but of birth, being the other extreme of an individual process of existence. With the advent of death, life does not come to an end, for it spells the beginning of a new life. Death is merely the ending of this combine of physical and psychical factors, which in dissolution will recombine with variations and permutations, reproducing certain essential characteristics with equally essential modifications. From another viewpoint, death may even be said to be identical with birth, as the exit from one lifespan is the entrance to a new one. And, with regard to final deliverance, birth, old age and death are just suffering, woe, conflict, which is the process of life.

A physical death is but a phase in that process, leading on to the next phase. By the severance of the ligatures of the joints in all the limbs, the body at death gradually withers like a green palm leaf wilting in the heat of the sun. When the faculties of the physical senses have ceased to function, the faculties of mind and life still remain as inner consciousness focussed on some action which presents itself owing to its importance or weightiness, or to the frequency of former repetition, or to the proximity of the performance of such action. When, at this stage, craving and ignorance have not been fully abandoned, craving bends the stream of consciousness in further grasping the familiar object, the dangers of which are concealed by ignorance. Thus, this dying consciousness “abandons its former support, like a man who crosses a river by hanging on to a rope tied to a tree on the near bank”. The act of letting go is death, the act of grasping to cross over the gap is the beginning of the next existence cp. Vism. xvii, § 163, p. 473.. The chief characteristic of the phenomenon of death is a passing away or falling off (cutilakkhaṇa). The function is to separate (viyogarasa). And it manifests itself in the absence of the sphere in which rebirth took place (gati-vippavāsa-paccupaṭṭhāna) Vism. xvi, § 47, p. 427.. It is, therefore, an entirely negative aspect, which is best expressed as a passing away (accaya).

When referring to the accomplishment (sampadā) of an individual in the course of his religious development, it may relate to his moral attainment (sīla-sampadā) by which is understood the whole body of morality (sīlakkhanda) which forms the first constituent of the entire range of attainments, virtues of observance and of avoidance, either temporary or lifelong, mundane or supramundane, belonging to the discipline of a noble disciple, a layman or an adept (asekha), to the discipline of monkhood, of sense restraint, of pure living, or to the various degrees of purification.

The accomplishment of concentration (samādhi-sampadā), although defined as one-pointedness of mind (cittassa ekaggatā: (M. I, p. 301), comprises the guarding of the senses, self-control, spiritual contentment, emancipation from the five hindrances and attainment of the four states of mental absorption.

The accomplishment of insight (paññā-sampadā) is the blessing of higher knowledge, the code of intellectual duties and practice of the attainment of the highest cognition, connected with supernormal faculties, leading to arahantship and culminating in final emancipation and the extinction of all causes of rebirth.

The accomplishment of deliverance or emancipation (vimutii-sampadā) is the attainment of release of will and mind, or heart and intellect (ceto-vimutti, paññā-vimutti), which is the state of arahantship whilst alive in this human existence.

And finally, there is the accomplishment of the knowledge of the attainment of emancipation (vimutti-ñāṇa-dassana-sampadā: (A. III, p. 118).

Except perhaps for this last accomplishment, these attainments cannot be called perfections in the true sense. To speak of religious successes would be more accurate though less usual, but the idea of achievement would agree well with the underlying thought of effort in the working out of one’s own salvation (cp. appamādena sampādetha).

Different sets of accomplishments are met with in the canonical writings, when they are sometimes not so much a success attained as a profit or blessing obtained: kin, wealth, health, virtue, and right views (ñā-ti, bhoga, ārogya, sīla, diṭṭhi: (D. III, p. 235); (A. II, p. 147). These right views (diṭṭhi) are frequently interchangeable with insight (paññā) of the earlier set, whereas the earlier concentration (samādhi) is sometimes replaced by mind (citta; (A. I, p. 269), with the result of two parallel sets of three accomplishments: sīla, samādhi, paññā, and sīla, citta, diṭṭhi. Three others are found as faith, virtue and insight (saddhā, sīla, paññā: (A. I, p. 287) which are enlarged as a set of five: faith, virtue, learning, charity and insight (saddhā, sīla, suta, cāga, paññā: (A. III, p. 118); and as a set of eight achievements in alertness, wariness, good company, right living, in faith, in virtue, in charity and in insight (uṭṭhāna, ārakkha, kalyāṇamittatā, sammā-jīvitā, saddhā, sīla, cāga, paññā), the first four bringing worldly happiness, and the last four leading to future bliss.

In his commentary on the Dhammapada (DhpA. III, p. 93–4) Buddhaghosa speaks of four blessings (sampadā), of a foundation for merit (vatthu-s°), of means of salvation (paccaya-s°), of good intentions (cetanā-s°) and of a high degree of virtue (guṇātireka-s°). And a completely different set of seven is found in the introduction to the Juṇha Jātaka (No. 456) where Ānanda is said to have gained by his continually attending upon his Master the following seven blessings: the blessing of the doctrine (āgama-sampadā), of the knowledge thereof (adhigama-s°), of the knowledge of past causes (pubba-hetu-s°), of enquiring into one’s own good (attattha-paripucchā-s°), of dwelling in a convenient place (titthavāsa-a°), of methodical attentiveness (yoniso-manasikāra-s°) and of the assurance of enlightenment (buddhūpanissaya-s°).

Depending, therefore, on the context, the term sampadā, which has the basic meaning of obtaining (Skt. prāpti), acquiring, gaining, has to be rendered as accomplishment, attainment, profit, merit, blessing, success, good fortune.

Thus, we find a series of suttas in which the possession of virtue (sīla-sampadā), of desire to do good (chanda-s°), self-possession (atta-s°), the possession of right understanding (diṭṭhi-s°), of earnestness (appamāda-s°) and of systematic attention (yoniso-manasikāra-s°) are spoken of as forerunners and harbingers of the arising of the Noble Eightfold Path, just as the dawn is the harbinger of the rising sun (S. V, pp. 30–8). For, with such possessions, headed by a noble friendship (kalyāṇamittatā), one may be expected to cultivate the Noble Path, based on seclusion, on dispassion, on cessation leading to self-surrender, ending in the restraint of lust, hate and delusion.

(habitual action) is one of the four kinds of karma when classified in respect of its efficacy (pākadāna-pariyāyena). Together with this habitual or chronic action are classed the so-called weighty (garuka) actions of telling effect, such as the serious crimes of wounding a Buddha, killing an arahant, parricide and causing a schism in the Saṅgha; further, death-proximate (āsanna or maraṇāsanna) action, immediately preceding death, and residual or accumulative action (kaṭattā-kamma).

There is a subtle difference between habitual and accumulative action, for habitual action does not reserve its full strength, awaiting the opportunity to become reproductive (janaka), as in the case of accumulative action. Habitual karma merely strengthens an existing tendency thereby facilitating a repetition of a similar act for good or for evil.

It is a psychological distinction which is not found in the early writings on Buddhism, even though the term is sporadically met with. Thus in the Upāli Sutta (M. I, p. 372–3), sutta 56, e.g., the word āciṇṇa is used merely to denote that “it is not the custom of the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta”, “it is not the custom of the Tathāgata” to speak of action and of punishment. And again in the Aṅguttara Nikāya (A. V, p. 74). we find a description of those “who proclaim what was not practised by the Tathāgata as his practice”.

Even the comparatively late Visuddhimagga Vism. 269. does not use the word in a special technical meaning, when referring to “the object on which the mind dwelt formerly” (āciṇṇārammaṇa).

As an action which forms the main concern in the shaping of the future, the term is found in the Maṭṭakuṇḍali-vatthu of the Dhammapada commentary DhpA. I, p. 30., although not exactly with the significance of habit, but as originating in an action, skilfully performed to perfection (āciṇṇa-samāciṇṇa-kusalamūlaka). For, it was a single act of gladdening his mind (manaṁ pasādesi) which provided the youth with a celestial rebirth. Still, the efficacy of the act is illustrated, the result being compared to the shadow which never parts (chāyā va anapāyinī) (A. IV, p. 26).

Many are the stories which show the power of habit which might even make a saint act in a manner seemingly incongruous with his supreme virtue and self-control. A deva in the celestial world of the thirty-three (Tāvatiṁsa) had a voice which carried a distance of sixteen leagues even if he whispered, because in a previous existence he was, as a dog, greatly attached to a paccekabuddha and used to bark loud at him, out of sheer affection, whenever it saw him DhpA. I, p. 173..

Also, the doubt which arose in the Buddha’s mind shortly after his enlightenment, when he considered the difficulty of the truth realised by him, the doubt concerning the feasibility of proclaiming this teaching to others, that too is said to arise habitually (āciṇṇa) in the mind of every Buddha Ibid. 81.. And again, when on the occasion of the Buddha’s first visit to Kapilavatthu, he went with his begging-bowl from house to house and was censured on this account by the king, his father, the Buddha replied, “Such is our custom, o king”! (cārittaṁ etaṁ mahārāja amhākaṁ), referring to all the previous Buddhas who had made it their habit to live on alms Ibid. 90..

It is the constant repetition of an act which, indulged in (ācarati), becomes a regular pattern of behaviour (cāra, ācāra), a manner of conduct (cāritta); and the action which is thus indulged in (āciṇṇakamma) becomes a habit. The selfish and callous man is born, as the immediate fruit of his evil, in a despised family, stupid and without enquiring tendency, as is the habit of dogs and the like (kukkurādivatāciṇṇo) Sdmp. 90. and such is his companionship. For, it is habitual karma which is usually the decisive factor in this and any subsequent life. Of the sixteen kinds of karma as enumerated and classified in later Buddhist literature Abhs. p. 23., habitual karma seems to be the most fearful. For even the weighty action (garuka kamma) of parricide with its unavoidable immediate reaction, is but a single action with effect, whereas the accumulative force of habit results in a piling up of deeds and their consequences which would have a truly crushing effect on many lives to come in many \ae ons. It is this incalculable amassment of dues which causes that agitation (saṁvega) of fear and anxiety in anyone who contemplates the miseries of the worldly life with its repeated round of birth, old age, illness and death, the miseries of the sufferings in an unhappy rebirth, the miseries of saṁsāra, past, present and future.

But, the formation of a habitual action does not necessarily involve a major part of time or practice. In the Saṅkha Sutta (S. IV, p. 317), a certain headman, the son of Asibandhaka, both followers of the Nigaṇṭhas, declared to the Buddha that the doctrine of their leader Nātaputta was that “according as a man habitually lives, so goes he forth to his destiny”. The expression used here is yam bahalaṁ yam bahulaṁ vihārati, indicating a life devoted to certain actions. This doctrine is refuted by the Buddha’s remark that as no murderer spends the greater part of time of his life in actually murdering people, and thus cannot be said to be living habitually murdering people, he would not go forth to the destiny he deserves. In fact, nobody would ever go to an evil destiny, as evil is performed only from time to time (samayā samayaṁ).

A habit is determined by association of ideas, and hence characters of the lowest level are actuated in their behaviour by habit and routine. The faculty of association of ideas, which is also found in the animal kingdom, does not betray much intelligence. It is, therefore, not correct to suggest that a bad habit should be sublimated by a good habit. Only through understanding can one’s life be regulated in such a way as to exclude all habit and routine. This is done in the Buddha’s method of mindfulness (satipaṭṭhāna) with full conscious awareness of the arising and cessation of every sensory reaction in body and mind, without suppression, without approval, till the very concepts of good and evil, of “I” and “mine”, vanish, and volitional activity (kamma) of the process of grasping has given way to pure action (kriya) which is purposeless, but full of understanding and insight leading to deliverance.

(General Aspects:} From various viewpoints this will be considered under headings. For action can be considered in respect of its moral implications: good and evil actions (kusala-akusala kamma), which is really not a view of action, but of the consequences of action, the result (vipāka).

Apart from good action (kusala kamma) there is right action (sammā-kammanta) which is a constituent of the Noble Eightfold Path (ariya atṭṭhaṅgika magga) and which refers to bodily actions only, right action being the abstinence from killing, stealing and wrong indulgence in the senses. In the wider sense of action as karma, it is also right thought (sammā-saṅkappa) and right speech (sammā-vācā) which have to be classified under kusala kamma; for action in its comprehensive meaning is volitional activity which may lead to mental, verbal, or physical activity. This volitional aspect (cetanā) is the most essential characteristic of karmic action, and without such intention there would be no karmic responsibility, even if there were physical activity. Action then can be viewed as the cause of the effect (vipāka) and will be accordingly classified; for it cannot be a good cause which produces an evil effect. From this point of view, action and its result can be considered from the time-aspect, i.e. the duration required for action to ripen in this life itself (diṭṭha-dhamma-vedanīya-kamma), or in an immediately following birth (upapajja-vedanīya-kamma), or in some further distant, future existence (aparāpariya-vedanīya-kamma). Again, without taking into consideration the effect itself, one can discuss the intrinsic efficacy of action, its reproductive force (janaka-kamma), its supportive activity (upattham-bhaka kamma), counteractive (upapīḷaka kamma) or even destructive force (upaghātaka kamma), or in other words the function or power of action to generate, to maintain, to suppress and to destroy.

From the seriousness of the result, action can be classified as weighty (garuka kamma) and unavoidable, as habitual (āciṇṇa kamma) or accumulative (kaṭattā-kamma), which will bide its own time to produce its fruit, if conditions permit. And if all that fails, it remains mere action spent, action that was (ahosi kamma) and that will never bear fruit.

A very special reference must be made here to the identity of the actor and the action, the door and his deed. For, this constitutes the most essential and characteristic teaching of Theravāda Buddhism, the doctrine of anatta, no separate self-entity, which refutes the heresy of individuality (sakkāya-diṭṭhi).

Karmic action being always intentional, there is a purely psychological conclusion to be drawn, viz., that only full-grown thoughts with volitional discrimination entail karmic responsibility; while mental processes which have not grown beyond the stage of sensory reactivity (vedanā) or perceptivity (saññā) and which do not possess the active power of discrimination which moulds (saṅkhāra) a thought with likes and dislikes–-such processes are not action, but reaction.

Finally, there is known that action which is born from the understanding of a need, and not from the hunger of greed. Action grown from greed (taṇhā) and misunderstanding (avijjā) is karma which will result in rebirth. But action, which springs from the necessity of understanding, has no further motive and does not project itself into a future existence. It is action, pure and simple (kriyā).

All the above aspects of action will be dealt with under the headings of the technical terms which have been mentioned here.

One frequently meets in Buddhist writings with two statements which seem to stand in glaring contradiction to one another. One is that there is nothing but movement and change (sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā), and the other is that things do not move, because matter and form disappear as soon as they appear (ruppatīti kho tasmā rūpan ti vuccati: (S. III, p. 86). The contradiction is only apparent as long as things are associated with entities. According to the Buddha’s teaching of anatta there are no abiding entities, no lasting substances, no permanent existence, no souls; only passing phenomena appear and disappear in a process of impermanence and change; hence there is nothing but movement. Again, this movement does not belong to abiding entities and hence there are no things that move, and whatever movement there is, is not of things: things do not move. Just as existence is not something added to the existing thing, so is motion, or change, not something added to a thing, whereby it moves and changes.

That motion is something different from the thing moving was the view of the Vaiśeṣikas Vaiśeṣika-sūtra I, 2, 7–8, quoted by Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, I, p. 99. who attributed to existence the three realities of substance, quality and motion. But the orthodox Buddhist view is distinguished from these views by the fundamental theory which denies the existence of any substance. When, therefore, action takes a prominent place both in the psychology and in the ethics of Buddhism, it is not a denial of empirical action, but a denial of action as something separate from the actor. “An actor there is not, but only action can be seen” (kārako na, kiriyā va vijjati) Vism. xvi, § 90, p. 436..

“There is no actor of the deed,
No reaper of the fruit in sight,
Phenomena alone flow on;
This is the only view that’s right”. \\!
kammassa kārakō n'atthī
vipākassa ca vedako,
suddhadhammā pavattanti,
ev'etaṁ sammadassanaṁ Ibid. xix, § 20, p. 517..

In Buddhism action does not require a medium to act, whereas in science the forces of action in nature are considered as the forces of definite elements, whatever their inherent constitution may be.

Action in Buddhism is not latent, is not a concealed force, awaiting the opportune moment to burst forth into action. For, action is actuality, i.e., arising from moment to moment, dependent on conditions both in arising and in ceasing, but never abiding, subsisting, enduring in any form of energy whatever.

In physics it is not energy which can be observed or measured but the effect in the form of motion or heat. The existence of energy is deduced from phenomena which are considered to have been caused thereby. Similarly action can only be observed in actuality when it is seen as reaction. This reactionary actuality comes into play in dependence (paṭicca) on certain conditions, but does not require some static energy behind it to set the chain of reactions going through some ultimate first cause.

It is absolutely essential for the proper understanding of Buddhism that this idea about the intrinsic nature of action being reaction is comprehended, for on this depend the understanding of the Buddhist denial of “God” and “soul”, the comprehension of the laws of dependent origination (paṭicca-samuppāda, q.v.), the doctrine of karma, the infinity of the process of evolution, the entire concept of existence as becoming.

Action, then, is entirely conditional, such as sensation being totally dependent on the function of organs, the proximity of objects and the actual contact of both. This does not mean that sensation is latent in the senses, except in a very wide meaning, according to which it would be equally accurate to say that sensation is latent in the sense-object, too.

The Buddhist concept of energy does not admit the idea of a static body of energy. Action can only be understood in action, never in isolation. It is as a reflection which cannot be observed in itself and apart from the reflecting agency. Thus, action cannot be admitted as result of energy and apart from it; neither can energy be thought of, unless in action. In other words, there is no energy, but energy arises in action; and action arises in dependence on conditions which make it reactionary. That these reactions are not purely mechanical is shown by the fact that the conditions on which a certain action recoils may be entirely negative: the dissociation (vippayutta), the absence (natthi), the disappearance (vigata) of conditions are all aspects which negatively influence the arising of mental and physical phenomena.

Action does not operate by latent or static energy becoming dynamic, but by accord. It means that there is not a flow of energy, path or beam, passing on from there to here, but a harmonious adaptation. The readers of this article will react to the ideas here expressed. If these ideas were conveying an impulse, the reaction in the readers ought to be similar. But the various readers may react vastly differently, in agreement or in total dissent, which cannot be inherent in these concepts, but are conditioned by the temperament, education, background, beliefs, etc., etc., of each individual. And thus each one’s reaction becomes his own individual action; and it is such individual action which forms the individual.

When reaction is explained by latent energy coming into operation, the door of speculation is opened wide and one illogical supposition is followed by a more absurd contradiction. A “soul” with all the qualities of “ether” is invented to explain the opposing phenomena: infinite in the future although with a beginning in the past; a substantial entity, yet entirely spiritual; a principle of thought and life of the body, yet not able to procure eternal physical life, not able to prevent acts of utter thoughtlessness; controlling all actions, and yet subject to the desires and passions of the flesh.

From the Buddha’s standpoint, however, there is no actor apart from his action, whether this be physical or mental. Actions are conditions for reactions; and reactions are the events of life as experienced, forming the background and the mould in which further events are cast and shaped. Such are the mental formations (saṅkhārakkhandha), the concepts of consciousness; such are the formations of actuality (saṅkhārā) which shape the process of thought, of becoming, and of rebirth.

(sammā-kammanta) is the fourth section (aṅga) of the Noble Eightfold Path (ariya aṭṭhaṅgika magga) which, together with the second and third sections: right thought (sammā-saṅkappa) and right speech (sammā-vācā), covers all human activity from an ethical viewpoint. These three sections contain the usual ten skilful or wholesome actions (kusala kamma) of thought, word and deed. The right activity of physical deeds is given (A. V, x, 28, 176; M. sutta 114) as the three abstinences from taking life (pāṇātipāta), stealing (adinnādāna) and wrongful indulgence of the senses (kāmesu-micchācāra), this last one with particular, though not exclusive, reference to prohibited sexual intercourse.

The mental and material, both are here in fact,
A human substance though cannot be found–-
Void it is, set up like a machine,
A mass of conflict, like a bundle of grass and sticks.\!
Nāmañ ca rūpañ ca idh'atthi saccato
na h'ettha satto manujo ca vijjati,
suññaṁ idaṁ yantam ivābhisaṅkhataṁ,
dukkhassa puñjo tiṇakaṭṭhasādiṣo Vism, xviii, § 31, p. 510..

With this verse, quoted by Buddhaghosa from “the Ancients” (ten'āhu Porāṇā), the doctrine of actuality is expounded, which together with the doctrine of insubstantiality (anatta) forms the basis of the entire structure of the philosophy of Buddhism, psychological as well as ethical. “As a puppet walks and stands through a combination of wood and strings, although it is empty, without life, without impulse, so this contraption of mental and material factors, void, without soul, without free will, can walk and stand, as if it had will and work of its own” (sa-īhakaṁ sabhyāpāraṁ viya) Ibid. pp. 509–10.. In this three concepts are involved: the ideal, the real and the actual.

Idealism considers the two factors, mind and matter, as two ultimate substances in an idealistic dualism of the type of Plato’s and Descartes'; or it finds in this dual aspect a synthesis, claiming with Hegel that mind alone is the basic stuff of existence. Idealism is supernaturalism, based on subjectivism.

The reaction to this is a materialistic objectivism, which originated in a naive form among the Greek philosophers of the sixth century B.C.E., later developed by Democritus and the Atomists. This reaction, too, knows its extremists who have given to matter the status of an independent absolute, whose laws govern the universe. Scientific laws, however, do not govern the world, but are expressions of man’s comprehension of natural phenomena, of the behaviour of matter.

Here we have, therefore, a mental conception of the action of matter; and that is actuality. The knowledge of activity is essential for such activity to become actual; without that knowledge there is either speculative idealism or ignorance which in gross materialism endeavours to exclude the mental. Hence it is said that mind is the forerunner of all, that all is made by mind (manopubbaṅgamā dhammā manoseṭṭhā, manomayā) (A. IV, p. 26). Mind is not a spiritual entity observing the events of a passing world, not a battlefield where conflicting armies clash and are conquered, but it is the battle itself, the actual conflict, in which the forces of grasping for an ideal stand revealed in opposition to the reality of nature. Not reality is experienced, but only the mind’s reaction to reality; and that reaction is actuality. It is the subject and the object of all Buddhist investigation, not to be grasped at in a purely conceptual analysis, not to be accepted in a dogmatic so-called realistic fashion, but to be actually experienced, over and over again, with each shifting standpoint, with each changing view, till ultimately the futility of all views (diṭṭhi) is fully comprehended and the possibility of any standpoint is finally discarded: “Unstayed and unstriving did I cross the flood” (appatiṭṭhaṁ anāyūhaṁ ogham atari) (S. I, p. 1), declared the Buddha.

Yet, there is no cleavage between the actual and the real. Nowhere in the Buddha’s teaching is there a denial of reality. The higher knowledge and insight of reality or the comprehension of the actual state of things (yathābhūta-ñāṇa-dassana) is one of the eighteen chief kinds of intuitive understanding which expose the truth of all corporeal and even in the further developed doctrine of the void (suññavāda) we do not meet with a universal illusion on the Vedantic lines of māyā, as a denial of the existence of the empirical universe, which was necessitated by the conception of an all-pervading ātman as the only reality to the exclusion of everything else: “the ātman is above and below, behind and in front. The ātman is all the world” Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VII, xxv 2.. In Vedānta as a system of non-duality (advaita) the phenomenal world does not exist. In the Buddha’s teaching the ātman is denied both as an individual soul or substance and as a universal spirit. Hence, there is no denial of the world of phenomena, but the universe is deprived of a permanent nature, and hence only phenomena roll on (suddhadhammā pavattanti) Vism. xix, § 20, p. 517..

The constitution of nature being phenomenal and without abiding essence or substance, it is intrinsically a process of becoming (bhava-santati). The viewing of this process as a constant, as an unvarying quantity under the same conditions, has given rise to a concept of a permanent substratum, which remains unchanged even when conditions and phenomena alter. Such a view does not represent the real nature of things, but is the actual response or mental reception, a re-actual perception in a dualistic state of mind. This illusion comes from the mind’s attempt to be both itself and its concept of itself. It is thinking with a split mind, one part as the passive observer of actuality, the other part standing aside to interfere with and to control the observed, to assert itself in its splendid isolation, to absorb the observed in admiration and to repel in condemnation. This illusion becomes the great delusion whereby the individual process of life asserts permanency and substantiality, and whereby the ground is prepared for the arising of conflict. To the reality of the void in the process of becoming is given an ideal reality of being, which constitutes the eternal conflict arising in the mind, and created by the mind. To bring this delusion to an end, the mind must cease to act upon its stream of experience (bhavaṅga sota) from the isolated standpoint of a self or ego. The experience itself is actuality, but there is no ego apart from experience. “Whoever holds views about the body, feelings, perceptions, ideations or consciousness, all of which are impermanent, in conflict and without entity–-views such as ‘I am better, or equal, or worse’ (than others), what else is such a person but blind to actuality” S. III, Soṇa Sutta, p. 48.?

Actuality then is the action which is both impression and expression, a communication in the most literal sense of the word, wherein the objective event has become unified with the reactor. It is, however, the appropriation of such a reaction by a misunderstanding subject which causes the conflict. In actuality, the subject is not less phenomenal than the object; through inter-conditionality they arise, support one another and break up, “The process of becoming with its five constituents of materiality and mentality moves on through interdependency of those factors (aññamaññaṁ nissāya pavattati), each one giving the other the support without which both will fall (ekasmiṁ patamāne itaram pi patati)” Vism. xviii, § 32, p. 510.. This process of actuality, which is life, is like the fire of which the Buddha spoke in the Ādittapariyāya Sutta S. IV, xxxv, sutta 28., the fire of the senses, their contact, their action and reaction, burning with grasping, fed by the fuel of birth and death in ignorance, resulting in the heat of inflamed passions, leaving behind the charred remains of grief and sorrow, while moving on to further fields to set ablaze, always restless, always grasping, always springing up afresh, drawing all into itself, consuming all, constant in its inconstancy, purposeful in its inconsistency, a living contradiction, because living on death.

This doctrine of actuality is not claimed as a dogma based on the Buddha’s authority, for he himself said, “Monks, whether a Tathāgata arises, or does not arise, this fact prevails, regarding that on which all natural phenomena are based and in respect of which they are fixed in the mind, that all phenomena are impermanent, unsatisfactory and without substance” A. I, iii, p. 286.: uppādā vā bhikkhave Tathāgatānaṁ anuppādā vā Tathāgatānaṁ, ṭhitā vā sā dhātu dhammaṭṭhitatā ( sabhāvaṭṭhitatā) AA. II, iii, p. 380., dhammaniyāmatā ( sabhāvaniyāmatā) Ibid., sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā, °dukkhā, °sabbe dhammā anatta. In other words it is in the natural composition of all world-events as well as of all individual concepts that they are passing events, that they, therefore, cannot provide lasting satisfaction, and that they have no abiding entity, but arise and cease in dependence of conditions. It is a process of “conditioned existence” (paṭicca-samuppāda), which “to be” does not last longer than its actual “becoming” which is a dependent relationship (idappaccayatā) (S. II, p. 25). As the natural order of things is thus, whether this truth has been discovered or not, there is no need and, in fact, no scope for authority and dogma. The facts speak for themselves and can be seen by anyone who cares, provided he sees with an unprejudiced mind.

This teaching of actuality, instead of giving cause for mental depression in its negation of everlasting life, is rather the joyous proclamation of deliverance from the bonds of delusion, whereby the misconceived “I” (sakkāya-diṭṭhi) is fettered to conflict and woe (dukkha). Thus the twin doctrines of actuality and of no-self are complementary and are frequently but different angles of the one truth.

Actuality is the main foundation on which the doctrine of action (kamma) is built. For the kamma of the Buddha’s word is, unlike its forerunner, the karma of the Upaniṣads, not a property of the soul, for no doer (kāraka) is discoverable, but only doing (kiryā) Vism. xvi, p. 513; xix, p. 602.. There is no experiencer (upabhuñjaka) Ibid. xvii, p. 555. of the fruit of action, no one who feels (vedaka) Ibid. p. 576.. But there is action with volition (cetanā) which is the reaction of the individual to actuality. Not all reaction evolves into a future result, but only such which grasps at actuality in ignorance of its true nature. For grasping is self-projection; and when self is a delusion, such projection can only lead to conflict with actuality itself, which is woe.

Existence then is actuality, and as such it is not just being, but action. Action does not arise spontaneously, but in dependence on conditions. The human mind has tried to bind this actuality down to a law of cause and effect, but in doing so made the mistake of postulating a beginning, a first beginning, an origin, a creator, a God. This view originated in the misconception of existence as “being” instead of “becoming”, as an ideal entity instead of an actual process, which has no beginning, but which is beginning always. “The beginning of things cannot be known” (na paññāyati) just because it is impossible to point out the beginning of an action which grows out of a world of actuality. Actuality is action and reaction; it has no fixity, no limits of time or space; it cannot be considered, therefore, in analysis or in isolation, for that would kill the process. Views, opinions, all stand condemned as erroneous, because they take up a standpoint which is ideal and not actual. A search becomes possible only if the object of the search is known. Said God to Pascal, “Thou would’st not seek me, if thou had’st not found me”. And so a search for truth becomes impossible; it is at most a search for an ideal which is a mere concept, born from desire. And he who only looks for what he wants to find, is a bad truth-seeker. For, truth is not a dogma, a view (diṭṭhi), an opinion, but a fact, an event, the embodiment of nature (bhūta-kāya) as a result of becoming (bhava). Hence, truth is not static, but actual; and the realisation of truth is the discovery of actuality (yathābhūta-ñāṇa-dassana). But, wherever actuality is discovered it is within the process of thought, not necessarily discursive thought or logic. Thinking itself is the most actual of the entire build-up of actuality, for actuality in word or deed is the mere result of the actuality of thought. And in this process of thinking lie both the entire problem of actuality and its solution. It is the egg within its unbroken shell which contains the germ of life which has to develop within itself and from within, then break its confinement, and live. Reality or nature exists everywhere, but it is known only within the shell of conceptual thinking; or rather, it is only the shell of conceptual thinking about reality, which is known. And whatever may be said or thought about reality, it still remains conceptual thinking, and not reality. The only point where reality can be touched is the shell itself, i.e., the process of thinking, for that, too, is nature. But to think about thinking is more speculation of thought; it is not grasping the real. Hence the only way to grapple with the problem is not a search for the real, but the understanding of the actual. Again, this understanding cannot be a process of logic, but must be an understanding which is comprehension through insight (ñāṇa-dassana). It is not in thinking that the process of thought can be understood; but through patient watchfulness and through minding (yoniso manasikāra) it will be possible to follow the ways of thinking, the subtle expedients and evasions which constitute the mask (persona), the shell, which hides and binds reality, all of which form actuality. For actuality is the form, the pattern of action, a pattern which is made by the mind, a mould in which the mind endeavours to capture and to shape reality, and in doing so gets caught itself. When once a mask is seen to be only a mask, it has no further power to instil fear; it can be seen as a mask, perhaps as a piece of art, but it cannot communicate a living emotion, just because it is an empty shell.

The task of the mind is to understand actuality, and not to seek reality. For a search of the unknown is but a quest for the ideal, which is unreal.

(kammaññatā) is a characteristic common both to body and to mind. Physical adaptability (kāya-kammaññatā) is the workableness and wieldiness of matter, such as that of sandalwood (candana); and mental adaptability (citta-kammaññata) is compared therewith, when the mind is made pliable in mental culture (bhāvitaṁ bahulīkataṁ cittaṁ: (A. I, p. 9). As a physical phenomenon it is one of the 24 derived (upāda) or secondary material attributes.

As a mental formation (cetasika) adaptability (kammaññatā) belongs to the group of 18 phenomena which occur in all wholesome mental states (kusala citta) and is distinguished in that group as adaptability of the mental faculties working through the physical senses (kāya-kammaññatā) and adaptability of consciousness (citta-kammaññatā).

(asekha), one who does not require any further training (from: sikkhati) and who is, therefore, perfect, very often in the meaning of an arahant. He has abolished the five hindrances (nīvaraṇa) of sensuous desire, ill-will, physical and mental sluggishness, excitement plus worry, and perplexity; whereas he possesses the five qualities of an adept, viz., his morals, his proficiency in concentration, insight, emancipation, together with knowledge and vision pertaining to the insight of an accomplished one (S. I, p. 99). In the Vinaya Mahāvagga (I, 62) this same group of five qualities is required in a monk, if he is to receive someone as a novice in the Saṅgha, that he may give instruction to him, and be attended on by him. In the same chapter several more groups of five qualities are mentioned, all of which go into the making of a teacher. Thus, apart from the qualities which have made him an adept, he should be a man possessed of and inspiring confidence, ashamed of doing wrong, cautious, energetic and full of mindfulness; he also should uphold moral habits, good habits, right views, be well informed and intelligent; he should know when an act is a transgression of discipline, and when not, when it is a slight or a serious offence, and have been a fully ordained monk himself for at least ten years.

Ceasing to be a learner, such a monk passes beyond the realm of Māra, for after this life there will be for him no further birth and hence no death; and in respect of the group of virtue, concentration and insight (sīla-samādhi-paññā) he is regarded as a Master (asekha; (It. 51).

The Saṅgīti Suttanta (D. III, p. 218) mentions without explanation three kinds of persons, to wit, the learner (sekha), the adept or accomplished one (asekha) and the person who is neither, i.e. the average person or man of the world (puthujjana). This distinction is repeated in the Puggala Paññatti (Pug. I, pp. 23–5). The seven types of learners are called those restrained through fear, whereas the accomplished arahant has completely uprooted fear and is, therefore, not restrained from sin through fear (abhayūparato: ibid. 11–12).

The clearest distinction between a learner (sekha) and an adept (asekha) is given by Buddhaghosa, when he associates the virtue of a learner with the four paths (magga) and the first three fruitions (phala) of sainthood, whereas the virtue of an accomplished one (asekha) is associated with the fruition of arahantship, the final stage on the path of sainthood (Vism. i, § 37, p. 12).

The marvel of thought-reading or, literally, of declaring (another’s mind). This is the second of three “marvels”, enumerated as the marvel of psychic power (iddhi-pāṭihāriya), the marvel of thought-reading (ādesanā-pāṭihāriya) and the marvel of teaching (anusāsani-pāṭihāriya).

The marvel of thought-reading consists in declaring what is in someone else’s mind (citta), the contents thereof (cetasika), mental reflections (vitakkita) and considerations (vicārita: (D. I, p. 213). This thought-reading is actual reading of a fourfold manifestation of the other person’s thought through some visible sign (nimittena), through some sound, human or non-human (manussānaṁ vā amanussānaṁ vā devatānaṁ vā saddaṁ sutvā), through hearing a rational sound made intelligently and deliberately (vitakkayato vicārayato vitakka-vipphāra-saddaṁ sutvā), or through concentration which is free from discursive thinking (avitakkaṁ avicāraṁ samādhiṁ: (D. III, p. 103 f.). In other words, thought-reading takes place through deduction, through inspiration, through inference or through intuition.

When the Buddha asked the brāhman Saṅgārava what he thought of this marvel of thought-reading, the reply was that it appeared to him to be of the nature of an illusion (māyā-sahadhamma-rūpaṁ: (A. I, p. 171). An unbeliever might not accept this power of thought-reading as a spiritual development, but as a performance through the efficacy of a charm (maṇiko nāma vijjā: (D. I, p. 214). And for that reason, although the Buddha acknowledged possessing this power, and not he alone but also more than five hundred of his monks (A. I, p. 172), at the same time perceiving danger in the practice thereof, the Buddha said that he was disturbed, vexed and that he disapproved of this marvel of thought-reading (ādesanā-pāṭihāriyena aṭṭiyāmi harāyāmi jigucchāmi: (D. I, p. 214).

Nevertheless it was Sāriputta who exhorted and instructed the monks with dhamma-talk by means of an instruction on the wonders of thought-reading, and Moggallāna who exhorted and instructed the monks with dhamma-talk by means of an instruction on the wonders of psychic power (Vin. II, Cullavagga, vii, 199). As a result of these talks by the two chief disciples five hundred schismatic monks who had been siding with Devadatta returned to the Buddha.

Higher thought in the sense of more intensified application of thought in concentration and contemplation. In the process of developing this higher consciousness (adhicittaṁ anuyutto: (A. I, p. 254) one discovers the impurities in one’s deed, word and thought, abandons them and takes precautions that they do not recur. And again it is said (A. I, p. 256) that the monk who is devoted to developing higher consciousness must attend to the characteristic of concentration by preserving his energetic grasp of mind (paggāha) without faltering, and yet with equanimity (upekkhā), not allowing it to contract or to expand. Exclusive attention to the developing of higher consciousness might lead the mind to indolence; exclusive attention to the growth of energetic application might lead to distraction; exclusive attention to the maintenance of equanimity might not keep the mind perfectly poised for the destruction of the mental intoxicants (āsava). But timely attention, properly directed, will make the mind pliable, radiant and not stubborn, but perfectly poised for the destruction of the mental intoxicants. And to whatever branch of special knowledge he may direct his mind, he has personally within him the power of realisation (A. I, p. 257).

Adhicitta is usually found in combination with adhisīla and adhipaññā, which form together the course of training and spiritual discipline (sikkhā), comprising the observance of the precepts (sīla saṁvara), culture of mind concentration (samādhi) and spiritual insight (paññā). This trilogy is frequently referred to in the Vinaya texts (e.g., (Vin. I, p. 70); III, p. 23) and in various discourses (D. I, p. 181); (D. III, p. 219); (A. I, p. 229); (S. III, p. 83); etc.). Throughout adhicitta is the mind under discipline, which makes it of a higher order than the uncontrolled thought-process of the average man (puthujjana). It is the concentrated mind of the monk who, with hands and feet properly washed, after his meal sits down in the cool shade intent on higher thought (sudhotahatthapādaṁ manuññaṁ bhōjanaṁ bhutāviṁ sītāyā chāyāya nisinnaṁ adhicitte yuttaṁ: M. I, p. 451).

Signifies attainment in the widest sense of “coming into possession of” (adhi + gacchati). Hence, acquisition of skill (kusala dhamma: (D. I, p. 224), of understanding and distinction (vivesa: (D. I, p. 229), attainment of Nibbāna (S. I, p. 22) and the deathless (amatapada: Pvu. iii, 7). Sometimes, even the process of acquisition of learning, i.e., study itself, is indicated, as well as the knowledge or information acquired thereby: One should grow ... in knowledge of the texts and study (āgamādhigame ... vaḍḍhitabbaṁ: (Miln. 388). It is also said that the decline of attaining an intellectual grasp of the doctrine is one of the ways of disappearance of such doctrine; for, with the cessation of attainment of an intellectual grasp even the man with right conduct has no clear understanding thereof, and without such understanding even the outward form of conduct will decline (ibid. 133–4).

Attainment is frequently to be understood as the process of progress which is not a final attainment of the ultimate goal, but rather an actual attainment at every stage. And as such, progressive attainment is frequently contrasted with decline. Hence, the energy (viriya) to acquire, to attain the unattained, to realise the unrealised (appattassa pattiyā, anadhigatassa adhigamāya, asacchikatassa sacchikiriyāya: (D. II, p. 255) (A. II, p. 148); IV, 332; (S. I, p. 217); II, 29) is as a basis of alertness (akusīta vatthu) an attainment in itself.

But attainment in the highest and most perfect sense is, of course, the attainment of the Noble Path, of perfect insight, the supreme attainment of the fruits of arahantship (arahattaphalādhigamamanuttaraṁ: (Miln. 358), which is the highest and best of the attainments to be gained in the world (loke adhigama-vipulavara sampattiyo: ibid. 362).

An undue estimate of oneself. It is one of the compounds descriptive of conceit (māna, q.v.) or haughtiness of mind (cittassa uṇṇati; Nd. II, p. 226) in an intensified degree with the prefix super- (adhi-). It is this kind of over-conceit, whereby a person regards his own value with undue estimate as truth, thinks that he has attained to what he has not won, thinks that he has achieved what he has not done, thinks that he has accomplished what he has not begun. And then he declares in his over-conceit to have attained perfect insight (adhimānena aññaṁ vyākaroti): “Rebirth has been conquered, the holy life is lived, all duty is done. I am assured of no more life in these conditions” (A. V, p. 162).

The cause of such over-conceit is traced by Mahā Kassapa to the fact that even though a man has deep learning and bears in mind the entire teaching of the Buddha, still his heart is obsessed by covetousness; he is fostering ill-will (vyāpāda), he allows the growth of physical and mental indolence (thīnamiddha), of indecisiveness (uddhacca) and doubt (vicikiccha). These are all symptoms of self-complacency, the negative effects of over-conceit. Or, such a person may feel the urge to show off the good qualities he imagines to possess or which he actually possesses to some extent; and then he becomes a busybody who finds his delight in doing things (kammārāma), in disputation (bhassārāma), in society (saṅgaṇikārāma). And as a result of all this, there is in him no further progress, notwithstanding his attainments. But half-way attainment (antarā-vosāna) is a falling off in the teaching and discipline of the Buddha (ibid. p. 164).

On another occasion Sunakkhatta, a son of the Licchavis, asked the Buddha whether or not some of the bhikkhus who declared having gained supreme insight, whether at least not some of them made such a declaration with an exaggerated opinion of themselves (M. II, p. 252). The Buddha admits that while some have really completed their task so that for them rebirth is no more, there may be others making a similar profession without having actually attained supreme deliverance “in the mistaken belief that there is nothing poisonous left behind” (visadosaṁ sa-upādisesaṁ anupādiseso ti maññamāno). In the end, however, lust will degrade their mind (ibid. 257) which will lead them either to death or to deathly woe. Pride goeth before the fall!

(Skt. adhimokṣa) resolve, decision. The term, derived from the intensifying directive adhi and the root muc (muñcati), to release, signifies an “abandoning” of the present position with a “going forth” in a new direction. Such resolve, therefore, has in it a liberating force which leads to emancipation (vimokkha), although with this specific connotation it would rather be considered as a perfection of determination (adhiṭṭhāna-pāramī).

In its basic function, resolve will be found in many a deed, word and thought, for without decision no new activity would arise. Hence, adhimokkha is one of the six particular mental factors (pakiṇṇakā) which go into the making of a thought. In itself, it is a purely psychological factor of non-moral import, but becomes moral or immoral according to its combination in a moral (kusala citta) or immoral thought (akusala citta).

Adhimokkha implies a release from the wavering state of mind between two courses of action. But, although it is the factor (cetasika) which chooses to attend to this rather than to that, it cannot be called a deciding factor, in the sense of passing judgment. Judgment is not formed until the process of thought has composed a synthetic concept out of the different component parts (samudāyaggahaṇa) and has classified it after relating it (sambandha) to the conventional marks or ideas. It is this discrimination which is the process of judgment (vinicchaya) and which completes the act of external perception.

This determination (voṭṭhappana) or arranging of the investigated material is a phase in the process of consciousness. But adhimokkha is merely a factor contributing to the resolve of indecision, which may obtain already in any purely presentative process in which an unknown object is presented for the first time and which, therefore, does not admit of any form of comparison, as in the case of judgment between two known concepts. At most, it is one of the more conspicuous elements in the process of judgment, but not judgment itself.

Its nature of decisiveness is made clear by its absence in the mental state predominated by the mental property of perplexity (vicikicchā-cetasika). Mutually exclusive, adhimokkha cannot combine with vicikicchā. For perplexity is the awareness of an unsettled state of mind, whereas resolve is the freedom from such unrest and a decision to act in a particular way, without, however, discerning the complicated nature of such action, this being reserved for judgment proper. “With the absence of perplexity, resolve arises” (vicikicchāya abhāvena pan'ettha adhimokkho uppajjati: Vism. xiv, § 178, pp. 398 f.). But a combination of resolve with agitation (uddhacca) is possible. And thus the two thoughts rooted in delusion (mohamūla), which are formed either with the inclusion of perplexity or of agitation, differ in their constituents also with the absence or presence of resolve (adhimokkha) respectively. It is said that, because of the presence of resolve, concentration is stronger in a thought-process associated with agitation (uddhacca-sampayutta: loc. cit).

Coming to descriptive definitions of the nature of adhimokkha, we find on the one hand that resolve is the act of being convinced (adhi-muccana) about an object, not as trusting (VismA. 489). It has the characteristic of conviction (sanniṭṭhāna-lakkhaṇa: Vism. xiv, § 151, p. 395). On the other hand, resolve is said to be faith (adhimokkho 'ti saddhā: ibid. xx, § 118, p. 546). For, strong faith arises in such a one, in association with insight in the form of extreme confidence of consciousness and its concomitants.

And again, the acquisition of the faculty of confidence is dependent on the intensity of resolve, for whether in meditation a person comprehends all component things as impermanent, as conflicting, or as insubstantial, when he emerges on the Path while contemplating on impermanence, “all three acquire the faculty of confidence, since they have great resolve” (tayo pi janā adhimokkhabahulā honti, saddhindriyaṁ paṭilabhanti; ibid. xxi, § 89, p. 568).

This apparent contradiction of adhimokkha being described as conviction and as faith is cleared in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī and its commentary the Atthasālinī, where the faculty of faith (saddhindriya) is explained as a believing attitude of mind (saddahanā), as putting one’s trust in (okappanā) and as a sense of assurance (abhippasāda), i.e., a development from faith to conviction (Dhs. 12); DhsA. 145).

An interesting, because unusual, reference is made to adhimokkha in the Vibhaṅga (165), where it replaces the customary term “clinging” (upādāna) in the stereotyped formula of dependent origination (paṭiccasamuppāda): dependent on sensation arises craving, dependent on craving arises decision, dependent on decision arises becoming (vedanā-paccayā taṇhā, taṇhā-paccayā adhimokkho, adhimokkha-paccayā bhavo, etc.). The commentary, Sammoha-Vinodani (p. 209), is not very helpful, but makes a suggestion in respect of this substitution: No clinging can possibly originate from craving in mental states free from wrong views (diṭṭhivippayuttesu taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṁ n'atthi) and hence the term clinging has been replaced by firmly rooted decision (upādānaṭṭhane upādānaṁ viya daḷhanipātinā adhimokkhena padaṁ pūritaṁ). This substitution takes place, according to the commentary, not only in mental processes which are dissociated from wrong views (diṭṭhi-vippayutta) as stated above, but also in the mental states which are accompanied by grief (domanassa-sahagata), when craving (taṇhā) is substituted by repulsion (paṭigha), and in those mental states which are associated either with perplexity (vicikicchā-sampayutta) or with agitation (uddhacca-sampayutta), in which cases craving (taṇhā) is replaced by those two properties, respectively. The interesting point here then is that decision (adhimokkha) is made in dependence on such varying conditions as craving (taṇhā) and repulsion (paṭigha), produced by, but not co-existent with perplexity (vicikicchā) and agitation (uddhacca).

It is noteworthy, however, that the term adhimokkha is hardly ever used in the older canonical texts, whereas in the Paṭisambhidāmagga the term is used practically synonymous with saddhindriya, the faculty of trust and faith (Ps. I, pp. 16), 19, 116 ff.; II, 26, 84, 86, 88, 216).

In the Anupada Sutta (M. III, p. 25–8)) we find adhimokkha among the sixteen concomitants of the first stage of mental absorption (jhāna), all of which qualities are ascribed by the Buddha to Sāriputta. Similarly, in the description of the second, third and fourth stages of mental absorption in the spheres of form (rūpa-jhāna), resolve (adhimokkha) is found with the usual concomitants, intention (chanda), energy (viriya) and others. And so again in the formless spheres of mental absorption (arūpa-jhāna) on infinity of space, infinity of thought and nothingness. But in the most subtle sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, and where both feeling and perception are extinct (saññā-vedayita-nirodha) the vision of the old qualities is now changed, so that there is neither leaning to nor aversion from them. No further resolve is needed or mentioned, for to the mind detached (vippamutta) and the heart untrammelled (vimariyādikata cetasa) there is no further refuge and no further growth.

The intensification and specialisation of knowledge (ñāṇa) comprises the higher faculties of cognition and intellect in their purest form of insight (paññā). But, in a way similar to the process of thought and the culture of virtue, where higher thought (adhicitta) and higher virtue (adhisīla}) are recognised, there is also a higher kind of insight (adhipaññā). Insight of higher understanding of mental phenomena (adhipaññā-dhamma-vipassanā) is described as knowledge of the mental object as matter, etc.; and as understanding not only that object as dissolved, but the identifying consciousness thereof as well; and as apprehending emptiness in that dissolution, as follows: Mental forms break up; this is the end of mental formations, besides which there is nothing else. This makes it both higher understanding and insight in mental phenomena, and it is called insight of higher understanding of mental phenomena. Adherence and clinging to the concept of an essence is abandoned through the clear understanding of the absence of a permanent substance and of an essence of self (Vism. xxii, § 118, p. 598). In support of this the following stanza is quoted:

With fixed attention on the object
He ponders o'er its breaking up,
Arising from its emptiness:
Such is deep understanding’s insight. \\!
(ārammaṇañ ca paṭisaṅkhā
bhaṅgañ ca anupassati,
suññato ca upaṭṭhānaṁ,
adhipaññāvipassanā (Ps. i, 58).

This higher understanding (adhipaññā) thus forms one of the eighteen principal objects of insight (vipassanā), a list found in later commentaries and treatises (Vism. xx, § 90, pp. 539–40; VisA. 506–7), where adhipaññā is explained as insight that occurs by knowing an object consisting of visible phenomena, and by seeing the dissolution of this conscious thought with its object, and by apprehending the voidness thereof through its dissolution.

It is through this understanding with insight (vipassanā-paññā) that investigation of the truth (dhamma-vicaya) as a factor of enlightenment (bhojjhaṅga) becomes possible.

Adhipaññā is the concluding term of the set of three higher instructions (adhisikkhā) in which moral conduct (adhisīla) is taught through the Vinaya, deeper thought (adhicitta) through the Suttas, and comprehensive insight (adhipaññā) through the study of Abhidhamma.

(For details, see the commentary on Part vii, § 6, of the Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha in the Abhidhammattha-vibhāvani.)

Sometimes found in the form ādhipacca, meaning supreme power, from adhi + pati: over-lord. This supreme power of absolutism is so much above the ordinary human power that it is rightly called divine (issarādhipaccaṁ: (A. II, p. 205); dibbena ādhipateyyena; (D. III, p. 146); (A. III, p. 33). It is the divine right of kings and universal monarchs, who rule with sole power among the clans (kulesu paccekādhipaccaṁ: (A. III, p. 76).

Even so, the provision of such absolute power and the establishment of one’s own parents in such supreme authority and absolute rule of the entire world would not suffice to pay off one’s debt of gratitude to them (A. I, p. 62). For, after all, even a rājā, holding such divine lordship (issariyādhipaccaṁ) and supreme dominion over the four continents, is thereby not yet released from rebirth in lower spheres, from the way of woe (S. V, p. 342).

Sovereignty over the sixteen provinces (soḷasa-mahājana-padā) is said to be not worth one sixteenth of the value attached to the observance of the eight precepts on an uposatha day (A. I, p. 213–4); IV, 252). And a poor thing indeed is human sovereignty when compared to heavenly bliss (loc. cit.)

The only lordship (ādhipateyya) which is praiseworthy and worth striving for is virtue, dominantly influenced by self-regard (attādhipateyya), dominantly influenced by the censure of the world (lokādhipateyya) and dominantly influenced by desire to honour the true doctrine (dhammādhipateyya: (A. I, p. 147–9); Vism, i, § 34, p. 12). This self-regard is said to be inspired by conscientiousness which is the subjective-sense of shame (hiri); and desire to ward off the censure of the world is influenced by the objective fear of blame (ottap-pa: DhsA. 125). In this threefold dominance evil is abandoned, goodness cultivated and utter purity attained.

\medskip The corresponding Hybrid Sanskrit term aupacayika means “dominant influence or factor” or “based on accumulation”. This has been translated into Chinese as tsêng-shang, meaning “increase” or “influence”, while in Tibetan it is literally translated as rgyas-pa-las-ḥbyun-ba, meaning “originating from increase”.

Generally speaking, these technical terms are analogous to modern words like “increasing power” or “dominant influence”. In fact, the words were used in innumerable ways, corresponding to almost all the meanings of “power” or “potence”.

The classification of this word in its strict sense was done by the efforts of the commentators of the Sarvāstivāda (or Vaibhāṣikas), and was taken over and expounded by the Vijñānavāda. These classifications seem complicated and scholastic, but on further examination it will easily be seen that all these classified powers can be divided into two parts. One is the increase of power itself, and the other is the cause of that increase of power and dominance. Strictly speaking, however, ādhipateyya or aupacayika only represents the former sense, while the latter is signified by Adhipati-paccaya.

It may be stated that the classifications of power originated in the speculations of the Vaibhāṣikas and they were expounded more and more minutely through the efforts of the Vijñānavādins. In the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra (fasc. xxi: Nanjio, No. 1263) there are mentioned only three kinds of aupacayika, i.e., dominance by oneself (tzu-tsêng-shang), dominance by the world (shih-tsêng-shang), and dominance by the dharma (fa-tsêng-shang). The first one is a power which is inherent in or gained by oneself, like the influence of ethical progress, not to commit an evil deed. The second one means the power or influence by the people of this profane world, like public criticism. The third and last one is influence gained through belief of the truth, or, in other words, this is the power of the dharma itself.

The interpretation given above is mainly concerned with the difference of the powers themselves. Another classification of power is made according to the difference of the powers corresponding to the instruments or the faculties of human beings (the 22 indriyas). Seven kinds of ādhipateyya are given and their classification is based on the difference of the indriyas. The seven ādhipateyyas are as follows: chü-tsêng-shang or the capacity of perception of eyes, ears, etc.; shêng-tsêng-shang or the productive potency produced from the genital organs of both male and female; chu-tsêng-shang, literally meaning the dwelling power, or the power of life embodied in the human body; shou-yung tsa-jan-tsêng-shang or the power of perception, or desire; ching-cheng-tsêng-shang, or the capacity or wish for purification; tien-tsêng-shang or the common power of karma in this world; chih-shou-tsêng-shang or the power of the elements (mahābhūta) in the modification of phenomena (rūpa).

Besides these, some other classifications with regard to the dominance of dharma are found in the teachings of the Vijñānavāda.

Is the concluding sutta of the Devadūta Vagga in Tika-nipāta of the Aṅguttara Nikāya (A. I, p. 147–50)) and deals with the threefold dominant influence by oneself (attādhipateyya), by the world (lokādhipateyya) and by the teaching (dhammādhipateyya). No amount of twisting can produce a “self” as the master in this “overlooked Pali Sutta” (C.A.F. Rhys Davids: JRAS. 1933, pp. 329–34). For the first form of dominance is not by a self but of oneself, in mind-control, which is self-control. The thought of self (atta) is introduced as the subjective factor, in opposition to the outer world (loka) as the objective factor, in consideration of which a monk puts forth energy to calm his body and control his mind.

Self-control (attādhipateyya) is brought about by reflecting on the unworthiness of pursuing the desires of the flesh and the spirit after having renounced a worldly life. It is the subjective approach of awakening conscience which brings about a sense of inner shame (hiri) and makes one abandon evil and cultivate what is good.

Control out of regard for the world (lokādhipateyya) is brought about by more external reflections on the reactions of one’s fellows in the holy life, or fear of public opinion. Thus, fear of blame (ottappa) makes one lead a blameless life.

Finally, the culture of what is good, the abandonment of what is blameworthy and the preservation of utter purity may be originated and dominated by consideration of certain qualities of the teaching (dhammādhipateyya), how it is well-proclaimed by the Blessed One, becoming effective in this very life, not involving the element of time, inviting deeper investigation, guiding onward and to be comprehended with true understanding by anyone’s personal effort.

(Skt. adhisīla), higher morality or conduct of a type superior to that of the moral obligations of an average man in the world. It is virtuous conduct based on the monastic rules of discipline (vinaya) and forms thereby part of the three types of higher training (adhisikkha) based on the three divisions of Buddhist texts: higher morality (adhisīla) based on the Vinaya, deeper thought (adhicitta) based on the suttas, and the wisdom of insight (adhipaññā) based on the study of Abhidhamma.

The training for higher virtue (adhisīla-sikkhā) is placed at the beginning, for “virtue that is quite purified is the beginning of all profitable things” (S. V, p. 143). But, this higher virtue is neither the volition to fulfil one’s duties, nor the restraint to abstain from transgression, but rather the moral basis for mental concentration, absorption and insight. Thus, the restraint following from mindfulness (satisaṁvara-sīla) guards the eye-faculty (rakkhati cakkhundriyaṁ) and becomes thereby the preliminary to concentration (D. I, p. 70); Vism. i, § 17, p. 7). For only when “endowed with morality, does concentration bring great fruit and blessing (sīla-paribhāvito samādhi mahapphalo hoti mahānisaṁso: D. II, p. 81). Endowed with concentration does wisdom bring great fruit and blessing. Endowed with wisdom, the mind becomes freed from all mental intoxicants (āsava), of sensuality (kāma), of thirst for existence (bhava), of attachment to opinions (diṭṭhi) and of ignorance (avijjā)”.

It is this threefold training in higher morality, higher thought and higher wisdom, which entitles one to be called a pupil (sekha: (A. I, p. 230–1)). This higher morality is not the observance of a greater number of precepts (as pañcasīla, aṭṭhasīla, dasasīla), but a training of one’s higher nature and character which is the basic meaning of sīla. The highest virtue is that of the Noble Path, and it is to this highest degree of conduct that the Buddha referred in the Kassapa-Sīhanāda Sutta (D. I, p. 174), “There are some monks and brāhmans, Kassapa, who place great emphasis on conduct, and speak in various ways in praise of virtuous conduct. But, Kassapa, as regards the most noble and highest virtue (ariyaṁ paramaṁ sīlaṁ) I am not aware of anyone who therein equals myself or transcends me. I have gone further in this respect, and that is supreme virtue (adhisīla)”.

(Skt. adhiṣṭhāna), determination, resolve, resolution. As the word “determination” is used in different contexts with various meanings, it may prove useful to set out here in brief their distinction as technical terms. Thus, determination as resolve (adhiṭ-ṭhāna) is a resolution towards a certain type of action which is thereby stimulated. Determination as decision (adhimokkha) is a steadfastness in choice, whereby the mind is freed from wavering between two courses of action. Determination as fixing (voṭṭhapana) is the arranging of the investigated material during the representative process of cognition. Here we shall deal only with the first term: adhiṭṭhāna.

A firm mental determination usually precedes a heroic act of self-sacrifice or renunciation, and thereby becomes the basis of further action. “Basis” is the fundamental concept of adhiṭṭhāna, which is sometimes found in its original meaning, e.g., when a Buddha, preaching the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, makes his disciple, the bodhisattva Sarvasattvapriyadarśana, the “basis” of his exposition, i.e., he preached for his special benefit (Sdmp. 405). In architecture the Sanskrit term is used as the physical foundation or basement of a building, the base of a pillar, the prop of a railing (Mhvyut. 5591; Divy. 221; Mhvu. i, 195; III, 2227; BHS. s.v. 4).

The Saṅgīti Suttanta (D. III, p. 229) enumerates four kinds of adhiṭṭhāna, distinguished by their objects. Here, too, the basic meaning of “foundation” is to be understood; they are the four foundations explained in the Dhātuvibhaṅga Sutta (M. III, p. 240) as insight not to be neglected (paññaṁ nappamajjeyya), truthfulness to be safeguarded (saccaṁ anurakkheyya), liberality to be fostered (cāgaṁ anubrūheyya) and tranquillity in which to train oneself (santiṁ sikkheyya). The foundation of insight (paññādhiṭṭhāna) is then explained by the commentary (MA. V, p. 52) as the insight of concentration and meditation (samādhivipassanā-paññā) which, through development of the stages of mental absorption, leads to the insight of the fruit of arahantship (arahatta-phalapaññā). The foundation of truthfulness (saccādhiṭṭhāna) is the supreme truth of Nibbāna, which cannot deceive (paramaṁ ariyasaccaṁ, yadidaṁ amosadhammaṁ nibbānaṁ: (M. III, p. 245). The foundation of liberality (cāgādiṭṭhāna) is the renunciation of all ties of existence (sabbūpadhi-paṭinissagga). The foundation of tranquillity (upasamādhiṭṭhāna) is the quelling of greed, hate and delusion (rāgadosamohānaṁ upasamo). Established on these foundations, a man is truly called a tranquil sage (muni santo ti vuccati: (M. III, p. 246), i.e., one who has destroyed in himself all intoxicants and is free (khīnāsava-muni santo nibbuto: MA. V, p. 60).

A resolution may be merely based on the right of a monk, e.g., to dispose of his robes (tricīvarā-dhiṣṭhāna: VinMS. ii, p. 91), although more often it is a supernormal strength of will-power as a result of meritorious action in the past (puṇyavipākādhiṣthānādhiṣṭhitās: Lal. 48). But, the predetermining of the duration of mental absorption (jhāna) before its induction requires cultivation (adhiṭṭhānavasitā), and is, therefore, neither normal in the sense of attainment within the reach of the everyday man, nor supernormal in the sense of belonging to the transcendental attainments of the Path (lokuttara magga). Neither should it be thought that determination is always good in the ethical sense; for that depends on its object, which may well turn a resolved mind into an obstinate and prejudiced one, and thereby place it in the same category with lust, craving, attachment to opinions, heretical views and religious bias (adhiṭṭhānābhinivesānusaya: (S. II, p. 17); III, pp. 10, 135).

Adhiṣṭhāna may acquire the meaning of power of control, over and above the right to control or determine. Thus, we hear of the force of the supernatural power of Maitreya bodhisattva (Mattreyasya bodhisattvasyādhiṣṭhānnabalena: Gvyū. 512). The continuation of the rolling of the Wheel of Righteousness also is assured through the supernatural power of all the Buddhas (sarvabuddhādhiṣṭhānāvilopitaṁ: Laṅk. 415). It is on account of the fixed determination of the Buddha to discipline creatures that are subject to evil rebirths, that the Wheel of his teaching cannot be turned back (akṣana-sattva-vinayādhiṣṭhānā-pratyudā-vartya-cakraṁ: Lal. 423).

Thus, a close connection may be observed between a resolution (adhiṭṭhāna) and an asseveration of truth (Saccakiriyā), which is a solemn statement of truth by the strength of which (saccādhiṭṭhāna) supernormal phenomena occur. This could actually be grouped under adhiṭṭhāna-iddhi, one of the psychic supernormal powers, by which a person could multiply his personality, if he resolved to do so.

The determined resolves of the individual (puggalādhiṭṭhāna) are, according to the Vibhaṅga, revealed by the positive progress in meditation, of conceptive ideation in its initial application (vitakka) and the sustained application of discursive thought (vicāra). But, even in the ordinary thought process (citta-vīthi) the factor of resolve forms a very important link. In the process of the development of a thought, which is the process of consciousness (viññāṇa-kicca) from the moment it is a mere disturbance (calana) in the unconscious (bhavaṅga) entering the field of presentation, till it loses itself in the stream of living after a final moment or two of registration (tadārammaṇa)–-which, perhaps, will allow it to survive as a memory–-in that entire process of a maximum of seventeen moments the most important is the stage of full cognition or apperception (javana) when sensory perceptions are interpreted, appropriated and assimilated. It is the stage of full awareness and responsibility, when thought (citta) acquires karmic liability through a volitional reaction (cetanā) to the passively accepted impressions in the senses. These moments of apperception (usually seven) are sometimes called the impulses of resolve (adhiṭṭhāna-javana), for it is here that the will is fixed in the process of acquiring some supernormal power (iddhi). The fifth and final state of mental absorption (jhāna) is then called the basis for the fixation of will (adhiṭṭhāna-pādaka-jhāna), for this state of mental absorption forms then the basis of the “willing” process (Compendium of Philosophy, p. 63); and the seven moments of volitional apperception are then known as adhiṭṭhāna-javana.

Adhiṭṭhāna is perhaps best known in later literature as a pāramī, one of the ten perfections to be developed in the highest degree by a bodhisatta during numerous lives and \ae ons in preparation for the supreme enlightenment of Buddhahood. “With unshakable resolution they work for the welfare and happiness of beings” (tesaṁ hitasukhāya avicalādhiṭṭhanā hon-ti: Vism. ix, § 124, p. 270). Thus we read of the bodhisatta as king Saṅkhapāla (J. No. 524, V, pp. 162–77), yielding himself up as a sacrifice, firm in his resolution not to open his eyes and regard his torturers with anger. It must be noted here, however, that only the later literature of the Theravāda (e.g., Jātaka, Cariyāpiṭaka, Mahābodhivaṁsa) speaks of these perfections, when ten pāramī are enumerated with adhiṭṭhāna in the eighth place. But in the texts of the Sarvāstivādins and the Mahāsāṅghikas only six are mentioned, and adhiṭṭhāna does not find a place there. On the other hand, no inference can be drawn from the absence of the ten perfections (dāsa pāramī) in the Book of Ten of the Aṅguttara Nikāya, for the Four Noble Truths are not found in the Book of Fours; neither is the Noble Eightfold Path in the Book of Eights.

Misery or wretchedness, is the object of contemplation of one of the eighteen kinds of insight-knowledge, named ādīnavānupassanā-ñāṇa. A class of five evils are grouped together, being the loss which the evil-doer suffers through his deviation from righteous conduct (pañca ādīnavā dussīlassa sīla vipattiyā: (D. II, p. 85): sloth will make him poor; his bad name will become notorious; with diffidence he will enter good society; bewildered he will face death; and after death he is due for an unhappy rebirth.

In a graduated discourse, slowly preparing his listener step by step from the elementary talk on generosity (dānakathā), the Buddha softens and uplifts the heart of Pokkharasādi by speaking of right conduct (sīlakathā) and its reward in heaven (saggakathā); from there on he makes him see the danger of sense-pleasures (kamānaṁ ādīnava), their vanity (okāra) and defilement (saṅkilesa), in order to lead him to the advantages of renunciation (nekkhamme ānisaṁsa: (D. I, p. 110). Here, we find ādīnava as danger and loss in direct opposition to ānisaṁsa as advantage and blessing. Elsewhere, the wretchedness of sensations (vedanānaṁ ādīnava: (D. I, p. 39) is placed in opposition to the sweet taste thereof (assāda); both of which are well known to the Tathāgata, who is free from both.

The various evils (ādīnava) which may beset a young man are enumerated as 36 in the Sigālovāda Suttanta (D. III, p. 182–4)). They are the results of drinking intoxicants, roaming the streets at unseemly hours, visiting fairs, gambling, associating with evil company and idling.

The “Fire Sermon”, as it is called, occurs in the first section of the Mahāvagga of the Vinaya Piṭaka (34 f.) and also as the 28th sutta of the Saḷāyatana Vagga (chap. 35) of the Saṁyutta Nikāya (S. Vol. IV). It is the third recorded address by the Buddha after his enlightenment, the first one being the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta and the second one the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta. The sermon is often referred to in the commentaries.

Soon after his enlightenment the Buddha went with a group of disciples to Uruvelā where lived three brothers of the Kassapa clan: Uruvelā-Kassapa, Nadī-Kassapa and Gayā-Kassapa. The Buddha spent a night in the fire-room of the hermitage of Uruvelā-Kassapa although this room was occupied by a venomous snake. Through his psychic power the Buddha overcame the snake with fire and smoke and thereby won the admiration of Kassapa, who invited him to stay with him permanently It was a subject popular with the sculptors of ancient Gandhāra. Reliefs from different sites are presented by Harald Ingholt (Gandhāran Art in Pakistan, Plates 80–81, 83–9).–-G.P.M.. Several exhibitions of psychic power were needed, however, before Kassapa of Uruvelā would admit the Buddha’s greater perfection. And only when Kassapa was told that he not only was not perfect but had not even entered on the way to perfection, and that his present way of living was not conducive to perfection–-only then did he ask to be accepted as a disciple of the Buddha and receive ordination from his hands. His own disciples, and his two brothers with their disciples, also sought ordination from the Buddha.

All these former ascetics had been fire-worshippers and most of the powers shown by the Buddha had connection with fire and smoke. It is, therefore, on fire that the Buddha preached a sermon to them which brought to all of them release from “the cankers (āsava) without grasping”. They had left their hermitages and had followed the Buddha on his tour to Gayā. Near that place on the crest of a rock, called Gayāsīsa, the Buddha addressed his monks, “Everything is burning” (sabbaṁ ādittaṁ). The sutta as a whole is an admirable piece of ordered thinking. First, the subject is stated and analysed with all particulars. Then the nature of the fire, followed by the cause of the conflagration, is explained. Action to be taken in this respect is detailed and finally the results of such action are shown. This arrangement displays a pattern almost identical with that of the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, the first sermon preached by the Buddha, in which he details the general fact of suffering and conflict (dukkha-sacca), the cause (dukkha-samudaya), the cessation (dukkha-nirodha) and the path or method leading to cessation (dukkha-nirodha-gāminī-paṭipadā).

1. The subject: “Everything is on fire. And what, O monks, is everything that is burning”? The six senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch and thought are now taken one by one. “It is the eye (cakkhu) that is burning, material shapes (rūpa) are burning, mental vision (cakkhu-viññāṇa) is burning, the mental impression through visual contact (cakkhusamphassa) is burning; in fact, the feeling, whether pleasant, painful or neutral, resulting from such contact is burning”. In other words, it is the physical sense-organ as subject, the physical sense-phenomenon as object, the physical activity of the sense-organ, the mental impression thereof and the mental reaction thereto, all that is burning. And the same analysis is repeated for each of the senses mentioned above.

2. Nature and cause: “But what is it burning with? It is ablaze with the fire of lust (rāga), of hate (dosa), of irrationality (moha)”. These are the three roots of all evil, passionate desire being directly opposed to hate, while either is always combined with and inspired by lack of understanding by dullness, senselessness, ignorance, stupidity, delusion. These fires, however, could not burn by themselves, but they are fed by the fuel provided “by birth, decay and death, by grief and sorrow, by physical and mental conflict and by the conflict” (resulting therefrom). It is life in all its phases from beginning to end, which is set ablaze with the fires of lust and hate, which is consumed in senseless action. It is not the body or the mind on account of which the corporeal and mental senses are said to be burning (āditta), flaming (paditta) and blazing (sampajjalita: SA. II, p. 363). But, the friction of that physico-psychical process, misapprehended as a permanent self, with the impermanent stream of life’s process, causes the conflict which is unrest, grief and sorrow, from birth to death. Thus is the nature and the cause of that which has set everything aflame.

3. Action to be taken: “Seeing this, O monks, the well-instructed ariyan disciple gets wearied” with the sense-organs, their objects, their contacts and their mental reactions, whether they are pleasant or painful, or neither. And in his disenchantment (nibbindati) he detaches himself therefrom (virajjati).

4. Results: Through dispassion he is set free (vimuccati) with the knowledge of deliverance and realisation that “rebirth is destroyed, the righteous life is lived, what had to be done is done, for life in these conditions there is nothing more”.

Noteworthy in these concluding lines is the absence of all reference to any person, even in an impersonal way. It is not the disciple who destroys rebirth by living a righteous life; it is not a perfected one who has completed his task; but “done is what was to be done” (kataṁ karaṇīyaṁ). The conflict has solved itself, the conflagration is burnt out, the fire extinguished.

The sutta appears in an abridged form as Āditta Sutta in the Saṁyutta Nikāya (S. III, p. 71).

Admission to participate in religious ceremonies usually involves membership of such a religious body through acceptance of its tenets and submission to its authority.

In certain instances the admission may partly exist in the transfer of power, in which case one speaks of consecration, e.g., of priests and kings. The admission may be an introduction to a specialised or even secret doctrine, in which case one speaks of initiation. Among the Romans initia was a generic term for mysteries (Varro, de Re Rustica, iii, 5).

The admission to early Buddhism, before any kind of organisation was possible owing to the absence of the Saṅgha, took place through the two-word (dvevācikā) formula (Vin. I, Mahāvagga, p. 4), when the first lay-disciples Tapussa and Bhallika took their refuge in the Blessed One and his teaching (bhagavantaṁ saraṇaṁ gacchāma dhammañca), the name Bhagavā being used instead of Buddha, and the Saṅgha being omitted, as no monks had been admitted at the time. Also, the earliest admission into the Order of monks lacked all ceremony. It was Aññāta Koṇḍañña, one of the group of five monks (pañcavaggiyā bhikkhū) who was with the Buddha before his enlightenment and who now, having listened to his first discourse, requested to be allowed to go forth into the homeless life (pabbajjā) and to be received into the brotherhood of monks. His admission (upasampadā) was affected by the simple word of the Teacher: “Come, monk” (ehi bhikkhu: ibid. p. 12). This was followed by similar admissions of the remaining four ascetics, Vappa, Bhaddiya, Mahānāma and Assaji, in that order (How very similar is this to the invitation of Jesus calling his disciples “Come ye after Me” in Matthew iv, 19).

After the Saṅgha is established, one reads of a merchant, the father of Yasa, who, after due instruction by the Buddha, acquires full confidence in him and requests to be admitted as a lay disciple, being the first one to take his refuge with the three-word (tevācika) formula: the Blessed One, his Teaching and Order of monks (bhagavantaṁ saraṇaṁ gacchāmi dhammañca bhikkhusaṅghañca: (Vin. i, p. 16).

When there were sixty-one arahants in the world (inclusive of the Buddha himself), they were sent out one by one in different directions, and from far distances would-be disciples came to the Buddha to receive admission from him, resulting in unnecessary fatigue. Therefore, the Buddha allowed his monks themselves to admit new entrants to the Order with the following observances: after having shaved the applicant’s hair and beard they were to give him the monk’s robes, arranging the outer-robe to cover the left shoulder only; then the applicant should pay his respects to his teacher and squatting down he should be made to repeat: I take my refuge in the Buddha, I take my refuge in the Dhamma, I take my refuge in the Saṅgha (Buddhaṁ saraṇaṁ gacchāmi, Dhammaṁ saraṇaṁ gacchāmi, Saṅghaṁ saraṇaṁ gacchāmi), to be repeated a second and a third time (dutiyam pi ... tatiyam pi \dots ibid. 22). And thus the Buddha allowed admission and ordination by these three undertakings (anujānāmi, bhikkhave, imehi tīhi saraṇāgamanehi pabbajjaṁ upasampadaṁ), although he himself continued to admit disciples in the Order of Monks with his simple formula, “Come, Monks”. Sāriputta and Moggallāna, who were to become the Buddha’s chief disciples, appear to have been among the last ones thus admitted into the Saṅgha, which had grown by now to a strength of several thousands (Vin. I, p. 43). While the wave of enthusiasm swept the country to such an extent that the Buddha was accused of making the people childless, of making women “widows”, or breaking up families, the large number of monks who had all joined within a short space of time roamed the countryside wrongly dressed, not befittingly attired, without instruction, without exhortation, because of the lack of preceptors (anupajjhāyakā: ibid. 44). And thus sheer necessity of discipline brought about the institution of tutor (upajjhāya), who, sharing the same dwelling place with his pupils (saddhivihārikā), should arouse in them the mental attitude of a son (puttacitta) while assuming himself the attitude of a father (pitucitta). The tutor had to accept his pupils either by word of mouth by saying: Very well (sādhu), certainly (lāhu), all right (opāyika), or something to that effect, or consent at least by gesture (kāyena), whereupon the pupil would agree to perform all the minor attentions expected of him, such as preparing wash-water, sweeping the place, folding the robes, and be, in short, the tutor’s attendant (upajjhāyassa pacchāsamaṇa: ibid. 46). The preceptor, on the other hand, would help his pupil in regard to recitation, interrogation, exhortation and instruction: provide for him the necessities of life in clothing and lodging; and look after him in illness. The tutor could dismiss his pupil for improper conduct and refuse to be waited upon by him any longer; but if the pupil apologised he should be forgiven (ibid. 54).

Many rules were thus gradually formulated regulating the relationship between tutor and pupil. And in the same way as the family is the prototype of society and state, so the tutor-pupil relationship became the prototype of the organized Brotherhood of Monks, the Saṅgha.

Thus, with the increase of regulations also the method of receiving a pupil in the Order was altered by the Buddha. He abolished the ordination by taking the three refuges as earlier allowed, and introduced a formal act consisting of a proposal or motion (ñatti), with a thrice repeated resolution, inviting the Saṅgha to express its disapproval, if so desired. This was followed by the actual decision as fourth item (ñatti-catuttha-kamma), that the Saṅgha is pleased to admit into the Order a new member, consent being expressed by silence (ibid. 56).

But, several complications set in by the indiscriminate admission into the Order, either on the occasion of going forth (pabbajjā) from home to homelessness, or on admission to full membership by ordination (upasampadā). And hence, when the occasion arose, further restrictions were laid down and an enquiry into those requisite conditions formed part of the actual ritual. Thereby, the following were debarred from admission: those suffering from cutaneous diseases, such as leprosy (kuṭṭha), abscesses (gaṇḍa), eczema (kilāsa), or from consumption (sosa), or epilepsy (apamāra). Again, jail-breakers (kara-bhedaka-cora) and refugees from justice (palāyita) or those against whom a warrant was outstanding (likhitaka), those who had been punished by flogging (kasāhata) or branding (lakkhaṇāhata), those in debt (iṇāyika) and runaway slaves (dāsa palāyita), all these were denied admission into the Order even in the lower grade (pabbajjā: Vin. I, Mahāvagga, pp. 71–6). An age limit was fixed for the upasampadā, at the age of twenty, when young boys wetted their bedding when oppressed by hunger during the night towards dawn. But the going forth (pabbajjā) was allowed as soon as a boy was able to scare crows (kāke uṭṭepetuṁ: ibid. 78–9).

This distinction between a preliminary admission at the time of going forth (pabbajjā) from home to homelessness and the subsequent confirmation thereof by a final admission or ordination (upasampadā), when the candidate takes upon himself (upasampajjatti) the obligations of the Pāṭimokkha, does not appear in the earlier stages of development of the Saṅgha, and it was probably rendered necessary by the phenomenal numerical growth of the brotherhood, which required a period of probation, both to allow the preceptor to test an applicant’s views, if he had been a member of another sect, and to allow the aspirant to test his own strength in leading a life of renunciation. The time before the final admission served, therefore, as a period of probation which was imposed irrespective of age on those who sought admission after having belonged to a different sect or school. A period of probation (parivāsa) very similar to that of the novitiate was also imposed as part of the penalty for breaking any of the major rules of discipline to be confessed to the Saṅgha (saṅghādisesa); but, in that case, no new admission to the Order was required after completing the period, but only a rehabilitation (abbhāna).

Thus the going forth ceremony (pabbajjā) became the initiation of the novice (sāmaṇera), and the confirmation ceremony (upasampadā) the admission into the Order as a full-fledged bhikkhu.

The general attitude towards immorality in the teaching of the Buddha is not expressed in a penal code; but, wherever social customs had already built up such a collection of laws, the influence of the doctrine tended to the mitigation of their severity. Far from condoning any transgression of rules which were based on and grown out of communal, social life, the responsibility for the result of such action is always laid squarely at the door of the transgressor. If the transgressor happened to be a member of the Saṅgha, monastic discipline would be enforced by the application of relevant regulations. Excommunication (pārājīkā) is the sentence fixed for any sexual intercourse in which a monk would find himself wilfully involved, irrespective of the act having been adultery or not. This excommunication, therefore, is not a punishment of the culprit, but a safeguarding of the community to preserve its own purity. The culprit has suffered “defeat” in his striving for the goal of a disciplined life.

Adultery does not in the Buddhist texts and traditions receive the same distinct attention as in some other religions and codes of morality. It is no doubt mentioned as one of the various degrees of sexual misconduct (kāmesu micchācāra); but apart from the act of inordinate desire (kāmacchanda) which is the first in the series of five hindrances (pañca nīvaraṇāni) and also the first and foremost of the group of ten fetters (dāsa samyojanāni) which prevent deliverance of mind and which bind to rebirth in saṁsāra, the sinfulness of the act appears to lie in the violation of custodianship. The Buddha explains to Cunda (A. V, p. 264), that in sexual desires the wrongdoer is he who has intercourse with girls under the guardianship of mother, father, brother, sister or relatives, under the protection of law, or with married women, jailed women, or with betrothed girls.

It is noteworthy that whereas the transgression of misconduct with an evil woman is censurable only to a small degree (micchācāro pi dussīlāya itthiyā vītikkamo appasāvajjo), it becomes increasingly worse with the proportionate growth of virtue in the woman as a lay-disciple, as a sāmaṇerī, a bhikkhuṇī, one who is on the road to sainthood, or one who has attained the extinction of all mental intoxicants (khīṇāsavāya pana ekantamahāsāvajjo va: VbhA. 383). It is also noteworthy that adultery is never referred to as a psychological wrong done by a married man to his own wife in his association with another woman. The reason is perhaps that the difference between monogamy and polygamy was not one of virtue and vice, but only a difference in degree of sense-desire (kāma). The ideal man will avoid both.

The Book of Monastic Discipline (Vinaya) speaks only incidentally of various types of women, as mistresses, “temporary wives” (taṅkhaṇikā), “wives for the moment” (muhuttika: (Vin. III, p. 139); they are mentioned factually, whereas the ethical fault is with the monk who should act as a go-between for such a woman with a man.

That a woman should make a living by selling her body does not seem to have appeared as if she was selling her virtue. For we come across several instances of courtesans, publicly respected and honoured, such as Ambapālī and the woman whose daughter was asked to be given in marriage to some disciple of the Nigaṇṭhas (Vin. III, p. 134). The stress is on the conjugal right of exclusive possession of the wife by her husband: If one is unable to lead a life of continence one should not transgress against another’s wife (asambhuṇanto pana brahmacariyaṁ parassa dāraṁ na atikkameyya: (A. IV, p. 26). A life of abandon is usually described as that of a man indulging in women (itthi-dhutta), in drink (surādhutta) and in gambling (akkhadhutta):

“The rake who squanders all he gets
Fast as it comes, on women, drink and dice.
Next comes the lecher who, not satisfied
With his own wife, is seen about with whores,
Or caught in dalliance with others' wives” (A. IV, p. 26–8), trsl. Chalmers.).

“He is seen with others' wives” (dissati paradāresu), stands here as the culmination of sexual misconduct. The brāhman’s wanton wife (bhariyā anācārī dussīlā) of the Rādha Jātaka (J. No. 145, I, p. 496) is nicknamed the owlish one (kosiyāyanī), possibly in consideration of her night activities, for that other bad woman of the Kosiya Jātaka (J. No. 130, I, pp. 463 ff.) is also named the owl (kosiyā). Although the commentary explains the name as belonging to Kosiya-gotta, a lower clan of brāhmans, the coincidence of these bad women being named after a night-bird is too strong to be without significance.

It would appear that if an adulterer (paradārika) were seized, he was beheaded (S. II, p. 188), but it is not clear whether this punishment was meted out by the law of the country, or by an outraged husband taking the law into his own hands. But even when remaining undetected in this life, the effect of adultery may be experienced after many lives perhaps, as happened in the case of that man in Rājagaha who was sunk, head and all, in a dung-pit; he used to be an adulterer in that same town (kūpe nimuggo paradāriko: (S. II, p. 259). An adulteress (aticārinī) was seen being flayed alive by vultures (loc. cit.). Inasmuch as she got her pleasures with other men, not with her own husband, she was to undergo this painful contact, being deprived of pleasant touch (VinA. 510).

Or advaya is found in Buddhism in the sense that the Buddha denies the duality (dvayatā) of existence (atthitā) and non-existence (natthitā), which two terms refer to the theories of eternalism (sassata-diṭṭhi) and annihilationism (uccheda-diṭṭhi). “The world, Kaccāyana, usually bases its views on two things: on existence and on non-existence” (dvayanissito khvāyaṁ Kaccāyana loko yebhuyyena atthitañc'eva natthitañca: (S. II, p. 17). But he, who with right insight sees the passing of the world as it really is, does not hold with the existence of the world. And he, who with right insight sees the uprising of the world as it really is, does not hold with the non-existence of the world, either.

Dualism is found in most religious systems with various modifications. But, essentially, it implies a co-eternal existence of two independent principles. In Zoroastrianism the two are the primal Good and Evil, applied to the soul and the body, spirit and nature, the psychical and the physical, or personified as God and the Devil. In Plato the world of ideas is rigidly separated from the manifold of sense.

Non-Dualism (advaita), as the fundamental principle of Vedānta, asserts that there is only one reality (brāhman), that the changing phenomena in the world of events are illusory (māyā), that the only reality (brāhman) is identical with the self (ātman), which, however, in ignorance is assumed as an individual Ego.

Thus where Dualism (dvaita) distinguishes and opposes the real Ego and the non-Ego, this is denied in non-Dualism (advaita) according to which this distinction is illusory. This non-Dualism is thus actually Monism in its acceptance of only one reality.

This one reality, however, is also denied in Buddhism, where only phenomena are admitted, without substance or noumenon; mental processes without a static mind; ethical actions without an individual performer. All this is enshrined in the doctrine of anatta which is the teaching of no-soul, no-substance, non-entity, and hence of non-Dualism in the most general sense. For it denies the existence of essence and its affiliated doctrine of eternalism, as well as the denial of existence as a phenomenal process, which denial is absolute scepticism and annihilationism.

The positive aspect of this Buddhist doctrine is the doctrine of Dependent Origination (paṭicca-samuppāda), according to which nothing arises or ceases unless in dependence on conditions, which again holds the middle between existence and non-existence.

The Buddha is spoken of as a teacher of non-duality (advaya-vādin: Mhvyut. 23; Divy. 95.13).

Also called “counter-image” (paṭibhāganimitta), is a mental mark, sign or reflex (nimitta), which arises during the successful practice of certain exercises of meditation (bhāvanā) and concentration (samādhi). After the setting up of the preliminary work-sign (parikamma-nimitta) which is the material object of concentration, and when the mind is fully concentrated on the object of its choice, an acquired image, called the assumed sign (uggaha-nimitta), presents itself. It is the mental reflection of the material object which should be seen as one views one’s own face in a mirror, with all its imperfections, till all details are seen, or rather known, whether the eyes are open or closed. From this mental reflex of the assumed sign or acquired image (uggaha-nimitta), the imperfections gradually disappear till the after-image or counterpart sign (paṭibhāga-nimitta) appears without any of the imperfections attached to the material prototype. It is a mere mode of appearance (upaṭṭhānākāramattaṁ: Vism. iv, § 31, p. 102) which has now become completely independent both from the preliminary object and the acquired sign, and is hence called the after-image, or counterpart image (paṭibhāga-nimitta). This mental reflex in its purity ceases to distract the mind and thereby becomes a true reflection of the state of mind at that time, as the hindrances (nīvaraṇa) are suppressed, and the defilements (kilesa) have subsided. Thus, while meditating on a loathsome object like a bloated corpse, the acquired image will be hideous and a dreadful sight, but the after-image thereof will appear “like a stout man resting after a heavy meal”.

These signs are not so sharply differentiated in the canonical texts, although even there already they can be recognised in their basic forms. Thus, “having cognised a mental object with the mind, he is not enticed by the outward sign (na nimittaggāhī hoti) or general appearance, nor is he entranced by its minor characteristics” (nānubyañjanaggāhī: (M. I, p. 180). In this passage the different signs accompanying the various degrees of concentration have not assumed as yet the technical distinction which is found in the commentaries, especially in the Visuddhimagga, where the three signs are indicative of progressive concentration, and are stages of visualisation. In the suttas these signs are rather methods of association of ideas, by means of which deeper concentration may be obtained. Thus, in the Vitakka-saṇṭhāna Sutta (M. I, p. 119) the Buddha refers to five signs (pañca nimittāni), but they are rather various attitudes of mind which should be developed from time to time depending on the characteristics involved in the development of a thought. When an object of thought becomes associated with desire, aversion or confusion, one should turn towards another object of thought associated with skill and virtue, “just as a clever carpenter drives out a large peg with a small one”. If this method does not prove sufficiently effective, the meditating monk should scrutinise his thoughts and reflect on the painful results (dukkhavipāka) of such unskilful thoughts. Or, he should ignore them and forget them through lack of attention (asati-amanasikāra). Or, if such forgetfulness is not possible, he should analyse the formation of such thoughts (vitakkasaṅkhāra-saṇṭhānaṁ manasikātabbaṁ) and thereby bring them to an end. Finally, he may resort to concentrated will-force to subdue, restrain and dominate his mind (cetasā cittaṁ abhinigganhitabbaṁ abhinippīḷetābbaṁ abhisantāpetabbaṁ).

The after-image or counter-sign (paṭibhāga-nimitta) is the immediate forerunner of a state of mental absorption (jhāna), but the transition is subtle. For, should one force one’s energy at the moment of the arising of this sign, thinking: “Now I shall soon reach absorption”, this agitation may easily prevent attainment and progress. On the other hand, delight in this counter-image (paṭibhāga-nimitta) may become a cause of idleness, whereby progress and eventual attainment of absorption will be retarded and even blocked (Vism. iv, § 72, p. 111).

Once the after-image is obtained, it should be extended “in order to perfect the development of consciousness” (cittabhāvanāvepullatthañca yathāladdhaṁ paṭibhāga-nimittaṁ vaḍḍhetabbaṁ: ibid. § 126, p. 123), till it pervades all and the mind becomes concentrated in access-concentration (upacārasamādhinā cittaṁ samāhitaṁ evā ti: ibid.
§ 31, p. 102).

A discourse by the Buddha on “faith” (pasāda) in the “best” (agga). It occurs, in what is probably its most original form together with verses, in the Itivuttaka (87–9), where the three “best” are explained as the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Saṅgha. For, amongst all beings, whether they have a physical form or not, sense-perception or not, the fully enlightened one, the Buddha, is supreme. Hence, faith in him is the best. Then, amongst all states or things, whether they are conditioned (saṅkhata) or not, the best is freedom from passion, for that leads to the subjugation of pride, restraint of lust, removal of clinging, the extirpation of the root of rebirth, destruction of craving, freedom from passion, cessation (of becoming) and Nibbāna. But it is the Dhamma which teaches this passionless freedom. Hence, faith in the Dhamma is the best. And again, amongst all orders and societies the Order of the monks of the Buddha is the best, for it is that Order which consists of the four pairs of holy men, i.e., of those who follow the path (magga) and enjoy the fruit (phala) of the four stages of holiness, who are thereby worthy of honour, reverence, offerings and worship, a field beyond compare in which the faithful may sow their good deeds to ripen into the fruits of merit. Hence, faith in the Saṅgha is the best.

This Aggappasāda Sutta has been enlarged with a fourth best, the Eightfold Path (aṭṭhaṅgika magga), to enable its inclusion in the Book of Fours (catukka nipāta) of the Aṅguttara Nikāya (A. II, p. 34). But in the Cundī Sutta (A. III, p. 35) the Eightfold Path is again omitted and replaced by five virtuous practices (pañca sīlāni). Had the Eightfold Path been included here too, it would have earned thereby the right to appear in the Book of Fives. But that both suttas in the Aṅguttara Nikāya have been edited is clear from the fact that in both cases the concluding verses speak only of the three best faiths, as originally mentioned in the Itivuttaka.

A quotation of the section dealing with conditioned and unconditioned states and the freedom from passion occurs in the Visuddhimagga (viii, § 242, p. 242) under the chapter on recollection of peace (upasamānussati) with a comprehensive paraphrase on some terms used therein.

A collective term, including physical (rūpa) as well as non-material (arūpa) groups. The Pali term khandha (Skt. skandha) indicates a collection of ingredients which together comprise the phenomenal process of continued existence (khandha santāna). The word is also used in a less technical sense indicating the total mass of ill, all that goes to make up the concept of conflict in its arising and cessation (kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudāya and–-nirodha). But in a more specialised usage the aggregates (khandha) are the factors which constitute the process of existence, not as elements but as agents. As these aggregates are the factors which contribute to the continuation of the process of birth, life and death through their grasping and laying hold of fresh material for their nutriment (āhāra, q.v.), they are rightly called the aggregates of clinging (upādānakkhandha).

In a stereotyped analysis of this process we find an enumeration of five aggregates (pañcakkhandha), which will be dealt with under their respective headings: one physical group (rūpakkhandha) with its four basic elements (dhātu) and 24 derived (upāda) material phenomena, and four mental aggregates (nāmakkhandha), each forming a group of psychic phenomena, analysed, divided and subdivided as five kinds of feeling or mental reception (vedanā), six kinds of mental perception (saññā), fifty kinds of ideation or mental conception (saṅkhāra), and six kinds of consciousness (viññāṇa). All of them are associated and conditioned in mutual dependability (aññamañña-paccaya), which gives this process of continuity the appearance of substantiality. But it is exactly for the purpose of showing the non-existence of a substance, soul or abiding entity (an-atta) that this entire process is analysed in such minute detail.

As factors of existence, the aggregates are compared to the various co-existing parts of a chariot; they constitute the whole, and apart from them there is naught.

There are various ways in which these five groups of aggregates are classified. The usual one of body (rūpa) and mind (nāma) has already been outlined. The Dhammasaṅgaṇī treats all phenomena under three groups: physical (rūpa); mental (cetasika) which comprehends vedanā, saññā and saṅkhāra; and mind (citta), the equivalent of consciousness (viññāṇa).

Nyanatiloka (Buddh. Dictionary, p. 77) emphasises that not only does the total process of individual existence not constitute any self-dependent real ego-entity or personality (atta), but also that these five complete groups have no real existence either, as only single representatives of these groups can arise with any state of consciousness. For example, with one and the same unit of consciousness (i.e., in one single thought) only one single kind of feeling, say joy or sorrow, can be associated and never more than one. Similarly two different perceptions cannot arise at the same moment. As phenomena they have no substantiality, and apart from them there is no substance either.

The name given to several discourses of the Aṅguttara Nikāya (A. III, pp. 185), 186; IV, p. 408). An entire chapter (xvii) of the Pañcaka Nipāta (A. III, p. 185–203)) has derived its title from the first sutta contained therein.

The first sutta (A. III, p. 185) deals with five ways of putting away malice (āghāta-paṭivinaya), viz., by developing feelings of loving-kindness, of compassion and of equanimity; further by means of inattention to the evil done, and finally by means of rationalisation: the fact that one is only reaping the fruits of one’s own deeds should dispel all feeling of malice for another.

The sutta which follows also deals with the overcoming of malice in five ways, and is spoken by Sāriputta addressing the monks (A. III, p. 186). But here the five methods vary according to the person in whom feelings of hatred with a desire to hurt (āghāta) have arisen. If such a person is impure in deed but not in word, he should, at the time when hate arises in his heart, dwell in his mind on actions that may be pure. Similarly, he who is pure in deed but not in word, should think of pure words only and put the impure out of his mind; just as a man, tortured by heat and thirst, arriving at a pond overgrown with mossy slime and weeds, would scatter those impurities with both hands and then plunge into that pool to refresh his limbs. Again, there may be some, impure both in deed and word, who yet obtain mental clarity and calm once in a way; they should fix their mind just on that occasional experience, however short-lived it may be, as a thirsty man, who finds no water except in the footprint of a cow, can sip only therefrom by crouching on all fours and drink from it as cattle do. But, when malice arises in a heart which is impure in thought and action, and which not even occasionally obtains clarity and calm, like an ailing man on a journey far from any village, unable to get either food or medicine–-then the only way for such malice to be overcome is through the compassion of someone else. But in him whose ways are pure and whose words are fair, whose mind is open and whose heart is calm, a thought may be made to arise and be fixed on any of those states (manasikātabba), and malice will be put away.

The other eight suttas which are included in this Āghāta Vagga (A. III, p. 185–203)) do not deal with malice, but with the qualities required in a monk to allow him to address his fellow monks (Sākacchā Sutta), and to be an example to them (Sājīva Sutta); with the states of mind of one who questions another (Pañha-pucchā Sutta); with a dispute between Sāriputta and Udāyin regarding the cessation of perception and feeling (Nirodha Sutta); with the five conditions required in one to be fit to exhort another (Codanā Sutta); with virtue and the absence thereof, affecting concentration and insight, disgust with the world, dispassion and emancipation (Sīla Sutta); with careful observation (Nisanti Sutta) leading to a thorough grasp and aptitude; and finally with the most perfect sense-objects as explained by Bhaddaji and Ānanda (Bhaddaji Sutta).

Two more suttas on malice (dve āghātāni) appear in the Navaka-nipāta of the Aṅguttara Nikāya (A. IV, 408 f.). The first speaks of the nine bases of malicious thought: which are the thoughts that someone has done, in the past, or is doing now, or will do in the future, “harm either to me or to someone dear to me; or good to someone not dear to me”. This sutta is followed by the nine ways of dispelling such thoughts, in which each of the evil thoughts of the preceding sutta is followed by the introspective question, “But wherein lies the gain to him from this”? And with such reflection the earlier malicious thought is put away.

There are various ways in which an experience can be approached. There is the detached view of the historian who deals with events and does not allow them to become experiences. There is also the approach of the scientist who, in developing his knowledge, has secured reliable information on a wide variety of subjects with which human knowledge is proximately concerned. He may admit his incapacity to achieve ultimate truth, but this should not be construed as a failure of science, as its aim is not to give a metaphysical view of reality. Only the most superficial thinkers will not feel their degrees of assurance diminish as they continue their probings into ever more remote regions of inquiry. Great thinkers have always been keenly aware of the narrow limits within which certain knowledge is possible.

Science is not a body of laws governing reality, but a scheme anticipating the further course of phenomena. Its main interest is in phenomena as such, that is, in their behaviour. Since physics and metaphysics have officially and effectively parted their ways, a stupendous advance in all the various fields of science has become evident. Scientific methods of enquiry are now being employed even by metaphysicians in an endeavour to locate the ultimate object, showing thereby a definite turning away from dogmatism towards scepticism.

It is felt more and more that, unless the spirit of agnosticisms–-or the admission that certain kinds of alleged existents do not fall within the range of assured knowledge–-is made the basis of research in any field, either of physics or metaphysics, the result will be a distortion of the actual values of life. Dreams may be more pleasant for the moment than realities, but life has to be adapted to reality rather than to dreams. To call poverty a blessing because of a subsequent supernatural abundance cannot have any meaning if the very existence of the supernatural remains beyond the reach of our present, knowledgeable experience. In such a case there will be no doubt in the mind of the willing believer, for wishful thinking has always had a strong influence on the formation of dogmas to the extent of arrogancy, “defining the nature of God Almighty with an accuracy from which modest naturalists would shrink in describing the genesis of a black-beetle” Sir Lesley Stephen, An Agnostic’s Apology, London, 1904..

Agnosticism becomes impossible for those who obviously cannot live and act without adopting some kind of positive attitude towards the problems of life, who cannot envisage existence without a goal or purpose, who must see plan and order even in extra-mental phenomena, who feel the inner urge to regulate their lives and those of their neighbours according to preconceived standards of morality, who cannot live without hope, whose present lies in the future, who, therefore, do not live now, but exist either as shades of the past or as phantoms of an imaginary future.

As for those who sport the name of agnostic, hoping thereby to remain in the foreground of advanced thought, there are many (not excluding T.H. Huxley who in 1869 invented the term Agnosticism), who have not been able to maintain a complete consistency. For T.H. Huxley himself already accepted something that went beyond the evidence of the senses, as quoted by the Very Rev. Dr. John Baillie “Are not all men agnostics”? in: Asking them Questions, Oxford Univ, Press, 1950, p. 9.: “If there is anything in the world that I do firmly believe in, it is the universal validity of the law of causation, but that universality cannot be proved by any amount of experience”. And yet, the same Huxley defined the agnostic principle by saying, “That which Agnostics deny and repudiate, as unmoral, is the contrary doctrine, that there are propositions which men ought to believe without logically satisfactory evidence” Controverted Questions, p. 450.. How a Buddhist Agnostic avoids this pitfall of universality of causation will be seen later.

Unlike the scientific sceptic who entertains varying degrees of doubts as to whether some or all of the psychological processes, purporting to yield knowledge, really do so–-the dogmatist is not interested in phenomena, but wants to see behind and go beyond. Events and experiences are for the dogmatist but expressions of a further and ultimate cause: a reality behind actuality. Once this supposition is accepted, the fact that the human intellect cannot penetrate this veil is no barrier, and transcendental or supramundane is created to explain the incomprehensible. Where the intellect fails to grasp an ultimate in an endless series of causes and effects, there an adequate cause in itself takes away the problem and makes it into a mystery which can be accepted by faith alone. But this transcendental, ultimate cause, being generated by an act of faith made by submission of the intellect to a dogma imposed by authority, still remains a product of thought and is, therefore, a self-deception. That this is realised more and more is shown by the fact that in modern times professed agnosticism springs mainly from the bosom of well-established and dogmatic religions. It is not so much the utter materialist but rather the reactionary to faith and dogma who now repudiates all supernatural knowledge.

Every truly reflective mind must be agnostic, for what else is meant by agnosticism than the recognition of the vast desert-like areas of uncertainty that surround the small oasis of knowledge we possess? For, even when agnosticism is described as a denial that we have any reliable knowledge at all about the ultimate meaning of things, it would not necessarily become identical with absolute scepticism. Whether the idea of an ultimate reality is reconcilable with the basic concept of Agnosticism, depends on the form given to this idea of ultimate reality. If reality is conceived as something supreme, as a principal entity, as an absolute essence, it must remain a contradiction, for such an existence is inconceivable without making it relative to the conceiving mind. If it is inconceivable, it is unknowable, and the mind’s attitude must remain agnostic. But if reality is understood to be identical with actuality, if the ultimate nature of phenomena is seen as a process of action and reaction without any basis for identity such as entity, essence, substance or soul, it falls not only within the purview of experience, but is experience itself. The actual is the real. Then the task of the philosopher will be to remove the conditions which prevent the actual from being conceived as the actual. This is precisely the self-imposed task of the agnostic, as tersely expressed by the Buddha of his own teaching: “to know and see things as they are” (yathābhūta-ñāṇa-dassana).

In the same way as science is an approach to experience which is actual, even if science cannot prove that this actuality is also reality, so the Buddha approaches life, which is an actual conflict, as a series of events, a process of experience. His aim, however, is not merely the discovery and analysis of this conflict-experience, but, in analysing and tracing its origin and cause, it is an attempt to prove that this conflict is not real, but is based on a delusion. The discipline of science is based not on faith, but on scepticism. The discipline of the Buddha is based neither on faith nor on scepticism, but on agnosticism. “Science makes no attempt to study or describe reality–-certainly not ultimate reality. Science is not even concerned with truth” (Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution). The Buddha on the other hand is not interested in phenomena as such, but only in so far as they affect and constitute the process of life, i.e., in phenomena as experienced. It is not their behaviour but their nature, which forms the subject of his enquiry. And when it is shown that their nature, i.e., their reality, does not correspond to their behaviour, i.e., their actuality, or their action and our reaction, his interest automatically ceases, as that of a traveller in the desert who discovers the oasis to be a fata morgana.

Such discovery is a system of knowledge which is neither scepticism nor dogmatism; and we find here once more the Middle Path See Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, A. IV, p. 26) f. between the two extremes of denial and affirmation. It is this agnostic attitude which characterises the teaching of the Buddha, which is mainly negative in its form. The reason is that his method is not one of positive speculation, but one of scientific analysis of actuality. And, whenever actuality is fully understood, it proves to be different from its original appearances. The result is not an absolute denial or a mere doubt of existence, but a qualified denial of appearances. Existence proves to be a process (santati) of becoming and ceasing. Time and space are mental concepts (paññatti) in which experiences are cast. The “self”, that precious “self”, around which the whole universe revolves, is but a fabrication of the mind (samoha-citta) which in isolation and opposition is building up this permanent “I” or soul-concept to escape the inevitable submersion in the stream of impermanence (anicca). Mind itself dissolves in a process of thinking, dependent in its arising and cessation on conditions which are equally without substance.

Therefore, although the method of approach of science may appear similar to that of the Buddha, viz. an analysis of experience, the two systems vary greatly in the object of their approach. Science is interested in phenomena and is not worried about their real nature as long as it can explain and experiment with their actual behaviour. The Buddha, on the other hand, is not content to play with phenomena; but, knowing them to be “self”-experiences, he probes into the nature of that “self” in order to discover the reality of such experiences. In this approach the Buddha does not become a Positivist. There is in his doctrine no insistence on synthesis, no preconception of a plan, order or purpose. His aim was not to find an explanation into which all events can be fitted, but he was prepared to meet life as a process of becoming, every moment afresh. Phenomena are not connected by the principles of causality and substance, but by conditionality and process. And thus the theological and metaphysical explanations of the world which are sporadically found in Buddhist texts should never be understood in the sense of cosmic laws. Such laws, as a matter of fact, are specifically rejected when based on the concept of creation. The Brahmajāla Sutta (D. I) explains how Brahma, believing himself to be the creator of the universe on account of his being the sole occupant of his heaven, is caught in the net of error. The sutta is a refusal to choose between the various possibilities of affirmation or denial, simultaneous acceptance of the affirmative and the negative, in respect of the so-called “unelucidated topics” See also Cūḷa Māluṅkya Sutta: A. IV, p. 26).

The Buddha did not lay down a rigid and positive code of morality, but was prepared to point out any anomaly which might disturb the smooth flow of mutual relationship of living beings in their constant contact in this process of life, without resorting to supernatural sanction. This regulation of living and thinking is, therefore, not according to a dogmatic plan, neither does it ignore so-called immaterial values as in scientific scepticism, but it approaches each problem afresh without preconceived standards with a perfectly open mind which is not afraid to admit ignorance.

Yet, it must be admitted that the Buddha never said, “I do not know”. On the contrary, he is claimed to have had omniscience (sabbaññuta-ñāṇa). This point, however, should not be stressed too much, for it is also mentioned that the Buddha, when he intended to preach the newly found truth, did not know of the death of his former teachers, Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka, but had to be informed thereof by an invisible devatā (Vin. I, p. 7). The commentator is at great pains in explaining the apparent contradiction as follows: The Buddha did not know this particular incident at that particular moment with his knowledge at the normal level. Had he applied his “divine eye” of supernormal insight (dibbacakkhu), this fact too would have been known to him.).

There are several occasions when the Buddha left a question unanswered or rather undecided (avyākata). Sometimes, views remain unexpounded or are dismissed without an answer. The question, “Either he knows that the world is eternal or he knows that the world is not eternal, or he does not know whether the world is eternal or not eternal”, comprehensive as it seems and forcing a solution, is simply met with a counter-question, “And who are you to reject whom”? (ko santo kaṁ paccācikkhasi), which is the real crux of the whole of the Buddha’s teaching, for, “the higher life is not contingent on the truth of any thesis of this type, in so far as there still remains the fact of birth, decay and death, of sorrow and conflict–-of all of which I proclaim the extirpation here and now”. In other words, the problem is psychologically dealt with. A mere “yes” or “no” answer would have disposed of the question, but not of the problem which gave rise to the question. The question raised about the eternity of the world or the everlasting life has a much deeper root than the superficial enquiry about the presence or absence of a time-limit. The psychological cause of the question is the problem in the mind of the enquirer who is seeking confirmation as to the continuation of life, i.e., of “self”. And with the solution of this problem by the Buddha’s teaching of soullessness (anatta), the earlier question becomes meaningless and hence does not require an answer. The actual problem to be solved is: Who are you?
(ko santo \dots).

Even so, the tricky question of the world’s beginning is not totally brushed away, for this round of existence (saṁsāra) is said to be incalculable: “This saṁsāra’s beginning is inconceivable, O monks; its starting point cannot be known” (anamataggo ayaṁ bhikkhave saṁsāro; pubbakoti na paññāyati: (S. II, p. 178). It is unadulterated agnosticism!

On another occasion (S. IV, p. 400). the Buddha is asked, “Is there a self”? and the Buddha remains silent. Again he is asked, “Is there not a self”?, but the Buddha maintains his silence. Only when Ānanda presses for an explanation at least of his silence, does the Buddha say that affirmation of a self would mean siding with the eternalists or dogmatists, while negation of a self would mean siding with the annihilationists or sceptics. Neither reply would have been in accordance with the knowledge that all things are impermanent. In a teaching of which the most fundamental thesis is the process of becoming in impermanency, the question “to-be” or “not to be” cannot be put and has to remain unanswered (avyākata).

Questions similar to those about the “self” were put by Anurādha about the existence or otherwise of an accomplished one (Tathāgatha) after his death. And here, too, the reply is to the effect that the question cannot be answered as the enquiry assumes the real existence, as an entity, of that which is only a process in actuality: “As a Tathāgatha is not met with in reality (saccato thetato), it is not proper to pronounce of him that he exists after death or does not exist after death, or that he both does and does not exist after death, or that he neither exists nor does not exist after death” (S. IV, p. 384). The question, therefore, cannot be conceived (anupalabbhamāna). The actual origin of such theories does not lie in a sincere desire for higher wisdom (paññā), but in hastily formed opinions (diṭṭhi), “opinions based on ignorance and blindness, personal feelings as a result of craving, with excitement and sceptical agitation” (D. I, p. 3), 32.).

A typical Buddhistic exposition by Sāriputta, based on the Buddha’s model reply to the so-called undecided (avyākata) questions, occurs in the Sañcetanika Vagga of the Catukka Nipāta in the Aṅguttara Nikāya A. II, iv, 18, sutta 174.. Mahākoṭṭhita wants to know whether anything at all exists or not after the complete and passionless cessation (asesa-virāga-nirodha) of the six spheres of physical and mental contact. Sāriputta explains his repeated and negative reply to each and every question by saying that any positive answer would cause an obsession where there was no obsession before (iti vadaṁ appapañcaṁ papañceti). The six spheres of physical and mental contact are an analytical description of individuality. As long as this is misunderstood as an entity, substance, soul or ego, this delusion will lead to questions, like the above, about the continuance or discontinuance thereof. “As long as this view of individuality persists, so long also will this obsession (of self-continuity) persist. But with the cessation, complete and passionless, of such a view of these spheres of contact, the obsession will also cease”.

It cannot be denied that the Buddha had a very definite theory concerning the hereafter. His doctrine of kamma and the results of such action, which he certainly shared with other spiritual teachers of his time, are not restricted to one single life-span only. And hence, when the question of future life is shown as one of the motives of control of present action, the question most intimately connected therewith, viz., of the antecedents of such action or a previous existence, cannot be simply ignored on the ground: let bygones be bygones. Satisfaction of curiosity, of course, as in the case of Māluṅkya (M. I, p. 63). would not have served any purpose, and the Buddha’s affirmation or negation would not have been any help towards the annihilation of the passions. But, we can visualise the same question, perhaps differently worded, to have been placed before the Buddha, with a view to finding not merely the physical origin of sorrow and life, but rather the psychological grounds, in which case the Buddha certainly would not have preserved a “noble silence”.

An instance is found Aggi-Vacchagotta Sutta A. IV, p. 26), when all the above mentioned and similar questions are answered in the negative, because the Buddha does not hold any of these views, “as this tangle of theorising is attended by conflict and does not lead to peace”. “The adoption of views” is a term discarded by the Tathāgatha, who has actual vision of the nature, origin and cessation of things and has thereby discarded all tendencies to the pride of saying “I” or “mine”. Because the subject of the enquiry is non-existent, in the same way as the extinguished fire cannot be determined, “these questions do not apply”. Theories are like reading-glasses. They only reveal the weak eye-sight of him who uses them, but do not explain the nature of the object cp. Paul Dahlke, Buddhism and Science, p. 187..

Hence, it is not to be considered a deficiency in the teaching of the Buddha that no ready-made answers are provided for such problems as the origin of the world, the eternal life of the soul, the ultimate goal. Religious systems based on faith have those answers ready-made, but beyond proof or verification. Theirs is a value which is fixed and supernatural. The value of the agnostic teaching of the Buddha lies in its pure relativity, which is in the nature of a process, where there is continuity without a persisting entity. Anything beyond this process cannot be known, as knowledge itself forms part of this process; and whatever is known being the object of knowledge, is thereby alone already also part of the process. Conditionality, therefore, forms the axis around which the teaching of the Buddha revolves: if certain conditions arise such effects will arise. But no dogmatic thesis is shown as to the causality of things, still less as to a first cause, or origin.

Does this mean that Buddhism is a form of atheism? Atheism is a positive assertion of the falsity of the existence of a God-Creator, first cause and origin of all that exists. It is not merely a negative attitude of refusal of acceptance, but a positive disbelief, involving the acceptance of a proposition which asserts the falsity of the existence of God. In this very assertion, however, is involved a challenge, as it were, which, in principle, is equivalent to a recognition of the opponent.

An agnostic, as was the Buddha, confines himself to disproving the arguments produced in favour of theism. And that is exactly what we find expressed in the Pāṭika Sutta D. III, xxiv, pp. 1–35., where certain recluses and brāhmans declare it as their traditional doctrine that the beginning of things was the work of a creator (issarakutta), the work of Brahma (brahmakutta). Then the Buddha, while claiming that he knows the beginning of this world (aggaññañcāhaṁ pajānāmi), explains that this so-called beginning is a re-evolution (vivaṭṭamāna) from a dissolving world (samvaṭṭamāna-loka) Ibid. pp. 28–9, § 15.. He does not take up the position of a sceptic or a materialist, adhering to spontaneous origination (adhicca-samuppanna), for he points out that the absence of knowledge of preceding conditions does not prove a fortuitous origin Ibid. pp. 33–4, § 20.. The Buddha’s vision of an evolving world Aggañña Sutta, A. IV, p. 26), §§ 11 f. is certainly in agreement with the modern concepts of the formation of this world in its process of evolution. In the darkness of slimy earth sexless bodies fed on the scum of the cooling surface of the boiling globe. With feeding their taste developed; on the surface, awareness of light became manifest; in the measure of their feeding, their bodies assumed solid forms in varying degrees of comeliness.

The evolution of evil, too, has been graphically described without-any recourse to the supernatural. A lazy disposition led some to hoarding, which is craving. When hoarding was not possible the same craving led to stealing; and stealing brings in its train censure, lying, punishment, with the social institutions of the judicial and governmental authority Ibid. p. 92, §§ 19–21..

Thus, the Buddha explained the involution and re-evolution of a world-cycle as phases of the universal process of evolution, which process does not depend on a supreme force remaining itself outside the evolving cycle. In the Buddha’s presentation of the evolving universe there is no room for any static energy, for the process is truly universal. He does not claim that he has a god greater than other gods, but points out that all gods, even Mahā Brahma, are included in this involving and evolving process Brahmajāla Sutta: A. IV, p. 26 p.2, 3.). He does not deny the possibility of certain forces, which appear to be creative, coming into this process, but these forces themselves merely appear because of the necessity of disappearance elsewhere. In other words, conditionality and impermanence are the rulers of this cosmos, physically as well as psychically.

But, as far as the beginning of the process of evolution is regarded, the true agnostic appears once again in the Pāṭika Suttanta D. III, xxiv, pp. 1–35. “Whether the beginning of things be revealed or whether it be not, the object for which I teach the Norm is that it leads to the complete destruction of woe”.

With his teaching of conditionality, especially in connection with the eleven theses of dependent origination (Paṭiccasamuppāda), the Buddha avoids the pitfall of universal causation, which, although it does not postulate an absolute beginning in the guise of a creation, yet sets an insoluble problem by its very universality. For, universality, by its own nature, lies outside the sphere of experience and verification, and hence is not acceptable to an agnostic. The Buddha’s teaching shows the origin of whatever has arisen in dependence on a condition (ye dhammā hetuppabhavā tesaṁ hetu Tathāgato āha), and it shows also the cessation thereof in dependence on the cessation of those conditions (yesañca yo nirodho evaṁ vādi mahā Saṁaṇo) DhpA. on Aggasamana Vagga.. Thus, causation is replaced by conditionality which is said to be found intrinsically in all phenomena.

Although the Buddha, in this way of dependent origination and cessation, refuted an absolute beginning, an absolute existence and an absolute ending, yet there were some recluses and brāhmans who misrepresented him thus, falsely saying, `The recluse Gotama is a nihilist, he teaches the disintegration, the destruction, the cessation of existence Alagaddūpama Sutta M. I, sutta xxii, p. 140.. This accusation the Buddha refuted by stating, “Formerly as well as now, I only teach the fact of conflict and the cessation of conflict”. His attitude towards existence is not that of a nihilist or a sceptic, but of the agnostic who accepts only the known. In respect of so-called existence he only knows it as a process of becoming, a process of conflict and a process of cessation of this conflict through the understanding hereof.

Is frequently met with in all Nikāyas with the acquired meaning of egotism and arrogance. The basic meaning of “I am the doer” is still found in the Udāna (70): Jaccandha Vagga (vi, 6), where it is used in opposition to paraṅkāra: another is the doer. “People are attached to the notion: ‘I am the doer’ (ahaṅkāra-pasutā); they are holding on to the idea: ‘Another is the doer’ (paraṅkārūpasaṁhitā); they neither understand the wrongness of the view, nor do they see the sting in it. But he who sees the poisonous dart thereof does not give rise to the thought: ‘I am the doer (ahaṁ karomi) or another is the doer (paro karoti)’,”. It is clear that in this instance the heretical doctrine of “self” or “soul” is criticised, which always places the “I” in opposition to “non-I”. This view of a separate I-entity naturally forms the basis of all selfish activity, and hence ahaṅkāra has acquired the meaning of egotism and arrogance.

The checking of all that makes for the “I” (ahaṅkārā ca me uparujjhissanti) and for “mine” (mamaṅkāra) is among the good results to be considered when establishing the perception of soullessness (anattasaññaṁ upaṭṭhāpetuṁ: (A. III, p. 444). The other advantages are a complete detachment from everything in the world, attainment of insight which cannot be imparted, full understanding of the root of all things and of their dependent origination.

And how should one understand and look at things, that neither in conscious thought the concept of “I”, nor in respect of external objects the idea of “mine” might arise? That was the question put by Rāhula to the Buddha. And the reply, “Whatever physical forms arise of the past (i.e., in memory), of the present (i.e., actual) or of the future (i.e., in imagination), whether they be internal mental states or external forms, whether they represent coarse figures or exquisite shapes, vulgar or noble, distant or near; and similarly whatever sensations, perceptions, ideations or thoughts arise of any of these types, while you know that that does not constitute the ‘I’, is not the property of the ‘I’, is not the soul, with that knowledge there will be no tendency towards egotism, arrogance and pride (ahaṅkāra-mamaṅkāra-mānānusaya na honti-ti: (S. II, p. 252) Also found in (M. III, p. 18); S. III, p. 80), 103, 136, 169.. When one thus sees by right insight the true nature of all things, one is set free without grasping (evam etaṁ yathābhūtaṁ sammappaññāya disvā anupādā vimutto hoti). And thus, Rāhula, knowing and seeing things in this way, the mind will have turned away from egotism, arrogance and pride, gone beyond all distinctions, will be at peace and fully emancipated” (ahaṅkāra-mamaṅkāra-mānāpagataṁ manasaṁ hoti vidhāsamatikkantaṁ santaṁ suvimuttanti: (S. II, p. 253).

The manner of extirpation of this evil tendency towards egotism, arrogance and pride is given in a passage (M. III, p. 32) ff.) describing the life of renunciation in the observance of the ten abstinences, which is also frequently found elsewhere (D. I, p. 4–5); (M. I, p. 179) and 287; (A. II, p. 208); (Pug. 26).

These notions of “I” and “mine” had been rooted out from Sāriputta such a long time that even a changing or becoming otherwise in the Master would not have given rise to grief, sorrow and despair, although he certainly wished that such a wonderful Master might not be taken from them, that he might abide with them yet a long time for the welfare and happiness of many people (S. II, p. 275).

The utter destruction of egotism in any form (sabba-ahiṅkāra-mamiṅkāra-mānānusayānaṁm khaya: (M. I, p. 486), sutta 72) forms part of the freedom of the Tathāgata and the arahant. It is only cast off with the breaking of the final five fetters (saṁyojana), in particular the fetter of the pride which says: “I am” (asmi māna). But, a mere conviction that there is no “I” does not mean that the truth of soullessness has been fully comprehended. Such was the case with the monk Khemaka who admitted that he had still got the idea of “self” in his mental-physical make-up, although he did not discern such a “self” (S. III, p. 128), sutta 89, (§ 13). And yet Khemaka was at that time one who had entered the Stream of Sainthood (sotāpanna).

A remarkable event is related (S. IV, p. 41) of Upasena, the younger brother of Sāriputta. After his meal he was seated in the shade of the cave in which he was staying near Rājagaha, mending his outer robe. A snake fell from an overhanging branch on his shoulder and bit him. The poison spread rapidly and the arahant, knowing its deadliness, asked some other monks to carry his body into the open. As they saw no change in his body, they told him so. But he replied, “In him who would think: I am the eye, the body, the mind–-in him there would be a change in his body Expressing fear of approaching death.. But as I have no such ideas, how could there be a changes in my body”? The monks carried his body outside, and there and then it was scattered just like a handful of chaff. But, it is not mentioned whether the brethren grasped the subtle reference to the “I” and “mine”, from the arahant’s viewpoint.

It is clear that we have come a long way from the pre-Buddhistic meaning of the word in Sāṅkhya philosophy where the term ahaṅkāra signifies the organ through which material attributes and mental events are wrongly ascribed to the soul (R. Garbe, Die Sāṁkhya Philosophie, Leipzig, 1894, p. 170). Then, the “I-maker” was considered a subtle substance of an inner organ with the function to relate objects to the “I”, corresponding in the mind to the material sense-organs of the body; it was the substance around which the mental phenomena were grouped, and by means of which such phenomena were communicated to the intellect (buddhi).

When the Buddha took a firm stand for his specific teaching on the doctrine of insubstantiality (anatta), the “I-maker” lost its original meaning, till it was incorporated in the suttas as an evil tendency (anusaya) of arrogance and pride, leading to the misconception of a separate I-entity and the fetter of self-conceit.

Food, nutriment, support, both in the literal and figurative meanings. On this simple word is hinged practically the entire teaching of the Buddha, particularly his specific doctrines of the process of becoming, rebirth without a soul, dependent origination, the Four Noble Truths–-to mention just a few of the more important issues. It is also the key-word which unlocks the doors of the mysteries of life and death in their most universal application. And all that is summed up in the answer to the first question, before which no problem can arise: Katamo eko dhammo? Sabbe sattā āhāraṭṭhitikā: All that lives subsists on food (D. III, p. 211). It is one thing that must be thoroughly understood (eko dhammo abhiññeyyo: ibid. 273). And again, there is one question, one statement, one explanation (eko pañho, eko uddeso, ekaṁ veyyākaraṇaṁ). The statement (uddesa) is that if concerning one fact a monk would feel the right kind of disgust (ekadhamme sammā nibbinda-māno), the right kind of fading interest in the world (sammā virajjamāno), be rightly released (sammā vimuccamāno), rightly see the limits and restrictions (sammā pariyantadassāvī) and rightly comprehend the meaning of things (sammatthābhisamecca), then in this very existence he would make an end to all conflict (diṭṭh'eva dhamme dukkhass' antakaro hoti). And the one explanation (veyyā-karaṇa), the answer to this one question, the one fact concerning which the above statement was made, is: “All that lives, subsists on food” (sabbe sattā āhāraṭṭhitikā: (A. V, p. 50–1)).

From such solemn utterances alone already the importance of the subject should be evident, and it has indeed been played upon throughout the suttas in the Nikāyas, followed up in later abhidhamma texts of the Dhammasaṅgaṇī and played back in the many commentaries of Buddhaghosa and Dhammapāla and in later treatises such as Anuruddha’s Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha up to the present century writers, such as Paul Dahlke in his Buddhism.

The quest for food, as well as the supply thereof, constitutes physically, psychologically and sociologically, the basis of all action. As a primary need of life itself it conveys the energy for sustenance at all levels, material, biological, volitional and intellectual. And all this is involved in the term āhāra, from the Sanskrit root ā-hṛ, to fetch, to bring near, to convey to oneself, which action is followed by absorption and assimilation. Thus, we find emumerated four sustenances for the maintenance of beings (bhūtānaṁ vā sattānaṁ ṭhitiyā) and for the assistance of those seeking birth (sambhavesīnaṁ vā anuggahāya: (S. II, p. 11), viz., material food (kabaḷiṅkāra-āhāra) which sustains the body, and which is either solid and gross (oḷārika), or fine and exquisite (sukhuma); contact (phassa) which nurtures the senses with feelings of delight (sukha-vedanā) and displeasure (dukkha); volition (mano-sañcetana) which sustains the three forms of becoming, for will is the food of the mind through which action (kamma) is formed; and consciousness (viññāṇa) which feeds, supports and conditions both mind and body (viññāṇa-paccayā nāma-rūpa). And of these four sustenances it is further said that craving is the base (taṇhā-nidāna), craving the origin (taṇhā-samudayā), craving the producer (taṇhā-jātikā), craving the source (taṇhā-pabhavā: ibid. 12). But when Phagguna with the long hair (moliya) questioned the Buddha as to who feeds on the consciousness-sustenance (ko nu kho bhante viñāñṅāṇāhāram āhāreti), the Buddha replied that this was not a right question, for “I do not say that someone feeds” (āhāretīti ahaṁ na vadāmi). The correct question would have been: Of what is consciousness the sustenance (kissa nu kho bhante viññāṇāhāro); and then the fitting answer to that would be: Consciousness-sustenance is the condition to renewed becoming, to rebirth in the future (viññāṇāhāro āyatiṁ punabbhavābhinibbattiyā paccayo: ibid. 13). Here, therefore, it is clearly pointed out by the Buddha that in this process of nutrition there is no eater separate from the food; it is a process of assimilation where the life-continuum is sustained by physical food, by sense-contact, by volitional activity and by reproductive consciousness. In this process of alimentation and assimilation the absorbent physico-psychical organism is not a separate entity, not even a separate process, but has become and continues to become that which it has assimilated and by means of which it sustains its process of becoming.

Seeing, then, that the continuance of the rolling of this cycle of existence, of birth, conflict and death, is conditioned and maintained by the renewed assimilation of these four sustenances, they should be regarded with the utmost suspicion. Thus the arahant Brahmadatta, son of the king of Kosala, reminded a brāhman who had reviled him (Thag. v. 445) of the parable of parents eating their own child. In the Puttamaṁsa Sutta (S. II, p. 98–100)) the Buddha taught his disciples how to regard the four kinds of nutriment. Material food (kabaliṅkāra āhāra) should be taken not for pleasure (davāya), not for indulgence (madāya), not for personal charm (maṇḍanāya), not for comeliness (vibhūsanāya), but for the sheer necessity of living, as parents with their child in the jungle, when their provisions have run out, forced by extreme hunger and faced with the prospect of certain death for all, would be driven to kill the child and eat its flesh (the parable goes into many grim details), even so without passion of the senses should material food be taken.

Contact (phassa), the nutriment on which the senses thrive, should be regarded as a cow with a sore hide would regard all contact. For, whether she leans against a wall or a tree, the creatures that live there would sting her; in water she would be afflicted by the creatures in the water; even standing aloof in the open air she would be bitten and stung by all kinds of insects. When contact is regarded in this way, the three kinds of feeling, pleasurable, painful or indifferent, will be well understood and “there is nothing further which the Ariyan disciple has to do” (tīsu vedanāsu pariññātāsu ariyasākassa natthi kiñci uttariṁ karaṇīyanti vadāmi: ibid. 99), the Buddha declared.

Of all the four types of nutriment the most important, perhaps, is the food which is will of mind (manosañcetanāhāra). It is mental volition, without which no thought becomes active or alive. It is the equivalent of karma, and hence it feeds rebirth, fixes destiny and forms the “soul” of existence. It is to be regarded as a pit of glowing charcoal which will beyond doubt burn one to death with mortal pain (loc. cit.).

Finally, consciousness (viññāṇa) is the rebirth-linking consciousness (paṭisandhi-viññāṇa), the food (āhāra) which at the moment of conception feeds mind and corporeality (nāma-rūpa) in the new life. It is to be considered as a robber seized by the king’s men, who inflict dire punishment on him, morning, noon and eventide (ibid. 100).

Āhāra is one of the four origins (samuṭṭhāna) of material phenomena (rūpa), the other three being karma, the mind (citta) and the changes of physical nature (utu). It is the nutritive essence (ojā) which gives rise to material phenomena at the period of assimilation. Out of the twenty-eight material phenomena (rūpa) the following twelve (Abhs. vi, 6, 4) find their origin in the process of nutrition (āhāra), the four essential material qualities (mahābhūta) of extension (paṭhavī), cohesion (āpo), caloricity (tejo) and vibration (vāyo), three material qualities of the sense-fields, viz., colour (vaṇṇa), odour (gandha) and taste (rasa), the material quality of nutritive essence (ojā), the material quality of limitation which is the element of space (ākāsa-dhātu) and the triple properties of lightness (lahutā), pliancy (mudutā) and adaptability (kammaññatā), which are grouped together as material qualities of plasticity (vikāra-rūpa). These are the material phenomena which are nutriment-originated (āhāra-samuṭṭhāna), for which nutriment is the producing condition (janaka-paccaya). Two more material phenomena are sometimes added to the above list of twelve, viz., growth (upacaya) and continuity (santati: Vism. xx, § 36, p. 528).

While it is admitted that food is the main prerequisite for existence, it is also acknowledged as a principal source of temptation, as an object through which the sense of taste develops into craving. Hence, on numerous occasions temperance with regard to food is advocated, although never to the extent of self-mortification (attakilamatha). The ideal monk is described as controlled in deed and word, restrained in food for the stomach (kāyagutto, vacīgutto, āhāre udare yato: (S. I, p. 172); (A. IV, p. 26); with small (light) stomach, moderate in food, easily satisfied, and undisturbed (ūnūdaro, mitāhāro, appicch'assa alolupo: ibid. 707). On the other hand, a person who is immoderate as to food is described as one who thoughtlessly and unwisely takes food for the sake of amusement, pride, decoration, ornamentation, insatiability, immoderation and thoughtlessness as to food (Pug. 21a>, trsl. p. 31). Solid food is not exclusively enjoyed among humans, animals and other infra-human beings, for in the entire sphere of sense (kāmāvacara) the objects of the senses provide the food for sense-contact. Thus, some devas are referred to as feeding on solid food (kabaliṅkārāhāra-bhakkha: A. III, p. 192) and they are of lower rank than those who live in a mind-made body (manomaya-kāya). Although this latter class of devas have body and form, they do not come under the spheres of sense-pleasure (kāmāvacara), but under the spheres of form (rūpāvacara), where the pleasures of the senses, such as the taste of food, do not occur. It was Udāyin’s wrong view to think that the devas with mind-made bodies (manomaya-kāya) are formless (arūpa: ibid. 194). Material food, or rather the process of digestion which involves the decomposition of food in the process of assimilation by the body, is one of the forty meditation-objects (kammaṭṭhāna) and is called reflection on the loathsomeness of food (āhāre paṭikkūla-saññā). “When one lives with this thought, reflecting on the loathsomeness of food, the mind draws back from a desire for life, and establishes itself either in equanimity or disgust” (A. IV, p. 49). And to the man who does not give up this reflection, although he may be weak and ailing, the Buddha promised that he may expect, ere long, to destroy the mental intoxicants (āsava) and to enter and abide in the emancipation of mind and deliverance through insight (A. III, p. 142). The commentary on the Dhammasaṅgaṇī (§ 646), called the Atthasālinī, gives a lengthy exposition on physical food as a derived material quality (rūpa). Here āhāra is shown to be both the material foodstuff and the nutritive essence (ojā). It is the presence of the material stuff in the stomach which prevents the feeling of hunger; in its absence the bodily heat seizes the stomach-walls, but when material food is introduced the bodily heat seizes that and the process of assimilation in digestion begins. In gross substance, it is said (DhsA. 331), the nutritive essence is weak; and thus after eating coarse grain, etc., one becomes hungry again after a brief interval. But in subtle food, such as butter, the nutritive essence is great. The food derived from herbivorous animals, such as deer and cattle, is more subtle and more nutritious than that from carnivorous animals, such as tigers and crocodiles. A point of some interest, though not essentially connected with our subject, is mentioned by Buddhaghosa (Vism. xx, § 37, p. 528): Nutriment (āhāra) taken on one day gives sustenance lasting for seven days, but the nutritive essence (dibbā ojā) sustains for one or two months. The food taken by a mother with child originates materiality by pervading the body of the child she bears. Also, nutriment smeared on the body begets materiality.

Nutriment is not only a material phenomenon, but as an active process it is also a condition (āhāra-paccaya) of support of two kinds: the relation of edible food to the body and the relation of immaterial supports to co-existing states of mind and body. It is this nutritive support in the psychological field which forms the basis of the doctrine of karma and the teachings connected therewith. Food or sustenance (āhāra) is frequently synonymous with causal condition, e.g., “from the arising of food is the arising of the body; from the ceasing of food is the ceasing of the body; and the way leading to the ceasing of the body is the Noble Eightfold Path” (āhāra-samudayā rūpa-samudayo, āhāranirodhā rūpanirodho; ayam eva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo rūpanirodhagāminī paṭipadā: (S. III, p. 59). Here, sustenance of the body has been substituted for the usual conflict of existence (dukkha), its origin (samudaya), its cessation (nirodha) and the path thereto (magga). And again, consciousness and its cause (pañcabījajātāniviññāṇaṁ sāhāraṁ daṭṭhabbaṁ) are to be considered as the five sorts of seed, which require both the soil of the four stations of consciousness (viññāṇaṭṭhiti) and the water of lust (nandirāga) in order to grow and increase (S. III, p. 54). Similarly, merit is called the food, i.e., the cause of happiness (sukhassāhāra: (A. III, p. 51).

Although in the stereotyped formulas of dependent origination (paṭicca-samuppāda), ignorance (avijjā) is shown as the first condition (paccaya) which is not to be traced back any further, “for the origin of ignorance is not discernible” (purimā koṭi na paññāyati avijjāya), and it cannot be said, “There was a time when ignorance was not” (ito pubbe avijjā nāhosi), still it was definitely stated by the Buddha that ignorance, too, is conditioned and sustained by the five hindrances (avijjaṁ p'ahaṁ bhikkhave sāhāraṁ vadāmi, no anāhāraṁ. Ko cāhāro avijjāya? Pañca nīvaraṇā 'ti' ssa vacanīyaṁ: (A. V, p. 113). Then follows a chain of dependent and conditioned origins, not unlike the paṭicca-samuppāda, but links are here shown as sustenances (āhāra) in the following sequence: ignorance (avijjā), five hindrances (pañca nīvaraṇāni), three evil ways of conduct (tīṇi duccaritāni), lack of restraint of the sense-faculties (indriyāsaṁvara), lack of mindfulness and of self-control (asatāsampajañña), distracted attention (ayonisomanasikāra), lack of trust (assaddha), not listening to the true teaching (asaddhammasavana), not following a worthy man (asappurisasaṁsevā). Such is the nutriment of ignorance and thus its fulfilment (evaṁ etissā avijjāya āhāro hoti, evañca pāripūri). But their opposites lead to deliverance through knowledge (vijjāvimutti) in the following sequence of sustenances: following a worthy man (sappuri-sasaṁsevā), listening to the true doctrine (saddhammasavana), confidence (saddhā), careful attention (yonisomanasikāra), mindfulness with self-control (sati-sampajañña), restraint of the senses (indriya-saṁvara), the three right ways of conduct (tīṇi sucaritāni), the four methods of mindfulness (cattāro satipaṭṭhānā), the seven factors of wisdom (satta-bojjhaṅgā), deliverance through knowledge (vijjā-vimutti: ibid. 115). The Saṁyutta Nikāya (S. V, 202) speaks of food or nutriment for the five hindrances (pañca nīvaraṇāni) and for the seven limbs of wisdom (satta bojjhaṅgā). Here, the alluring feature of things (subhanimitta) is said to be food for the arising of sensual lust (kāmacchanda), while the repulsive feature of things (paṭighanimitta) is said to be food for the arising of malevolence (byāpāda). Discontent, weariness, languor, drowsiness after meals, torpidity of mind (arati, tandī, vjambhikā, bhattasammada, cetaso līnatta), are food for the arising and growth of sloth and torpor (thīnamiddha), while agitation of mind (cetaso avūpasama) the food for the arising and growth of excitement and worry (uddhacca-kukkucca); and beings which are based on doubt and wavering are the food for the arising and growth of perplexity (vicikicchā).

As regards the seven elements of wisdom (bojjhaṅga) which is enlightenment, it is said that the things which are based on these various limbs, when systematically attended to, form also the nutriment of these seven elements of insight-wisdom, viz., mindfulness (sati), investigation of what is true (dhamma-vicaya), energy (viriya), zest (pīti), tranquillity (passaddhi), concentration (samādhi) and equanimity (upekhā: ibid. 103–4).

Again, sustenance (āhāra) is used in a weaker sense of help, as opposed to obstacle (paripantha), when ten things are enumerated which will assist one to obtain what is desirable, dear and charming, but hard to win in the world. Thus, energy and exertion are aids (āhāra) to wealth; finery and adornment are aids to beauty; seasonable action is an aid to health; noble friendship is an aid to lead a virtuous life; sense-control is an aid to a life of holiness; non-quarrelling is an aid to maintain friendship; repetition is an aid to the storing of knowledge; listening and questioning are aids to the acquisition of wisdom; application and reflection are aids to understand the teachings; right conduct is an aid to attain to happiness in heaven (A. V, p. 136).

Thus, the process of nutrition in its various aspects covers the entire field of the teaching of the Buddha, physically, psychologically, emotionally, mentally, ethically, for it is the essence of the Buddha’s teaching which shows existence as a flux, as a process of becoming, dependent on conditions. And that is a process of nutrition, which is a living experience in which the object is assimilated and becomes the subject. This so-called subject can only continue in its process by gathering fresh experience, just as a flame can keep itself alive only by burning, by drawing into itself new fuel, until everything is seen as food for body, food for will, food for thought. In the realisation of the loathsomeness of this food will arise a disgust with the process itself which alone can make one free.

Whatever conflict there may be
It finds support through nutriment;
But when nutrition’s process comes to end
No growth of conflict there can be. \\!
Yaṁ kiñci dukkhaṁ sambhoti
Sabaṁ āhārapaccayā,
Āhārānaṁ nirodhena
Natthi dukkhassa sambhavo (A. IV, p. 26).

A teaching which denied causality. This heretical doctrine, teaching the non-existence of a moral cause, or karma, is referred to in the Mahābodhi Jātaka. One of the five counsellors of king Brahmadatta of Bārāṇasī taught the people that beings in this world were purified by rebirth and, therefore, that no moral responsibility attached to them. But he was refuted by the bodhisatta whose name was Bodhi, with the following verses:

“If this thy creed: `All acts of men, or good or base,
From natural causes spring, I hold, in every case',
Where in involuntary acts can sin find place?
If such the creed thou holdst and this be doctrine true,
Then was my action right, when I that monkey slew” (J. V, p. 237), trsl. H.T. Francis.).

When the Buddha gave his discourse on the certain, true or sure doctrine (Apaṇṇaka Sutta: (M. I, p. 401–13)) to the brāhman householders of Sālā in Kosala, he referred to many recluses and brāhmans who speak in direct opposition to one another. The Sāmaññaphala Sutta (D. I, p. 53) mentions a view which is ascribed to Makkhali Gosāla: “There is no cause, no reason for the depravity of beings; they become defiled without cause, without reason. Neither is there a cause or a reason for the rectitude of beings; they become purified without cause, without reason” (n'atthi hetu n'atthi paccayo sattānaṁ saṅkilesāya, ahetu-apaccayā sattā saṅkilesanti; n'atthi hetu n'atthi paccayo sattānaṁ visuddhiyā, ahetu-apaccayā sattā visujjhanti). “All living beings are without power, without strength, without energy, bent by fate, by chance, by disposition” (sabbe sattā avasā abalā aviriyā niyati-saṅgati-bhāva-pariṇatā). By holding such views, the Buddha said, men do not see the peril in wrong things, the vanity, the defilement, nor the advantage allied to purity, in renouncing them for the good things; for they have laid aside the three good things: right conduct of action, of speech and of thought. Consequently, a variety of evil states spring up, such as false conception, false speech, mocking of noble disciples, convincing others of untruth, exaltation of oneself and disparaging of others. Then a person who is unable to decide the issue for himself may agree thus: if there is no moral causation, a person who accepts this doctrine may be safe at the breaking up of his life, but in this life itself he will be condemned by all intelligent people as being of bad moral habits and as having heretical views; whereas if there is a moral causation, then such a person is defeated twice, both here and hereafter (M. I, p. 408).

The fatalistic view which denies causality (ahetuka-diṭṭhi) is included together with the view of the inefficacy of action (akiriya-diṭṭhi) and the nihilistic view (natthika-diṭṭhi) among the ten unwholesome courses of action. Some specified instances of the teaching which denies the existence of moral cause and effect are to be found in the Sevitabba-asevitabba Sutta (M. III, p. 52): “There is no result in giving, in offering, in sacrifice; there is no fruit or ripening of deeds, whether they are done well or ill; there is no benefit from serving mother and father”. But “the following up of this kind of assumption of views will make the evil states of mind develop greatly and the good ones decrease” (loc. cit.).

The rejection of this doctrine of non-causality does not imply the acceptance of the contrary doctrine, as held by the Uttarāpathakas, that objective matter is the cause of mental presentation (Kvu. ix, 3), which is subjective (sārammaṇa), i.e., having a mental object. “Having a mental abject” (sārammaṇa), however, establishes merely the correlationship between object and subject (ārammaṇa-paccaya), but not the relationship of causality (hetu-paccaya).

The denial of causality (if understood as a law of conditionality) is a denial of the very core of the ethical teaching of the Buddha, which is most tersely expressed by the formula: Whatever phenomena have arisen from a cause (ye dhammā hetuppabhavā), of these the Tathāgata has told the cause (tesaṁ heṭuṁ Tathāgato āha: (Vin. I, p. 40). But the conclusion drawn by Ananda K. Coomaraswamy (HJAS. IV, 130) that the opposite hetuvāda, which is synonymous to kammavāda, makes the Buddha “a causalist, that is to say a determinist or fatalist”, is certainly not borne out by the Buddha’s own exposition of the working of the law of kamma, which is mental volition (cetanā).

Is an unprofitable mental property or factor (akusala-cetasika) of unscrupulousness, impudence and shamelessness in doing an unskilful action (akusala-kamma). Unless this mental factor is present, the mind will not think of doing evil. Hence, it is found in all unskilful thoughts, always combined with carelessness of blame (anottappa), mental agitation (uddhacca) and delusion (moha) in which it is firmly rooted. These four are collectively called the general unskilful mental factors (sabbākusala-sādhāraṇa-cetasika).

Ahirika has no conscientious scruples and does not abominate evil for evil’s sake; it has neither fear nor disgust at misconduct (kāyaduccaritādīhi ajigucchana: Vism. xiv, § 160, p. 396), and is, therefore, characterised as immodesty (alajjālakkhaṇa) or shamelessness, disregard of the law, disobedience, lack of internal shame and impudence. Disregarding the accepted standards of morality, it has a good deal of independence and self-reliance (attādhipateyya), and, therefore, of consistency to some extent, many times leading to stubbornness, owing to its lack of power of adaptation.

Its motivating force acts, therefore, from an intrinsic cause. The subjective nature of this unskilful mental factor is its essential characteristic by means of which it is sharply differentiated from carelessness of blame (anottappa), the objective recklessness of consequences in doing evil, with which it is always combined.

Is literally “action that was”, with the implication that it is no more. The doctrine of karma involves the active and the passive aspects of the process of mental volition (cetanā). All the various classifications of types of karma have the efficacy of action in view, as functional (kicca), as productive (pākadāna), as intensive in its own sphere (pākaṭṭhāna), or as extensive in duration and time (pākakāla). When action ceases to be re-active, this may be due to its force having been obstructed (upapīḷaka) or even destroyed (upaghātaka) by other influences. It may be that, owing to a lack of opportunity to react immediately (diṭṭha-dhamma-vedanīya), the karmic force is lying in abeyance accumulatively (kaṭattā). But, when action with volition is not given any opportunity, either here or hereafter, not through having spent its reproductive energy (janaka), or through destructive opposition, but merely through lack of time or appropriate conditions, it is said: There has been action (ahosi kammaṁ), there has been no karma-result (n'āhosi kammavipāko), there will be no karma-result (na bhavissati kammavipāko), and there is no karma-result now (n'atthi kammavipāko; (Ps. ii, 78); Vism. xix, § 14, p. 515).

As most types of action, however, have an inherent accumulative power of reproductivity without being bound by a time-limit, it is mostly that kind of action which must become reactive in this life itself (diṭṭha-dhamma-vedanīya) which will become inoperative and ineffective as ahosi kamma, once the limit of this life span has been passed. Its potential force having lapsed, it cannot be revived again; just as a man who has been acquitted in a murder-trial cannot be tried for that case again. Another reason for karmic action becoming inoperative (ahosi) is the intrinsic weakness of an action. Thus, a thought arising as the seventh thought-moment of apperception (javana) is not strong enough to carry its effect beyond a second birth; and if such thought (upapajja-vedanīya-kamma) does not become subsequently effective, it also will be an action that was (ahosi kamma). “All ineffectual volitions, by reason of their inherent weakness, and all time-barred kammas, by reason of their inhibition by more powerful kamma, are termed ‘have-not been-s’ (ahosika)” (Compendium of Philosophy, p. 46).

There are several suttas bearing this title (A. III, p. 279), 280; IV, 290 ff., 373; V, 23) and each one deals with a certain number of individuals, six, eight, nine or ten, who, for various reasons, are worthy of offerings made to them (āhuneyya). The term āhuneyya is the gerundive form from ā + hu, connected with the noun āhuti, oblation, sacrifice, veneration, adoration, and with the verb juhati, to offer, to dedicate.

The concept of sacrifice as a form of placation being foreign to Buddhism, the underlying idea is that of an offering as a token of respect and veneration. The term is best known as the first in a series of epithets applied to the noble disciples, namely, the four groups (cattāri purisa-yugāni) who have attained the four stages of sainthood (sotāpanna, sakadāgāmin, anāgāmin, arahant). Each group comprises a pair (yuga), one who has attained the path (magga) and the other who enjoys the fruit (phala) of such attainment. All of them are worthy of offerings (āhuneyya). The offerings to be made are said to be the four “requisites” (paccaya: Vism. VII, § 94, p. 181): food, clothing, shelter and medicine; and the above mentioned community of noble disciples is worthy to receive them, for offerings made to them bear great fruit (mahapphala-karaṇāto: loc. cit.).

When the list of “worthy ones” is extended to ten, the following are included: a Tathāgata, who is an arahant, and a fully enlightened Buddha; a paccekabuddha; one who is released in both respects (ubhatobhāga-vimutta) or in two ways, viz., by way of mental absorption (jhāna) and by the path of insight-meditation (vipassanā); one who has found deliverance through insight (paññāvimutta); one who is a witness of the truth or realisation in his own body (kāya-sakkhi), having attained the eight deliverances; one who is possessed of vision (diṭṭhippatta) during the middle stages on the path of holiness; one who is released by faith (saddhā-vimutta) at any stage, after having entered the path of holiness (sotāpanna); a truth-devotee (dhammānusārī), having gained the faculty of wisdom when entering the path of holiness; a faith-devotee (saddhānusārī), having gained the faculty of faith through contemplation of impermanence at the moment of entering the path of sainthood; and a matured one, one of the elect (gotrabhū), i.e., who has become a member of the family by adoption, immediately before entering the path of holiness which will make him one of the noble clan by attainment (A. V, p. 23).

Two other suttas which open the Chakka-nipāta (Book of Sixes) of the Aṅguttara Nikāya (A). III, p. 279–81) bear the same title and have given their name also to the first chapter thereof (Āhuneyya Vagga), although only the first four, directly (1–2) or indirectly (3–4), deal with the subject. A monk becomes worthy of offerings (āhuneyya) who does not become elated or depressed, but retains his mental equilibrium, mind-control and self-possession, when an object presents itself to any of his six senses (A. III, p. 279). They are also due to him who experiences the five supernatural powers (iddhi) together with deliverance of heart and mind through destruction of all mental intoxicants (A. III, p. 280–1). The two following suttas, although identical in structure and also giving reasons why a monk is worthy of offerings, have not been named āhuneyya in the uddāna at the end of the chapter, but are mentioned by the names indriya and bala, as the first one speaks of faith (saddhā), energy (viriya), mindfulness (sati), concentration (samādhi) and insight (paññā) as the faculties (indriya) which together with emancipation (vimutti) make a monk worthy of offerings. These faculties are referred to as powers (bala) in the subsequent sutta (A. III, p. 282) which derives its name from them.

When monasticism had not yet developed into a system of organised hierarchy with vested interest and permanent hold on property, when the life of a bhikkhu was more like that of a wandering ascetic although the spirit of asceticism as self-mortification was denounced, when the chief characteristic of a follower of the Buddha was contentment with little (appicchatā), at that time the shade and shelter of a spreading tree played an important part in religious living. The foot of a tree (rukkha-mūla) is recommended frequently for meditation, and is one of the four reliances (nissaya) of a true monk’s life.

Not only do trees and shady groves in general form the background of many historical details in the life of the Buddha, but some have acquired an individuality and history of their own. And the Goatherd’s Banyan tree (ajapāla-nigrodha) is one of the most outstanding among them. The story of how it got its name does not, however, occur in Pali literature and is probably a late invention based on the name BHS. II. 7..

We read in the Mahāvastu Mhvu. III, 301. that when Gautama as a bodhisattva was living his life of austerity on the banks of the Nairañjanā, he was seen by a goatherd who with great devotion planted a young banyan-tree with the firm belief that when that banyan-tree should have grown to its full size, the bodhisattva would have achieved his aim. And he begged. “For my sake, be pleased then to make use of this banyan-tree”, to which request assent was given by silence. From time to time the goatherd would hoe the soil around the tree and pour water on it. Thus, the tree grew quickly with many branches. When the goatherd saw this, his heart became exceedingly serene; and when he died, he was reborn in the Heaven of the Thirty-three (trāyas-triṁśa).

The Chinese version of the Abhiniṣkramaṇa Sūtra translated by S. Beal, The Romantic Legend of Sākya Buddha, London, 1875, pp. 192 and 238., too, mentions a shepherd boy, who offered the bodhisattva some goat’s milk, and also anointed his body therewith. Then, cutting down some branches from a banyan-tree, the boy made therewith a covering over the head of the bodhisattva as a shelter from the wind and the rain. These branches took root and bore flowers and leaves.

Still, the name of the banyan-tree, as recorded, is probably no more than an indication that goatherds used to come and sit in its shade UdA. 51 and VinA. 957.. But, whatever the origin may be, it is evident from these and other sources that the Buddha after his enlightenment sat down at the foot of this Goatherd’s Banyan-tree, for a period of seven days, experiencing the bliss of emancipation (Vin. I, p. 2), in joy and ease Mhvu. III, 302.. As to the exact placing of those seven days, there is some discrepancy among the different sources.

From the Book of Discipline and the Verses of Uplift Vin. I., Mahāvagga, 2; Udāna, 1–4. it would appear that the Buddha spent the first seven days in concentration of mind, experiencing the bliss of emancipation, seated at the foot of the Bodhi-tree. At the end of this first week he formulated the doctrine of dependent origination (Paṭiccasamuppāda). The following seven days were spent in contemplation and in the blissful experience of release under the Goatherd’s Banyan-tree.

But according to the Mahāvastu Mhvu. III, 302 and 314., it was only after the fifth week spent by the Buddha at the abode of Mucalinda, the nāga king, that he sat for seven days in joy and ease at the foot of the Goatherd’s Banyan-tree. While the narrative of the Mahāvastu does not mention any detail about the happenings in connection with this week under the Ajapāla-nigrodha, the Mahāvagga (Vin. I, p. 2). relates that at the end of the seven days there, a brāhman, with a fault-finding nature (buhuṅka-jātika-brāhmaṇa) and stiff with pride UdA. 51., approached the Buddha with the questions: To what extent is one a brāhman? What are the things that constitute a brāhman? The Buddha replied with an Udāna-gāthā (Ud. p. 3), saying that a brāhman is one who has done away with all evil, who is without stain, who has self-control, who is well-versed in the sacred lore, and lives a saintly life.

It will be noted that the reply has been couched in very general terms which could have been uttered by any spiritual teacher without expressing any definite characteristic of a specific doctrine. It is, no doubt, for this reason that this utterance, although the first one of the Buddha after his enlightenment directed to human ears, has never attained the status of his first sermon, the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta. It is after this conversation that the Buddha left the shelter of the Goatherd’s Banyan-tree. It was beneath this tree that the Buddha meditated in solitude, just after he had won full enlightenment (S. I, p. 103), with joy in his mind over the freedom attained, and which is so hard to achieve. It was there and then that Māra, the tempter, approached him with the thought that the giving up of his austerities had given the Buddha an illusory freedom, whereas, in truth, he had strayed from the path of purity. The Buddha understood at once the source of such distracting thoughts, and rejoined in verse that he knew the uselessness of rituals, which may be compared to the oars and the rudder of a boat on dry land. When Māra realised his defeat, he immediately changed his tactics and assumed the likeness of a great elephant in order to frighten the Buddha; but once again his efforts were in vain Ibid. 104..

It was, probably, on the same occasion, as the Buddha subsequently related to Ānanda and as recorded in the Mahā Parinibbāna Suttanta (D. II, p. 112–4), that Māra, the evil one, approached the Buddha, resting under the banyan-tree, shortly after having attained enlightenment, with the request, “Pass away now, lord, from existence” (parinibbātu dāni bhante Bhagavā). But the Buddha replied, “I shall not pass away, O Evil One! until not only the brethren and sisters of the Order, but also the lay-disciples of either sex shall have become true hearers, wise and well-trained ... I shall not die until this pure religion of mine shall have become successful, prosperous, wide-spread, and popular in all its full extent until, in a word, it shall have been well proclaimed among men” SBB. III, Dialogues of the Buddha, II, pp. 120–1.!

It was still during the same season and in the same place, when the Buddha was seated under the open sky during the night, and Māra once more tried to produce fear in the Buddha, making use of the rain which was falling drop by drop (S. I, p. 104), but failed to make the slightest impression on the Buddha who dismissed Māra by saying that those who are well controlled in deed, word and thought were in no way to be conditioned by Māra’s seductions.

According to the Māhavastu Mhvu. III, p. 314. and other sources, it was at the foot of the same banyan-tree that the Buddha hesitated to teach his doctrine because it was “profound, abstruse, subtle, hard to understand by mere logic, intelligible only to the wise \dots” But it is only in the Pali canonical works Vin. I, Mahāvagga 4; (D. II, p. 36); M. I, p. 167); (S. V, p. 136). that we read of the solution of this doubt and hesitation, of how Brahma Sahampati pointed out that there were some beings “with only little dust in their eyes, who would grow in knowledge on hearing the doctrine”.

In the commentary to the Dhammapada DhpA. I, p. 86., however, we read that “for seven weeks he remained on the Throne of Wisdom; in the eighth week he seated himself under the Goatherd’s Banyan-tree and meditated upon the depths of the Law, finally arriving at misgivings as to his ability to preach the law to others” HOS. XXVIII, p. 196.. But then, following Brahma Sahampati’s petition, the Buddha surveyed the world and acceded to his request.

A year passed, and again the Buddha had cone to Uruvelā on the banks of the river Nerañjarā. For seven years now Māra, the evil one, had been dogging (anubaddha) the Exalted One, six years before the enlightenment and one year thereafter, watching for an opening (otārāpekkha) to make him falter, but without gaining access. Once again the Buddha was seated underneath the Goatherd’s Banyan-tree, which seems to have been not only his favourite retreat for meditation, but also the haunt of Māra’s choice. This time Māra presented himself as a compassionate friend of that lonesome figure, “Is it sunk in grief thou art, that in the wood thou meditatest? ... Is there no one with whom thou canst be friends” (S. I, p. 122).? But, if friendship is not wanted, the spheres and objects of the senses are the domains of Māra, and hence he boasts, “Thou will not, O recluse, escape from me”! The Buddha, however, replies that as he is not interested in whatever belongs to the senses, Māra cannot even see the way he (the Buddha) goes. That really sets Māra worrying and so he entreats the Buddha that if he has found a path that is safe (khema) and that leads to deathlessness (amatagāmina), “go thou that way alone and do not lead another there” (pehi gaccha tvam ev-eko, kim aññam anusāsasī 'ti). But even that is not conceded by the Buddha;

“When people seek the kingdom not of death,
Enquiring for a road beyond,
To them, when asked, I do declare
The freedom from attachments all” Ibid. 123..

But although the evil one apparently gave up, not so his daughters Taṇhā (craving), Arati (discontent) and Ragā (lust), who, assuming their most enticing forms, offered themselves to minister at his feet Ibid. 125.. All their efforts, however, were like attempts to cleave a rocky mountain with lotus stalks Ibid. 127..

Not only were temptations fought and overcome at the foot of this famous tree, but it was here also that during the Buddha’s meditation in solitude he discovered the one and only way (ekamagga) (S. V, pp. 167) and 185.) that leads to the purification of beings, to the utter passing beyond sorrow and grief, to the destruction of woe and lamentation, to the winning of the Path, to the realising of Nibbāna, namely, the four methods of mindfulness (satipaṭṭhāna), contemplating the body, feelings, thoughts and mental states. Here, too, the Buddha reflected on how the five controlling faculties of faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration and insight could be cultivated and developed, and would culminate in the deathless state of Nibbāna Ibid. p. 232..

And again at the foot of the Goatherd’s Banyan tree, after having been rebuked for his apparent lack of respect for seniority, the Buddha thought of the things which make an elder: to speak in due season things true and profitable; and,

“He who, in virtue perfect, learned,
Of ready wit, controlled, a sage,
With wisdom sees the sense of things,
Of open heart, of ready wit
He hath transcended every state. \\!
Who hath abandoned birth and death,
Who in the God-life perfect is–-
That is the man I elder call.
By ending of the āsavas
A monk is rightly elder called” (A. II, p. 22), trsl. F.L. Woodward, Gradual Sayings, II, p. 24.).

King of Magadha. The life story of Ajātasattu, who reigned during the last eight years of the Buddha’s life and yet twenty-four years more thereafter Mhv. ii, 82., begins even before he was born. It is a prenatal incident which provided him with the epithet Ajātasattu, one which adhered to him for life and even thereafter, superseding his own proper name, unknown in Theravāda history Ajātasattu (Skt. Ajātaśatru) is called Kūṇika or Koṇika by the Jains (JBORS. V, pp. 560–1) and Kṣemadarśin by Tāranātha (IHQ. III, p. 508).. For, at the time of his conception there arose in his mother, a princess of Videha and daughter of the king of Kosala, an intense desire to drink blood from the right knee of her husband, king Bimbisāra of Magadha. When the king heard of this, he called for his astrologers to find out from them what would be the result thereof. The astrologers said, “The child conceived in the womb of the queen will kill you and seize your kingdom”. Whether the king did not think much of this prophecy, or resigned himself without reservation, he had his right knee cut open with a sword and gave the blood to the queen to drink out of a golden vessel. But the queen lost her affection for the unborn child which thus became its father’s enemy while still unborn (ajātasattu) J. I, p. 121.. Several times the queen endeavoured to bring about an abortion by causing her womb to be “crushed” and to be heated with steam. But notwithstanding all her efforts the child was born in due course to fulfil the prophecy, as will be seen later.

Bimbisāra, however, loved his child dearly, so much so that once, instead of paying attention to a discourse by the Buddha, who was being entertained at the royal palace, the king fondled the boy on his lap without listening to the doctrine expounded. The Buddha admonished the king in this connection and told him a story of olden time, called the Thusa Jātaka J. III pp. 122–6, No. 338., in which the king was apprised of the danger coming to him through his son. But Bimbisāra gave no heed to the words of the Buddha.

Another incident is related, showing Bimbisāra’s affection for his son. Once the child was in great pain, due to an abscess on his finger. Although the king was administering justice, he wanted to soothe the pain by holding the child’s festering finger in his mouth, where the abscess broke. As he could not leave the courtroom to spit out the matter, the king swallowed it DA. I, p. 138..

The prince showed evil tendencies quite early in his life. Once he visited the palace that was being built for Jotika, the treasurer. Holding his father’s finger, as he walked round and round the palace, he thought to himself, “What an utter simpleton my father is! This Jotika, although he is a mere householder, dwells in a palace made entirely of the seven precious minerals. But my father, although he is a king, dwells in a house of wood. Not for a moment after I have become king will I permit this householder to dwell in such a palace” DhpA. IV, p. 211..

His ambitious tendencies did not pass unnoticed and were exploited in due course by Devadatta, a cousin of the Buddha, who through his personal ambition and self-conceit had formed evil wishes for religious leadership and power. He planned to secure the co-operation of Ajātasattu for the fulfilment of his avid schemes. Having developed certain psychic powers (iddhi), Devadatta was able to win his admiration thereby, and ingratiated himself with the prince Vin. I, Cullavagga, vii, p. 184; DhpA. I, p. 139..

Ajātasattu showered gain and honour on the crafty Devadatta while the latter developed his plan to place himself at the head of the Order of monks. He even suggested to the Buddha, that since he, the Buddha, was now feeble and aged, he should live free from care, and that he, therefore, should leave the direction of the Saṅgha in the hands of Devadatta. The Buddha’s refusal was received by Devadatta with indignation which soon developed into real hatred Ibid..

Meanwhile Ajātasattu had a monastery built for Devadatta at Gayā-sīsa; and every day he brought him perfumed three-year-old rice flavoured with the choicest spices. Such great honour and gain brought Devadatta a large following J. I, p. 186: Mahilāmukha Jātaka, No. 26.. But it also brought about his downfall, as “the bearing of fruit brings about the destruction of a plantain tree” (S. I, p. 154).

After the Buddha had caused the Order of monks to issue in Rājagaha an Act of Proclamation (pakāsanīya-kamma) that in anything done by Devadatta neither the Buddha, nor the Doctrine (dhamma), nor the Saṅgha was to be recognized but only Devadatta, the latter went to Ajātasattu and proposed that, while he himself should kill the Buddha, Ajātasattu should kill his father, Bimbisāra. Ajātasattu took a dagger and went to do so, but on being found out by the ministers, he confessed his purpose. The ministers advised the king that the prince and all the plotters should be slain; but Bimbisāra, when he found out who the real instigator was, pardoned his son and handed over the kingdom to him Vin. II, Cullavagga, vii, p. 189..

Devadatta, having succeeded thus far in that the tool in his hands had now acquired real power as king of Magadha, approached Ajātasattu again with the request “to command his men to deprive the recluse Gotama of life” Ibid. p. 190.. And Ajātasattu asked his soldiers to do whatever Devadatta wished. Thus it was that Devadatta laid various plans to encompass the Buddha’s death, all of which miscarried.

But, although Bimbisāra had handed over the kingdom to Ajātasattu, the evil seed sown by Devadatta had taken root, and the new ruler thought that as long as Bimbisāra was alive, he might try to regain his throne and power; therefore, he should be done away with. But, after his abortive attempt at patricide failed, he hesitated to adopt the extreme course of direct action, and resolved instead to imprison Bimbisāra and allow him to be starved to death. In prison, nobody but queen Khemā, sister of the king of Kosala, was allowed to visit Bimbisāra. This queen secretly took food with her, on which Bimbisāra used to live. When this was discovered and forbidden, she took food hidden in the locks of her hair. On this being found out, she was allowed to enter only with flowing tresses. Then she took small quantities of food in her shoes, but this too was discovered, and she had to go bare-footed. When, finally, she smeared her body with honey which Bimbisāra used to lick and thereby kept himself alive, she was no longer allowed to see Bimbisāra at all.

It is said in the Amitāyur-dhyāna-sūtra SBE. XLIX, ii, pp. 163–4. that Ajātaśatru became so angry when he heard of his mother’s action of smuggling food into prison, that “he brandished his sharp sword, intending to slay his mother”. But, his minister Candraprabha and the physician Jīva intervened; they rebuked him for such low conduct, calling him a caṇḍāla (outcast), and threatened to leave his court. Thereupon, Ajātaśatru repented, laid down his sword and did not hurt his mother, but ordered his officers to put the queen in a hidden palace and not to allow her to come out again. Bimbisāra ultimately died in prison of starvation, at the age of 65.

On the very same day that Bimbisāra died, but before the news thereof had reached the royal palace, a son was born to Ajātasattu who was greatly pleased thereby This child could not have been Udāvibhadda, mentioned in A. IV, p. 26), whose mother Vajirā, Pasenadi’s daughter, was given in marriage to Ajātasattu much later.). Ajātasattu’s mother used the opportunity to tell him of the incident, related earlier, when the prince had an abscess on his finger. Hearing this, Ajātasattu, now himself the happy father of a child, was overcome with remorse and issued orders to have his father released at once. But, when the messengers reached the prison, Bimbisāra was already dead.

Ajātasattu’s friendship with Devadatta and his consequent hostility against the Buddha and his Order of monks probably endeared him to those who felt their prestige waning with the increasing influence of the Buddha’s doctrine. It is not surprising, therefore, to find a different version of Bimbisāra’s death in the Nirayāvalī Sūtra of the Jains, who have tried as far as possible to free Ajātasattu from the guilt of patricide. There Koṇika (as Ajātasattu is named) orders his father’s imprisonment, owing to some misunderstanding. When the mistake is realised, the good son himself rushes to the prison with an axe wherewith he intends to hack through the fetters which keep his father bound. Bimbisāra, however, not aware of the son’s changed attitude and seeing him approach with an axe, thinks that he has come with murderous intentions. Rather than allow his son to become a patricide, Bimbisāra takes his own life Kern and Jacobi, Der Buddhismus und seine Geschichte in Indien (Leipzig, 1882) p. 244, n. 2..

One feels inclined to think that Ajātasattu’s change of heart was not very deeply rooted, or was not considered by others as convincing. For, his half-brother, commonly called Abhayarājakumāra, the son of king Bimbisāra and Padumāvatī of Ujjeni, was not only greatly disturbed in mind at the tragic death of his father, but, even though he had less claim to the throne than Ajātasattu, he seems to have thought it wiser or safer to dispel in others all possible thoughts of a future claim of his in this regard. Whatever be the reason, he became a Buddhist monk shortly thereafter, and later, having listened to the Buddha’s preaching of the discourse on the parable of the hole in the yoke Tālacchiggalūpama Sutta: (S. V, p. 455.; M. II, p. 169), he attained the first stage on the path of sainthood (sotāpatti), and subsequently, stirring up insight, became an arahant (Thag. v. 26); ThagA. I, p. 83–4.).

Another son of Bimbisāra (the commentary is silent as to the person of his mother) was named Sīlavat. When he was come of age, Ajātasattu, the king, wished to put him to death, but was unable to do so, because Sīlavat was in his last span of life and had not yet won arahantship. It was Mahā-Moggallāna who led the young prince to the Buddha who taught him, adapting the doctrine to his temperament and understanding. The youth developed confidence in the Teacher and entered the Order of monks. Later on, while living in Kosala (was there still fear in him that he did not live in his native country of Magadha?), men were sent to him by Ajātasattu to murder him, but he taught them in turn, converted them, so that they, too, joined the Order of monks (Thag. vv. 606–19), No. 241.).

During his life-time, Bimbisāra had received some hairs and nail-parings of the Buddha, over which the king had erected a thūpa within the women’s quarters in his palace. The women used to pay their homage to these objects with incense, lamps and flowers. But when Ajātasattu had ascended the throne after his father’s death, he issued strict commands that no woman should, on pain of death, do so thereafter. One of the women, named Srīmatī, however, took no notice of this command and lit a row of lamps all round the monument. She was killed by the enraged king, but her dying thoughts remained fixed on the Buddha and ensured her a happy rebirth in heaven Avadāna Śataka, No. 54..

There was yet another son of Bimbisāra, a half-brother of Ajātasattu, born of the famous courtesan of Vesālī, Ambapālī. He was called Vimala, but was afterwards known as Vimala-koṇḍañña, there being, however, no apparent reason for his acquiring this brāhman clan-name C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Psalms of the Brethren, p. 65, n. 2.. He, too, became a monk in the Order of the Buddha, and attained arahantship. There is no reference of any attempt on his life having been made by Ajātasattu (Thag. v. 64).

After Bimbisāra had died in prison, the queen who was a sister of Pasenadi, king of the Kosalas, died of grief. The revenue of a Kāsī village, amounting to a hundred thousand (kahāpaṇa?), had been assigned to her as part of her dowry, but Pasenadi refused to continue payment thereafter. Because of this he was at war with his nephew, Ajātasattu (S. I, p. 68); (J. II, p. 403), with varying success. Victory at first lay with Ajātasattu. He raised his banner and marched through the country in triumph while returning to his capital. But when a battle was lost, he returned downcast without letting anyone know. In this connection the Buddha related how in some previous existence too, when Ajātasattu was a water-snake, he used to catch and eat fish. Once the snake-crept into a wicker cage in the river, full of fish; but when a number of fish thronging together fell to biting him until he was covered with blood, he complained to a frog that it did not seem fair. The wise frog, however, replied that as the snake ate fish in his domain, so fish would kill him when entering their domain Harita-māta Jātaka, No. 239.. Evidently Ajātasattu took his reverses very unsportingly DPPN. I, p. 33..

While the war dragged on, undecided, the king of Kosala asked his councillors for some device to capture Ajātasattu. The councillors suggested to have the matter referred to the monks as having great skill in magical charms. Accordingly, Pasenadi sent his men to the monastery with instructions to hide themselves there and overhear what the monks should say. In that monastery dwelt some of the king’s officers who had renounced the world, in particular Dhanuggaha-Tissa, an expert in strategy. It was this thera who was overheard by the king’s men as saying: That pot-bellied king of Kosala is a big fool; all he knows is how to eat. And thus he allows himself to be beaten by Ajātasattu, who is no better than a worm in his own belly. What he should do is to fight the “Waggon-battle” by posting brave soldiers on his two sides, on hill-tops, and then advance with his main force in the middle. Once the enemy gets in between, they will have him like a fish in a lobster-pot. That is the way to catch him J. Nos, 239 and 283..

When the messengers reported this back to Pasenadi, he set out with a large force, acted according to the advice of Dhanuggaha-Tissa thera, took Ajātasattu prisoner and had him bound in chains. But having punished him in this manner for some days, he set him free again. Thus, peace was finally made and Pasenadi gave his own daughter, Vajirā, in marriage to Ajātasattu, with the revenue of the disputed village as her bath-money.

A son was born from this marriage, named Udāyibhadda, obviously greatly loved by his father, for when Ajātasattu once visited the Mango Grove where the Buddha was in residence with 1,250 monks and saw how silent was the assembly his wish was: Would that my son Udāyibhadda have such calm as this (D. I, p. 50): Sāmaññaphala Sutta, § 12.). Does this reflection show that remorse had been eating so deeply into the king’s heart, that he did not even dare to wish for peace in his own mind? That Ajātasattu’s conscience was certainly much perturbed is also clear from his reaction to the peaceful surroundings of the monks' dwelling place in that Mango Grove near Rājagaha. He was seized with a sudden fear and consternation which made the hairs on his body stand erect. In anxiety and excitement he said to Jīvaka, the physician, who accompanied the king and on whose advice this visit was made: You are playing me no tricks, Jīvaka? You are not deceiving me? You are not betraying me to my foes? How can it be that there should be no sound at all, not a sneeze nor a cough, in so large an assembly Ibid. § 10.?

In this account of Ajātasattu’s visit to the Buddha the king says that he had previously paid visits to six teachers of other schools, and he repeats their doctrines: Pūraṇa Kassapa who taught the doctrine of non-action, i.e., the absence of merit in any virtuous action and of demerit in even the greatest crimes; Makkhali Gosāla who admitted the fact of depravity, but said that purification was attained merely by transmigration, not by any action of the individual; Ajita Kesakambalī, who taught the doctrine of cutting off, i.e., of annihilation at death; Pakudha Kaccāyana, who maintained the existence of seven permanent, uncreated substances; the Nigaṇṭha (Jain) Nātaputta, who taught that a Nigaṇṭha, i.e., one free from bonds, is restrained by restraints in four directions; Sañjaya Belaṭṭhaputta, who prevaricated and refused to affirm any doctrine positive or negative. Having done this, Ajātasattu points out to the Buddha the advantages which various people in the world derive from their occupations, and asks whether the members of the Saṅgha, who have renounced the world, derive therefrom any corresponding advantage, not only in a life hereafter, but in their present existence. The Buddha’s reply is given in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta (D. I, p. 2), pp. 47–85.).

After hearing this discourse on the advantages of the ascetic life, Ajātasattu confessed his sin to the Buddha, “Transgression overcame me, Lord, in that in folly, stupidity and wickedness, for the sake of lordship, I deprived my righteous father, that righteous king, of life. May the Lord accept it from me that I admit my transgression as such, that I may be restrained in the future”. The Buddha accepts his confession, and this was taken by some as if the matter of his patricide was ended herewith, and as if Ajātasattu were let off far too easily. But after the king’s departure, the Buddha mentions merely one evil effect which overtook him in his present life, for it was owing to this criminal action that Ajātasattu did not attain at that meeting the initial stage on the path of holiness (sotāpatti). Said the Buddha, “This king, brethren, was deeply affected, he was touched in heart. If the king had not put his father to death, that righteous man and righteous king, then would the clear and spotless eye for the truth have arisen in him, even as he sat there” Ibid. p. 85.. Moreover, he would still have to bear the effect of his evil deed in the future, both in this life and the next.

The visit of Ajātasattu to the Buddha has been preserved in stone sculpture on one of the monolithic corner pillars of the western gateway of the thūpa of Bhārhut, 120 miles south-west of Allahabad. An inscription: “Ajātasattu worships (the foot) of the Buddha” (Ajātasata Bhagavato vandate) identifies the story in stone with absolute certainty. Cunningham Alexander Cunningham, The Stūpa of Bhārhut (London, 1879), Plate XVI and pp. 14 and 89. assigned the thūpa to the Asokan period, somewhere between 250 and 200 B.C.E. The small sculpture represents three stages of the visit: Ajātasattu leaving his palace at night by torchlight, accompanied by several women, each mounted on an elephant; the king demounting from his elephant near the dwelling place of the Buddha; and above these two, the king paying his respects, with bended knees and joined hands, to the Buddha’s seat and footprints, the usual representations of the Buddha himself, who is not known to have been delineated in human figure, at that time. Although Ajātasattu had certainly been touched by the Buddha’s discourse, and his remorse over his crime was accepted as genuine, the self-centredness of his character does not appear to have improved much. In fact, we do not read even of a second visit of his to the Buddha, even though he remained till the end a faithful follower and received also a share of the relics after the Buddha’s passing away. But looking at his whole life as a continued process, there is no striking point of conversion, as, e.g., in the case of emperor Asoka after his conquest of the Kāliṅgas.

Ajātasattu appears to have been an egoistic despot, and an opportunist where his own advantage was concerned. Even his one single visit to the Buddha had a purpose, to find out the advantage of a life of renunciation. And seeing that many good results of such a life could be expected from such a life in this present existence, Ajātasattu was full of praise for the system in preference to more idealistic views of other teachers, such as the inefficacy of action, the existence of uncreated substances, purification through transmigration, etc. As long as his father Bimbisāra was alive and patronized the Buddha, Ajātasattu encouraged a schism in the Saṅgha by his support of Devadatta. But, as soon as he had usurped the throne and allowed his father to die in prison he had no further use of Devadatta.

And, again, in the struggle for supremacy between Kosala and Magadha, although Ajātasattu was captured and put in chains, he managed not only to obtain his release, but emerged ultimately as the victor of the contest, returning home not only with his conqueror’s daughter as wife, but even with the restored revenue of the village, which was the casus belli.

It is clear that this did not satisfy Ajātasattu’s ambitions, for we see him soon afterwards making plans for the conquest of Vesālī, the capital and territory of the princes of the Licchavis, the Vajjian confederacy, although his mother, Callanā, the princess of Videha, was a daughter of the aged head of the Licchavis, Ceṭaka Akshaya Kumari Devi: Gautama the Buddha, p. 116.. As the Licchavis were the chief patrons of the Jaina sect of Jñātiputra, it might have been a matter of prudent policy that Ajātasattu went for spiritual advice elsewhere, and by preference to the one opposing sect powerful enough to make its weight felt; and that was the brotherhood of monks following the Buddha. It was to the Buddha that the chief ministers of Magadha, named Sunidha and Vassakāra, came with great respect, while they were building a fortified town on the south of the Ganges at Pāṭaligāma for repelling the Vajjis.

The Vajjian confederacy included eight clans, the most powerful of which was the Kṣatriya clan of the Licchavis. It is probable that this clan with their capital in Vesālī caused the overthrow of neighbouring monarchies, such as the Videhan monarchy, and thus formed a republican confederation, retaining Vesālī as the capital. The princes of the Licchavis seem to have loved war as much as independence. They attacked the kingdom of Magadha across the river Ganges during the time of Bimbisāra; and even Ajātasattu, although himself a terror to his neighbours, the Kosalans and the Sakyans, was sufficiently afraid of them to have this strong fortress built on the junction of the Ganges and the Sōn. With his “divine eye”, i.e., with supernormal clairvoyance, the Buddha saw on that occasion how many devatas were occupying the sites at Pāṭaligāma, bending the minds of the building ministers to erect their structures on selected spots. From this vision the Buddha prophesied that the new town would be a leading trading centre, a place where men would open up their bales of merchandise. Calling the place Pāṭaliputta, the Buddha also announced three dangers from which it might suffer: fire, water and internal dissension Vin. I, Mahāvagga, vi, p. 228..

But Ajātasattu had made up his mind to attack the Vajjians and sent his chief minister, the brāhman Vassakāra, to the Buddha to find out his views about his decision to conquer the Vajjians. But the Buddha, although the usual complimentary greetings were exchanged, did not give a direct reply to Vassakāra’s main enquiry. Instead, the Buddha spoke to his pupil Ānanda with praise of the Vajjians and their democratic confederacy. He declared that their prosperity would last as long as the Vajjians would often gather their clan in public meetings in concord, adhering to their ancient traditions, respecting the elders of the clan while listening to their advice, respecting also their womenfolk, honouring the religious places of worship in their country while supporting those worthy of veneration. As long as they would continue on these lines, taught them by the Buddha earlier at the Sārandada shrine at Vesālī, so long might the Vajjians be expected not to decline, but to prosper. And the Buddha also said of the Licchavis: Now they are sleeping on wooden couches, full of zeal and fervour in their service. Against them Ajātasattu, the king of Magadha, gets no chance, no opening. But in some time to come the Licchavis will become delicate, soft-handed and tender-footed; they will lie down on soft-beds with pillows of down till sun rise. And against them Ajātasattu will get his chance, his opening S. II, xx, § 8, p. 267..

And the shrewd minister drew his own conclusion that the Vajjians could not be conquered in battle without diplomacy or breaking up their alliance, all of which came to pass about three years after the Buddha’s death.

Vassakāra was then sent to Vesālī to create dissension, quarrel and civil strife among the Licchavis. He pretended that he had fled suddenly to the Vajjian capital Vesālī, giving out that he had barely escaped with his life from Ajātasattu. Having been given refuge and hospitality, he dwelt among them for three years, which time he utilised in spreading lies and slanders, thereby breaking up the unity of the Licchavis. The poor began to hate the rich, and the strong looked down upon the weak. Three years after his kindly reception, Vassakāra gave the hint to his master Ajātasattu, who swooped down on Vesālī at that psychological moment, taking advantage of the internal dissensions. The weak Licchavis refused to stand against him and said: Let the strong Licchavis go forward and crush him. Thus, it was easy for Ajātasattu to conquer Vesālī, the capital, which he destroyed, slaughtering as many of the clan–-men, women and children–-as he could seize. Many, however, escaped; and that they regained their power and status is clear from the fact of their subsequent connections with the imperial Guptas. Thus, in the 4th century C.E., Chandragupta I married Kumāradevi, the daughter of the Licchavis, who became the mother of Samudragupta DA. 99; JASB. XVII (1921), pp. 269–71..

An interesting sidelight on Ajātasattu’s character is shown by his impatience, anger and displeasure with a certain Upaka, the son of Maṇḍikā and a supporter of Devadatta. Upaka had come to find out whether the Buddha would praise or blame him, but Ajātasattu understood him to have presumed to abuse the Buddha after the latter had severely censured Devadatta. “What a pestilent fellow is this salt worker’s boy! A scurrilous, shameless rogue! To think that he should presume to revile that Exalted One, the Arahant, the fully-enlightened One! Away with you, Upaka! Let me see you no more” A. II. iv, sutta 188, p. 182; trsl. F.L. Woodward.! And the commentator adds that the king had him taken by the neck and dragged away.

Again, Ajātasattu is mentioned in a quarrel which developed into a great massacre between the Kosalans and some Sakyan princes. In the earlier stages of his reign the king of Kosala had through his own negligence lost the confidence of the Buddhist monks who for that reason failed to come to his palace on their usual tour for alms. The best way to regain their confidence, the king thought, would be to introduce into his household the daughter of some kinsman of their teacher, the Buddha. Thus, he had sent messengers to the Sakyans, requesting one of their maidens for a queen. But the proud clansmen deceived Pasenadi and had given him a girl born from a slave-woman, who in due course became the mother of Pasenadi’s son Viḍūḍabha. When Viḍūḍabha, grown up, had learned incidentally of the treacherous way the Sakyans had treated his father, the Kosalan prince wanted to take revenge in blood. But, as he was unable to make his father, king Pasenadi, see his point, he made use one day of the king’s absence to rebel and raise himself to the throne. Pasenadi set out for Rājagaha to secure Ajātasattu’s help against his rebellious son, but he died from exposure during the night outside the closed gates of that city.

This tragic end of Pasenadi, the king of Kosala, only shows how easily in those times enmity could be changed to friendship, as well as vice versa. For Ajātasattu did not move to interfere in the quarrel between the Kosalan and Sakyan princes, since the destruction of the latter by the vindictive Viḍūḍabha would have suited him well, confirming his stability among neighbouring states without effort on his own part. A great number without distinction of age or sex were put to death, and Kapilavatthu, the Sakyan capital, was destroyed.

It was during Ajātasattu’s reign that the death occurred of the Buddha’s two chief disciples, Sāriputta and Moggallāna, and also of the Buddha himself. Moggallāna, although an accomplished arahant, was overtaken by the weightiness of an evil act of his in some earlier existence, when he had killed his own father and mother. The resultant effect of this heinous crime was experienced by Moggallāna when he himself was clubbed to death. Ajātasattu sent out spies to discover the murderers, who, when arrested, confessed to have been set up by a sect of naked ascetics, the Nigaṇṭhas. The reaction in the king was typical of his impulsive nature. Five hundred Nigaṇṭhas were buried waist-deep in the court of the royal palace and had their heads ploughed off DhpA. III, p. 66.. It is not surprising that Ajātasattu seems to have been held in hatred by the Nigaṇṭhas DPPN. I, p. 35..

He does not seem to have been aware at the time of the passing away of the Buddha, the news of which event was communicated to the king very carefully and delicately. The story of the Buddha’s death being related to Ajātasattu is found as part of a series of frescoes covering the walls of a walk around a thūpa at Qyzyl in the Kucha area of north-central Turkistan, dating from the Tocharian period. The king is here being told, by a device, of the Parinibbāna of the Buddha. The Buddha has passed away, but who shall tell the king? The news is going to imperil his life: he may die of shock if the tidings are indiscreetly borne to him. His brilliant minister Vassakāra, therefore, induces him to take a bath in melted butter and, while the king is undergoing this soothing treatment, unfolds before his eyes, without a word, a painting that he has ordered made, from which the king may deduce what has happened. The principal scenes of the Buddha’s life shown to the king are those of Siddhattha’s birth, the enlightenment, the Buddha’s first sermon concluding with his death in the sāla-grove at Kusināgāra. When he saw this last scene, the king cried out in despair, throwing up his hands Heinrich Zimmer, The Art of Indian Asia, Plate 612, pp. 203–4. There appears to be a slight historical anachronism in the presence of Vassakāra at Ajātasattu’s court, while he is said to be residing with the Licchavis, pretending to have fled from Magadha in fear of his life, unless the beginning of his treacherous mission to Vesālī placed after the Buddha’s Parinibbāna, which is not chronologically impossible..

On the pretext of warding off the evil effects of a dream, the king’s ministers place him in a vat filled with the four kinds of sweets (catu-madhura) and then break the news to him. The king faints immediately, and only after the process has been repeated twice more, he grasps the implication of the message with utter despair.

After having thus learned the sad news, he sent a messenger to the Mallas saying, “The Exalted One was a kṣatriya (a warrior by caste) and so am I, I am worthy to receive a portion of the relics of the Exalted One. Over his remains will I put up a sacred monument and in their honour will I celebrate a feast \dots” Doṇa, the brāhman, in assent to the request of those assembled, divided the remains equally into eight parts with fair division. And so the king of Magadha, Ajātasattu, the son of the princess of the Videha clan, made a thūpa in Rājagaha over the remains of the Exalted One, and celebrated a feast D. II, Mahā-parinibbāna Suttanta, pp. 164–6..

There is no evidence in Theravāda tradition of Ajātasattu’s sustained interest in the teaching of the Buddha after his visit mentioned earlier. As a matter of fact, there is no record of any visit by the king, either to the Buddha or to one of his disciples thereafter. Still, when, after the passing away, of the Buddha, Ajātasattu had obtained a share of the relics on the ground of equality of caste, he was approached by the monks who planned to hold a council (dhamma-saṅgīti) for the purpose of compiling the Buddha’s teaching through recitation, and asked for help, which he readily gave. With all speed he had a splendid hall built by the side of the Vebhāra rock by the entrance of the Sattapaṇṇi grotto, like to the assembly hall of the gods, adorned in every way and spread with precious mats, a noble seat for the presiding thera on the south side, and a lofty seat for the reciting monk in the middle of the hall Mhv. iii, 19–22..

In the Chinese translation A-yū-wang-ching by Saṅghapāla (512 C.E.) of the Aśokāvadāna Trip. (ed. Tokyo), xxiv, 10, p. 47 a; Nanjio, No. 1348, partly translated in French by Jean Przyluski in Le Concile de Rājagṛha, Paris, 1926, pp. 22–53. we find a more elaborate account of Ajātaśatru’s activities in connection with the Council of Rājagṛha. When Ajātaśatru was informed of the approach of Kāśyapa and 500 arahants, he had the roads to Rājagṛha cleared, and placing all kinds of offerings along the route, he himself went ahead of Mahā-Kāśyapa. Now, on an earlier occasion, Ajātaśatru had fallen down from a raised pavilion when he had gone to see the Buddha entering the town. The Buddha, then, had come to his rescue. This time, when, having mounted his elephant, he was on the point of falling to the ground, Mahā-Kāśyapa with his supernormal power, seized him, saying, “The supernormal power of the Tathāgata manifests itself without particular concentration, but in his disciples this requires very special will-power. If I had not exercised my will thus, you would have been killed in your fall. Be more careful in future”. Then Ajātaśatru prostrated himself at the feet of Mahā-Kāśyapa, requesting him: “When the Blessed One entered Nirvāṇa, I was not able to see him. But when you enter Nirvāṇa, allow me to be present”. Mahā-Kāsyapa consented and informed the king that they wished to recite the Dharma in that town. To which the king replied, “Henceforth, and as long as I shall live, I shall donate to the Saṅgha clothing, food, medicine and bedding. I beg the members of the Order to stay in the Bamboo Grove”. But Mahā-Kāśyapa thought, “That is a vast place, and the resident monks will disturb our work by interfering: ‘That must be said thus; that should not be said thus’\”. And he spoke to the king, “There is a mountain cave named Pi-po-lo-yen (Pippalāyana). Allow us to compile the collected sayings of the teachings there”.

Further mention is made of Ajātaśatru in connection with the recital of the teaching of the Buddha, as related in the Chuan-chi-san-tsang-chi-tsa-tsang chuan or the “Account of the Compilation of the Tripiṭaka and of the Tsa tsang” Trip. op. cit. xxiv, 8; Nanjio, No. 1465.. The Tsa-tsang mentioned in this work is a collection of miscellaneous sayings, which constitutes a further and fourth piṭaka. It speaks of the various causes which produced successive existences of the bodhisattva in the course of three incalculable world cycles. In this collection, there is more diversity than in the three piṭakas Ibid. v. 190., while the sayings are not only attributed to the Buddha, but also partly to his disciples and to celestial beings. They are said to have been the result of a request by king Ajātaśatru regarding the practices of bodhisattvas, and were called by the Buddha the Bodhisattva-piṭaka. Several sūtras of later development (Vaipulya-sūtra) are included Przyluski, op. cit. p. 120..

But the more reliable tradition of the Ceylon chronicles Mhv. iii, 19. is that the Council of Rājagaha was held under the patronage of Ajātasattu on the Vebhāra hill at the entrance to the Sattapaṇṇi cave, and lasted seven months. There is, however, no evidence of Ajātasattu taking any personal interest in this matter, unlike Dharmāsoka in respect of the third Council of Pāṭaliputta. But then, apart from the expulsion of Devadatta and the outburst of Subhadda, there were at the time of the Rājagaha Council no signs of dissension, and the assembly of 500 arahants confined itself to the recitation of the sacred texts, so that it might be known authoritatively what they really were. Hence, Ajātasattu’s patronage was restricted to the provision of the monks' requisites during those seven months.

In the account of this first Council, as it is found in the Vinaya of the Mahāsāṅghikas Trip. op. cit. xv, 10; Nanjio, No. 1119. we find Mahā-Kāśyapa saying to the bhikṣus assembled for the cremation of the body of the Buddha, “The relics of the Blessed One are not our business. The kings, heads of families, brāhmans, householders, and the many who search for merit will pay due respect to the relics. Our business is to gather the collections of the teaching to prevent a speedy disappearance of the Buddha’s doctrine”. Immediately, the monks began to discuss where they should meet to gather the collections of the teaching. Some said: Let us go to Śrāvastī. Other places suggested were Sāketa, Campā, Vaiśālī and Kapilavastu. Then Mahā-Kāśyapa spoke the following words: “We must go to the town of Rājagṛha and there bring together the collected sayings of the Doctrine. And for what reason? The Blessed One has predicted that in the town of Rājagṛha, Ajātaśatru, the son of the Vaidehī princess, was by far the most pre-eminent Ajātasattu’s name, however, is not mentioned in the long list of pre-eminent disciples, found in the Aṅguttara Nikāya (A. I, xiv, pp. 23–6). among his lay-followers, having faith without root-conditions as concomitant. Moreover, this king has sleeping accommodation and food offerings for five hundred individuals. It is there we should go”.

Apart from Ajātasattu’s aggression against the Vajjian confederacy in the third year after the Buddha’s death, hardly anything is known of the final stages of his reign. There is, moreover, some discrepancy among the various sources of history in respect of the duration thereof. According to Tāranātha’s “History of Buddhism in India” From the German version of A. Schiefner: IHQ. III. pp. 508–9., the teacher’s office, when the Tathāgata had passed away, was given to Mahā-Kāśyapa, who, when he “disappeared from existence” made it over to Ānanda. Ānanda carried on the teachership for forty years and during this entire period Ajātasattu was living, for he obtained one half of the relics of Ānanda’s cremation, the other half being taken by the inhabitants of Vesālī. A year after him, king Ajātasattu also died.

But according to the Ceylon chronicles, Ajātasattu lived only twenty-four years after the Buddha’s passing away, bringing the total number of years of his reign to thirty-two Mhv. ii, 31–2.. His evil deed of murdering his father recoiled on him with full and equal strength, for Ajātasattu himself was slain by his son, Udāyibhaddaka Ibid. iv, 1..

According to Tāranātha, he was “in a trice reborn in hell, from there he passed away (lit. separated himself) and was reborn among the gods. Thereafter, he heard the teaching from Śāṇavāsika and attained the grade of a srotāpanna” IHQ. III (1927), p. 509.. But according to the Theravāda tradition as recorded by Buddhaghosa DA. I, p. 237–8. he was reborn in the Lohakumbhiya-niraya after his death. There he will have to suffer the torments of that hell for 60,000 years, but finally he will attain deliverance as a paccekabuddha under the name Viditavisesa or Vijitāvī DPPN. I, p. 35..

One of the sixteen arahants, according to the Nandimitrāvadāna, as translated into Chinese by Hsüan-tsang. In this work compiled by the arahant Nandimitra of Siṁhala (Ceylon) about 800 years after the Buddha’s Nirvāṇa, Ajita is the fifteenth arahant mentioned, and he is said to have lived with his retinue of one thousand five hundred arahants mostly on mount Gṛdhrakūṭa.

These sixteen arahants, according to the Ratnamegha Sūtra (fasc. vii) as mentioned in the “Notes on the Analytical Study of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra” were ordered by the Buddha to sustain Buddhism and not to enter Nirvāṇa until the coming of the next Buddha. They took an oath to this effect in the presence of the Buddha.

The veneration of these sixteen arahants became widely prevalent in China after the translation of the Nandimitrāvadāna during the T'ang dynasty, and many pictures are recorded to have been made by Lu Lêng-Ch'ieh of the Ch'ien-yüan period (758–60 C.E.).

It is obvious that the concept of “arahantship” in respect of these sixteen disciples of Śākyamuni is not in total accord with the Theravāda doctrine. Nor is it possible to identify the arahant Ajita of the Mahāyāna tradition with any of the Buddha’s disciples as known from Pali literature.

Space, atmosphere, sky, open air. The meaning varies according to the context, but the basic concept of space is predominant. Etymologically derived from the Skt. kāś (to shine, to be visible), ākāsa is the medium in which objects can be seen; but which is not occupied by objects; hence space. In Sanskrit philosophic literature ākāsa stands for the subtle and ethereal plenum, supposed to pervade the universe, the vehicle of light and life, as the air is that of sound.

But in Buddhist terminology ākāsa is not a reality, not an ultimate (paramattha), but a concept (paññatti), an idea or notion which corresponds to a collection of attributes. This space-concept (ākāsa-paññatti) is not a notion corresponding to a thing (nāma-paññatti), such as the idea of land or mountain; but it rather reveals certain attributes, or connotes them (attha-paññatti) as subjective views, without corresponding to an individual thing. Not being linked, even conceptually, to a corresponding object, ākāsa is a permanent concept (nicca-paññatti) “by which the mind is enabled to distinguish objects in external perception” (Shwe Zan Aung, Comp. of Phil., Introd. p. 16). Without having objective reality it is spoken of as that by which an object is limited and bounded (paricchedarūpa). Space (ākāsa) is that by which objects are perceived as mutually distinct; it is the possibility–-but not the actuality–-of being occupied. Thus, space is to the external perception of matter what time is to mental perception. Just as events happen in time, so objects are placed in space. Both are essential in the process and succession of mental states, without having an individual reality of their own.

Space itself, not the concept of space, is therefore dependent on the objects delimited by it. Theoretically speaking, an expansion or increase of objects would decrease the amount of space available. And thus space is dependent on all the four causal conditions which regulate the origin of material phenomena: kamma, citta, utu and āhāra. For, just as the concepts of units of mass (rūpa-kalāpa: bundles of matter) originate in dependence on volition, mental aspects, physical change, nutritive absorption from pre-existing materials, and such units move about as electrons in intra-atomic space, so space itself is equally dependent on the same conditions. The modern atomic and electronic theories of matter did, of course, not find a place in the conception of matter as visualised by the ancient commentators, but the amount of resemblance found in the old and the new concepts is remarkable. Ākāsa is not a positive medium in which matter (rūpa) moves, but, it limits the material units (rūpa-kalāpa). The units together with the space between them constitute a material object as it enters the field of the senses with its characteristics of solidity and extension, and all the other varying phenomena, which give it appearance (ruppanato rūpaṁ). From this central concept of space, as a potentiality of occupation, is derived the meaning of place or even region of rebirth (kahiṁ ākāse pravṛttājīvo: Mhvu. II, 49). But even if it is raised to the rank of an element (ākāsa-dhātu), it is the empty space to be occupied by the other elements, the void in which the elements are placed (ākāśagatika: Sdmp. 214). From this again the notions of above, below and across are formed, according to Buddhaghosa (DhsA. 326).

As a rule, ākāsa is treated separately from the four great material elements (mahā-bhūta) and is not considered in the Piṭakas as an element, except in the Mahā Rāhulovāda Sutta, where Rāhula is advised by the Buddha to develop mind-concentration which is like open space (ākāsasamaṁ bhāvanaṁ bhāvehi: (M. I, p. 424). And what is the element of open space? (katamā ca Rāhula ākāsa-dhātu). Internal (ajjhattika), it is the space, enclosed by material, such as the openings inside the mouth or nose; external (bāhira) space would be that which surrounds matter. Perfect, intuitive wisdom (sammappaññā) in respect of this element of empty space cleanses the thought (cittaṁ virājeti) of the misconceptions of “I” and “mine”.

There is a bare enumeration of six elements (cha dhātuyo) in the Saṅgīti Suttanta (D. III, p. 247) and in the first sutta of the Mahā Vagga of the Aṅguttara Nikāya (A. I, p. 176), where they are given as essential parts of the Dhamma together with the teaching on the six spheres of contact (cha phassāyatanāni), the eighteen applications of mind (aṭṭhārasa manopavicārā) and the Four Noble Truths (cattāri ariyasaccāni). The six elements are enumerated as the elements of extension (paṭhavī-dhātu), of cohesion (āpo-dhātu), of caloricity (tejo-dhātu), of vibration (vāyo-dhātu), of space (ākāsa-dhātu) and of consciousness (viññāṇa-dhātu), without any internal connection being shown; in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, however, it is explicitly said that space does not commingle (asamphuṭṭhaṁ) with the four great elements, as they do with each other (Dhs. § 638).

From all this, the following points of interest may be noted. There is, first of all, the unyielding attitude of Theravāda Buddhism which admits space only as a potential. This is, perhaps, not surprising in modern philosophic thought, but it must have been rather a “shock” in those early times when not only in Indian schools was space considered a reality, but it was also accepted as such by the great masters of Greek philosophy. For, not only in general were Plato’s “ideas” eternally existent, but space in particular, although deriving its existence as a logical projection from the “ideas”, ceased to be, for Aristotle, a dialectical relativity and became a reality dependent upon matter. This intangible reality developed into a distinction between the entitative existence of space and a substantial existence apart from matter. Thus, Aristotle carefully distinguished space from matter and form.

Another point to be noted is the constant separation in Buddhist philosophy of space (ākāsa) and extension (paṭhavī). Space is a potentiality and a limitation of matter. Extension is the solidity of matter, one of its four essential elements or constituents (mahā-bhūta). In other words, space is mental and extension is material. But in the views of many western philosophers (early and late) space is identified with extension, although according to Locke “pure space”, which is capable neither of resistance nor of motion, is to be distinguished from solidity (Essay concerning Human Understanding, II, iv). In Buddhist philosophy it is solidity, the element of earth (paṭhavī), which gives extension to objects, while space (ākāsa) circumscribes its limitations. It is not an aptitudinal extension forming the basis of an actual extension, but a void (suñña) which has nothing in common with either air, or ether, or matter in any form.

Ākāsa as pure space and empty void has naturally found its application in less rigidly philosophic connotations. And thus we find the term used for the open air (abbhokāsa: (D. I, p. 63); (M. III, p. 132); (A. II, p. 210), as an unsheltered place, recommended sometimes as being suitable for simplicity of living and for meditative purposes. The infinity of space (ākāsānañca), or the sphere (āyatana) of unbounded space, forms the object of the first of the higher mental states of absorption (jhāna) and will be detailed under Ākāsānañcāyatana. But even as a limited space-aperture (paricchinn'ākāsa-kasiṇa) it forms a device for concentrating a wandering mind, an aid in the practice of meditation (kammaṭṭhāna). Here too, however, it is newer endowed with positive characteristics and, if properly developed, such concentration should lead to insight into the essential emptiness and insubstantiality of all things, through which the mind becomes emancipated and the perfect deliverance of Nibbāna is attained.

The sphere or base of boundless space, the first of the four immaterial states (ārruppa). In surmounting all gross physical matter originated from action (karaja-rūpa), by means of the fourth state of mental absorption in the sphere of materiality, which is free from sense-desires (rūpāvacara-catutthajjhāna-vasena: Vism. x, § 2, p. 271), one gives no more attention to the concentration device of the limited space aperture (paricchinn'ākāsa-kasiṇa), which has been devised for the purpose of bringing a wandering mind to one-pointedness (citt'ekaggatā). Thus, being free from attachment to its limitations, one pays attention to space without limits (ananta-ākāsa). Here, the space which was still materialised by the boundaries of the kasiṇa has now become immaterial (arūpa) by the removal of those boundaries. “With the complete transcending of material perceptions (sabbaso rūpasaññānaṁ samatikkamā), with the disappearance of the perception of sensory reactions (paṭighasaññānaṁ atthaṅgamā) and with the non-attention to perceptions of the multiformity of sensuous impressions (nānatta-saññānaṁ amanasikārā), one becomes aware of just unbounded space (ananto ākāso ti) and one enters into and dwells within the sphere of boundless space” (akāsānañcāyatanaṁ upasampajja vihārati: Vbh. 245; Vism. x, § 12, p. 273).

It is not only the transcending of matter or the perception thereof, but even of the sensory reactions to such perception, which is necessary to the attainment of this first stage of mental absorption in the immaterial spheres (arūpa-jhāna). Only when the multiformity of sensuous impressions ceases to draw attention and all sense-sphere-consciousness (kāmāvacara-citta-cetasikānaṁ pahānaṁ), has been rejected, is the sphere of unbounded space attained. The specification “unbounded” (ananta) refers not only to space (ākāsa) in so far as it has discarded its boundaries, but also refers to the state of mind which pervades space without bounds (anantaṁ: Vbh. 262).

In the canonical texts the sphere of boundless space (ākāsānañcāyatana) is frequently referred to when the various stages of mental absorption are enumerated (e.g., Nivāpa Sutta: (M. I, p. 159) or when the seven sorts of beings, distinguished by their states of consciousness, are explained (Mahā-Nidāna Suttanta: (D. II, p. 69), or when the eight stages of deliverance (aṭṭha vimokkhā) are expounded, e.g., by the Buddha to Ānanda in the Mahā-Parinibbāna Suttanta (D. II, p. 112). In the last-mentioned context after the Buddha has given his final admonition, the various stages of his mental process are mentioned before he attains complete deliverance (parinibbāyi: ibid. 156).

A monk who attains and abides in the sphere of infinite space is said to have “won access to the imperturbable” (ānejjappatto hoti: (A. II, p. 184). This term appears to have been misunderstood as though this state was unconditioned (asaṅkhata), making it identical with Nibbāna. This controverted point was, however, rejected by the Theravāda (Kvu. vi, 4).

The sphere or mental station of “not being anything”. A sphere, mental station or base is called āyatana, because it provides a range for arising (āye tanoti) and because it also leads on that which has already arisen (āyatañca nayati: Vism. p. 449, xvii, § 48). In this particular context it refers to a range of knowledge which has as its object the negation of something (a-kiñcana). It is the third and penultimate state of mental absorption in the immaterial spheres (arūpajjhāna or arūpāvacarajjhāna) and is brought about “by the total overcoming of the sphere of unbounded consciousness and with the idea: ‘Nothing is there’,” (sabbaso viññāṇañcāyatanaṁ samatikkamā, n'atthi kiñcīti ākiñcaññāyatanaṁ upasampajja viharati: Vbh. 245). This, it is said, is not to be understood as an attempt to make consciousness not arise, cease or disappear (abhāveti, vibhāveti, antaradhāpeti; Vism. p. 278, x, § 38), but as an attention to its non-existence, its voidness, its secludedness (natthibhāvaṁ suññabhāvaṁ vivattabhāvaṁ eva manasikaroto: ibid.).

The immediately preceding range, the sphere of unbounded consciousness (viṅññāṇañcāyatana), which is based on the concept of boundless space (ākāsānañca) as pervaded by consciousness (taṁ yeva ākāsaṁ viññāṇena phutaṁ manasikaroti: Vbh. 262), contains the danger of the misconception (micchadiṭṭhi) of a universal self, as found in the Upaniṣads: I am the Absolute (ahaṁ brahmāsmi). It is to overcome this self-delusion that the sphere of unbounded consciousness in the second stage of mental absorption in the immaterial realm has to be totally overcome (samatikamati).

Ākiñcaññāyatana is, therefore, strictly speaking not a sphere of nothingness, which implies a contradiction such as something of nothing, but a mental sphere in which the universality of space and consciousness is realised as an empty thought.

Kiñcana has, in the older texts, assumed a moral implication of something that sticks or adheres to the character of a man, and which he must get rid of, if he wants to attain to a higher moral condition (PED. s.v.). Thus, it becomes synonymous with the three impurities of lust, hate and delusion (rāgo kiñcanaṁ do-so kiñcanaṁ, moho kiñcanaṁ: (D. III, p. 217). And thus, akiñcana obtains the special sense of being without moral defilement and becomes frequently an attribute of the arahant, owning naught, having naught (kāme akiñcano: (A. V, p. 232). Here too, the state of mental purity becomes more and more refined till in the realisation of no-self (anatta) the perfection of arahantship is attained.

In the spheres of mental absorption this refinement can be observed, first, in the transition within the material spheres (rūpāvacara) where application (vitakka-vicāra), interest (pīti) and satisfaction (sukha) are gradually overcome to make room for one-pointedness (ekaggatā). Then these material spheres, where form (rūpa) remains predominant in the various concentration devices (kasiṇa), fade away, and consciousness dwells in the formless (arūpa). First, according to the ṭīkā, the mind in its state of immaterial abstraction (arūpajjhāna) has as its object the infinity of space. Realising that this, however, is merely a mental, concept, this state of mind itself becomes the object of the second stage, the object being the infinity of mind. But, in the awareness of the nature of the mind being a mental process without inherent or abiding entity, this same infinity of space and thought is seen as nothing (akiñcana). Thus not being anything, not being attached to anything, and hence owning nothing, is the immediate fruit of this third state of concentration. Such insight-knowledge may be but little removed from the perfect insight (añña), which has complete deliverance as its immediate fruition. Yet, to imagine that such experience is the equivalent of arahantship (D. I, p. 37) is rightly condemned.

These states of mental absorption do not really belong exclusively to the teaching of the Buddha. Even before his enlightenment, Siddhattha Gotama, the bodhisatta, had attained these spheres under the guidance of such ascetic teachers as Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta (M. I, p. 164 f.). The efficacy of these states is not denied, but they should not be made the aim of the doctrine and of spiritual effort. In several places (e.g., (Vin. I, p. 161); IV, 24) the states of mental absorption (jhāna) are mentioned in the beginning of a graded series of attainments, even before the attainment of entering the path or stream of holiness (sotāpanna). But, when the states of mental absorption are thus mentioned in general, they are merely referred to as the four “ecstasies” (jhāna) and only the four rūpajjhāna are indicated, as induced during meditation exercises based on some material device (kasiṇa). The states which are referred to in Abhidhamma literature as the four mental absorptions in formless spheres (cattāri arūpajjhānāni: Dhs. §§ 265–8) appear in the Nikāyas as four of the eight deliverances (vimokkha: A. IV, p. 306) or in immediate sequence to the four ecstasies based on material form (rūpajjhāna), but neither with any collective title, nor as parts of the fourth rūpajjhāna. Thus, in the Sāriputta Saṁyutta (S. III, xxviii) the mental states born of solitude (viveka), apart from thought applied and sustained (avitakka avicāra), with fading zest and with dispassion (pītiyā ca virāgā upekkhako ca) and in equanimity of utter purity (upekkhā satipārisuddhiṁ), are described as the four states of absorption (jhāna: suttas 1–4, pp. 235–7). But when, in similar style, Sāriputta continues to explain to Ānanda his further attainments, passing utterly beyond the consciousness of shape and form (rūpa-saññaṁ samatikkama), ending the awareness of individuality-resistance (paṭigha-saññānaṁ attagamā), not averting the mind to the diversity (nānatta-saññānaṁ amanasikāra) of sensuous impressions, we find no more mention of jhāna, but only of the fact of the attainment of having realised that particular sphere of mind that there is “nothing” (n'atthi kiñcīti ākiñcaññāyatanaṁ upasampajja viharāmi; S. III, sutta 7, p. 237).

This sphere of the voidness of both material space and mental concept also has to be abandoned and completely by-passed in order to attain a still more subtle sphere where perception itself becomes imperceptible (nevasaññā-n'āsañññāyatana), the last step before the final attainment of cessation of perception and sensation (saññāvedayitanirodha).

A final point of interest to be noted in this respect is that each sutta of the Sāriputta Saṁyutta contains the repeated statement of Sāriputta: “But to me, friend, never came the thought: It is ‘I’ who am attaining, who have attained, or who have emerged from such attainment”. And that is, indeed, the goal of meditation and concentration in Buddhism throughout all the various stages: the realisation of no-self (anatta).

The doctrine which denies the efficacy of action, and denies that karma has any results. Of the traditional six heretical views enumerated by king Ajātasattu on the occasion of his only recorded visit to the Buddha (D. I, p. 52), the doctrine of akiriyavāda was attached in varying degrees to several of these heretical teachers. Pūraṇa Kassapa denied the efficacy of action in the most absolute sense: “To him who acts or causes another to act (karato, kā-ra-ya-to), whether the deed be mutilation or even killing, whether theft, robbery, adultery or deceit, to him thus acting there is no guilt (karato na karīyati pāpaṁ). Likewise in generosity, in self-control, in mastery of the senses, in truthfulness, there is no merit and no increase of merit” (dānena damena saṁyamenā sacca-vajjena n'atthi puññaṁ, n'atthi puññassa āgamo). Thus did Pūraṇa Kassapa expound his teaching of inefficacy (evaṁ eva Pūraṇo Kassapo akiriyaṁ vyākāsi: ibid. 53).

Makkhali Gosāla, whose followers were called Ājīvikas and who is mentioned both in the Buddhist and the Jain texts, was equally absolute in his denial of all causation: “There is neither causality, nor conditionality (n'atthi hetu n'atthi paccayo); beings are either defiled or pure without cause and without reason” (ahetu-apaccayā sattā saṅkilasanti: ahetu-apac-ca-yā sattā visujjhanti: ibid. 53). This fatalistic view of natural predestination ascribes all experience to fate (niyati), to accidental occurrence (saṅgati), to nature (bhāva), to change (pariṇata), to one’s position in a particular group (evābhijāta). Even though a wise man may hope to bring his karma to maturity by virtue or by penance, and even though a fool may foster the same hope, yet the measure of joy and sorrow cannot be altered; there is neither decrease nor increase (n'atthi hāyana-vaḍḍhana), neither excess nor deficiency (n'atthi ukkaṁsāvakaṁse: ibid. 54). This fatalistic view also implies the inefficacy of action (aki-ri-ya-vā-da) to bring about a change.

Ajita, who used to wear a garment of hair and is hence always referred to as Ajita Kesakambalī, denied everything that was non-material, and thus amongst a long list of denials one finds also: “There is neither fruit nor result of either good or evil deeds” (n'atthi sukaṭa-dukkaṭānaṁ kammānaṁ phalaṁ vipāko; ibid. 55). His was a teaching of annihilation (uccheda-vāda) which ridiculed any doctrine of spiritual values as a “doctrine of fools” (dattu-paññata). In some respects, therefore, his annihilationism is a kind of akiriyavāda, although, perhaps, it would be more correct to say that the doctrine of the inefficacy of action (akiriyavāda) is a kind of annihilationism (ucchedavāda).

In fact that was the conclusion arrived at by Sikhā-Moggallāna, the brāhman, and the youth Soṇakāyana, as stated in the Soṇakāyana Sutta; for they proclaimed: “Gotama the monk teaches the inefficacy of all activity (samaṇo Gotamo sabbakammānaṁ akiriyaṁ paññāpeti: (A. II, p. 232). And by teaching the inefficacy of all action he teaches also the annihilation of the world” (sabba-kammānaṁ kho pana akiriyaṁ paññāpento uccedaṁ āha lokassa). But the Buddha cleared himself of this accusation by explaining in great detail that dark deeds have dark results (kammaṁ kaṇhaṁ kaṇha-vipākam), bright deeds have bright results (kammaṁ sukkaṁ sukka-vipākaṁ), and deeds which are neither dark nor bright are deeds which abandon both dark and bright results; and such is the deed that is conducive to the waning of karmic action (kammakkhayāya saṁvattati: (A. II, p. 232).

The accusation levelled against the Buddha of teaching the inefficacy of action, notwithstanding a wealth of references to the opposite effect, may well have arisen from an incomplete understanding of his most fundamental teaching of anatta. For, if there is no doer of deeds, it does not matter whether the deeds are good or bad. The fallacy of this argument is, of course, situated in the misunderstanding of the “doer”. According to the doctrine of anatta, there is no permanent entity, substance or soul, apart from individual actions, but those actions do not thereby become ineffective. They produce their results and exercise their influence in the arising or cessation of further conditions, which may become operative in their turn, and thereby set a chain-reaction going, of which neither the beginning nor the end can be seen. The arising and cessation of physical and mental phenomena are dependent in their origination and cessation on conditions, but not on an unchanging entity, essence, substance or soul. As those active conditions are also reactive; there results a connection of conditionality which carries with it a moral responsibility for the results. Morality is thereby purified, for the ego-element in striving for virtue has been eliminated. Thus, anatta does not lead to akiriya, not to inefficacy of action, but to kiriya, which is self-less action. The taming of self (atta-damatha) which leads to the extinction of self (atta-parinibbāpana) does not involve an abandonment of ethical values in the sense of repudiation thereof, but rather of sublimation which becomes possible through a perfect understanding that, what had to be done, has been done (kataṁ kattabbaṁ). Such perfection is synonymously described in reference to an arahant: having destroyed the cankers (khīṇāsavo), having lived the life (vusitavā), done what was to be done (katakaraṇīyo), laid down the burden (ohitabhāro), attained the goal (anuppattasadattho), having completely destroyed the fetter of becoming (parikkhīṇabhavasaṁyojano), he is freed with perfect insight-knowledge (sammadaññā vimutto: (M. I, p. 235).

In the Apaṇṇaka Sutta (M. I, p. 404) f.) the Buddha explains the “sure” (apaṇṇaka) kamma and refers amongst other heresies to the akiriyavāda of Pūraṇa Kassapa, although he is not mentioned by name, and its opposing view of evil to follow (tatonidāna-pāpa) and good as reward (tatonidāna-puñña). The holding on to the view of the inefficacy of action, says the Buddha, leads to evil conduct, as one does not discern the danger of doing wrong; it produces false intentions (micchāsaṅkappa) and false speech (micchāvācā); it leads to mocking noble disciples (ariyānaṁ paccanīkatā), convincing others of falsehood (asaddhammasaññatti), self-exaltation (attukkaṁsanā) and disparagement of others (paravambhanā: ibid. 406).

This heretical doctrine of the inefficacy of action (akiriyavāda) should not be confused with the noble ideal of the sublimation of action, when an enlightened monk is able to rise above the obligations and abstentions of morality (kiccākicca-pahīna: (A. IV, p. 26). An action becomes karmically effective (kamma-vipāka) when it is performed with an intention (cetanā), and the intended goal is the purpose of such action. Then the act projects itself in the intended result; for the act in itself is incomplete and seeks completion in the effect. That is kamma. An action which, however, is not performed for a different purpose, but which arises from the understanding of the necessity of action, will be complete in itself and the urge for self-projection will be absent. This is a pure action (kiriyā) without volition (cetanā) and without moral result (vipāka). This kiriyā should not be confused with the inefficacy of action (akiriyā) This “inefficacy of action” is thus much more pernicious than mere “inaction”, which is the translation of F.L. Woodward of the traditional doctrine of inefficacy of action (paraṁ pi gantvā akiriyāya: (A. I, p. 173, in Gradual Sayings, I, p. 157), for here are actually presented the fatalistic teachings of Makkhali Gosāla, “everything is without cause or condition” (sabbaṁ taṁ ahetu-appaccayā: A. I, p. 175)., to which the Buddha gave the following “reasonable rebuke” (sahadhammika-niggaha): “For those who fall back on the uncaused and unconditioned as the essence (sāra), there is no desire to act (na hoti chando), no effort (vāyāma), no duty to perform (karyaṇīya), no obligation to abstain (akaraṇīya). Thus, living in a state of bewilderment (muṭṭhasati) and without caution (anārakkha), they cannot be truly said to have retired from a worldly life”.).

The doctrine which denies the efficacy of action is a wrong view (micchā-diṭṭhi). It is definite (niyata) in its evil consequences, and produces immediate results on the disintegration of the five aggregates of existence (pañcakkhandhā), i.e., at death. Other wrong views with similar consequences are those held by the Anti-Causationists (ahetuka-vādā), who are fatalists, and by the Nihilists (natthika-vādā or uccheda-vādā), who are materialists. “Not a hundred, not even a thousand Buddhas would be able to enlighten them” (DhsA. 358).

Attachment, as a developed meaning from what was originally a roosting place or perch, an abode or house (gehālaya: J. I, p. 10; (Miln. 213). Ethically, it acquired the meaning of desire, clinging and lust; taking pleasure in, being devoted to and getting excited about the things to which one is attached (ālayarāma, ālayarata, ālayasamudita: (S. I, p. 136). And thus, house and home, being the chief objects of attachment, ālaya is synonymous with oka, resting place, shelter, dwelling, attachment (e.g. DhpA. II, p. 170).

The Sāratthappakāsinī alludes to the wife as a nest by reason of attachment (ālaya-vasena bhariyaṁ kulāvakaṁ katvā: SA. I, p. 38). But, also, the Four Noble Truths are enumerated on the basis of dependence or reliance (ālaya), used as a synonym of craving (taṇhā) and hence of conflict (dukkha): reliance (ālaya), delight in reliance (ālayārāmatā), removal of reliance (ālayā-samugghāta), and the means to the removal of reliance (ālayā-samugghātakūpayānā: Vism. p. 422, xvi, § 28).

A still further developed meaning is found in attachment as imputation: “though not mad, he pretends to be mad” (ummattakālayaṁ karoti: (Vin. II, p. 82) and even as impersonation, e.g., in Devadatta’s efforts to pose as a Buddha (Sugatālayaṁ: J. I, p. 491).

Synonym of mindfulness (sati), awareness, attention. Although less frequently used by authors on the subject in English, it is in a way more appropriate than any other translation of the term. Sati is certainly not memory, although the Sanskrit form smṛti has that meaning; it is also more than attentive awareness of things happening in the physical world of events or in the mind. For awareness of an event is usually awareness of a reaction thereto, which is an after-event. But the mindfulness which is sati, as the four methods of awareness (satipaṭṭhāna), is a constant state of alertness and watchfulness, which does not merely pay attention to states which have arisen but rather to states as they arise. “Inhaling a deep breath he is aware: ‘I inhale a deep breath’,” (dīghaṁ vā assasanto: dīghaṁ assasāmīti pajānāti: (M. I, p. 56).

Alertness, moreover, has a certain neutrality which may not be found always in attention. In attention one is prepared and is on the lookout for a certain event; and the mind may be prejudiced. But alertness is a ready receptivity which is more passive and hence neutral.

Mentioned in a rock inscription of Asoka, found at Bhābru and referred to as the Bhābru edict, or Bhabra inscription.

There has been some speculation in the process of identification of the texts recommended by Asoka for recitation. But the latest opinions establish the identity of Alyavasāṇi with the four Ariyavaṁsa of the sutta of that name (A. II, p. 27).

For the text of the inscription see E. Hultzsch, in CII., Vol. I, p. 173, and for the identification of the text by Dharmananda Kosambī see IA. Vol. XLI (1912) p. 39. This identification is strengthened by the immense popularity which this sutta enjoyed throughout the ages, and which no doubt largely contributed to the maintenance of discipline and purity of morals in the Saṅgha, which was the very purpose of Asoka’s edict.

The Ariyavaṁsa Sutta speaks of the four noble lineages or heritages which the ideal Buddhist monk should cherish and cultivate: (1) contentment with whatever robes he obtains, (2) satisfaction with whatever food (medicine) is offered to him, (3) gratification with whatever lodging he obtains and (4) delight in meditation.

Or symbolic representations in literature are not to be found in the Buddhist Theravāda texts. The well-known stories of previous lives of the Buddha and of persons connected with him historically during his last existence, are frequently explained by modern interpreters as parables, legends and myths. Although each Jātaka-story contains a moral lesson and is an illustration of a particular virtue or perfection, they are certainly not myths in the eyes of the Buddhists throughout the centuries. Even the fact that animals are made to speak and are endowed sometimes with more than human qualities is no ground for relegating them to the fairy-land of myths. It is not for us to decide the historicity of such accounts, neither to measure their veracity with our modern scientific yardstick. The power of yogins has not disappeared from India even in this 20th century, and the unexplained influence of mantras is well recognised, not in the mystic East alone. The existence of life, may be in other than human form, in spheres not of this world, has never been disproved or reasonably doubted. And, although the doctrine of rebirth should not be confused with the Hindu doctrine of transmigration of a soul, there is no need to reject the stories of previous births with their identification of individuals as mere allegories, on the ground of the basic doctrine of “soullessness” (anatta) in Buddhism. Remembrance of previous existences (pubbe-nivāsānussati) is one of the recognised five mundane (lokiya) spiritual powers of insight (abhiññā, pp. 97 ff.), and is essentially not different from memory, which faculty is certainly not reserved for humanity alone. The mode of presentation in story form is an adaptation of the doctrine of the absolute truth (paramattha sacca) to conventional explanation (vohāra-desanā).

The Jātakas are historical illustrations, but they are certainly not allegories, parables, myths or fables.

On the other hand, symbolism is found already in the earliest suttas, e.g., when the sense-organs are referred to as the sense-doors (pañca-dvāra) which are approached by a sense-object, and to which the mind turns (āvajjana) its attention. The beginning of a life of consistent spiritual advancement, with no retrogression, is referred to always as the entering of the stream (sotāpatti) which inevitably runs its course to final deliverance.

One of the aids used in meditation: The act of contemplation finds its instrument or base (kammaṭṭhāna) in forty different methods, ten of which are aided by various devices (dāsa kasiṇa): These ten are usually enumerated as earth, water, fire, air, blue, yellow, red, white, space and intellection (viññāṇa). As such, they are mentioned in the Mahā-Sakuludāyī Sutta (M. II, p. 14–15), the Jhāna Vagga of the Aṅguttara Nikāya (A. I, p. 41), §§ 71–2), the Saṅgīti Suttanta (D. III, p. 268) and the Dasuttara Suttanta (D. III, p. 290). But in later sources we find the last two substituted by limited space aperture (paricchinnā) and light (āloka). Thus, light (āloka) is substituted for intellection or consciousness (viññāṇa).

It is interesting to note that these two devices of space and intellection have been omitted from the usual list of the Sutta Piṭaka when referred to in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, where only eight devices are mentioned (aṭṭha kasiṇa: Dhs. §§ 202–3; (Ps. i, 6).

And, thus, after their elimination from the later books of the canon, they are re-introduced under different names in commentarial works, such as the Visuddhimagga and Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha.

It will be seen that the difference is only in name, since the light of intellection is the common object in this meditation exercise, whether it is called āloka or viññāṇa. The Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha (p. 41, ix, § 2) refers to the ten concentration circles (kasiṇa-maṇḍala) and mentions light (āloka) as the last. The Visuddhimagga (p. 141, §§ 21–3) places light as the ninth. An explanation for this substitution of āloka for viññāṇa is offered, probably because the coincidence of this space-device (ākāsa-kasiṇa) and intellection-aid (viññāṇa-kasiṇa) with the first two immaterial states of mental absorption of boundless space (ākāsānañcayatana) and infinite consciousness (viññāṇañcayatana) might lead to confusion.

Of the light-device (āloka-kasiṇa) it is said: One who is learning with this aid apprehends the sign (nimitta) either in the light which comes through a hole in a wall, or through a keyhole, or a window Quoted in Vism, p. 141, but without reference.. This sign or mental image arises (after previous practice) when one sees the circle of light thrown on the floor or opposite wall through the hole.

Another more artificial way in producing a similar effect is to place a lamp inside a pot, allowing the light to fall through the opening on to the opposite wall. This last method appears to be preferable, as the circle of light cast on the wall will not shift, unlike the circle of light thrown by the sun or moon through a window (ibid.).

The development of this material device into the mental image thereof or its representative sign (nimitta) and its further unfolding into the so-called after-image (paṭibhāga-nimitta) or mental reflex, is common to twenty-two meditation exercises, viz., the ten circle devices (kasiṇa-maṇḍala) which include āloka-kasiṇa, ten exercises of concentration on various types and stages of impurity (asubha), the one exercise of concentration on the thirty-two parts (koṭṭhāsa) of the body, and the one exercise of mindfulness regarding respiration (ānāpāna-sati: Abhs. 42).

The acquisition of knowledge as to the passing away and reappearance of beings (cutūpapātañāṇa) or knowledge of the divine eye (dibbacakkhuñāṇa), which is one of the supernormal faculties (iddhi), is brought about in a state of mental absorption (jhāna) which forms the basis for intuitive knowledge (abhiññā-pādakajjhāna). Access to this state of mental absorption (upacārajjhāna), should be obtained through one of the three circle devices, viz., fire (tejo); white (odāta), or light: (āloka-kasiṇa). The light-device is said to be the best (āloka-kasinaṁ seṭṭhataraṁ: Vism. 381; § 95).

Literally, perception of light. The term is used in an extended meaning of consciousness or awareness of the faculty of sight. With mind alert, one is aware of, pays attention to, and concentrates on whatever light there be, by day or by night (ālokasaññaṁ manasikaroti divāsaññaṁ adhiṭṭhā-ti yathā divā tathā rattiṁ: (A. II, p. 45). And, with mind awake and cleared, he develops his thought to brilliance (vivaṭena cetasā apariyonaddhena sappabhāsaṁ cittam bhāveti: (D. III, p. 223). Thus, the acquired meaning is not the mere perception of light, but the awareness of such perception.

This awareness is also referred to in the Yodhajīva Sutta (A. III, p. 92) where a monk is described as being aware of light, mindful and controlled, his mind cleansed of sloth and torpor (ālokasaññī sato sampajāno thīnamiddhā cittaṁ parisodheti).

Devotion to the good of others. Ethically, it is the opposite of self-interest or egoism. In the teaching of the Buddha, where self as a permanent soul or entity (atta) has no place, it is obvious that benevolence and other disinterested tendencies occupy a prominent place. The term altruism is supposed to have been first used by Comte, and after him extensively by Spencer in his Data of Ethics, both in the meaning mentioned above. And it is especially that sense which is attached to the Pali word parahita, the good of others, as opposed to selfishness (attahita: (D. III, p. 233).

Altruism, which ethically places others above self, is naturally limited to such dispositions as are consciously directed towards the benefit of others. Hence, it is limited to conscious beings and is not found in spontaneous, or natural, but unconscious action. In fact, psychologically, altruism is unnatural, because nature is extremely selfish in its struggle, where only the fittest survive. Altruism, therefore, is never an innate virtue, but must be acquired and developed by practice and through the understanding of insight. Hence the Pali term parahita is so much more accurate.

It is doubtful whether the instinctive animal feelings of giving protection to offspring could be called altruism, instead of a subtle extension of egoism and possessiveness of one’s own. Thus, the more an action is inspired by conscious thought and directed against selfish tendencies the greater will also be the element of altruism. Animals will defend their young and attack even a stronger enemy, risking even their own life; but as such action does not amount to self-sacrifice it cannot be classed as altruism. Appetites, passions, desires, even affections are found in the lower strata of life; but it is doubtful whether the conscious element has any control over such self-expressions. When, however, conscious control can check such expressions purposely for the greater benefit of another, then only the virtue of altruism is born.

Philosophically, however, we come up against a problem here, for, the Buddhist denial of an ego carries naturally, with it a denial of an alter. But the terms attahita and parahita should not be understood in the absolute sense of the welfare of a permanent ego, an eternal soul, or an individual substance in opposition to other such entities. For, it is exactly in social relationship and not in individual isolation that virtue, and especially the virtue of altruism, can bloom. In relationship there is only the interaction; and only when this interaction is misunderstood a distinction can be made between ego and alter as if in opposition. Such opposition, arising from ignorance, is the conflict which is common to all complexes (sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā). It is also in relationship that such conflict can be solved. And that is the important role of unselfishness or altruism which does not see the others as opposed to self, but which sees the common conflict in self and others, in self as the small measure of misconception, in others as the mass of ignorance to which each one contributes with lust and hate, and always in delusion.

Name of the 21st. of the 33 forms of Avalokiteśvara, as venerated in Japan. The cult was introduced from China in the 9th century by Shūei. With three eyes and four arms, mounted on a white lion which looks up from below her left knee, the goddess wears a hairdress of white lotuses. Her two hands in front hold a lute which terminates in a phoenix. Behind these her left hand grips a dragon and her right hand an auspicious white bird. Her left foot rests on the head of the lion, while her right foot hangs down. Beautifully dressed and ornamented, her whole body radiates light and her facial expression is that of compassion.

(Phyllanthus emblica) the emblic myrobalan, one of the five fruits allowed as medicine in the rules for monastic discipline (Vin. I, p. 201), 278). It is recommended as a remedy against cold and thirst. It seems to have been used also in the composition of a hair-shampoo (Taishō, 1451, 1). The myrobalan fruit in the open palm of the hand (hastāmalaka) was used in brāhmanic schools as a symbol of obvious truth. Half such a fruit was the last gift of the dying emperor Aśoka to the Order of monks, having distributed all his wealth earlier (ibid. 2042, 2043).

Its leaves resemble those of the jujube-tree; its flowers are white and small; the fruit with the shape of a nut is sour and sweet at the same time, as the first contact is bitter, while the juice is sweet. From this is derived its Chinese name Yū-kan meaning “the rest is sweet”.

A suburb of Mandalay in the Union of Burma. It was founded in 1783 as the new capital by king Bodawpaya (1782–1819), who decided for astrological reasons to move the capital from Ava, six miles up the river. He called the new town the Immortal City (Amara-pura) and it grew rapidly with an estimated population of 170,000 in 1810, when a large part of the town was destroyed by fire. Subsequently in 1823 the royal court moved back to Ava. An earthquake in 1839 destroyed the greater part of the remainder, which was finally abandoned in 1860, when king Mindon occupied Mandalay. Some of the material from the various buildings, temples and palaces, was removed to and incorporated in the new capital.

Amarapura is known by the Burmans as Myo-haung, the old city, or as Taung-myo, the southern city, to distinguish it from Mandalay, or Myauk-myo, the northern city.

The present ruins of Amarapura show its extent of 3/4 mile square with a solid brick temple-tower at each corner which may have reached a height of 100 ft. A very large bronze statue of the Buddha is said to have been enshrined in its celebrated temple with 250 gilded wooden pillars.

The Kyauktawgyi Pagoda on the east of the Taung-tha-man lake and the Patodawgyi Pagoda are the best preserved of the numerous religious buildings at the deserted capital. The former was built in 1847 by king Pagan (1846–52) on the model of the Ānanda Temple at Pagān; and the latter by Bagyidaw in 1816.

It was in Amarapura that king Bodawpaya received bhikkhus from Laṅkā (Ceylon) on two occasions, one in 1802 and the other in 1812 (Harvey, op. cit. below, p. 277; see also the next article). The occasion was the restriction of the higher ordination (upasampadā) by the ruler of Laṅkā to members of a particular caste. Representation was made by excluded candidates to the king of Burma, requesting him to arrange for the continued succession of ordination through the Saṅgha in Burma. This succession was vouchsafed and is now known as the Amarapura Nikāya.

(G.E. Harvey, History of Burma (Longmans, Green & Co., 1925); Sangermano, A Description of the Burmese Empire, 1783–1808 (Rangoon, 1885).

“sceptic”. The word seems to indicate a confused (vikkhepa) mental state, similar to an upset eel-basket (khipa). It is used to indicate persons who, like those “sitting on the fence”, are reluctant to take sides, and whose action resembles the wriggling of an eel. “When a question is put to them they resort to equivocation, to eel-wriggling. Fearing to be wrong in an expressed opinion, they will neither declare anything to be good, nor to be bad” (D. I, p. 24). “Because of his stupidity and confusion, on being asked a question, he falls into equivocation, into eel-wriggling ... uttering: I do not say it is not, I do not deny it is not” (M. I, p. 521); DA. I, p. 115).

The first sutta of the vagga bearing the same name in the Satipaṭṭhāna Saṁyutta (S. V, p. 184). Speaking of the four methods of mindfulness–-contemplating the body, its feelings, the mind and its mental states–-the Buddha admonishes the monks to establish their thought according to any of these four methods, but at the same time he cautions them not to confuse these means with the end which is the final emancipation of Nibbāna, here called the deathless (amata): “Do ye dwell with mind well established, but let not that be to you the deathless”.

Notwithstanding this warning, we hear of the sect of the Andhakas with their sub-groups of the Pubbaseliyas, Aparaseliyas, Rājagirikas and Siddhatthikas, confusing the subjective and the objective aspects of the applications of mindfulness. They held that the objects of mindfulness (the body, its feelings, the mind and its mental states) were themselves the conscious subject (KvuA. i, § 9), confusing the objects of the exercise with the mental exercise itself.

In the course of this same point of controversy the Theravādin quotes another saying of the Buddha: They who partake of mindfulness regarding the body do indeed partake of the deathless (A. I, p. 45). According to this the deathless is shown as equivalent to, or at least as an immediate result of, the practice and development of mindfulness. Where thus the exercise or means, and the result thereof or the object, are placed together on such an equal footing, it is not surprising that certain sects became confused. The most interesting part, however, is that the Andhakas and their sub-groups also quoted the Buddha’s words in support of their view that all mental states are applications of mindfulness, which words are recorded in the very next sutta: “I shall teach you the induction and the ending of the applications of mindfulness: the body arises and ceases with the introduction and cessation of food; feelings arise and cease together with contact; the mind arises and ceases together with the individuality-concept; mental states arise and cease together with attention” (S. V, p. 184). Basing themselves on this text, they confused the origination of the body, its feelings, the mind and its mental states (i.e., the objects of the mental exercise) with the arising of mindfulness thereon (i.e., the subjective exercise itself) and concluded that all mental states are mindfulness.

The clan (gotta) to which belonged the brāhman youth named Ambaṭṭha. When, however, this youth was once asked by the Buddha (D. I, p. 91) to which clan he belonged, Ambaṭṭha replied that he came from the Kaṇhāyana-gotta. It is thought (DPPN. 153) that this Kaṇhāyana-gotta was either one of the principal sections of the Ambaṭṭha-gotta, or, perhaps, the family of its original ancestors. The members of this clan during the time of the Buddha considered themselves to be of very pure blood and high up on the social ladder of the time, looking down on the royal caste of the Sākyas as dirt from under their feet.

According to the Dasa-brāmaṇa Jātaka (No. 495: (J. IV, p. 363) the Vessas and Ambaṭṭhas were only brāhmans by name, without having a right to such appellation, because:

“Some follow trade and husbandry,
Keep flocks of goats in fold,
They give and take in matrim'ny
And daughters sell for gold”.

In its original meaning of going round (latin: ambeo) canvassing for support, has still retained that meaning, generally in a bad sense, of a strong desire for power, for superiority, for excellence. Any kind of desire is ambition in a certain way, being a will to attain, to perform or to obtain. But, usually, ambition has a connotation of seeking the advantageous rather than the right. Thus in a worldly sense, ambition is necessary for progress, for expansion, for achievement. But in the religious or spiritual field of the Buddha, where the very foundation of achievement, viz., the “I”, is denied, there all desire is to be overcome. “Not only evil (akusala), but also good (kusala) has to be abandoned”.

On the other hand, it would appear that without a will-to-do (chanda) not even a thought can be formulated, and that the peace of deliverance is something to look forward to: aspiring to Nibbāna (nibbānaṁ abhikaṅkhantaṁ: (S. I, p. 198).

It is then clear that the essential factor in ambition is not attainment but acquisition. For, attainment of a goal can be selfless, when all is done which had to be done (kataṁ karaṇīyaṁ); but acquisition is for the purpose of self-expansion. Then ambition assumes that characteristic of desire (icchā) which makes man “of odour foul, hell-doomed and shut out from Brahma’s heaven” (D. II, p. 243). Ambition is the desire to become (bhava-taṇhā). The object may be crude in a worldly sense such as wealth and honours, or more subtle in a spiritual way of striving for perfection, but it will always be a modified continuity. Only in the fullest comprehension of what actually is in the present there will be the total cessation of ambition, of desire to become, of continuity; and that is the real deliverance of Nibbāna.

A Mahāyāna sūtra about the essence of Amoghapāśa, a manifestation of Avalokiteśvara. This religious instruction is given by the Śākyamuni on the top of Mt. Potala in the residence of Avalokiteśvara who is presenting this short sūtra to 18,000 monks and a large number of bodhisattvas and devas. The moral instruction contains several mantras, said to be very efficacious, and descriptions of ceremonies during which these mantras have to be repeated. Tradition has it that this sūtra was handed down by the monk in whose residence the sūtra was preached (AMG. II, 333).

This text is extant in its Tibetan translation, entitled Don-yod-shags-paḥi sñin-po shes-bya-ba theg-pa chen-poḥi mdo, by the translators Amoghavajra and Rinchen grags (TM. 682). The text has been also translated into Chinese under the title Pu-k'ung-chüan-so-chou-hsin-ching by Bodhiruci of the T'ang dynasty (Nanjio, No. 315; Taishō, No. 1095).

A detailed description (569 folios in the Narthang edition) of the religious rites and ceremonies connected with Amoghapāśa. The description includes that of maṇḍalas and mantras, together with verses of praise. The Tibetan version (Ḥphags-pa) Don-yod-paḥi-shags-paḥi cho-ga shib-moḥi rgyal-po, has been translated by different people at different times, and finally revised by Chos grags dpal-bzaṅ-po and Rin-chen-grub (AMG. II, 335; TM. No. 686). There is also a Chinese translation in thirty fascicles in 78 chapters entitled Pu-k'ung-chüan-so-shên-pien-chên-yen-ching which would mean Amoghapāśarddhi-vikṛti-mantra-sūtra, made by Bodhiruci between the years 707–709 C.E. during the T'ang dynasty (Nanjio, No. 317; Taishō, No. 1092). The first chapter of this work has been translated independently under various titles.

(var. °paripūrāya-) a short collection of magical formulas invoking Amoghapāśa’s assistance for the accomplishment of the six transcendental virtues, with verses of adoration of several Buddhas and some mantras.

The Tibetan translation Don-yod-shags-paḥi pha-rol-tu-phyin-pa drug yoṅs-su rdsogs-par-byed-pa shes-bya-baḥi gzuṅs in three folios was made by Mañjuśrī-varma and Blo-ldan śes-rab, and was revised by Chos-kyi śes-rab (AMG. II, 330; TM. Nos. 687 and 903).

The references to a Chinese translation (Nanjio, No. 317 and Taishō, No. 1092) do not appear to be in respect of this work.

Which bring out the likeness between two things for the purpose of elucidating some point which was not so obvious in one of them are to be found in the Buddhist texts in great abundance. They are made use of mostly in the discourses or suttas, for, on such occasions, the doctrine, or some particular aspect thereof, would be presented in the conversational form of a dialogue or discussion, without assuming the more scholastic form of an analytical lecture. There is no attempt at identifying one with the other, although frequently one or more qualities, usually ascribed to one, are attached to the other in comparison, investing such qualities with further associations which may be entirely beyond the field of similitude. Thus, the analogies in the Buddhist texts are not actually metaphors, for there is no transfer ( metaphor) of significance, but there is a comparison of qualities, and similarity is noted. Such similes are then further developed in many details, comparing analogies point by point.

Point by point analogies are very common in the Aṅguttara Nikāya, where the suttas are numerically graduated, a system which facilitates itemised comparisons.

The longer analogies or similes are usually introduced by the adverb of comparison: “just as” (sey-ya-thā); whereas the single figures of likeness are attached to the simpler form “as” (yathā), or followed by the indeclinable iva.

Analogies are made use of for the purpose of clarifying some doctrinal point, and, therefore, the analogy will be drawn from well-known facts and figures of everyday life and surroundings. Hence, incidentally, they give us after 25 centuries a glimpse of the common vistas of that age in the northern districts of India, along the banks of the Ganges. There, in a tropical climate, life, cultivation and hence culture, are inseparably linked with this mighty, life-giving or death-bringing river, which, therefore, plays a very prominent part, sometimes by its own name, sometimes as the Great River (Mahā-nadī), sometimes with its tributaries (kunnadī), Yamunā, Aciravatī, etc.

“Suffusing the whole world with a mind like the river Ganges (Gaṅgāsamena cetasā; (M. I, p. 128), far-reaching, widespread, immeasurable, without malevolence”. “A creature swept by river-current toils” (nadīsu āyūhati: (S. I, p. 48). “Finding a footing high and dry he stands, he toileth not ... even so the arahant, who has attained the end of death, he toileth not” (loc. cit.). “Just as the ocean at flood-tide makes the great rivers swell, and they in turn their tributaries \dots, even so the increase of ignorance causes the swelling of karmic action”, etc. (S. II, p. 118). “I winnow away my old beliefs as in a mighty wind and wash them away as in a swiftly running stream” (mahā-vāte vā opunāmi sīgha-sotāya vā nadiyā pavāhemi: (D. II, p. 132).

The concept of coolness and refreshment is another theme which recurs constantly and which must have been so much appreciated in a country, where the glare of a blazing sun is sometimes obscured by a burning sand-storm in a scorching wind. “Delightful as a breeze of wind to one in sweat, a drink of water for one athirst”.

(vāto va sedakaṁ kanto
pānīyaṁ va pipāsino (D. II, p. 265).

The coolness of the freedom from passion’s fire is referred to so many times, that it has become a synonym of Nibbāna. Thus the arahants sing, “Cool am I now. Gone out all fire within” (sītibhūto ’smi nibbuto'ti: (Thag. vv. 79), 298.)

“Cleansed of passion for sensations,
Wait thine hour and live in holy coolness”.
(so vedayitāsu vītarāgo kālaṁ
kaṅkha idh'eva sītibhūto 'ti (Thag. v. 1015).).
“Ever in blissful cool he wends his way”.
(ajalo jalasamāno sadā carati nibbuto (Thag. v. 1015).).
“Among those that burn, he is cool and still”.
(jhāyati anupādāno ḍayhamānesu nibbuto (Thag. v. 1060).).
“Quenched, cool as a lake”.
(parinibbuto udakarahado va sīto (A. IV, p. 26)}.)).

Where the attainment of perfection gives rise to songs of freedom (vimutti) and release (vimokkha), it is natural that the imperfection of the passions is seen as a bond (bandhana) and a fetter (saṁyojana) of both mind and flesh. They are the hindrances (nīvaraṇa) to perfection, preventing right understanding with their intoxication (āsava). The progress towards perfection is along a path (magga), the Noble Eightfold Path (ariya aṭṭhaṅgika magga) which leads to the Path of Sainthood (ariya-magga) with its four attainments, each one immediately followed by its fruit (phala).

The doctrine of moral responsibility being attached to each individual’s action (kamma), the comparison of action and result (kamma, vipāka) with the seed and its fruit (bīja, phala), good as well as evil, is frequently met with and worked out in detail (e.g., (A. IV, p. 237).

The simile of the seed (bīja) is applied to consciousness (viññāṇa) in which connection action (kamma) is compared to the field (khetta) and craving (taṇhā) to the moisture (sineha), which assists in the maturation of the seed (A. I. 223).

The company of noble disciples (sāvakasaṅgha) in a stereotyped formula is called a field of merit (puññakkhetto), for the good deeds, such as offerings made to them by the laity, are like seeds sown in this field, producing much merit in due course (M. I, p. 37); (S. I, p. 220); (A. I, p. 208); etc.). A field, of course, does not produce exclusively good fruits, there will be weeds such as anger and lust, indolence and worry, etc. Apart from the analogy of a field (khetta) being damaged by the weeds of hate (tiṇa-dosa: (A. IV, p. 26) and other evils, from roots (mūla) of which all evil springs, we find those wicked dispositions compared to poison (visa: (Thag. v. 758). Coming to detailed expositions of various evil states we find a rich mine of illustrative synonyms is the Dhammsaṅgaṇi. The passion of lust (lobha) or greed (rāga) is compared (Dhs. § 1050) to a quagmire (paṅka) in which one sinks deeper and deeper (osīdana: DhsA. 363); to a seamstress (sibbanī), for it sews life upon life in rebirth; to a wife (dutiyā), for “wedded to cravings, man perforce must pass from life to life” (taṇhādutiyo puriso, dīgham addhāna-saṁsāraṁ: (A. IV, p. 26); to a jungle (vana) and undergrowth (vanatha) in which it is impossible to find one’s way; to a yoke (yoga) and fetter (gantha); to a creeper (latā), which strangles the tree on which it grows; to a trap (pāsa) and fish-hook (balisa), a fowler’s net (jāla) and a dog’s leash (gaddūla).

An interesting simile is the comparison of the fourfold group of sensuality (kāmacchanda), of desire for renewed existence (bhava), of speculative opinion (diṭṭhi) and ignorance (avijjā) with intoxicants (āsava). They are thus called because of their pervasiveness, their influx and outflow with the effect of an intoxicating extract or secretion of a tree or flower, or the discharge from a festering sore (aruka) which exudes its matter more and more (bhīyosomattāya āsavaṁ deti: (A. I, p. 124). They are intoxicants, as from them arise pride and infatuation in man (mānapurisamadādayo yenāti: Subhūti, Abhidhānappadīpikāsūci. Of these intoxicants, sensuality (kāma) and the desire for existence (bhava) are spoken of as thirst (pipāsa) and fever (parīḷāha: Dhs. §§ 1097–8, p. 195); while speculation (diṭṭhi) is said to be a jungle (gahana) and a wilderness (kantāra: ibid. § 1199).

There are other mental defilements, all of them characterised in similes and analogies, some of them in a most revealing way. Thus the morbid state of mind which is torpor (middha) of the emotional feelings, passive impressions and objective mental formations, is compared with the drowsiness of sleep (soppaṁ pacalāyikā), which is like a shroud (onāha: ibid. § 1157). The hindrances (nīvaraṇa) to spiritual progress are not merely obstacles, but form an infectious contagion (parāmāsa), which perverts anything it touches (parāmaṭṭha: ibid. § 1181–3).

The analogies drawn from animal life give us first of all a glimpse of man’s contact with the animal world at that time, and secondly make us see the depth of insight, of those who used the analogies, in the subtle points of comparison, their understanding of the animal world, of the behaviour and characteristics of the animals used in similes; but they also frequently make us smile at the fine sense of humour underlying the analogy, from which man does not always emerge the better.

Among the domesticated animals referred to in analogies we find, of course, the cow, her calf and the bull, the goat and the ram, the horse and the donkey, and the ox yoked to the plough. We also meet the dog, the cat and mice, and various birds, such as the owl, the cuckoo, the vulture, the heron, the hawk, the peacock, the crow, the parrot and the swan. Then there are the jungle animals, with pride of place given to the elephant and the lion; further, the snake, the tiger, the wild boar, the jackal, the deer, the hare and the monkey. There are the spider and the fly, the bee and the fish. Even the alligator and the tortoise are not overlooked. Several of these animals have brought to the scene many associations, such as pastures, milk, butter and honey, the hunter with his bow and arrow, the knife, the bait, the fish-hook and the snare. Each and all have a lesson to teach us, and make us pause a moment to allow the deeper meaning of the Buddha’s teaching to clear itself.

The cow (go, gāvi) is not only respected but even worshipped as the Mother, in olden times and in modern India. “The brāhmans of old held the view that the cow, just as their mother, father, and other relations, was their best friend (yathā mātā ... gāvo no paramā mittā), being the giver of many good things such as health, food, strength; and out of gratitude they never slaughtered cows” (Sn. vv. 296–7). And thus the metaphorical personification for the bhikkhu is seen not only metaphysically, as the Buddha is called the Sakya bull (Sakyopuṅgava: (A. IV, p. 26), or ethically, but also quite materially. Thus, the wise man should not only find delight in the pastures of the noble ones (ariyānaṁ gocare ratā: (A. IV, p. 26), or feed his faculties on the various grasslands of the sense-objects (indriyānaṁ nānāgocarāni: (S. V, p. 218), but even the houses from which the monk begs his food are his material pasturage (gocara-gāma) and should be suitable in location to be of help to one who is intent on meditation (Vism. iv, § 37, p. 103). And during such training for greater virtue, deeper understanding and higher intuitive wisdom (adhisīla-, adhicitta-, adhipaññā-sikkhāya) a monk should be always concerned also about the manifold duties he has in respect of his fellow monks, “just as a cow with a young calf, even while she is pulling the grass, yet keeps an eye on her calf” (seyyathā pi bhikkhave gāvī taruṇavācchā thambañca ālumpati vacchakañca apavīṇati: (M. I, p. 324). The pathetic picture of the cow with a sore hide (gāvī niccammā: (S. I, p. 99) which prevents her from leaning against a wall or a tree, while even in the water or in the open she will be bitten by creatures in the water or by flies, shows the sympathetic approach. But even so, the lesson is not to be forgotten, for in suchlike manner should one regard all contact with physical or mental nutriment. When the process of nutrition of body, will and mind is well understood, there will be no attachment to sensations following such contact, and “there is nothing farther which the noble disciple has to do” (loc. cit.). One who is perfect in virtue and wisdom will be respected by all without consideration of his race, clan or origin, just as a mighty bull, swift and tame, will be singled out from the herd, whether his colour is uniform or dappled, white, black or red (A. I, p. 162). On the other hand, the life of man is like that of a doomed cow (govajjhūpama: (A. IV, p. 138) who each time she raises her foot is one step nearer to death in the slaughter-house; or like that of oxen driven round and round the threshing floor (gāmaṇḍala: (Thag. v. 1143). For, in the foolish, undiscerning man, his craving grows with his age, just as the horns of a cow grow larger year by year (gāvaṁ va siṅgino siṅgaṁ vaḍḍhati: (J. IV, p. 172). The horns of the cow are used again in another connection to illustrate man’s foolishness, “like one who wants milk and milks the horn of a cow” (visāṇato gāvaṁ dohaṁ: J. VI, p. 371). But a man as wise as prince Gopāla in search of a religious life feels like a cow gone astray in the forest: “I have seen the path by which my brothers Hatthipāla and Assapāla have gone, like the track of a lost cow; and by that same path I will go” (J. IV, p. 481).

Closely connected with the cow and the herd is, of course, the cowherd (gopāla), who, owing to his constant association with the cattle in guiding, watching and protecting them, gives such an apt ground for analogies. The cowherd who does not own the flock, but merely counts the cows of others (gopo va gāvo gaṇayaṁ paresaṁ: (A. IV, p. 26) is the type of man who can recite the scriptures, but has not made them his own, in practice.

The bull (āsabha) is valued not so much as the male companion of the cow, but rather for his own strength. Thus the Buddha is frequently described as the lordly bull among men (narāsabho sabbapajānam uttamo: (A. IV, p. 26), or when shown as a new born baby to Asita as a bull among stars, i.e., the sun (tārāsabha: (A. IV, p. 26). He speaks thus of himself as having broken his bonds with the strength as of a bull (usabhor iva chetva bandhanāni: (A. IV, p. 26). His monks, too, who had reached the perfection of arahantship by the destruction of all mental intoxicants, were likened by the Buddha to these bulls who are the leaders of the herd, guiding the herd across the stream (usabhā gopitaro gopariṇāyakā: (M. I, p. 226). And Sāriputta adopts the analogy and speaks of himself while explaining his conduct which had offended a fellow monk of little understanding: “Just as a bull with cut horns (seyyathā usabho chinnavisāṇo: (A. IV, p. 376), mild, well tamed, well trained, roaming from street to street, from cross-road to cross-road, harms nothing with its feet or horns; even as I abide with heart, large, abundant, measureless, feeling no hatred, nor ill-will”.

The sense-organs do not hold the sense-objects bound, nor do the sense-objects bind the sense-organs; for, just as two oxen yoked to the plough do not bind one another, but both are bound by the yoke-tie, so organs and objects are bound together by desire (chandarāga: (S. IV, p. 163), 282). Over and over again the ox is shown as example for capacity of work, yoked to the plough, in subjugation, without initiative, without intelligence. Thus a man who has learnt but little, grows old like an ox (balisaddo va jīrati: (A. IV, p. 26); his fleshy bulk is multiplied, but insight groweth not (Thag. v. 1025).

The horse (assa) is always referred to as the well-trained horse, the thoroughbred (ājañña) to be ridden or drawing a chariot (hayavāhin). Hence in similes only its good qualities are used analogically: restrained by modesty, as a well-trained horse avoids the whip (asso bhadro kasām iva: (A. IV, p. 26). Its amenity is shown as its main asset, and in consequence thereof its speed as a-racehorse (sīghassa: ibid. v. 29), like which the wise man advances, leaving behind the mentally slothful. The virtues of a well-trained thoroughbred steed (assājāniya), which make it an asset of a rājā are enumerated as straightness (ajjava uju-bhāva), speed, patience and docility; and these same four virtues qualify a monk to be a recipient of respect and offerings (A. II, p. 113); sometimes gentleness is added (A. III, p. 248). In the more poetical sections of the canon the thoroughbred horse is frequently compared with the mind under training and arahants, looking back on their efforts of mind-culture, recall the control and the goal achieved, “As a good rider skilled in horse-breaking tames the mettle of the thoroughbred, so will I bring thee under control by means of fivefold spiritual strength” (Vijitasena in (Thag. v. 358). Indra and Brahma pay homage to Sunīta, the arahant, “Hail unto thee, thou thoroughbred among men” (namo te purisājañña: ibid. v. 629). For “even the gods envy him whose senses are subdued like horses well tamed by the charioteer” (assā yathā sārathinā sudantā: (A. IV, p. 26). The simile of the charioteer is often used, the Buddha himself being called the supreme trainer of the human heart (anuttaro purisadamma-sārathī).

The donkey’s inherent foolishness did not escape the watchful eye of the teacher. One who joins the order of monks without striving for higher training of virtue, understanding and insight is compared to a donkey, following close behind a herd of cattle, thinking it is a cow (seyyathā gadrabho gogaṇaṁ piṭṭhito: (A. I, p. 229). Māra, the evil one, too, saw this characteristic and persuaded some brāhmans and householders to annoy the monks and vilify them, “These shavelings meditate with their shoulders drooping, with their faces cast down as if drugged, just as a donkey meditates on the edge of a refuse heap when its burden is removed” (M. I, p. 334). The fable of the donkey in a lion’s skin has found its prototype in the Theragāthā (v. 1080) where Mahā-Kassapa compares a monk who is proud on his patched robe with a monkey in a lion’s hide (kapi va sīhacammena), without profiting by his attire.

There is no suggestion in any text that the dog (sunakha) was ever treated as a pet, as man’s best friend. In Hindu society the dog is an unclean animal, although it may be kept outside the gate on a chain as a watchdog. Said Sumedhā therī, an arahant, “Let not thyself be bound by thy own sense-desires as dog is bound by chain; or else those hungry pariahs will deal with thee likewise” (Thig. v. 509). Only outcasts would eat dog’s flesh.

The eternal enmity between cat and mouse was allegorically described by the Buddha when certain monks dallied too long in the village without self-restraint, resulting in their defeat in the higher life, just as a cat which pounced violently on a mouse and swallowed it wholesale; the mouse gnawed the stomach of the cat which thereby came to great pain and death (S. II, p. 270).

Among the animals, especially those of the jungle, there is hardly one which has not been mentioned in analogy. Perhaps most used in analogies are the elephant and the lion, selected no doubt for their majestic independence and lordship over all, as well as for the fierceness of their passions when roused and uncontrolled. Thus Yasoja, the arahant, extolled the love of solitude:

In forest great and mighty wood,
Bitten by gadflies though I should,
I still will roam like elephant,
Alert, mindful and vigilant (Thag. v. 244)}.

Abhibhūta, the arahant, exhorted his relations and former retainers to shake off the armies of the king of death, as does the elephant a hut of straw (naḷāgāraṁ va kuñjaro: ibid. v. 256). And Tālapuṭa thera, looking back on his struggle for emancipation, sang, “I'll lead my mind by force of will, like a fierce elephant is controlled by a skilled mahout” (ibid. v. 1139); and, “I'll bind thee, by the power that training gives, to the object thou shouldst meditate upon, as an elephant is bound to the post by strong cords” (ibid. v. 1141). The taming of the elephant by means of rope and post and hook is a commonly accepted allegory for the control of thought and mind. “Even as one who firmly wields the hook makes the untamed elephant turn against its will, so will I turn thee back” (ibid. v. 357); “like a fierce elephant by a skilled mahout” (gajaṁ va mattaṁ kusalaṁ kusaggaho: ibid. v. 1139). But when controlled, the elephant retains its strength and proves its usefulness in work and battle. “O when, like elephant in battle charging, shall I break through desire for joys of senses”? (ibid. v. 1105).

The elephants, however, are afraid of the lion, for, hearing the lion’s roar they break the leathern bonds with which they are tethered and run to and fro for very fear (S. III, p. 85). Thus is the lion king of beasts; and so is a Tathāgata when he gives his teaching to the world, that even devas realise their instability. The Buddha himself is frequently compared to a lion. Even his rest is in the lion’s posture “like unto lion in a rocky cave, for whom all fear and dread have passed away” (Thag. v. 367) and his teaching is likened to the lion’s roar, “,'tis thus the enlightened lift their triumph-song, like lions roaring in the hill-ravine” (ibid. v. 177). “Now pay good heed to his words, impressive as a forest lion’s roar” (ibid. v. 832). Not only is his teaching as a lion’s roar, but he also teaches with care and thoroughly (sakkaccaṁ), as a lion whether he strikes a blow at an elephant, a buffalo, a leopard, or any small creature, be it but hare or a cat (A. II, p. 121). The analogy of the lion’s roar compared to the Buddha’s teaching is carried even further, as a warning to tiny creatures wandering astray; similarly the Buddha gives his teaching not to cause destruction to those wandering astray (A. V, p. 32); (A. IV, p. 26).

Compared to the Buddha’s lion-roar the wrong views of others, who, like Sarabha, had deserted the truth, are likened to the screaming of a decrepit jackal (jarasigāla: (A. I, p. 187).

The sage seeks liberty as deer in the forest (migo araññamhi: (A. IV, p. 26), free to range where they will, on the mountain, where no crowd can come (Thag. v. 1144).

An unstable mind which changes quickly like the colour of turmeric dye (haliddā rāga) is also called a monkey-mind (kapicitta: (J. III, p. 148) for the obvious reason that a distracted mind is like a monkey skipping from branch to branch (kapīva sākhaṁ pamuñcaṁ gahāya: (A. IV, p. 26), or like an ape prowling in a little house with five windows (Thag. v. 125), referring to the mind and the five sense-doors. “Just as a monkey, faring through the woods, catches hold of a bough, letting it go catches another, even so that which we call thought, mind, consciousness, that arises as one thing, ceases as another, both by day and by night” (S. II, p. 95): The monkey also symbolises folly and greed, for it is those vices which make him handle with one paw first the pitch of a pitch-trap; then in order to free that paw he sticks in a second, then a third and fourth paw and finally his muzzle, till he is completely stuck fast. Thus a monk, who does not control his five physical senses and who does not abide in mindfulness (S. V, p. 148), falls into Māra’s trap.

By their heedless ways men are caught like fish in the openings of a funnel-net (macchāva kumināmukhe: (Ud. p. 76), or like fish in shallow water (maccheva appodake khīṇasote: (A. IV, p. 26). The flesh-baited hook (āmisagata balisa: (S. II, p. 226) is an obvious simile for favour, flattery and gain. But the net or snare (jāla) seems to be reserved to illustrate the trap of wrong views in which speculators get caught. Thus 62 wrong views are caught in Brahma’s net (Brahmajāla Sutta: (D. I, pp. 12–46)). Other snares are mentioned, such as death (maccupāsa: (Thag. v. 463), and the repeated round of existence which is as a flood (oghapāsa: ibid. v. 680) by which people are trapped in the snares of lust (rāgapāsa: (S. I, p. 124). The fierce and venomous snake (āgataviso ca ghōrāviso ca āsīviso: (A. II, p. 110) is likened to a person who is quick to anger and whose anger lasts long. But more than that: life itself with its clinging tendencies is compared with a deadly poisonous snake. No man with knowledge thereof will proffer his whole hand or even one finger to such a snake; likewise one should be freed by the destruction of clinging (M. II, p. 261); for bitter as a serpent’s poison are the desires of sense (kāmā kaṭukā āsīvisūpamā: (Thig. v. 451). Hence a monk should abandon the higher as well as the lower worlds, as snakes their outworn sloughs (urago jiṇṇam iva tacaṁ purāṇaṁ: (A. IV, p. 26–17).

The wolf (vaka) is mentioned only in poetry. Brāhmans and ascetics, parading “like wolves disguised as sheep” (urabbharūpena vak'āsu pubbe: (J. V, p. 241), are shown up as exploiting the credulous by the old trick of pretence of saintliness. It is interesting to note the counterpart of this analogy in the Christian Gospel, “wolves in sheep-clothing” (Matthew, vii, 15).

From animals to insects. “Even as a bee gathers honey from a flower (Dhp. v. 49) and leaves it without injuring it, nor taking its colour or scent, let thus the wise man pass through the village on his alms-round”. Man is slave to his passion as a spider clings to its web (Dhp. v. 347). Just as flies enjoy themselves in a food-basket wherever that may be carried, without a thought of worry about the future, thus devatās enjoy themselves in the heavens without giving a thought to the impermanence of their state (M. III, p. 148).

The kingdom of the birds has given its share in illustrating conditions of social life among humans. It is among the birds in general that we find analogies with thoughts on wing, “Bring not thine evil thoughts to me, as bird that flies bewildered into flame” (Thag. v. 1156), “As flight of bird in air, 'tis hard to track his trail” (ibid. v. 92). The Indian cuckoo (karavīka), famed for its sweet note, provided the comparison for the voice of the Buddha (M. II, p. 137), of Mahā-Brahma (MA. III, p. 382) and of the boy Vipassī, son of Bandhuman, the rājā, who later became a Buddha (D. II, p. 20). It is one of the 32 signs of a superman (mahāpurisalakkhaṇa). The defenceless widow is likened to an owl pecked by crows (J. VI, p. 508). But life is easy for one who is shameless and bold like a crow (sujīvaṁ ahirikena kākasūrena: (A. IV, p. 26). The feelings of Māra after one of his abortive attacks on the Buddha are described as those of a crow that pecked at what proved to be a rock, though it looked like fat (S. I, p. 124). Worked out in detail in the Soṇaka Jātaka is the simile of the crow which saw a carcass floating down the river. On this goodly store of food he is heedlessly swept to the peril of the sea, only realising his plight when his food-supply is exhausted far out, with no land in sight. Thus is the doom of those who greedily pursue the pleasures of sense (J. V, p. 255). The swan (haṁsa), on the other hand, is found in analogies only to express noble sentiments and characteristics. The swan-song, however, is not connected with the dying animal’s last song, but with the sweet, melodious strains of the Buddha’s voice (Sn. v. 350), rich and well-modulated (Thag. v. 1270). The swan, gracefully rising from the surface of a lake, flying into the path of the sun, has given ground for analogies for wise men who are not attached to house and home (Dhp. vv. 91)} and 175). Even the peacock with all its fine plumage cannot match the swan in flight, neither can a layman emulate a monk with his mind soaring in meditation (A. IV, p. 26).

Birds in general give rise to comparison with the spirit of detachment, so characteristic of the monk. “Just as a bird with its wings carries them wherever it flies, so the monk is satisfied with sufficiency of robes and food” (D. I, p. 71); “just-as a sand-flecked bird throws off the dust by shaking itself, so the good monk shakes off all worldly dust in heedfulness” (S. I, p. 197). Incidentally, the craft of augury from sounds made by birds (sakuṇa-vijjā) was considered a low art by the Buddha (D. i, p. 9).

The surrounding nature provided many objects of comparison, such as the fields with paddy and barley; the trees in the farmlands and in the jungle, such as the palmyra-palm, the sāla-tree, the banyan, bamboo-groves, flowers and creepers, fruits and seeds, grass and thorns.

With rice as staple-food, the paddy fields would have been encountered everywhere, and the constantly repeated stages of ploughing, sowing, planting, ripening and harvesting would have been the most obvious illustrations of life itself. Thus, action is the field, consciousness the seed and craving the moisture which makes the seed germinate and produce fruit (kammaṁ khettaṁ viññāṇaṁ bījaṁ taṇhā sineho); thus, in the future there is repeated rebirth (evaṁ punabbhavābhinibbatti hoti: (A. I, p. 223). But, when a field is undulating, rocky, stony, saline, without depth for ploughing, with stagnant water or too high for water, too far from a watercourse and not protected by a bund, such a field is not considered a flourishing plot; similarly those who have wrong views and wrong intentions, who do wrong in word and deed; who earn a living by wrongful means or with misdirected effort, who apply wrong mindfulness and concentration (i.e., the opposite of the Noble Eightfold Path), they do not constitute a fruitful field, in which the gifts of the pious will not grow to perfection (A. IV, p. 237). But the truly noble disciples form a field of unsurpassed merit (M. I, p. 37). For, just as weeds are the bane of fields, so are lust, hate and folly the banes of mankind, hence, let gifts be made to those free from those banes (A. IV, p. 26).

While the fields provided the analogy for the repeated round of rebirth, it was the palmyra-palm which gave the apt illustration for the escape therefrom; for, just as a palmyra-palm whose crown is cut off (M. I, p. 250) cannot come to further growth, so is the perfect one in whom all cankers and defilements connected with rebirth are destroyed. The banyan-tree, on the other hand, which with its aerial roots and spreading branches seems to have no limitations to its growth and existence, is at times shown as a haven of rest at the cross-roads, to which is compared the religious man who can provide solace to all (A. III, p. 42); and at other times as the symbol of craving.

“Like banyan saplings, these are inward growths by ‘Self’ begotten, craving’s progeny, which spread abroad a tangled growth of lusts, like creepers rank that overgrow the woods” (A. IV, p. 26)}, trsl. Chalmers.).

The jungle (vana), with its other meaning of lust (taṇhāvana), becomes naturally a typifying picture of entanglement of thickets and creepers. “Having cut down the forest of lust, you can obtain deliverance” (Dhp. v. 283). This deliverance of Nibbāna is the absence of all desire (nir-vāṇa). The creeper itself is, of course, frequently used for attachment and entanglement (Dhp. v. 334), the craving of a thoughtless man. On the other hand, the lotus, born in the water, though sprouting from the muddy soil yet does not allow even a drop of water to cling to its petals (Sn. v. 71), becomes the perfect example of a life of detachment. But again, “whatever object in the world is dear and delightful is called a thorn in the noble discipline” (S. IV, p. 189). Nanda, having won release of heart in the attainment of arahantship, was spoken of by the Buddha as “having crushed down the thorn of lust” (Ud. 24). But thorns have still another lesson, for, one should move through the world

“as one who shoeless walks in thorny brake calling up heedfulness at every step” (Thag. v. 946).

Analogies from plant life are indeed as varied as the plants themselves, and seem to occur more frequently in works of a poetical character, such as the Suttanipāta. “Be straight and unattached as the bamboo-shoot” (Sn. v. 38). “Give up the worldly life as a tree sheds its leaves” (ibid. 64), “Like ripened fruits which threaten soon to drop, the constant threat of death dogs man from birth” (ibid. 576). “In whom sense-pleasure finds no resting place, as mustard seed rests not on needle-point” (ibid. 625).

Nature-study served the monks and nuns with object-lessons which led them to the final victory of perfection:

As trees and shrubs refreshed by rain
Bud forth and fragrance spread,
So I, enjoying lonely gain,
Should virtue show instead (Thag. 110).

As plant uprooted still lives a while,
So I continue in this life vile.
Of earthly rebirth the wheel I broke
When understanding in me awoke (Thag. 90).

Similar poetical utterances are found in the Thera- and Theri-gāthā, in which those who had attained the supreme deliverance through insight attempted to express their experience in verse. They are filled with analogies comparing their victory, their achievement, their earlier difficulties in most original ways, sometimes picturesque and realistic, or at other times conveying a general impression. The beautiful Subha (Thig. vv. 338–65), the daughter of a goldsmith, had realised the danger of life in the world and in twenty-four verses she convinces her relatives of the superiority of a life of renunciation, using many analogies, several of which occur in discourses ascribed to the Buddha (A. IV, p. 128); (S. V, p. 112); M. I, p. 130). Thus worldly lusts are described as foes and murderers, as a blazing fire, a thorny bush, a gaping pit of infatuation. And Sumedhā, in her effort to obtain her parents permission to renounce the world while they were making arrangements for her wedding, compared sense-desires with the bitter poison of a snake (Thig. v. 451).

“Like a beautiful flower, full of colour, but without scent, are the fine but fruitless words of him who does not act accordingly” (Dhp. v. 51). “As on a heap of rubbish cast along the highway the lotus will grow full of sweet perfume and delight, thus among those who are as rubbish, the true disciple of the Buddha shines forth by his knowledge among the blinded worldlings” (ibid. vv. 58–9). “As a Blade of kusa-grass, if wrongly handled, will cut the hand, so asceticism wrongly practised leads to downfall” (ibid. v. 311), “The scent of flowers does not travel against the wind, but the perfume of good people pervades every place” (ibid. v. 54).

Among the analogies which are worked out in greater detail the simile of the pith in the Mahā-sāropama Sutta and the Cūḷa-sāropama Sutta (M. I, p. 192–205)) may be mentioned: like a man going about in search of pith, looking for the pith of a tall, stable and pithy tree, but is content with cutting down a few branches and leaves, or some young shoots, or with peeling off the bark or with cutting away some soft wood, mistaking those for the pith he needs, thereby showing that he does not know the good he searches for–-so a person who leads a life of renunciation in search of deliverance, but is content with receiving alms and respect, or with the acquisition of virtue and moral habits, or with the attainment of mental composure and one-pointedness of mind, or with the development of knowledge and vision even–-such a person will become remiss and lax, notwithstanding his successes. Only he who does not remain satisfied, does not exalt himself and does not look down on others, but who develops a desire and strives for transcending even the various stages of mental absorption in material and immaterial spheres, till he has destroyed all mental intoxicants (āsava) through intuitive wisdom–-only he may be said to have obtained what he had set out for, taking with him the pith, knowing it to be the pith, which is the culmination of the holy life, the unshakable freedom of mind.

The same simile, but much abbreviated, was used by Mahā-Kaccāna in the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta (M. I, p. 111), and again by him in the Mahā-Kaccānabhaddekaratta Sutta (M. III, p. 194–5), where he employs the analogy, comparing the monks, who came to him for explanation of a discourse by the Buddha (Bhaddekeratta Sutta: (M. III, p. 187–9) instead of asking the Teacher himself, with people looking for the pith of a tree in its foliage, etc. Using the same simile, Ānanda also rebukes fellow-monks for by-passing the Master while being with him face to face, and coming to Ānanda for explanation, searching for sound timber among the leafy branches (Adhamma Sutta: A. V, p. 226).

The supreme attainment of deliverance of heart and mind (ceto-vimutti) which can only be adequately described in negative achievement, such as the cessation of becoming (bhava-nirodha) and final extinction (nibbāna), is, of course, a first class subject for analogous comparisons. Thus the Buddha himself explained this state to Upasīva (Sn. v. 1074), “As a flame blown about by the strength of the wind goes out and henceforth cannot be considered as existent, so the sage, once freed from mind and body, disappears and cannot be considered as existing”. And to Kappa he spoke of Nibbāna as an island citadel where “the old has passed away and nothing fresh can lodgement find; no more come death and eld” (A. IV, p. 26); trsl. Chalmers).

A most telling simile is given by the Buddha in the Alagaddūpama Sutta (M. I, p. 135) where he compares his teaching with a raft (kulla), useful for the purpose of crossing the stream of saṁsāra, but which has to be discarded once the crossing has been effected, lest it become a burden and an obstacle. This sutta itself is called the snake-simile (alagadda-upama) or the parable of the water-snake: a person holding a wrong view is like a man laying hold of a water-snake by its tail; the water-snake may coil back on him and bite his hand. In the same sutta the various stumbling blocks (antarāyikā dhammā), which are the sense-pleasures, are likened unto a skeleton, a lump of meat, a torch of dry grass, a pit of glowing embers, a dream, something borrowed, a slaughter-house, an impaling stake, a snake’s head.

The noble disciples, who had learned from the Buddha “to see things as they are”, were not ascetics who had left home and comfort and refused to look at things. It is because of their looking at things in their true perspective that they were free from attachment ... For them, too, the world of events was full of object-lessons, and many an arahant was indebted for his attainment to little incidents of daily life, such as rain-water dripping from the roof in a pool, thereby causing an empty bubble to arise and burst. “Even as a bubble, so does this personality of ours rise and burst” (DhpA. xiii, 3). According to the Dhammapada (v. 170), “as a bubble, as a mirage, so should one view the world”. Then there was the arahant Sāmidatta, who spoke of the balance of his life-span after his attainment of supreme insight:

As plant uprooted still lives a while
So I continue in this life vile.
Of earthly rebirth the wheel I broke,
When understanding in me awoke (Thag. v. 90).

Even Kaṇhamitta–-nick-named Valliya, the creep-er, because he was like ivy and such plants that cannot grow without leaning on something; for, he, too, could not get on without leaning on someone who was wise–-even he became heedful, intelligent and ripe in insight after he put forth right exertion, saying:

As Gaṅgā moves on silently and steady
And loses self in the ocean great,
So do I strive in solitude and quiet
To free the mind from folly, lust and hate (Thag. v. 168).

With their innate intuitive faculties the female disciples of the Buddha did not lag behind. Thus Paṭācārā, the nun, relates in her verses (Thig. vv. 115–16), trsl. by Mrs. Rhys Davids) how she attained deliverance of her mind:

“Then going to my cell, I take my lamp,
And seated on my couch I watch the flame.\
Grasping the pin, I pull the wick right down
Into the oil ...
Lo! the Nibbāna of the little lamp.
Emancipation dawns! My-heart is free”!

Salt, being such an essential condiment in constant use, has quite obviously been employed analogously in various ways. Mahā-Moggallāna compared himself with Sāriputta as a little pinch of salt alongside of a big jar of salt (S. II, p. 276). The efficacy of action is also compared with salt by the Buddha: a few grains of salt in a cup of water make it undrinkable, but if the same amount of salt is thrown in the river Ganges, it would not make any difference; likewise a trifling evil deed committed by a person uncultured in action, in virtue, in mind and in insight, will lead him to hell, whereas a similar trifling evil deed, committed by a person highly developed in virtue and insight, may be experienced in this very life, i.e., outlived by him, and not much of a remnant can be seen (A. I, p. 249–50). And then there is, of course, that most solemn utterance of the Buddha, “Just as the ocean has but one taste, the taste of salt; even so this discipline of Dhamma has but one flavour, the flavour of deliverance” (seyyathā pi Pahārāda mahāsamuddo ekaraso loṇaraso, evam eva kho Pahārāda ayaṁ dhammavinayo ekaraso vimuttiraso: (A. IV, p. 203). Special reference must also be made to that beautiful dialogue between the Buddha and Dhaniya, the herdsman (A. IV, p. 26–34)). Dhaniya is rich and feels secure in his wealth, in his social status, in his family life; and he tells the Buddha that he has no fear, come what may. He even challenges the rain-god (pavassa deva). But for each little boast of his the Buddha has a retort, sometimes with a play of words, or with terms finely used in opposition, while at the same time the higher meaning of the Buddha’s words is evident. “My rice is cooked” (pakkodano), says Dhaniya, and the Buddha replies. “In me there is no ill-feeling” (akkodhano). Dhaniya has built his farmstead on the banks of the river (anutīre Mahiyā samānavāso); but the Buddha is not bound by home-life, and stays on the banks of the river but for one night (anutīre Mahiy'ekarattivāso). The fire in Dhaniya’s hearth is lit (āhito gini); the fire in the Buddha’s heart is quenched (nibutto gini). “I have a docile steady wife” (gopī mama assavā alolā); “I have a mind, docile and free” (cittaṁ mama assavaṁ vimuttaṁ) “I have never heard an evil rumour about my wife” (tassā na suṇāmi kiñci pāpaṁ). “In me no evil can be found” (pāpam pana me na vijjati). “For my living I work only for myself” (atta-vetanabhato 'ham asmi), says Dhaniya. “I do not earn a living in any sense, neither do I need a wage”, replies the Buddha. Dhaniya’s cows and calves are well tied with new ropes, he says; but the Buddha claims to have broken all bonds. And thus Dhaniya repeatedly challenges the rain-god, “Pour down, O rain-god, if you wish” (atha ce patthayasī, pavassa deva), for he feels safe in his stronghold; but the Buddha knows no fear, for he has crossed the flood. Then the storm breaks the bund of the river flooding the farmland, destroying Dhaniya’s home and stables, showing him the unreliability of worldly goods. And with his wife he takes his refuge in the Buddha, who concludes,

“No woe assaileth him whose base is naught”.

It is appropriate to conclude this article with the oft repeated closure of several suttas (e.g., the Aggi-Vacchagotta Sutta: (M. I, p. 488–9); Madhura Sutta: (M. II, p. 90). “It is excellent, Master Gotama; it is as if one has set upright what had been lying down or has disclosed what had been hidden, or has shown the way to one who had gone astray, or has brought an oil-lamp into the darkness to enable those with eyes to see things for themselves–-thus in many various ways (anekapariyāyena) has the doctrine been declared by the Master”.

Name of four of the five hundred paccekabuddhas who were in ancient times living on the Isigili mountain in seclusion. They were seen by the people of that time entering the mountain range, but were never seen thereafter. Hence the people used to say that the mountain had swallowed up the sages (isī gilatī ti) and named it Isigili. The names of 101 of these paccekabuddhas are given by the Buddha in the Isigili Sutta (M. III, p. 69) f).

Buddhaghosa in his commentary (MA. II, p. 889) relates how these sages had made their dwellings inside the mountain behind a rock which would open and close like a folding door.

A prominent author of esoteric Buddhism in the beginning of the eighth century C.E. A son of king Gopāla in eastern India, he became a disciple of Padmavajra who introduced the Hevajratantra into Buddhism. To this, Anaṅgavajra (known in Tibet as Yan-lag med-paḥi rdo-rje) composed several works, of which two sādhanas are included in the tantra section of the Tibetan Tengyur under the titles Dpal dgyes-pa rdo-rjeḥi sgrub-thabs (translated by Vajrapāṇi and Rma-ban chos-ḥbar: TM. No. 1249) and Dgyes-paḥi rdo-rjeḥi sgrub-paḥi thabs (translated by Kun-tu bzaṅ-po and Tshul-khrims rgyal-ba: TM. No. 1264).

His most famous composition is the Prajñopāyaviniścayasiddhi, a work characterised by its boldness of spirit, its lucidity of teaching and brevity of expression (B. Bhattacarya, An Introduction to Buddhist Esotericism, 1932, p. 74). This work has now been published as one of the Two Vajrayāna Works (GOS. XLIV). This work, too, has been included in the tantra section of the Tibetan Tengyur under the title Thabs daṅ śes-rab rnam-par-gtan-la-dbab-pa sgrub-pa, translated by Śantabhadra and Ḥgos Lhas btsas (TM. No. 2218; Cordier, II, p. 211).

A suggestion is made by J. Filliozat (L'Inde classique, II, p. 508, following Grünwedel and Shahidullah) to identify him with Gorakṣanātha, the preceptor of Padmasambhava, as Anaṅgavajra was the preceptor of Padmavajra Saroruha, who may have been the same as Padmasambhava.

A Sanskrit text which, according to Nanjio, could be the original text from which a variety of Chinese translations have sprung (Nos. 353–60 and 956). It is a work based on a magic formula (mantra or dhāraṇī) for the acquisition of supernatural power. The Śākyamuni instructs his disciple Śāriputra at his request (AMG. II, p. 250).

There is a Tibetan translation, entitled Sgo-mthaḥ-yas-pas bsgrub-paḥi gzuṅs, in the Mdo (sūtra) section of the Kangyur, comprising six folios (See Catalogue of Tibetan Manuscripts from Tun-huang, published by the Commonwealth Relations Office, 1962, p. 101.) According to TM. there are three Tibetan translations, one in the Mdo (sūtra) section (No. 140), one in the Rgyud-ḥbum (100,000 tantra) section (No. 525) and one in the Gzuṅs-ḥdus (dhāraṇī) section (No. 914) of the Tibetan Kangyur. The last mentioned translation stands in the names of Prajñāvarma and Ye-śes sde.

Without interval, immediately following, synonymous with niyata, fixed as to its consequences. In the case of an ānantariya (or ānantarika) kamma, it is impossible for any other conduct to set aside the effect thereof which will be experienced immediately after the cessation of the present life.

The third section of the Mahāvagga of the Paṭisambhidāmagga (Ps. I, pp. 162–96)).

As regards the culture of concentration based on mindfulness of breathing (ānāpānasati-samādhi) this section speaks of 200 kinds of knowledge (although 220 are enumerated): knowledge in respect of eight kinds of obstacle (paripantha) to concentration and eight kinds of help (upakāra) to overcome them; eighteen types of defilement (upakkilesa) and thirteen purifications (vodāna); thirty-two ways of cultivating mindfulness (satokārin), twenty-four through concentration (samādhi), seventy-two with insight (vipassanā); eight types of knowledge based on disgust with a worldly life (nibbidā), eight on realisation of such disgust (nibhidānuloma), eight on the calming of the mind as a result of such disgust (nibhidāya-paṭipasaddhi) and twenty-one on the well-being of deliverance (vimutti-sukha). But apart from enumerations and some etymological explanations, the text does not enter into any detailed exposition.

The 54th saṁyutta of the Saṁyutta Nikāya (S. V, pp. 341–41)). It is the tenth book of the Mahāvagga and comprises two chapters of ten suttas each. Every one of these twenty suttas deals with some aspect of, relation with, or result from, the culture of mindfulness of breathing. It is for this reason that they are all grouped together in this book, although there is unavoidably much overlapping of material and even repetition; for, the suttas were spoken on different occasions, either to individuals (e.g., Ānanda, Mahānāma, Mahā-Kappina) or to the monks in general assembly, at Sāvatthī, Vesālī, Kimbilā, Icchānaṅgala or among the Sakyans at Kapilavatthu.

Mindfulness of breathing, is one aspect of contemplation of the body (kāyānupassanā) which is the first of the four applications of mindfulness (cattāro satipaṭṭhānā). These applications or methods of mindfulness are explained in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (M. I, p. 55–63)) and are considered to be so important that the Buddha speaks of them there as the one way (ekāyana-magga) which leads to the purification of beings and the solution of all problems; it is the approach to the knowledge of the Noble Eightfold Path (MA. I, p. 236) and effects the realisation of deliverance (nibbānassa sacchikiriyā).

The first of these four applications of mindfulness has as object the body either within oneself (ajjhattaṁ vā) or externally (bahiddha vā). Thus, while contemplating the body from within, one becomes aware of one’s breathing. One is aware of breathing in, and aware of breathing out. With intensified attention one becomes aware of the slight nuances of breathing: when breathing in (and likewise exhaling), becomes longer or deeper, shorter or more subtle, it is noticed as such.

Here lies the essential difference between the Buddhist method of mindfulness of breathing and the Yogic breathing exercises–-“It is an exercise in mindfulness, and not a ‘breathing exercise’ like the prāṇāyāma of Hinduistic Yoga. In the case of the Buddhist practice, there is no ‘retention’ of breath or any other interference with it. There is just a quiet ‘bare observation’ of its natural flow, with a firm and steady, but easy and ‘buoyant’ attention, i.e., without strain or rigidity. The length or shortness of breathing is noticed, but not deliberately regulated” (Nyāṇaponika thera, The Heart of Buddhist Meditation, p. 61).

There is nothing in mindfulness of breathing to remind one of time-relation in the process of breathing as prescribed in certain occult schools, where the ratio for the beginner between the in-take, retention and exhalation is 1:4:2. On the contrary, it is in bare attention (sati), in watchfulness, in awareness, without the introduction of any type of regulation that lies the greatest value of this application of mindfulness. For, in this passive watchfulness without anticipation or exertion, without intention or eagerness of reaching a set purpose, “a calming, equalizing and deepening of the breath will result quite naturally; and the tranquillization and deepening of the breath rhythm will lead to a tranquillization and deepening of the entire life rhythm” (ibid. p. 61).

The Buddha himself recommended this application of mindfulness of breathing as follows: If cultivated and developed it is peaceful, excellent and unique, a delightful way of living. It conquers all evil and unwholesome mental states that have arisen in the mind and makes them vanish in a moment, as a shower of rain lays down all dust (S. V, p. 321).

That it is not easy to remain alert and mindful of such a subtle object as breathing in the midst of the turmoil of daily life, is shown by the Buddha’s advice of retiring to the forest, the foot of a tree or a lonely spot, i.e., any place favourable to the development of concentration. For, although mindfulness (sati) is not a meditation and concentration exercise, no purpose would be served by unpreparedness or indifference, still less by inviting distraction and disturbance.

A seated position is recommended as this is the most restful posture of the body, without tending to idleness as a reclining position would, without causing fatigue as a standing posture, without giving rise to agitation as walking might (Vism. viii, § 159, p. 223). The sitting position is further described as consisting of folding the legs crosswise (pallaṅkaṁ ābhujitvā), i.e., with the thighs fully locked (samantato ūrubaddhāsanaṁ). This posture gives firmness to the body and allows ease of breathing, for, with the body thus erect, the joints of the spinal column resting end to end (piṭṭhikaṇṭake koṭiya koṭiṁ) and the sinews and nerve-cords uncoiled (maṁsa-nahārūni na paṇamanti: ibid. § 160), no feeling of discomfort will arise and the thought-process becomes one-pointed and single-minded. The posture of sitting, therefore, is not in-itself a meditation exercise.

This quiet attitude becomes the essential approach if concentration of breathing is considered and developed as a subject for tranquillity meditation (samatha-bhāvanā) which induces the various stages of mental absorption (jhāna). But even apart from such mental culture (bhāvanā) mindfulness of breathing may have many beneficial results in the midst of ordinary life.

Mindfulness of breathing, however, is more than just tranquillisation of emotions; it is a quieting down of all bodily activities (passambhayaṁ kāyasaṅkhāraṁ: (M. I, p. 56), which is the entrance to the states of mental absorption (jhāna). Or, if one chooses, this mindfulness may lead on to the path of insight, seeing the body as a process of origination and dissolution (samudaya-vaya), realising that there is just the body, passing on without grasping. It is in such realisation of no-self (anatta) that deliverance is attained through mindfulness of breathing.

The method of development is explained in five stages: learning the meditation subject (kammaṭṭhāna), questioning about the same, establishing the subject, absorption therein and ascertaining the individual characteristic of such meditation subjects.

As regards a single process of concentration on breathing we find in the Visuddhimagga (viii, § 189–93, pp. 229 f.) the following details for beginners. The counting of breaths is advised as a device to settle mindfulness and to cut off the external distraction of reasoning. One should count the breaths one by one at the completion of each breath, not making a series less than five or more than ten. Counting up to less than five necessitates a too frequent repetition of the beginning of the series, and that would not allow the settling of mindfulness; counting in series of more than ten might result in attention being diverted to numbers rather than to breaths. A breath is considered completed when the outgoing air strikes the nostrils. This counting, however, has no connection with the tempo of breathing and it is not intended to regulate the inhalation and exhalation. It is merely a help to unify the mind and keep it in the same direction, “just as a boat is steadied with the help of a rudder” (arittupatthambhanavasena caṇḍasote nāvāṭṭhapanaṁ iva), which itself does not contribute to progress and speed. It must not be forgotten, however, that counting is a mere device to settle the mind and, therefore, as soon as the distractions of reasoning have ceased and mindfulness is settling itself, the counting should be dispensed with.

The next advice is that concerning the connection and the uninterrupted following of the process of breathing with mindfulness, after the counting has been given up. This connection (anubandhanā: Vism. § 196, p. 231) is established by not following each individual breath from its beginning through its passage till its end. For, such following up would lead to external distraction and perturbance of both body and mind (Ps. i, 165). The attention given to breathing is at the point of contact, whereby each breath as it were is fixed in mindfulness (phusanāvasena ca thapanāvasena ca manasikātabbaṁ: Vism. viii, § 197, p. 231), just as a sawyer of wood pays attention to the point where the teeth of his saw cut into the wood, without giving attention to those teeth when they approach or recede.

Once such contact of mindfulness is established, it is sometimes not long before the sign (nimitta) arises. It is the acquired sign (uggaha-nimitta), a mental image which appears as if seen with the eye and which varies with the different subjects of meditation. From this stage on, attention should be fixed on this image; and it is this fixation (ṭhapana) which marks the entrance of the mental process into absorption (ibid. § 204, p. 233). But, whereas in other meditation-subjects the mental image becomes clearer in the course of progress, here in the application of mindfulness on breathing the subject becomes more and more subtle and might even cease to manifest itself. This should not become a source of alarm, and the meditator should, without changing his position, merely temporarily shift his attention from the breaths to the place of contact at the nostrils, as the place where they were last noticed, till they become perceptible again.

The sign (nimitta) or mental image in this particular type of meditation has naturally no direct resemblance to the material object. And thus the mental image rather conveys the impression created. In some it produces the impression of a light touch of cotton or silk or a gentle breeze. In others, it creates the impression of a star, or a cluster of pearls; or again of a wreath of flowers, a puff of smoke, a film of cloud, etc. They all are poetic attempts to translate a mental impression of gentle peacefulness according to individual perception. Hence this sign is called the counter-image or the mental reflex (paṭibhāga-nimitta). As soon as this image arises, the stage of “neighbourhood concentration” (upacāra-samādhi) is reached which is the access to the stages of mental absorption (jhāna). It is at this point that a decision has to be made either to proceed towards absorption of mind which is meditation of tranquillity (samatha-bhāvanā) or to turn towards meditation of insight (vipassanā-bhāvanā) into the real nature of all phenomena, which alone can lead to complete deliverance.

With the appearance of the mental reflex the hindrances towards perfection are arrested and the mental defilements suppressed, but only for so long as mindfulness remains established and the thought-process remains composed (ibid. § 220, p. 236). The hindrances (nīvaraṇa) and the defilements (kilesa) can be completely overcome and removed only through insight into the nature of all materiality (which includes breathing) and mentality, as being impermanent, the cause of conflict and without abiding entity. Only in the realisation of these three characteristics (anicca-, dukkha-, anatta-lakkhaṇa) can the path of sainthood be entered and completed.

Of the four applications of mindfulness which include mindfulness on breathing the Buddha said that whoever should develop these for seven days, for him may be expected one of two points, either insight-knowledge (aññā) in this life itself, or the state of non-return to this existence (anāgāmitā: (M. I, p. 63).

It is, moreover, the one kind of concentration, the culture of which brings all four methods of mindfulness to completion. And as these four in their turn bring the seven factors of enlightenment to perfection, leading to comprehensive insight and deliverance (S. V, p. 329}, ff.), it is, therefore, rightly that the Buddha spoke of this method of mindfulness of breathing as the ariyan way of life, the divine way of life (brahma-vihāra), the Tathāgata’s way of life, for he himself generally spent the three months of the rainy season in the intent concentration on in-breathing and out-breathing (Icchānaṅgala Sutta: S. V, p. 326).

The seventh chapter in the 46th saṁyutta constituting the second book of the Mahā Vagga of the Saṁyutta Nikāya (S. V, 129–32)). The entire seventh chapter deals with the great benefits such as peace from bondage, spiritual emotion and delightful living, resulting from various methods of concentration in the culture of the seven factors of enlightenment (satta sambojjhaṅga). It is only in the concluding tenth section of this chapter that the concept of in-breathing and out-breathing (ānāpāna) is mentioned as the alternative to the preceding objects of concentration on the various stages of loathsomeness (asubha): a skeleton, a worm-eaten corpse, etc., and the four sublime virtues of good-will, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity. Yet this section has given its name to the entire vagga.

It contains the following ten suttas: (1) Aṭṭhika (2) Puḷavaka (3) Vinīlaka (4) Vicchiddaka (5) Uddhumātaka (6) Mettā (7) Karuṇā (8) Muditā (9) Upekkhā (10) Ānāpāna. The title is translated by Woodward (Kindred Sayings, V, p. 109) as “In-breathing and Out-breathing”. For each sutta see under relevant headword.

One of the five hundred paccekabuddhas who were in ancient times living on the Isigili mountain in seclusion. He was seen by the people of that time entering the mountain range, but was never seen thereafter. Hence the people used to say that the mountain had swallowed up the sage (isī gilatī ti) and named it Isigili. The names of 101 of these paccekabuddhas are given by the Buddha in the Isigili Sutta (M. III, p. 69 f.).

Buddhaghosa in his commentary (MA. I, p. 889) relates how these sages had made their dwellings inside the mountain behind a rock which would open and close like a folding door.

On the “characteristic of soullesness”, the second discourse given by the Buddha after his enlightenment to his five followers in the Deer-park at Isipatana near Bārāṇasī. There is a tradition that it took place on the full-moon day of Āsaḷhā (July–August; Sinhala: Äsala).

This discourse is considered the most important after the “foundation of the rule of righteousness” (Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta), a fact which is also borne out by its results. For, at the termination of the first sutta, though all five ascetics approved of the doctrine and became followers of the Buddha, it was only Koṇḍañña who understood sufficiently to “enter the path of holiness”.

Further explanation was needed, and at the termination of the second discourse all five disciples were freed from mental intoxicants without grasping, which indicates that all five had become arahants. The first discourse gave the doctrine in its essential outlines, such as the Four Noble Truths, the Noble Eightfold Path, the middle path between two extremes, the nature, cause and cessation of conflict, etc. The second discourse deals with the most essential detail, the key-stone of the entire structure, the doctrine of no-soul (anatta).

The “soul” which is here denied is not the individuality of actual experience, but is a denial of the theory of the permanent nature of a “soul”, of the theory of the reality of an “ego” behind the psychical phenomena and of a “substance” underlying the physical phenomena.

The argument is analytical. The so-called individual is seen as a psycho-physical compound (nāma-rūpa), and whatever there is of body or of mind is further analysed without discovering anything of a permanent nature. Physical elements change and so do feelings, perceptions, ideations and thoughts. If the body were a permanent entity it could not be subject to illness and decay; it would be able to determine its own nature. Likewise feelings or sensations (vedanā) are obviously not permanent and not independent; they have no nature of their own and hence cannot constitute a permanent entity or soul. Perceptions (saññā), which are the mental reactions to what was received in the senses, have no existence of their own and hence cannot constitute permanent entity. Ideations or mental formations (saṅkhāra), which are reproductions and reflections of such reactions, are likewise impermanent and cannot form a permanent “ego”. Thoughts of full-grown consciousness (viññāṇa) are as fleeting as the impressions which originated them, and they, too, cannot be of the nature of a permanent “soul”.

As all these phenomena are of an impermanent nature and subject to constant change, it is a painful conflict which cannot be self-determined. It is painful because of an unfulfilled desire for permanence without which there cannot be an abiding self-entity; it is a conflict because of the opposition between this desire for permanency and an impermanent nature.

The conflict is, therefore, based on the delusion of a permanent self which has no existence at all, and which cannot be discovered in this total analysis of both matter and mind. It is the discovery of the unreality of this delusory “self” (anatta) which brings about the solution of the conflict which was based on the opposition between “self” as permanent and actuality as impermanent. Thus the doctrine of soullessness, if fully comprehended and realised, leads immediately to insight of the real nature of things, which is the realisation of an arahant, the enlightenment of a Buddha. “When this exposition was uttered, the hearts of the five monks without clinging to existence were emancipated from all mental intoxicants (āsava)”.

The text of this sutta is found in the opening chapter of the Vinaya (Vin. I, pp. 13–14)) and in the Pañca Sutta of the Saṁyutta Nikāya (S. III, pp. 66) ff.). The arrangement of the argument is slightly different in the account given in the Mahāvastu (III, 335 ff.), as the support of each thesis does not immediately follow the statement of it. But there is total agreement in respect of contents and doctrine.

However, it would appear that the discourse in its Sanskrit version has been taken in two parts, the first part being restricted to the analytical doctrine that the five aggregates are not “mine”, “I” or “self”. At this stage the heart of Ājñāta Kauṇḍinya became free from mental intoxicants (āśrava), grasping no more at existence, i.e., he became an arhat, while the other four monks, Aśvaki, Bhadrika, Vāṣpa and Mahānāma, won the unimpaired and unblemished pure dharma-insight into things, together with 300 million devas, i.e., they entered the path of holiness from which there is no return, while progress and attainment are assured.

It is only after the conclusion of the second part of the discourse, linking the impermanence of the aggregates with cessation of desire for them, that the four monks attain arhatship, while Ājñāta Kauṇḍinya, who realised this state of perfection earlier, now attains mastery of the powers (bala) of wisdom (prajñā), exertion (vīrya), blamelessness (anavadya) and self-restraint (saṅgārha). Fifty million more devas gain pure insight into the nature of things (Mhvu. III, 338–9).

According to the Tibetan version in the Vinaya (Dulva, vol. iv, folios 68–9) Ājñāta Kauṇḍinya was not present on this occasion as he had become an arhat already at the conclusion of the Dharmacakra Sūtra, the first discourse. This second discourse on soullessness is incorporated in the general account of the early events after the enlightenment, but has not found a place elsewhere in the Kangyur as a separate sūtra. There is no doctrinal variation.

A Sanskrit work, a translation of which in Tibetan is found in the Rgyud-ḥbum (tantra) section of the Kangyur under the title Rgyud-kyi rgyal-po rñog-pa med-pa shes-bya-ba (TM. No. 414. See Peking Ed. Tib. Trip., ed. D.T. Suzuki, Vol. III, No. 58).

The work, begins with a salutation to Vajraḍākinī (Rdo-rje mkhaḥ-ḥgro). It is a tantric text, in 5 folios, of the first order, called “universal” “pure”. It develops the concept of the supreme Being according to different theories, gives instructions as to the manner of sitting, of meditating, of understanding the supreme intelligence (AMG. II, p. 296).

The Sanskrit work was translated into Tibetan by the Indian paṇḍit Gayadhara and the lotsava Śākya-ye-śes.

Name of a heretical sect which professed belief in a doctrine of original creation. “In the beginning there was neither sun, nor moon, there were no stars, no air, no earth, but only water. From that came forth the great egg (aṇḍa) of golden hue. When the time was ripe it broke itself in two, of which one half rose up and became the heaven, and the other half descended and became the earth. Then, between heaven and earth was born the god Brahma who is called the first of all that is” (Taishō, No. 1640). It is easy to recognise here the classical teaching of brāhmanism about the primordial egg of Brahma, the Brahmāṇḍa.

A collective name given by Buddhaghosa to four schools of early Buddhism, comprising the Pubbaseliyas, Aparaseliyas, Rājagiriyas and Siddhatthikas. In the Kathāvatthu he ascribes to them in common 72 theses, thereby making this group from a doctrinal point of view the best known one in the Sinhalese tradition. Inscriptions and the testimony of Hsüan-tsang prove that at least the first two of these schools had their residences in the delta of the Kistna, around Amarāvatī, and Nāgārjunakoṇḍa, i.e., in the east of Andhra, from where they derived their name.

Although neither the Sinhalese tradition as represented in their chronicles, nor the commentary of Buddhaghosa, precisely formulates the relationship between the Andhakas and the main schools, there are other traditions which agree with the general views attributed to the Andhakas by Buddhaghosa and which make them out to be a comparatively late development from, and a subgroup of, the Mahāsaṅghikas, with a special link with the Cetiyavādins. The fact that the presence of these later ones is shown in inscriptions in Amarāvatī, dated from the second century C.E., and there only indicates that the four Andhaka schools were most probably offsprings from the Cetiyavādins of this region. It is therefore not surprising that the greater part of the theses attributed by Buddhaghosa to the Andhakas belong equally to the mother-sect of the Cetiyavādins. A number of their tenets were upheld also by the Mahāsanghikas of the north as known to us from non-Sinhalese sources.

The theses of the Andhakas are recorded and disputed in the Kathāvatthu as follows:

Theses 21, 22, 51 and 61 deserve comparison with the Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu (cp. ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin, chap. vii, p. 15; iv, pp. 242–4 and iv, pp. 33–4).

Buddhaghosa in his commentary (MA. II, p. 889) relates how these sages had made their dwellings inside the mountain behind a rock which would open and close like a folding door.

Or hate is the repulsion felt in opposition to all selfish tendencies. In the conflict between self and non-self, which is always based on delusion (moha) as the “self” is unreal and unsubstantial, there are two tendencies at work: one of attraction which grasps at whatever may strengthen this self-delusion and which is greed (lobha); and one of repulsion which rejects whatever may weaken or attack this self-delusion, and that is anger or hate (dosa). These are the three main roots of all evil (akusala-mūla) and any unskilful or unwholesome thought (akusala citta), apart from always being rooted in delusion, is also either inspired by greed or by hate.

The fourth of the five divisions of the Pali Sutta Piṭaka. In this division the suttas are grouped in “higher” (uttara) “parts” (aṅga), that is in groups of numerical ascendency, and the English equivalents of the title are “Numerical Sayings” C.E. Jayasundere, 1925., or “Gradual Sayings” C.A.F. Rhys Davids, 1930., which are definite improvements on Max Müller’s “collection of discourses in divisions the length of which increases by one”.

This particular way of grouping is evidently intended as an additional assistance to memorising the contents. Here we find that the lengthy sermons of the Dīgha Nikāya and the Majjhima Nikāya have been broken up and the subject-matter separately dealt with in smaller groupings. The additional advantage of greater emphasis is obvious. Hence, a connected exposition of the doctrine with a logical development of a catechism is not to be expected here.

That not every saying is a direct quotation from the Buddha is proved, e.g., by the last sutta (A. III, pp. 57–62).) of the Muṇḍa Rāja Vagga of the Pañcaka-nipāta (the Book of Fives) where the rāja Muṇḍa, grieving for his beloved queen, is consoled by Nārada thera with a discourse of the Buddha, who had predeceased the prince by fifty to seventy years. For the Buddha passed away during the reign of Ajātasattu, who was succeeded by Udāyibhadra first and then by Muṇḍa Divy. 369..

It has been suggested that the suttas of this Nikāya form the real historical background of the contents of the Vinaya texts B.C. Law, Chronology of the Pali Canon, p. 33.. As said already, the grouping of the suttas is according to a numerical order with an arithmetical progression from one to eleven. Thus the Book of the Ones (Eka-nipāta) deals with a great variety of subjects, but always from one single aspect at the time, e.g., “There is no other single form by which a man’s heart is so enslaved as it is by that of a woman. A woman’s form obsesses a man’s heart” (A. I, p. 1). And again: “There is no other single sound by which a man’s heart is so enslaved us it is by the voice of a woman. A woman’s voice obsesses a man’s heart” loc. cit.. And similarly for scent, savour and touch. It is by counting such suttas as five separate units that the computation in Buddhist books Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, London, 1886, p. 23; Atthasālinī, p. 25, Introd. Discourse. brings the total of sayings in this Aṅguttara Nikāya to 9557. Making allowance for this method the number of suttas has been calculated at 2344 by Edmund Hardy A. V, p. vi..

Although the majority of suttas are short, some very short indeed, others are of considerable length. But throughout, the doctrine has been set out in classes of carefully systematised groups.

The eleven books (nipāta) of the Aṅguttara Nikāya are divided in turn into groups of suttas, called vagga or chapter, according to some similarity of subject or of treatment. Thus we have a chapter on the hindrances (nīvaraṇa), which although five in number, find a place in the Book of the Ones, because they are singly treated as to their arising, increase and abandonment, and also in the Book of Fives, as would be expected (A. I, pp. 3–4) and cp. (A. III, pp. 63–4).). In chapter twenty of the Book of the Ones are grouped 192 suttas, all dealing with different kinds of meditation, but which have one thing in common: “he who practises any one of these methods but for the lasting of a finger-snap, he is to be called a monk, his meditation is not fruitless, he abides doing the Master’s bidding, he takes advice and eats the county’s alms-food to some purpose” (A. I, pp. 38–43).).

“Very numerous are the suttas and gāthās which the Aṅguttara Nikāya has in common with other texts of the canon, and these are sometimes actually quoted as extracts These parallel passages and quotations are recorded by E. Hardy, Aṅguttara, Vol. V, p. vii.. But it is not always the Aṅguttara which does the borrowing. Thus, for instance, the account of the admission of women into the Order, i.e., the founding of an Order of nuns, is just as much in its right place in A. viii, 51, as in the Cullavagga x, 1, of the Vinaya Piṭaka. On the other hand, the enumeration of the eight causes of an earthquake and the eight kinds of assemblies is absolutely in its right place in A. viii, 70, while the parallel passage in the Mahā-Parinibbāna Sutta does not fit in with the contents at all” M. Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, II. 62..

M. Anesaki Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 1908, XXXV, pp. 83 f. thinks that both the Pali Aṅguttara Nikāya and the Chinese Ekottarāgama bear traces indicating that this collection is later than the three others. Moreover, it contains the greatest number of quotations which are given as quotations. However, the Nikāyas or other collections are never cited as such, but only separate suttas or portions of a collection. Thus, in the Aṅguttara Nikāya (A. V, p. 46) a verse which occurs in the Saṁyutta Nikāya (S. I, p. 126) is quoted with the following words: “Thus it was said by the Exalted One in the questions of the daughters (of Māra): In peace of heart I did my goal attain, ... etc”. Similarly, the Suttanipāta is not quoted as such, although the Aṅguttara Nikāya (A. I, p. 133) quotes verses from the Questions of Puṇṇaka. The Buddha himself said on that occasion to Ānanda that he had uttered this particular verse in the “chapter on the Goal” (Pārāyana Vagga) in the sutta called the Questions of the Youth Puṇṇaka (Puṇṇaka-māṇavapucchā (A. IV, p. 26)}.)). And again, the Buddha quotes himself (A. I, p. 134). to Sāriputta as having uttered certain verses in the “chapter on the Goal” (Pārāyaṇa Vagga) in the sutta called the Questions of the Youth Udaya (Udayamāṇavapucchā) (A. IV, p. 26)}–7.).

As there is no essential or even appreciable difference among the four Nikāyas (i.e., excluding the Khuddaka Nikāya), either in style or in language, there cannot have been any great interval of time between the Aṅguttara and the other Nikāyas. As regards the earliest accessible sources of the teaching of the Buddha, there is no particular collection which could justifiably make any claim thereto. They would have to be culled from the whole of Buddhist literature as isolated suttas appearing in different collections, because all the four Nikāyas contain very ancient as well as comparatively modern elements.

That, on the other hand, the Aṅguttara Nikāya has assisted in the composition of other books of the Buddhist canon is clear from the Itivuttaka, a book belonging to the Khuddaka Nikāya or the Smaller or Miscellaneous Collection. The Chinese translation of this book by Hsüan-tsang has several of the last portions of the Pali Itivuttaka missing, which portions, however, are found in the Aṅguttara Nikāya. It is, therefore, suggested that they were incorporated in the Pali Itivuttaka after the Chinese translation of the seventh century.

Many of the suttas of the Aṅguttara Nikāya show the beginnings of the texts of the Abhidhamma, and the very nature of the Aṅguttara collection with its progressive classification would have lent itself spontaneously for an extension of the philosophical and ethical lists of threes and fours and fives, etc., thereby forming a basis for the abhidharmic superstructure. The fourth book of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, the Puggalapaññatti, which is a description of human types or individuals, has entire sections (e.g., 3–5) which are for the most part found in the Aṅguttara Nikāya already.

The Sanskrit parallel of the Pali Aṅguttara Nikāya is the Ekottarāgama of which only fragments have been found amongst the remains of manuscripts discovered in eastern Turkestan. These fragments, however, are not always in agreement with the corresponding Pali texts, and the more notable divergences are not limited to the order of the suttas.

It was in the fourth century that the Sutta Piṭaka of the Theravāda with its four Pali collections (nikāya) or Sanskrit traditions (āgama) was translated into Chinese. The Ekottarāgama was translated into Chinese by Saṅghadeva in the years 397–8 C.E. from an oral recital by Saṅgharakṣa, both Kashmiri monks. It would seem that Saṅghadeva made also use of an earlier version by the Tokharian monk, Dharmanandin (384–91 C.E.), who also recited for him the original text which, however, has been lost. The Chinese version, therefore, is not based on the original Pali, and as the edition availed of was used in the north-west of India, it contains numerous Mahāyana additions.

I. Speaking in detail of the Aṅguttara Nikāya, the Book of Ones (Eka-nipāta) contains twenty-one chapters totalling one thousand suttas according to the text A. 1, p. 46.. As said already, every subject is reduced to one, but for the sake of coherence the many ones dealing with allied subjects are placed together in separate chapters (vagga): five on the senses, five on the arising, on the increase and on the abandonment of the hindrances (nīvaraṇa), on the uncultivated and the cultivated mind, on the mind untamed and tamed, uncontrolled and controlled, unguarded and guarded, unrestrained and restrained, ill-directed and well-directed, corrupt and pure, defiled by or cleansed of taints, on energetic effort (viriya) and negligence, on discipline and truth (dhamma). Then follows one chapter (vagga 13) on the one person whose birth into the world is for the welfare and happiness of many folk, who is born out of compassion for the world; and that is the Tathāgata, the fully enlightened Buddha. The next vagga deals one by one with eighty outstanding qualities in which various disciples (monks, nuns and lay-disciples) were pre-eminent. Some of these disciples have more than one of these outstanding qualities to their credit. Thus, Ānanda is mentioned as the chief among those who are of wide knowledge, of retentive memory, of good behaviour, among those who are resolute and among the Buddha’s personal attendants. A chapter on the impossible contains twenty-eight suttas on things which cannot come to pass, e.g., that a person who is possessed of right understanding should regard any one phenomenon as permanent, or any one phenomenon or even the unconditioned as having the nature of an entity or substance. Chapter 16 discusses in ten suttas how each one of ten reflections (anussati) is conducive to Nibbāna. Next follow suttas on perverted and right views with the results thereof, and on the few and the many. The concluding chapters Vagga 20 and 21, pp. 38–46. of this Book of Ones deal with meditative states, especially mental absorption (jhāna) in its various stages, induced by a great variety of preparatory steps.

II. The Book of Twos (Duka-nipāta) deals with various subjects from a dual aspect, such as evil actions which will have immediate retribution, i.e., in this present life span, and evil actions with retribution in some future life; the dual struggle, one of the householder having to provide clothing, food, etc., and the other of him who has renounced the world in order to contract no further rebirth A. Vol. I, Nipāta ii, Vagga 1..

Of himself the Buddha says, “Two things, O monks, have I realised: to be dissatisfied with performing good actions and not to be hindered in striving on. Rather let skin and sinews and bones in my body wilt, and flesh and blood dry up, than discontinue the energy by which the goal may be attained” This is found elsewhere too: D. III, p. 214; M. I 481; A. IV, p. 26); Dhs. 1367; J. I, p. 71.. The Book of Twos could well be called the Book of Opposites, and equally well the Book of Pairs, for frequently we find the twos placed in opposition, such as satisfaction and disgust, while at other times the point of comparison is one of equality, such as the two dark states of shamelessness and recklesness (A. I, p. 51). Again, the comparison between two states may point out some difference although not so much as opposition. Thus the power of reflection (paṭisaṅkhāna-bala) which considers the possible effects of a deed, and the power of meditation (bhāvanā-bala), which by virtue of mind-control prevents possible effects of a deed, are compared together Ibid. p. 52..

In the “Chapter on Company” Parisa Vagga, ibid. pp. 70–76. we find a sutta explaining the characteristics of the “cream of society” (parisā-maṇḍa) as opposed to the “dregs” which leave a bitter taste (kasaṭa), owing to impulse, malice, delusion and fear. Then follow chapters dealing with various contrasting types of individuals (Puggala Vagga), and kinds of pleasures of the home life and of a life of renunciation, etc. (Sukha Vagga). The chapter on characteristics (Nimitta Vagga) Ibid. pp. 82–3. is practically in its entirety found in the Saṁyutta Nikāya, too Book of Gradual Sayings, I, p. 75 n. 1 refers to Kindred Sayings, V, 188 n..

The second section of this Book of Twos, which begins with the sixth chapter, Puggala Vagga, and ends with the Bala Vagga, contains according to the text fifty suttas, but has in fact 66 suttas.

The final section of the Book of Twos is divided into seven chapters with a total of 167 suttas, the majority of which are short statements such as: “There are these two conditions or states: Anger and malevolence” (A. I, p. 95). The concluding chapter speaks of pairs of results, such as the control of ill-behaved monks and well-being of self-controlled monks.

III. The Book of Threes (Tīka-nipāta) deals with a variety of subjects viewing them from a triple aspect, the most common being the actions of body, speech and mind, or deeds, words and thoughts Ibid. pp. 101–5.. There is the threefold release through faith, through concentration, through insight Ibid. pp. 118–19. and, of course, the obvious triple enumeration of lust, hate and delusion as causes (nidāna) of evil Ibid. pp. 134–6..

But sometimes the enumeration has no moral relationship between the constituents, e.g., the three terrors that part mother and son, when a great fire breaks out in which villages and towns are burnt, or when villages and towns are swept away by a great flood, or when the country is raided by robbers Ibid. pp. 178 ff..

The well known Kālāma Sutta Ibid. pp. 188 ff., rightly famed for its teaching of self-reliance and freedom of personal choice in respect of different views, forms also part of this chapter. The importance of this sutta is further emphasized by its practically verbatim repetition with slight variants as to the occasion and the audience in the immediately following sutta, a discourse with Sāḷha.

Every sutta of the eighth chapter introduces Ānanda, either as going to see the Buddha with some question by himself or with some others, or even, solving some householder’s problem all by himself. On one occasion the Buddha himself is the interrogator about the results of ceremonial practices (sīlabbata), and when Ānanda replies that such practices which increase unhealthy mental states are useless, the Buddha not only agrees with him, but praises him after his departure from the assembly.

Of the suttas contained in the, tenth chapter Loṇaphala Vagga, ibid. pp. 239–58. of this Book of Threes, there are several which recur in full or partly in the Puggalapaññatti, the Book of Human Types. Suttas 97 and 98 recur as iii, 10 and 11, while the opening of sutta 92 may be compared with Pug. iv, 24. The sutta concluding this chapter is noteworthy for its beautiful simile, fully worked out in all details, where the culture of the mind is compared stage by stage with the process of refining gold, till it is not only fully purified and flawless, but also pliable, workable and lustrous.

In the eleventh chapter Ibid. pp. 258 ff. on enlightenment (Sambodhi Vagga) the Buddha explains the meaning of enlightenment.

The three causes (nidāna) of all kammic action, lust, hate and delusion with their opposites, are dealt with in the concluding suttas Suttas 107–10, pp. 263–5. of this chapter.

The Warrior’s chapter (Yodhājīva Vagga) contains some interesting suttas, comparing different types of monks with various sorts of colts, thoroughbreds and trained steeds, gifted with speed, beauty and good proportions Ibid. pp. 284 ff..

The fifteenth chapter of the Tika-nipāta is called the Moṅgala Vagga, or the chapter on the auspicious. It deals with the qualifications required for entry into heaven, qualities begetting merit, and with their opposites, the inauspicious, while the final chapter deals with various practices of the sensualist, the self-tormentor, and the practice of the middle path consisting of mind-control and mind-culture Suttas 151–2, ibid. pp. 295–7..

IV. The Book of Fours (Catukka-nipāta) is divided into five sections, each containing five chapters (vagga) of ten suttas apiece, but the fifth and last section of fifty (paññāsakaṁ pañcamaṁ) has actually seventy-one suttas, bringing the total number of suttas of this Book of Fours to 271, making it the largest of the eleven books (nipāta) of the Aṅguttara Nikāya. Many suttas are extremely short and mere enumerations, e.g., “Monks, there are these four controlling powers. Which four? The controlling power of faith, of energy, of mindfulness and of concentration. These are the four controlling powers” (A. II, p. 141). It will be noticed that introduction, explanation and conclusion are absent. Other suttas, especially those contained in the Great Chapter (Mahā Vagga) Ibid. pp. 185 ff., are lengthy discourses, full of details as to place and occasion, names of disciples and visitors, with conversational questions and answers. The audience varies between the plain-looking, poor flower-girl Mallikā, who was by that time raised to the rank of queen by Pasenadi, the king of Kosala Kummāsapiṇḍa Jātaka (No. 415)., a number of Koliyan clansmen visiting the thera Ānanda (A. II, pp. 194) ff, a Jain naked ascetic visiting Moggallāna the Great Ibid. p. 196., some Licchavī princes calling on the Buddha Ibid. pp. 190 and 200., or an assembly of bhikkhus addressed by the Buddha Ibid. pp. 185, 187, 205, 211 and 213..

As regards their contents, the general thread which has bound these suttas together in this Book is the number four.

A late insertion of the ninefold Buddhist scriptures which were not collected at that time, is found here classified according to their contents Ibid. p. 7.. But, even the accumulation of all this knowledge is called “small learning and profitless”, if the learner knows neither the letter, nor the meaning, and does not live in accordance with the Dhamma.

Some of the more classical enumerations in groups of four are the four bonds (yoga) of sensuality, becoming, wrong views and ignorance Ibid. pp. 10–12.; the four postures or deportments of the body in walking, standing, sitting and lying down Ibid. pp. 13–14.; the four evil actions leading to a downward life, killing, stealing, sensuous misconduct kāmesu micchācāra is not only sexual misbehaviour, but intoxication is also included. and lying (A. II, p. 71).; the four kinds of effort (paddhāna) to restrain, to abandon, to make-become and to preserve Ibid. p. 74.; the four kinds of fear of birth, of old age, of disease and of death, or four different kinds of fear of self-reproach, of blame, of punishment in this life and of an evil rebirth Ibid. pp. 121–3.; the four sublime mental states (brahma-vihāra) of amity, compassion, sympathy and equanimity Ibid. pp. 128–30.. But the Four Noble Truths (ariya-sacca) are notable absentees.

The opening sutta of the third chapter, called Uruvela Vagga, gives rise to an enigmatic situation. There the Buddha relates to his monks an incident which occurred soon after he had become fully enlightened. While he was staying under the Goatherd’s Banyan-tree the thought came to him that he would do well in honouring and serving some recluse or brāhman, “for the perfection of virtue, concentration, wisdom and release which are still imperfect” (aparipūrassa sīla-samādhi paññā-vimuttikkhandhassa pāripūriyā) Ibid. p. 20.. But he found that in all the worlds of devas and men there was no recluse or brāhman more perfect than the Buddha to receive his reverence and service, which fact made him decide to honour and obey the Dhamma. Some have seen in this an admission by the Buddha of his own imperfection, but the silence of the commentary is significant.

An important sutta opens the fourth chapter, the Rohitassa Vagga Ibid. pp. 44 ff.. It deals with four kinds of cultivation of concentration (samādhi-bhāvanā). It is in this sutta that reference is made to the “questions of Puṇṇaka” in the Pārāyana Vagga of the Suttanipāta.

In view of the silence maintained by the Buddha on certain occasions although pressed for an answer, the next sutta is also of interest. Here are given four ways of answering a question: a categorical reply, a counter-question, a dismissal of the question, or an analytical, qualifying reply Ibid. p. 46..

Typical of the Buddha’s teaching, his denial of individuality and of an ultimate goal is clearly expressed as follows: “Where there is no more being born, growing old or dying–-that end of the world, I declare, cannot be reached by going. But in this very body, a fathom tall, with its perceptions and thoughts, there, I proclaim, is the world, the origin of the world and its ending” Ibid. pp. 47–9..

A variation of the better-known Mettā Sutta (A. IV, p. 26)}–52.) with its all-embracing love for creatures seen or unseen, dwelling far or near, born or yet to be born, in all the universe in all its heights and depths, is found here in the Book of Fours, in the Pattakamma Vagga:

“All creatures, living things,
May all that has become,
May one and all see luck,
And may no harm befall” A. II. pp. 72–3; trsl. F.L. Woodward..

A characteristic of the first seven chapters of this Catukkanipāta is that every sutta concludes with a set of verses (gāthā), mostly only four lines or even two, but sometimes extending to over twenty lines. From the eighth chapter (Apaṇṇaka Vagga), however, not a single one of the remaining 201 suttas is accompanied by a verse. This striking difference might be an indication of not only different compilership, but also of how much of the actual drafting of the suttas was left to the individual rehearsers.

A section of the Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta from the Dīgha Nikāya (D. II, p. 154). has been reproduced in this chapter as a separate sutta, but there is not the slightest indication as to why this section should have been included here in the Book of Fours.

Sutta 88 of the Macala Vagga (A. II, pp. 88–9).) sets out in detail the four stages of holiness in respect of the wearing out (parikkhaya) or only weakening (tanutta) of some or all of the ten fetters (saññojana) and these stages are given the following symbolical names: stream-winner (sotāpanna): the unshaken one (acala); once-returner (sakadāgāmin): the blue lotus (puṇḍarīka); non-returner (anāvattin): white lotus: (paduma); arahant (āsavānaṁ khaya) the exquisite one (sukhumāta). These symbolical names are also mentioned in the sutta immediately preceding and the two suttas following the one under reference Ibid. pp. 86, 88 and 90., but there the distinction among the four classes is somewhat different and confused, as even the blue lotus and the white lotus monks are said to have destroyed the mental intoxicants (āsavānaṁ khaya) which is otherwise the distinctive attainment of the arahant alone. The distinction between the experience of the eight deliverances (aṭṭha vimokkha) in one’s own person or the absence of such experience does not usually constitute a different degree of sanctity, as even arahants were known without the attainment of such mental bliss (sukkha-vipassaka).

The eleventh chapter, the Valāhaka Vagga, contains a series of beautiful similes.

Compared to the king’s elephant is a monk if he has the four good qualities of being a listener to the discipline of the Dhamma, a destroyer of evil thoughts, a bearer of discomfort and enmity, a goer to the end of craving and passion Ibid. pp. 116–18..

The story how a nun, pretending to be stricken with a sore disease, invited Ānanda to her lodging with evil intent, and realising her fault begged forgiveness, is told in the Bhikkhuṇī Sutta of the Indriya Vagga Ibid. pp. 144–6..

During a discussion on the various modes of progress it is mentioned that Mahā Moggallāna attained release from the intoxicants (āsavehi cittaṁ vimuttaṁ) in the mode of progress that is painful, but with swift intuition Ibid. p. 154., whereas Sāriputta attained release by way of the mode of progress that is pleasant with swift intuition Ibid. p. 155.. An explanation is given of these different modes of progress.

A typical Buddhistic exposition by Sāriputta, based on the Buddha’s model-reply to the so-called undecided (avyākata) questions, occurs in the Koṭṭhita Sutta of the Sañcetanika Vagga Ibid. pp. 161–3.. Mahākoṭṭhita wants to know whether anything at all exists or not after the complete and passionless cessation (asesa-virāga-nirodha) of the six spheres of (physical and mental) contact. Sāriputta explains his repeated and negative reply to each and every question by saying that any positive answer would cause an obsession where there was no obsession before (atth'aññaṁ kiñcīti iti vadaṁ appapañcaṁ papañceti). The six spheres of physical and mental contact are an analytical description of individuality. As long as this is misunderstood as an entity, substance, soul or ego, this delusion will lead to questions, as the above, about the continuance or discontinuance thereof.

The considerable length of suttas 191–200 has not only given the name of the Great (Mahā Vagga) to the twentieth chapter, but also to the fourth section of fifty suttas (mahāpaṇṇāsaka). Their length, however, is not proportionate to their importance. Repetitions are frequent, not only of short sayings and expressions, but also of entire episodes. Thus the advice given to Bhaddiya, the Licchavi Ibid. p. 191., is a repetition of that to the Kālāmas, referred to earlier.

A very vivid description is given of the various practices of self-tormenting Ibid. pp. 205–11. which can be found literally in other parts of the canon, too (D. I, p. 165–7); (M. I, p. 77–8), 342–3; Pug. v, 55.); but here it leads up to the practices of him who torments neither self nor another, and attains to final release.

Eighteen kinds of thought are shown to be haunted by craving concerning one’s personal inner life (ajjhattika), such as, “I am in this world; I am eternal; may I become thus”; etc., and eighteen kinds of thought are shown to be haunted by craving concerning what is external to one’s person (bāhira), such as, “By this I am in the world; by this should I become”; etc. (A. II, p. 212).

Fine psychological understanding of human problems is shown in the last sutta of the Mahā Vagga Ibid. pp. 213–16., where it is explained how affection may beget either deeper affection (pema) or hatred (dosa); and how in reverse even hatred may give rise to affection, although it usually will beget more hatred. But in the monk who dwells aloof from sense-desires, there is neither affection nor ill-will.

The fifth and final “fifty suttas” (paññāsaka pañcama) contains actually seventy-one suttas in six chapters (vagga). The first three chapters have each ten suttas which are mere variants of the opening sutta, substituting one word of the text by another according to the theme of the chapter: good or bad persons in the Sappurisa Vagga Ibid. pp. 217–25., moral or immoral qualities in the Sobhaṇa Vagga Ibid. pp. 225–8., right or evil conduct in the Sucarita Vagga Ibid. pp. 228–30..

The twenty-fourth chapter (Kamma Vagga) is less catechetical in its exposition of the various kinds of deeds.

Suites 261–270 are all alike in style apart from the evil or good action which in turn is fitted into the uniform framework, dealing with four qualities for which one goes to the underworld or to some celestial sphere, respectively.

The final sutta of the Book of Fours deals with the comprehension of passion (rāgassa abhiññā) and its utter destruction. The four divisions of this sutta are sometimes In the Sinhalese edition. considered as individual suttas.

V. The Book of Fives (Pañcaka-nipāta) opens with expositions of the five powers (pañca-balāni) in brief and in detail together with their opposite qualities. In this chapter Sekhabala Vagga: A. IV, p. 26–9). they are called the powers of a learner and vary slightly from the usual enumeration. The two different sets occur in successive suttas suttas 12 and 13, ibid. p. 10. in the next chapter, Bala Vagga, where only the earlier set is spoken of as the five powers of a learner. The commentator Buddhaghosa does not appear to attach any value to this distinction, for he interprets AA. III. the five powers (pañca-balāni) of sutta 13 also as the five powers of a learner (pañca-sekha-balāni).

The third chapter presents us with a fivefold gradation of moral observances: the minor precepts (abhisamācārika dhamma), the learner’s code (sekha-dhamma), virtue (sīla), right views (sammā-diṭṭhi) and right concentration (sammā-samādhi). None of the higher classes, it is said, could be practised if the lower grades were neglected. The defilements (upakkilesa) are given as five in sutta 23, although this group is subject to expansion and reaches its completion as ten Vism. vii, § 224; xx § 105., freedom from which rightly disposes the mind for psychic knowledge (abhiññā).

Of great interest is sutta 28 dealing with the five-limbed right concentration (pāñcaṅgika-samma-samādhi) where the five stages of mental absorption (jhāna) are fully described.

The last sutta of this third chapter is unusual in that the long introduction concerning the arrival of the brāhman householders of Icchānaṅgala leads to nothing as the Buddha refuses to have anything to do with them or their offerings, owing to “the great din and uproar” made by them. Instead, Nāgita, who was the Buddha’s personal attendant at that time, receives a fivefold exposition of the effects (nissanda) of action.

The fourth chapter is named Sumanā Vagga after princess Sumanā, sister of Pasenadi, the king of Kosala. At this time she was still a lay disciple, although in her old age she became a bhikkhuṇī and attained arahantship. Here, in the first sutta (A. III, pp. 32–4).) of this chapter, she is instructed by the Buddha about the far-reaching effects of good deeds.

Three further suttas are also directed to individuals. Princess Cundī receives advice to place her trust in the Buddha, his teaching and the Order Ibid. pp. 35 f.. At the request of the householder Uggaha, the Buddha visits his home and after the noon-meal exhorts the two daughters about the duties of a good wife Ibid. pp. 36–8.. General Sīha of the Licchavis receives from the Buddha the assurance of the visible results of giving (dāna Ibid. pp. 38–40.). The advantages, the timeliness and the objects of giving form the topics of the next three suttas Ibid. pp. 41–2.. Faith, virtue, learning, charity and insight are compared with five stages of growth of the great sāla trees in the Himālayan ranges Ibid. p. 44..

The fifth chapter, the Muṇḍorāja Vagga, opens with five reasons for getting rich by honest means. And if subsequently wealth declines there will still be the satisfaction of having used it well, as long as it lasted; and there will be no remorse.

To Anāthapiṇḍika the Buddha explains that it is of no use to yearn or pray for long life, etc. One must follow the way that leads to the winning thereof Ibid. pp. 47–9.. The next sutta mentions several kinds of gifts accepted by the Buddha out of pity (anukampaṁ upādāya). And here, there can be no doubt that pork (sūkaramaṁsa) was included Ibid. p. 49., whatever may be the interpretation of the “pig’s soft food” (sūkara-maddava) which was the last food tasted by the Buddha before his passing.

The last three suttas Ibid. pp. 54–62. of this chapter are identical, apart from the occasions on which they were preached.

They deal with five states not attainable by anyone: such as old age without decrepitude. They were preached first, presumably by the Buddha to his monks, then by the Buddha to Pasenadi of Kosala, after the death of his beloved wife Mallikā, and again by Nārada, dwelling near Pāṭaliputta, to the rāja Muṇḍa after the death of his wife Bhaddā, where the discourse is named the “Plucker Out of Sorrow’s Dart” (sokasallaharaṇa).

The second group of fifty suttas (dutiya paṇṇāsaka) in the Book of Fives opens with the Nīvaraṇa-Vagga Ibid. pp. 63–79., which chapter has derived its name from the subject dealt with in the first sutta: the five hindrances (pañca-nīvaraṇa). They are here variously described as obstructions, etc.

Without being rid of those five checks, no man can know his own good nor can he realise perfection of knowledge and insight.

The seventh chapter in the Book of Fives is called the Saññā Vagga Ibid. pp. 79–83., and it is at once evident from the way the word saññā is used in the first two suttas that it is not merely the mental factor (cetasika) of perception which is under observation but the whole full-grown thought-process of contemplation Ibid. p. 79..

The eighth chapter called “The Warrior” (Yodhājīva Vagga) has an interesting opening sutta Ibid. pp. 84–5., where the monk who is both mind-emancipated (cetovimutta) and insight-emancipated (paññā-vimutta) is described under various war and siege similes. Although the various elements and stages of emancipation are given, there is as yet no attempt at the rigid classification which is so typical in the later works.

The sutta is repeated with a variation of the five things which have to be cultivated (bhāvitā) Ibid. pp. 85–6..

The next sutta Ibid. pp. 86–7. is worthy of attention for its introduction of a new compound “one who lives the teaching” (dhammavihārī) which is not found elsewhere.

The four concluding suttas Ibid. pp. 100–10. of this chapter speak of fear in various degrees with different objects, but with the general trend that now is the proper time to put forth energy in striving for emancipation, lest some hindrance would deprive one of the opportunity. Asoka, the emperor, recommended these suttas in his Bhabra edict.

Chapter ix, the Thera Vagga, speaks of many qualities in various groups of fives which should or should not be possessed by an elder (thera), that he may be “what he ought to become” (bhāvanīyo). Chapter x is named after Kakudha, a Koliyan, who had recently died and had now assumed a body, formed by the magic power of the mind (manomaya kāya) Having been Mahā Moggallāna’s attendant, he informed him of Devadatta’s intention to usurp the leadership of the Saṅgha. Mahā Moggallāna thereupon passes the information on to the Buddha, who gives him an exposition of five kinds of teachers Ibid. pp. 122–6.. The nine preceding suttas in this chapter are merely short enumerations of achievements, ethical or mental, with hardly any exposition.

The comfortable abodes (phāsu-vihāra) which have given their name to chapter xi are the achievement of virtue, self-concentration, remaining unknown and yet not worried by the absence of fame, the four stages of mental absorption, etc., till the deliverance of mind in the emancipation through insight Ibid. pp. 132–4..

Six suttas Ibid. pp. 139–42. of chapter xii, each deal with five ways of conduct or views, following which a bhikkhuṇī is sure of being born either in the lower regions (niraya) or in heavenly abodes (sagga). They contain several duplications, and no explanations.

The Chapter on the Sick, Gilāna Vagga, opens with a visit of the Buddha to the infirmary in the Great Park of Vesālī. His purpose here is not the healing of the sick physically, but the healing and ultimate deliverance of the mind through self-realisation here and now. Illness ceases to be an obstacle, and even becomes a help in curing the mind by concentration on the unattractiveness of the body, the loathsomeness of food, the absence of joy in all the world, by reflection on the impermanence of all complexities and by contemplation of death. An absolute rejection of the usual: mens sana in corpore sano! Another sutta in the same chapter speaks of how a sick man can be a sure help to himself Ibid. pp. 143–4. and still another sutta gives the qualities of him who waits on the sick Ibid. p. 144.. The real ills of a monk are, however, not his physical ailments, but his discontentedness with any of the four requisites Robes, food, lodging and medicaments. and his finding no delight in leading a pure life (brahmacariya) (A. III, p. 146).

An interesting, short sutta Ibid. p. 156. occurs in the next chapter, the Rāja Vagga about the five kinds of people who sleep little by night: a woman longing for a man, a man longing for a woman, a thief longing for booty, a ruling prince bent on his royal business, and a monk longing for bondage-release.

Although compared to a royal elephant, a monk is not worthy of offerings, if he cannot compose his mind when alluring forms, sounds, etc., present themselves Ibid. pp. 157–61.. Then follows the description of a monk who is worthy of offerings and salutations, and becomes in this world an unsurpassed field of merit Ibid. p. 164..

On the occasion of Udāyī As there are three theras of this name, it is not clear which one is referred to in the text (ibid. p. 184). preaching to a great gathering of laymen, the Buddha explains to Ānanda the difficulties in teaching others.

Suttas 163 and 164 in the Āghāta Vagga (ch. xvii) are a word-for-word repetition of suttas 65 and 66 in the Saññā Vagga (chapter vii).

The Nirodha Sutta Ibid. pp. 192–6. in the Āghāta Vagga settled an apparently controversial point which was upheld by Sāriputta, without a single other monk agreeing: A monk perfected in virtue, concentration and insight could bring his mind process to a state of cessation of sensation and perception and again emerge therefrom; if there and then it would please him not to attain the supreme insight (aññā) of arahantship, he would be surpassing the celestial sphere where beings still live on solid food and be reborn among the celestials with a mind-made body (manomaya kāya), provided he brings his mind-process to a state of cessation of sensation and perception.

In the Sīla Sutta Ibid. pp. 200–1. Sāriputta repeats verbatim a discourse earlier given by the Buddha cp. A. IV, p. 26–20): Dussīla Sutta.

A typical side-light is thrown by the Khippa-nisanti Sutta (A. III, p. 201). on the mutual respect between the Buddha’s chief disciples.

The next chapter (xviii) is entitled the Upāsaka Vagga and treats of the householder’s duties in various ways. The first four suttas conclude, each, with the five abstinences (paṭivirati) which form the basis of the layman’s code of morality Ibid. pp. 203–5.. The Vaṇijjā Sutta Ibid. p. 208. enumerates the five trades to be avoided by a layman: trades in weapons, in slaves, in meat, intoxicants and poisons.

The Arañña Vagga (chapter xix) Ibid. pp. 219–21. contains ten suttas, each dealing with five types of people practising some kind of asceticism, the highest type of whom is the one whose practice follows from his contentment with few wants.

Biting sarcasm can be sensed in the simile of the ancient brāhman and the untouchable dog. Contemporary brāhmans cannot even be compared with dogs Ibid. pp. 221–2..

The brāhman Saṅgārava received from the Buddha a good psychological reply to his question why sometimes after much study certain doctrines remain unclear, while at other times clarity appears even with little study: “When one dwells with thoughts full of passion and lust, without knowing how to escape therefrom, one cannot truly see and understand either oneself or another; and however long one studies, the real meaning of the doctrine will not become clear” Ibid. pp. 230–6..

The brāhman Piṅgiyānī speaks in sutta 194 to the brāhman Kāraṇapālī in the highest terms of praise of the Buddha and his doctrine, so that Kāraṇapālī takes his refuge in the Buddha, even before meeting him personally.

Dreams have always exercised a fascinating influence over man’s attitude towards life and here, in the Supina Sutta Ibid. pp. 240–2., the five premonitory dreams of the bodhisatta immediately before his enlightenment are explained, and we find the commentator AA. II, pp. 316–19. expanding various types and causes of dreams.

In the Vācā Sutta (A. III, p. 243–4).) are tersely enumerated the five marks of well-spoken word. In the final sutta Ibid. pp. 245–6. of this Brāhmaṇa Vagga the most interesting part of the ways of eschewal (nissaraṇīya) is that the thought of renunciation leads to the obviation of lust, whereas the other evil thoughts are eschewed not by any positive action as renunciation, but merely by avoidance of the evil thought.

With this sutta ends the fourth group of fifty suttas (catuttha paṇṇāsaka) in the Book of Fives.

Chapter xiii is called Akkosaka Vagga, deriving its title from the first sutta, dealing with the evil that awaits a monk who abuses (akkosaka) those who lead a holy life Ibid. p. 252.. And the entire chapter continues the theme of the advantages of a moral life and the disadvantages of immorality, except for the two concluding suttas which deal with the five disadvantages of fire and of the town Madhurā. The Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādins, an early schismatic sect of Buddhism, has not much good to say about Madhurā either. Both texts agree that the ground was uneven, and covered with dust and stones, meals were difficult to obtain owing to the habit of the people there taking solitary meals. But where the text of the Theravāda objects to the fierce dogs and bestial yakkhas, the Mūlasarvāstivādins found that there were too many women Th. Watters, On Yuan Chwang’s Travels in India, Vol. I, p. 312, quoting Vin. Ms. Yao-shih ch. 10..

Chapter xxiii, although short, is of great interest in so far as opposing actions are fairly compared as to their disadvantages and profits. For example, though wandering has its disadvantages, such as lack of information, easy subjection to disease and friendlessness, there are also disadvantages attached to staying in one place too long, such as accumulation of possessions, concern with many duties, attachment to company and place (A. III, pp. 257–8).).

The last three chapters xxiv–xxvi of this Book of Fives contain many repetitions on account of which the suttas are abbreviated, omitting the repetetions with a more reference “etc.” (pe for peyyāla, i.e., repetition of formula).

An extreme example of compactness of suttas and their expansibility is found at the conclusion of this Book. For, here we find 4,250 suttas compressed in less than one and a half pages of normal print.

The most notable absentee of a group of fives in this nipāta is the group of the five aggregates of existence (pañcakkhandha).

VI. The Book of Sixes (Chakka-nipāta) has only twelve chapters (vagga) and would have been very small, if not for the Great Chapter (Mahā Vagga) which occupies more than one-third of the whole nipāta. Here too, the usual schedule is maintained, and whatever can be classified in groups of six has found a place. For example, it is the monk who has control over his six senses, who experiences the six psychic powers (iddhi), who possesses the six faculties (indriya) and the six mental powers (bala), it is he who is worthy of offerings. The faculties and powers appear elsewhere usually in groups of five only; but here for the purpose of completing the team of six an addition is given in the destruction of the intoxicants (āsavānaṁ khaya) Ibid. pp. 279–82.. The six recollections (anussati) are detailed in sutta 10. Other suttas give details of the six ways to show one’s friendly concern (sārāṇīya) with one’s fellow monks Ibid. pp. 288–90. and the six factors of escape (nissaraṇa) from or avoidance of evil thoughts Ibid. pp. 290–2; cp. D. III, p. 247..

Of six conditions because of which one fails in righteousness, three were taught by a deva and the series was completed by the Buddha, who added three more points (A. III, pp. 309–10).).

Sutta 25 on the six recollections (Anussati Sutta) is quoted in the Visuddhimagga as the Gedha Sutta Ibid. pp. 312–14: A. IV, p. 26). Vism. vii, § 123, p. 187, but this title is not mentioned in the contents (uddāna) at the end of this third chapter (Anuttariya Vagga).

Who is the monk from whom one should obtain advice when overwhelmed by passionate lust, etc., asks another sutta and the answer is that he is the monk who has caused his mind to develop, who has cultivated his mind as it ought to be (manobhāvanīya), i.e, self-composed A. III, suttas 27 and 23, pp. 317–22.. One cannot expect to be directed to a mere student of the mind As suggested by the translation: Gradual Sayings, III, pp. 225 ff..

Further subjects of recollection (anussati) are mentioned in the Udāyī Sutta, where Ananda gives some details which are completed by the Buddha himself A. III pp. 322–5..

The Anuttariya Sutta mentions six unsurpassed things (anuttariya) which have given the name to the sutta Ibid. pp. 325–9. and to the entire chapter.

The Devatā Vagga gives an account of Mahā Moggallāna paying one of his periodical visits to the celestial spheres, with the view to ascertain how many of the inhabitants there would have attained the first stage of sainthood and having entered the Stream would be ensured of not falling back, and of his meeting there with a former pupil of his, Tissa Brahma, who gives him the details he seeks Ibid. pp. 331–4..

From this stage on it would appear as if the compiler found it increasingly difficult to collect sufficient material to compose the numerical series with the increase in numbers. Thus the sixfold offering is actually threefold on the giver’s part and threefold on the receiver’s part Ibid. pp. 336–7.. Likewise the six means of accumulation of deeds are the three roots of all evil and the absence thereof Ibid. pp. 338–9.. The Dārukkhandha Sutta Ibid. pp. 340–1. supplements the four elements with the two further qualities of beauty and ugliness (subha-asubha) to make up a group of six.

The Attakāra Sutta which also occurs in this chapter Ibid. pp. 337–8. would appear, for various reasons detailed under that title, to be a fairly late interpolation.

The last sutta, Nāgita Sutta, of this Devatā Vagga is for the greater part identical with the sutta of the same name, occurring as the last sutta of the Pañcaṅgika Vagga of the Book of Fives cp. (A. III, p. 341 ff. with A. III, p. 30 ff.. Earlier, Nāgita, the Buddha’s personal attendant at that time, received a fivefold exposition of the effects of action which is in keeping with the schedule of the Book of Fives. Here in the Book of Sixes, the scheme is adhered to, when the Buddha gives Nāgita two circumstances in which he would not be pleased and four when he would be pleased with a monk’s abode The English translation Gradual Sayings, III, p. 242, has omitted § 6 of the text: A. IV, p. 26). The same sutta occurs once more in the Book of Eights (Aṭṭhaka-nipāta) as sutta 86 with two further items added to it.

The Migasālā Sutta (A. III, pp. 347–51).) of the next chapter, the Dhammika Vagga, explains how it is possible that people leading different moral lives yet may reap the same reward in the future.

The Mahā Cunda Sutta Ibid. pp. 355–6. brings to the foreground a distinction which has been perpetuated in the Saṅgha up to the present day, distinction among monks who are devoted to the doctrine (dhamma-yogā bhikkhū), i.e., according to the commentary, the teachers of the doctrine (dhammakathika), and monks devoted to a life of meditation (jhāyī bhikkhū). We see here, therefore, the active and the contemplative sides of monastic life which exist also in the clerical and monastic institutions of other religions.

Another sutta Ibid. pp. 358–9. is connected with insight (aññā). The classical formula of declaration of attainment of deliverance or supreme insight was approved by the Buddha after Khema and Sumana had declared their attainment. “The achievement is told, but self is not mentioned” (attho ca vutto, atta ca anupunīto). There is no particular reason why this sutta should have been included in the Book of Sixes. Similar declarations and approvals recur elsewhere in the Tipiṭaka e.g., Vin. I, Mahāvagga, p. 185..

A chain of six links describes the corollary from sense-control, etc., each link depending on the previous one, just as the maturity of a tree depends on its various stages (A. III, p. 360).

An interesting little study of psychology can be found in the discourse of the Buddha with the brāhman Jāṇussoṇi Ibid. pp. 362–4., which is a study of contrasts in human interests and characters.

The Great Chapter (Mahā Vagga), although it does not contain more than the usual ten suttas, is outstanding for the unusual length of these suttas. In the first sutta of this chapter the Buddha admonishes a young monk who wanted to revert to a layman’s life: “Energy, when overstrung, ends in flurry, when overlax, in idleness” Ibid. p. 375.. And the monk Soṇa, observing the even mean (samatā), attained not long thereafter the realisation of arahantship.

The Āsava Sutta Ibid. pp. 387–90. deals with six methods for getting rid of the mental intoxicants (āsava). It would appear, however, that this sutta has been partly excised to make it fit into the Book of Sixes, for the same sutta appears in the Majjhima Nikāya (M. I, pp. 6–12).) as the Sabbāsava sutta with an additional method.

The Citta-hatthisāriputta Sutta (A. III, p. 392). is of interest as it contains the word abhidhamma without its usual combination with abhivinaya. As there is, however, nothing in this sutta to indicate that the monks were holding a philosophical seminar, there is no ground for attaching to the word abhidhamma-kathaṁ any further meaning than “a talk pertaining to the doctrine”. The specialised meaning of Abhidhamma, as given to it in later works, cannot be accepted in the Sutta Piṭaka.

The next sutta, Pārāyaṇa Sutta, gives one of the rare instances where another part of the Tipiṭaka is quoted, thereby establishing a seniority of texts. The “Questions of Metteyya” (Metteyya pañha) referred to in this sutta Ibid. p. 401. is quoted from the Suttanipāta v. 1042., called Tissa Metteyyamāṇavapucchā.

In a discourse on discrimination (nibbedhikapariyāya) the Buddha analyses sense-desires, sensations, perceptions mental intoxicants, actions and conflicts which have to be recognised as such, as well as their sources of origin, their distinctions, their results, their ending and the process leading to their cessation. It is in this Nibbedhika Sutta (A. III, pp. 410–17).) that the famous definition of action occurs: action is determined by volitional thought (cetanāhaṁ bhikkhave kammaṁ vadāmi).

The remaining six chapters are very brief and most of the suttas contained therein are merely outlines and enumerations. The names of the chapters indicate in general their contents: Devatā Vagga, Arahatta Vagga, Sīti Vagga, Ānisaṁsa Vagga on advantages which are difficult to obtain, and Tika Vagga on the cultivation of three states to obtain three conditions. The concluding chapter is a mere resume and its final 510 suttas are compressed in less than one page. Here, for ten purposes of seventeen states three groups of six each have to be cultivated. The ten purposes are: full understanding, comprehension, exhaustion, abandoning, destruction, decay, freedom, ending, quittance and renunciation. The seventeen states are: passion, hate, delusion, anger, enmity, hypocrisy, malice, envy, avarice, deceit, craftiness, obstinacy, impetuosity, pride, arrogance, intoxication and indolence. The three groups of six each are the six unsurpassables: the supreme sight of a Tathāgata, the supreme sound of his Teaching, the supreme gain of confidence in the Buddha, the supreme training in the Buddha’s dispensation, the supreme service to the Order, and the supreme and constant mindfulness; the six recollections of the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Saṅgha, of virtue, of liberality and of the devas; the six perceptions of impermanence, of the conflict therein, of the unreality of conflict, of renunciation, of dispassion, and of ending. And with this is concluded the Book of Sixes.

A diagram showing the connections of these 510 suttas is drawn on p. \pageref{I_641_510_Suttas_Connections}.

\begin{figure*}
\includegraphics[width=1.0\textwidth]{./graphics/I_641_510_Suttas_Connections}
\caption{Connections between 510 Suttas of the last six chapters in the Book of Fives}

\end{figure*}

VII. The Book of Sevens (Sattaka-nipāta) follows in broad outlines the same pattern as the earlier books in this series. All sevens which have something in common, are grouped together, even though some may have been mentioned in numerically lower groups or will occur again combined with others, in higher groups. Frequently the enumeration forms a bare list stated as a fact without any explanation, e.g., “The monk who is desirous of gain, of honour, of praise, who is lacking in conscientiousness and fear of blame, who is a man of evil desires and of wrong views, such a monk is not dear to his companions” A. IV p. 1.. The next sutta repeats this in full, but changes the last two terms to “envious” and “mean”. The powers (bala) are better known in a group of five only. But here in the third sutta we find the addition of conscientiousness (hiri) and fear of blame (ottappa) to the usual five. There is a short explanation of each power in the next sutta.

The seven treasures (dhana) are for the greater part a repetition, as four of them, trust, conscientiousness, fear of blame and insight, are identical with the corresponding powers (bala) of the previous suttas. The new items, virtue, listening and liberality, too, contain much detail which can be found elsewhere suttas 5 and 6; ibid. pp. 4–6. Cp. Vin. II, p. 95; A. IV, p. 26).

The fetters (saññojana), dealt with in suttas 8–10, differ between themselves and also from the usual group of ten, as seen in table \ref{graphics/I_642_Table} on p. \pageref{graphics/I_642_Table}.
\begin{figure*}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{./graphics/I_642_Table}
\caption{The Fetters According to Suttas 8–10 and the Abhidhamma}

\end{center}
\end{figure*}

This first sutta-list of “fetters” is repeated as a list of evil tendencies (anusaya) which nowhere exceeds this maximum of seven (A. IV, p. 9). Only sensuous desire (kāmarāga) has taken the place of fawning (anunaya).

In three suttas Ibid. pp. 16–22. much stress is laid on the democratic conduct to be followed when meeting in assembly. The example of meetings among the Licchavis is shown as worthy of emulation by the brotherhood of monks.

From subsequent suttas certain interesting points may be culled, all of which cause growth and not decline: that the monks shall not delight in various activities, in talk, sleep or company; shall not halt because of some trifling success; shall be great listeners; shall test the Dhamma and make the factors of enlightenment arise Ibid. pp. 22–4..

Chapter iv is called Devatā Vagga Ibid. pp. 27–39., as the first few suttas are introduced with statements by a celestial being.

A beautiful description of a true friend is given in suttas 35 and 36 of this same chapter.

Leading an unworldly life (brahmacariya) in all its fullness and purity for twelve or even for forty-eight years is not sufficient reason for a monk to be considered praiseworthy with distinction (niddesa). The real reasons for such honour are stated in suttas 39–40.

The Samādhiparikkhāra Sutta Ibid. p. 40., on the requisites of concentration, is noteworthy as the seven requisites are the first seven members of the Noble Eightfold Path and the eighth member is here mentioned as one-pointedness of mind (ekaggatā), which is to be approached and equipped by the other seven. They are not referred to, however, as a Path of Eight (aṭṭhaṅgika magga), under which designation they are not placed in the Book of Eights (Aṭṭhaka-nipāta), either.

The position taken by the Buddha with regard to the slaughter of animals for the purpose of sacrifice is very definitely stated in the Aggi Sutta of the Mahāyañña Vagga, the chapter of the Great Sacrifice, where “even before the sacrifice ... evil thoughts are set up, leading to demerit ... along the way of ill” Ibid. pp. 41–6..

The seven preceptions of the foul, of death, etc., mentioned in the Saññā Sutta Ibid. p. 46., are repeated in the Book of Nines with two additions: renunciation and freedom from passion Ibid. p. 387.. Both series lead to the deathless (amatapariyosāna).

A fine study of the psychology of sex is found in the Saṁyoga Sutta Ibid. pp. 57–9. where it is shown how each one, noting the peculiarities of one’s own sex and excited by the charm thereof, is attracted by the charms of the opposite sex and, desiring a bond therewith, enters into a new bondage without having escaped from the original bond.

The gift of one who seeks reward is not great in fruit, but the gift of him who gives without thought of selfish reward is indeed great, for to him there will be no coming back to this state here (anāgāmī) Ibid. pp. 59–63..

The sixth chapter in the Book of Sevens derives its name, Avyākata Vagga, from the first sutta which deals with the unexpounded (avyākata) Ibid. pp. 67–70..

The Arakkhita Sutta Ibid. pp. 82–4. is another example of probable patchwork in the books of higher numerals, for here we find the seven made up of a group of four which need not be covered up by the Tathāgata together with a group of three on account of which the Tathāgata is blameless. The earlier part, moreover, is found also in the Saṅgīti Suttanta (D. III, pp. 217) ff.).

Once when Mahā Moggullāna was found nodding on his meditation-seat Aliquando bonus dormitat Homerus; cp. Horace, Ars Poetica, 359; A. IV pp. 85–8. the Buddha gave him seven ways to make that drowsiness pass, by means of mental and physical application. And if after all that one’s sleepiness cannot be shaken off, one should lie down to rest, mindful and self-possessed, with the mind set on the thought of arising. The concluding sentence of this sutta contains a few interesting terms, all indicative of the final realisation of Nibbāna.

Of the seven types of wives, those who neglect or rob their husbands or treat them as a mistress would, will find rebirth in the lower spheres of existence, while those who love as a mother, respect as a younger sister, gladden as a companion, or serve as a handmaid, they will wander in the happy world of heaven Ibid. pp. 91–4..

As in the earlier Books we find also in the Book of Sevens one chapter called “the great” (Mahā Vagga), containing ten suttas of more than usual length. The opening sutta Hiri Sutta, ibid. p. 99. employs a method of stating a conditional sequence which we meet elsewhere also. Each step is dependent on the previous one, regarding its arising and cessation.

In the Nāgara Sutta Ibid. p. 106–13. the noble disciple is compared to a rāja’s fortified citadel.

The next sutta enumerates the qualities needed by a monk to be worthy of respect and offerings.

The Bhāvanā Sutta Ibid. p. 125–7. on mental development speaks of the causing to arise or the making become of thirty-seven factors of enlightenment (sattatiṁsabodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā) as they are grouped together in the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha Abhs. VII, 6.. The full details, however, are not given here, and the same list can be found also in the Mahā-parinibbāna Sutta D. II, p. 120.. It would seem that the list was so well known at the time of compilation that the details were taken for granted. The process of mental development (bhāvanā) is beautifully compared to the hatching of eggs. The concluding sutta of this Mahā Vagga gives first the doctrine of a teacher of old, named Araka, who had overcome all lust of the bodily senses (kāmesu vitarāgo). He lived during the time of Buddha Vessabhū. The Buddha endorsed that ancient teaching as being applicable with equal force and even more so in his time. He repeats the teaching, thereby making it his own. The sutta (A. IV, pp. 136–9).) concludes with a tail-piece found also in the Mahā-parinibbāna Sutta quoting the Buddha’s last words.

The next chapter is called Vinaya Vagga by the text, but Vinayadhara Vagga (Chapter bearing on Discipline) by the commentary. The suttas do not throw any new light on the various rules of discipline, as they merely mention some types of offences in a general classification, with slight alteration as to the attainments. But in the Upāli Sutta Ibid. p. 143. occurs once more that beautiful phrase which is given elsewhere also D. I, p. 189; III, pp. 130, 136: S. II, p. 223; V, pp. 82, 179, 255, 361; etc. as the Buddha’s sign by which to recognise unreservedly (ekaṁsena) the teaching, the discipline, the message of the Teacher, “whether it leads one to absolute disgust with the world, to dispassion, to cessation, to tranquillity, to supernormal insight, to perfect comprehension, to deliverance”.

The concluding sutta (A. IV, p. 144). of this chapter enumerates the seven ways for settling disputes, the full explanation of which can be found in the Vinaya Texts (III, pp. 1–65).

As in the case of the preceding books of the Aṅguttara Nikāya, the Book of Sevens has also a concluding chapter in the form of a recital, although this is not mentioned in the commentary, the Manorathapūraṇī, and in which suttas are not numbered.

Seven conditions, should be broken up in order to be a real monk; these seven should be pacified to be a recluse; they have to be excluded by a brāhman, etc. The text here employs a series of words which have no etymological connection, but are linked by obvious alliteration which cannot be reproduced in translation; bhinna-bhikkhu; samita-samaṇa; bāhita-brāhmaṇa; nissutta-sotthika; ninahāta-nahātaka; vidita-vedagū; arihata ariya; āraka-arahā.

A further 520 suttas are condensed in this recital in the space of a little more than one page; where seven different persons worthy of offerings are mentioned. Each of them sees one of eight things: impermanence, ill, etc. If this could be worked out in detail, we would obtain 480 suttas. To these are added eight views, of each of the five aggregates of existence, which give an additional 40 suttas.

The Book of Sevens concludes the recital with a synopsis of the complete understanding, comprehension, exhaustion, etc. of 17 conditions: lust, hate, delusion, anger, etc. To bring about 170 combinations, we are given three sets of seven qualities to be developed. As each set forms one sutta this final section comprises 510 suttas. The three sets of seven qualities are as follows: the seven factors of enlightenment, the seven types of perception and the seven thoughts of foulness, of death, of the impurity of food, etc. And thus ends the Book of Sevens.

VIII. The Book of Eights (Aṭṭhaka-nipāta) is divided into ten chapters of which the last one is the usual concluding recital, the earlier chapters containing ten suttas each. The opening sutta on loving kindness (mettā) has given the name to the entire first chapter, although the other nine suttas deal with insight, endearing qualities, worldly conditions, corrupt practices, etc. This first sutta here should not be confused with the Mettā Sutta to be found in the Suttanipāta (A. IV, p. 26)}–52.) and which is the better known one, regularly used in chanting-ceremonies. Moreover, the eight advantages of loving kindness, enumerated in this sutta, have been increased to eleven in the Ekādasa-nipāta (A. V, p. 342).

Gain and loss come to all alike in the world, not only to the unskilled, common man, but also to the learned disciple of the Noble One. Then what is the difference, it is asked, and the sutta proceeds to explain (A. IV, p. 157–60).).

Another sutta in the same chapter explains that one may be like Nanda, of good family, strong, handsome and energetic lit. “very passionate” (tibbarāga): A. IV, p. 26), yet it will not be possible to lead a holy life unless the senses are guarded and mindfulness practised.

In the Kāraṇḍava Sutta the Buddha exhorts his disciples to eject a monk who is incorrigible, like sweepings, lest he corrupt the other monks A. IV pp. 168–72..

The opening sutta of the Mahā Vagga has been bodily taken over from the first chapter, Pārājika, of the Suttavibhaṅga Vin. III, pp. 2–5. where it serves as an introduction to the events at Verañja during a famine. Here a brāhman of Verañja rebukes the Buddha for not paying due respect to senior brāhmans and remarks that that is not right (na sampanna). But the Buddha replies that he whom the Buddha would revere, his head would be thrown off. An argument ensues, which will be given under Verañja Sutta. At the end of the discussion, the brāhman takes his refuge in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Saṅgha with the request to be accepted as a lay disciple (A. IV, pp. 172–9).).

The next sutta, called the Sīha Sutta, repeats much of the preceding one and is also to be found in the Mahāvagga of the Vinaya Piṭaka Vin. I, pp. 232–8; A. IV, p. 26–83, but here the questioner is Sīha, a general of the Licchavis and a disciple of the Nigaṇṭhas. The initial refusal of the Buddha to accept Sīha as a convert to his doctrines unless he examined the matter thoroughly and his admonition not to discontinue the giving of alms to the Nigaṇṭhas causes Sīha to be still more pleased and gratified.

It is difficult to guess the compiler’s intention in copying these two long suttas from the Vinaya and inserting them here in the Book of Eights, when neither of them has any allusion to the number eight.

That excitable horses have much in common with men reproved for some wrong deed, is the burden of another interesting discourse (A. IV, pp. 190–5).).

The verses attached to the Malāni Sutta Ibid. p. 195. recur in the Dhammapada (v. 241). It is noteworthy that, here as elsewhere in the Dhamma, ignorance (avijjā) is considered as the culmination (parama) of all evil and its source, exceeding even a watcher’s carelessness or a woman’s misconduct.

In the Pahārāda Sutta Ibid. pp. 197–204. the Buddha explains to the asura king of that name how his teaching shares the eight characteristics of the ocean in which the asuras take such delight.

The next sutta, called the Uposatha Sutta, which concludes the Mahā Vagga, it is found in its entirety in the Cullavagga of the Vinaya Piṭaka Vin. II, pp. 236–40., including the repetition of the previous sutta which compared the teaching with the ocean. Although, therefore, its appearance here in the Aṅguttara Nikāya may not be the original version, nor its inclusion in the Book of Eights be warranted except for its tail piece which was inserted as a separate sutta already, it must be admitted that the various elements of the first section are impressive.

The third chapter on householders (Gahapati Vagga) deals with various lay-disciples endowed with eight qualities which are wonderful (abbhuta) in the sense of miraculous, and marvellous (acchariya) in the sense of rarely achieved (A. IV, pp. 208–23).).

The attributes of a monk who has destroyed all defilements (khīṇāsava) are limited to eight Ibid. p. 223–5. by the omission of two classes of factors of enlightenment, which are, however, included in the repetition of this sutta in the Book of Tens (A. V, p. 176). Reference has already been made to the absence of the Four Noble Truths from the Book of Fours and of the five aggregates of existence from the Book of Fives. Here in the Book of Eights we are further surprised by the absence of any reference to the Noble Eightfold Path as such, although the eight evil qualities and their converse are given (A. IV, pp. 237–8).). The Path without its constituents is mentioned elsewhere Ibid. p. 225.. This is all the more notable since many passages could be quoted in support of the view that the Noble Eightfold Path (ariya-aṭṭhaṅgika-magga) represents an original and even essential teaching of the Buddha (D. I, p. 156), 157, 165; (M. I, p. 118); It. 18; Sn. v. 1130; (A. IV, p. 26)}, 273; (Thag. vv. 2), 158, 171; (Vin. I, p. 10); Nd. I, p. 485, etc, the most important of which occurs in the Buddha’s first sermon. Its omission here in the Aṅguttara Nikāya may be called significant, but the nature of this significance has not yet been satisfactorily explained. The suggestion of a later crystallisation of a systematic tendency C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Original Gospel, p. 60; JRAS. 1935, p. 723. would mean the suppression in other Nikāyas more than is omitted here. And it certainly cannot be maintained that the Aṅguttara Nikāya is the earliest compilation.

The concluding sutta of this chapter is most informative as regards the foundations of spiritual development. Anuruddha in his reflections discovered that the Dhamma is only for one who wants little, who is contented, who is fond of seclusion, who is energetic, whose attention is fixed, who is composed in mind, and possessed of insight. To these the Buddha himself added an eighth reflection, that the Dhamma is for him who is free from obsessions (nippapañca). These eight reflections of a great being (aṭṭha-mahāpurisa-vitakka) are explained by the Buddha in detail and form the bulk of this sutta which is concluded with a quotation from Anuruddha’s verses wherein he later reviewed his achievement: in the bliss of emancipation (A. IV, pp. 228–35); (Thag. vv. 901–3).).

The fourth chapter on giving (Dāna Vagga) deals with the subject of liberality from the various aspects of giving, the grounds for giving, the usefulness of giving, etc. The three refuges and the five precepts of abstinence from evil are called the great gifts (mahādana).

This theme of the observance of the five precepts by laymen in daily life is continued in the next, the Uposatha Vagga where the great advantages are detailed of the observance of the eight precepts, which are summed up in the concluding stanzas of sutta 42 of this Book of Eights.

This sutta and the concluding verses are repeated in the following suttas, with alteration of place name and disciple.

In the 46th sutta the Buddha explains to Anuruddha the eight qualities whereby women are reborn with lovely form, and the same are repeated to the famous lay disciples Visākhā and Nakulamatā at Sāvatthī and in the Bhagga country, respectively. Then once again to Visākhā the Buddha explains the four qualities whereby a woman wins power in this world and the four qualities whereby she gains power in the next world. Each item is explained, and the whole sutta repeated to the monks (A. IV, pp. 262–73).).

The entire story of Mahā Pajāpatī Gotamī’s desire to renounce the world, the Buddha’s thrice repeated refusal to admit women into the Order, Ānanda’s intercession and ultimate success is found in the Vinaya Piṭaka Cullavagga, x, 1. where the origin of the Bhikkhuṇī-Sangha is related. But here in the Aṅguttara Nikāya this sutta is not out of place either, as the story terminates with the eight cardinal rules (garu-dhamma), by accepting which Mahā Pajāpatī was deemed to have received the full ordination (upasampadā) (A. IV, pp. 274–9).).

The sutta which bears the title of a nickname Dīghajānu “Long Knees” given to a householder of the Koliyan clan called Tigerfoot (Byagghapajja) is another example of the manner in which many suttas were composed. The eight items needed for the Aṭṭhaka-nipāta are actually the subjects of two suttas of four each. The four conditions leading to happiness here on earth and the four channels through which wealth amassed will flow away. Elsewhere, in the Sigālovāda Suttanta D. III, p. 182, we find six channels for dissipating wealth, but only two bear any resemblance to the channels mentioned in the Aṅguttara Nikāya. The concluding verses are very cosmopolitan, as pointed out by E.M. Hare Gradual Sayings, IV, p. 191, n. 1. “This gāthā provides a good example of how probably many verses came into being; thus the first line (of the text) recurs at (J. VI, p. 297), with the last word reading vicakkhaṇo for vidhānavā, which recurs a little higher up, p. 287; cp. (S. I, p. 214); the second half of the second line recurs at (A. IV, p. 266) and 271; the third line at (A. IV, p. 271), and the second half of it at (S. I, p. 34); the fourth line and first half of the fifth also at (A. IV, p. 271); the second half of the latter at (A. IV, p. 26)}; and the seventh line recurs at (D. II, p. 240); (A. III, p. 354)”.

Another sutta, which appears to be out of place, occurs in the next chapter Alaṁ Sutta in the Bhūmicāla Vagga: A. IV, p. 26–9. where six qualities (not eight!) make a monk both self-sufficient and useful for others. The proportion of usefulness, however, varies with different individuals.

This is followed by the Saṅkhitta Sutta Ibid. pp. 299–302. where a brief exposition is given about the development of mental training in various stages leading to arahantship.

Deliverance (vimokkha) in eight different stages from the more crude conceptions of forms of one’s individual body, till the ending of perception and feeling (saññā-vedayita-nirodha), is described in the Vimokkha Sutta Ibid. p. 306..

The concluding Bhūmicāla Sutta of this seventh chapter of the same name contains with some slight variations of the story which recurs elsewhere Ibid. pp. 308–13; Ud. 62; (S. V, p. 259, D. II, p. 102). of the broad hint given by the Buddha, which, however, was not understood by Ānanda, that the Buddha could have remained on earth, if he so wished, for his full span of life or for what was left of it. A full life-span would have been “a hundred years or a little more”, for the words kappaṁ and kappāvasesaṁ are by the commentary not explained as implying a complete world-cycle (kevala-kappa).

The Saddhā Sutta of the Yamaka Vagga, the chapter on pairs, thus called because the first six suttas deal in pairs with the same subject-matter, gives the eight qualities which make a monk altogether pleasing and serene (samantapāsādika), and perfect in every way (sabbākāra paripūra) (A. IV, pp. 314–15).).

Awareness of death (maraṇa-sati) should be practised so constantly that even if one were to ponder over the word of the Buddha in this respect occasionally, he would still be considered to live indolently, unless that thought would be in his mind with every morsel of food eaten, with every breath taken Ibid. pp. 316–319..

The bases of indolence (kusīta-vatthu) are later explained in the concluding sutta Ibid. pp. 332–5; cp. D. III, p. 255. of this chapter, which is an extract from the Sangīti Suttanta, together with the eight bases, or mental inceptions of energy, for, as everywhere else, thought precedes action.

Mindfulness (sati) is once again the theme of the opening sutta (A. IV, pp. 336–7).) of the ninth chapter, where we are presented with a chain of dependent conditions, reminiscent of the chain of Dependent Origination (Paṭiccasamuppāda). The Mūla Sutta Ibid. pp. 338–9; A. IV, p. 26–7. is repeated and enlarged in the Book of Tens and will be dealt with there.

As talk about robbers is classified under the so-called “beastly talk” (tiracchāna-kathā), we are surprised by a Sutta giving a highwayman’s code with eight stipulations (A. IV, p. 339).

The Yasa Sutta Ibid. pp. 340–4. is a repetition of the last sutta of the third chapter in the Book of Fives, and has already been mentioned in its proper place. It appears also in the Book of Sixes as sutta 42. Nāgita was at that time the Buddha’s personal attendant. He received the instruction which was refused to some brāhman householders who came to pay homage (yasa) to the Buddha, but who were not admitted because of the great noise made by them.

The four last suttas of this Sati Vagga speak of different aspects of relationship between monks and lay-people and when and how defects can be rectified Ibid. pp. 344–7..

There is an appendix to this chapter, consisting of a mere list of 27 names of lay-women, three of whom are called disciples (upāsikā), while four others are mentioned only as being the mother of a more famous son or daughter. There is no connection either between themselves, or with preceding or subsequent suttas. As a matter of fact, no reason is given why they are mentioned at all.

The concluding chapter of this Book of Eights is once more in the form of a summary. The eight sections of the Noble Eightfold Path (although the Path as such is not mentioned), the eight spheres of mastery (abhibhāyatana) or powers to be obtained in meditative exercises (bhāvanā) and the eight deliverances (vimokkha) which are three types of detachment from the perception of forms and the five states of mental absorption in the immaterial sphere, are the three sets of eight states which have to be developed (bhāvetabba) for ten purposes, which are enumerated. This summary could thus be developed and counted as 510 suttas, wherewith the Book of Eights ends.

IX. The Book of Nines (Navaka-nipāta) contains some definitely original touches, such as the “conditions that wing to awakening” (sambodha-pakkhika) differing in every detail from the usual seven “factors of enlightenment” (sambojjhaṅga) and having only a remote resemblance to a few of the 37 “parts of awakening” (bodhipakkhiya dhamma). It has also some interesting, human, individual touches, e.g., when the Buddha appeals to Meghiya, his personal attendant, not to leave him, but to “stay awhile, till some other monk appears, for we are alone” Ibid. p. 355., or when he complains about the length of Nandaka’s Dhamma-discourse, which was so long that “my back ached as I stood outside the doorway, waiting for the discourse to end” Ibid. p. 359.. But, apart from all this, the Book of Nines shows also many obvious signs of patchwork. For the same first sutta, the Sambodhapakkhika Sutta, is a composition of five conditions and “another four to be cultivated” (cattāro dhammā uttariṁ bhāvetabbā). Whereas the five conditions are explained with some detail, the “further four” are disposed of in exactly fourteen words. The suggestion of this being the compiler’s idea, who was in need of nine items, is all the more powerful when it is noticed that the five earlier conditions conclude with “wisdom with ariyan penetration concerning the way: to the complete destruction of woe”. Any “further conditions to put away lust, ill-will, distraction and conceit” would seem to be utterly out of place.

The immediately following Nissayasampanna Sutta Ibid. pp. 353–4; cp. A. IV, p. 26). has a similar arrangement, where a group of five has incongruously been augmented with another group of four.

In the Nandaka Sutta (A. IV, pp. 358–63).) the Buddha enumerates only four items which go into the perfection of a monk. And with these four and the Buddha’s departure from the hall the sutta could have ended, but for its inclusion in the Book of Nines, for which reason Nandaka is made to continue the discourse giving five advantages from listening to the Dhamma at the proper time.

And again in the next sutta we find four powers geared to five fears: “In possession of those four powers, the ariyan disciple has overcome these five fears” Ibid. p. 365..

The nine standards which cannot be (abhabba) transgressed by an arahant in whom all evil inclination is destroyed are enumerated in the Sutavā Sutta Ibid. pp. 369–71..

The second chapter opens with a beautiful sutta, named the Vuṭṭhi Sutta, which is Sāriputta’s lion-roar (sīhanāda) after having been falsely accused by a fellow-monk. On hearing this “lion-roar” the monk confesses his transgression of falsely accusing Sāriputta from whom he begs and obtains pardon Ibid. pp. 373–8..

The Sa-upādisesa Sutta Ibid. pp. 378–82. explains the nine types of people who although they die with some remainder of attachment (sa-upādisesa), yet will not be subject to rebirth in any of the four spheres of woe. The Buddha shows some reluctance in declaring this, as he fears that this knowledge might result in a tendency to idleness.

In the next sutta an interesting discussion has been recorded between Mahā Koṭṭhita, who elsewhere (A. I, p. 24). is called chief among the disciples who are masters of logical analysis, and Sāriputta. The discussion takes place about the expectation, goal or purpose (attha) of leading a holy life under the guidance of the Buddha (A. IV, pp. 382–5).).

The Saññā Sutta Ibid. p. 387. adds two more items, renunciation and freedom from passion, to the seven perceptions mentioned in the Book of Sevens in the sutta of the same name Ibid. p. 46.

The eight precepts (aṭṭhaṅgika-sīla) to be observed by lay disciples on the new and full-moon days (uposatha) are given a psychological impetus by the recollection that they were observed by arahants all their lives. An additional paragraph on boundless loving kindness as a further qualification completes the group of nine, required in the Book of Nines Ibid. pp. 388–90..

The Velāma Sutta which concludes this second chapter illustrates how the value of a meritorious act is not only dependent on the value of the gift and the purity, of intention of the donor, but also on the worthiness of the recipient Ibid. pp. 392–6..

The word abhidhamma occurs in the Khaḷuṅka Sutta Ibid. pp. 397–400., but it has not the meaning acquired later on, of “special dhamma”, still less of “transcendental teaching”. In its juxtaposition with abhivinaya the simple meaning is: “what pertains to the Dhamma”.

In the same chapter occur further two suttas which, if compared, shed an interesting light on the mental development of one on the Path of Sainthood. In the 25th Sutta, alternatively called in different manuscripts Paññā Sutta or Saññā Sutta, the arahant full of wisdom is said to be able to declare his achievement in the impersonal statements: “Rebirth is destroyed, the holy life has been lived, done is what had to be done, no further life under such conditions”. But in the Vera (bhaya) Sutta Ibid. pp. 405 ff., the stream-enterer (sotāpanna) declares his personal attainment, which is not final even though he cannot recede and which has left him with some major fetters such as self-conceit (asmimāna) and ignorance (avijjā). This is shown in the very words of his declaration: “Destroyed for me is rebirth in the lower worlds (khīṇanirayo'mhi), I am a streamwinner (sotāpanno'ham asmi)”.

The last sutta Ibid. p. 409. of the third chapter would have been better placed as the first sutta of the fourth chapter, for its subject matter is very analogous to that of all the ten suttas of the following Mahā Vagga. All these eleven suttas speak of the nine states of mental absorption (jhāna), either in the fine material spheres of form (rūpajjhāna), or in the immaterial or formless spheres (arūpajjhāna). It is this attainment which makes the mind subtle and pliant, enabling it to develop boundless concentration and realisation of psychic knowledge; or should one wish, after destruction of the intoxicants, one could enter and abide in the realisation of emancipation Ibid. pp. 418 ff.. The destruction of the intoxicants (āsava), which according to the commentary hereon is equivalent to arahantship, is dependent on the various states of mental absorption Ibid. pp. 422 ff.. Mental absorption, however, is not always conjoined with perception. But as long as perception is present in the attainments, penetrative insight may arise. The two states, however, of neither-perception-nor-non-perception and of the cessation of both perception and sensation should for that reason not be despised, but spoken well of by those who are skilled in both entering and emerging from those states. This attainment of cessation (nirodha-samāpatti) is called elsewhere Poṭṭhapāda Sutta: A. IV, p. 26). the summit of consciousness (saññagga) which is only found in a “non-returner” (anāgāmin) and an arahant, who alone have the necessary qualifications of perfection; and even in them there must be a balance of the power of serenity (samathabala) with that of insight (vipassanābala) for this final attainment to occur Vism. xxiii, § 18, p. 605..

At Kosambī Ānanda explains to his fellow-monks that in the immaterial states of mental absorption the senses would be there, but without contacting the objects and without sensing the spheres. Such a one is thus percipient (saññā) but does not discern the sense-sphere (āyatana) Ibid. pp. 426 ff.. This kind of concentration is “not controlled by conscious effort” Gradual Sayings. IV, p. 287. and has arahantship as its fruit (aññāphala).

In the last sutta of this Great Chapter we find the various states of mental absorption (jhāna) leading up, as usual, to the cessation of perception and sensation (saññā-vedaytia-nirodha) and insight of the total destruction of the intoxicants (āsavā parikkhaya). But the approach thereto is different, for it is the understanding of the danger of sense satisfaction which makes the mind leap up in joy in seeing the advantage of renunciation, whereupon the mind becomes clear, composes itself and is freed, seeing: “This indeed is peace” (A. IV, pp. 438) ff.).

The next two chapters, comprising twenty-one suttas are mere variants of the identical theme on the four material states of mental absorption (rūpajjhāna), the four immaterial states of mental absorption (arūpajjhāna) and the attainment of cessation, of perception and sensation, which are called a way of escape from the noose Ibid. pp. 449 ff..

All ten suttas of the seventh chapter refer to the four methods of setting up mindfulness (satipaṭṭhāna), each time, however, combined with a different set of five Ibid. pp. 457–61..

The ten suttas of the eighth chapter are identical with the preceding ten, apart from the four methods of mindfulness (satipaṭṭhāna) which have been replaced by the four right efforts (sammapadhāna) Ibid. pp. 462–3.. A similar treatment is followed in the ninth chapter, where the four bases of psychic power (iddhipada) Ibid. pp. 463–4. form the common factor.

The concluding chapter of the Book of Nines comprises, as before, 340 suttas summarised in a few words only.

X. The Book of Tens (Dāsaka-nipāta) is no exception to the almost regular feature we have encountered from the Book of Sixes onward, namely, that frequently the number required in a particular Book is made up by component parts. An extreme case in this respect is the Vera Sutta (A. V, pp. 182–4).) where the required ten components are made up of the fivefold guilty dread (pañca bhayāni verāni), the four phases of stream winning (sotāpattiyaṅga), and penetration of the Ariyan method through insight (paññā). Other cases will be noted in due course.

The opening suttas of this Book employ the system of causal relation. Thus the profit (ānisaṁsa) of good conduct is freedom from remorse, and then joy is the profit of freedom from remorse; joy further leads on to rapture, calm, happiness, concentration, knowing and seeing things as they really are, revulsion and fading of interest, release through knowledge and insight Ibid. pp. 1–7.. Thus one state causes the fulfilment of another state.

In suttas six and seven, first the Buddha and then Sāriputta explain to Ānanda that it is possible to have perception and yet to be without any distinct awareness.

The three following suttas speak of ten qualities which make a monk altogether charming and perfect. The three versions agree as regards the first seven. The first two suttas then agree on a further quality of living in the forest in solitude, which quality is described in the tenth sutta as an ability to remember previous existences. The ninth quality, however, is different in all three suttas. In sutta eight it is an ability to attain the various states of mental absorption (jhāna) at will; in sutta nine it is a physical experience of the formless, having transcended all matter (atikkamma rūpe āruppā te kāyena phuṣitvā); and in sutta ten it is the possession of the supernormal faculty of clairvoyance (dibbacakkhu). The final quality is again found to be identical in all three suttas: the realisation of the mind’s release through insight, having destroyed the mental intoxicants (āsava) Ibid. pp. 10–14, .

The next four suttas betray a fair amount of patchwork which enabled the compiler to include them in this Book of Tens: a monk with five qualities should resort to a dwelling place which is complete with five factors Ibid. pp. 15 f.. All-round proficiency (kevalī) is acknowledged in the monk who has given up the group of five spiritual obstacles, generally known, though not so styled here, as hindrances (nīvaraṇa), and who is complete in the sum total of an accomplished (asekha) one’s attainment of virtue, concentration, insight, deliverance and the knowledge thereof Ibid. pp. 16 f.. Fetters (saṁyojana) are enumerated in two groups of five, gross and subtle Ibid. p. 17.. Five mental obstructions (cetokhila) are yoked to five bondages of the mind (cetaso vinibandha) Ibid. pp. 17–21., which two groups of five are found in two adjoining suttas in the Book of Fives A. III pp. 248–50. and appear as a whole in what is probably the original Cetokhila Sutta (M. I, pp. 101–4).).

The first of the two Nātha Suttas (A. V, pp. 23–5).) contains the word abhidhamma, but it does not have the specialised meaning of that section of Buddhist philosophy collected in the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka, although the commentary states it has.

The Ariyavāsa Suttas summarise first the details given in the Saṅgīti Suttanta (D. III, p. 269). and then give the sutta in full. These ten conditions of noble living, occurring as they do in different Nikāyas, do not thereby provide proof of seniority, or of borrowing, one way or the other. Each may have incorporated the passage or stanza or episode from the common stock of such passages, etc., handed down in the community T.W. Rhys Davids Introd. to Dialogues of the Buddha. III, p. viii.. Still, it will be observed that the style and composition are entirely according to the plan generally observed in the Aṅguttara Nikāya, and not according to the plan of the Dīgha and Majjhima Nikāyas, where suttas are arranged according to length.

The following chapter, called the Great Chapter (Mahā Vagga) consists of the usual ten suttas, and is the longest chapter of this Book of Tens. In the opening sutta the Buddha claims leadership on ten grounds, which are generally known as the ten powers of a Buddha (dasa Tathāgata-balāni) (A. V, pp. 32–6).).

These ten powers are repeated in the following sutta, but the introduction differs, when the Buddha tells Ānanda, that his method of preaching is such, that, if he who listens to him is a follower of the path (paṭipanno), he will know the real from the unreal.

The two Kasiṇa Suttas Ibid. pp. 46–7. mention the ten devices for the development of mental concentration (samādhi) and absorption (jhāna). They are objects of concentration suited to different temperaments.

In sutta 26, the Kālī Sutta, occurs one of the rare instances where another sutta is quoted, the quotation here being from the Kumāri-pañha, the Maiden’s Questions, from the Saṁyutta Nikāya, the Sutta of Māra’s Daughters (S. I, p. 126).

The next two suttas are called the Mahāpañha Sutta, for they contain the great questions which together with their respective statements and explanations are said to embody the specific teaching of the Buddha, for “I behold not one who could convince the mind with an explanation of these questions except the Tathāgata or one of his disciples, or one who had learnt from them”. The ten questions and answers, however, slightly vary in the two suttas (A. V, pp. 48–59).) one from the other, while the first one has more points in common with another version occurring in the Khuddakapāṭha (2). The Citta Saṁyutta in the Saṁyutta Nikāya refers also to ten questions which were put by Citta, the house father, to Nātaputta, the Nigaṇṭha, but for which he did not receive a reply (S. I, pp. 207–300).). The commentary refers to them as the Kumāra-pañha. They will receive detailed attention under that title.

The Great Chapter concludes with two Kosala Suttas (A. V, pp. 59–69).) of which the first one deals with the fading of interest (nibbindati) and revulsion (virajjati) in the contemplation of universal change (aññathatta) and reverse (vipariṇāma). These vicissitudes occur even to Mahā Brahma, the chief of the thousandfold world-system.

In the second sutta the king of Kosala demonstrates with profound humility such a show of affection for the Buddha, that the Buddha himself asks him for an explanation, which the king gives.

The ten suttas of the chapter are replies given by the Buddha to questions of Upāli and Ānanda, regarding the object in view of the training of disciples (sāvakānaṁ sikkhāpadaṁ) and the rules of discipline (pāṭimokkha) Ibid. p. 70.; the ten necessary qualifications for a monk to be allowed to sit in judgement over a dispute involving the expulsion of a bhikkhu (ubbāhika) Ibid. p. 71.; his qualifications to give full ordination (upasampadā) Ibid. p. 72.; and to be in charge of pupils (nissaya) Ibid. p. 73.. The suttas as to what constitutes a schism in the Order (saṅghabheda) are repeated as Upāli and Ānanda ask the same question Ibid. pp. 73–5.; likewise the suttas as to what constitutes harmony in the Order (saṅgha-sāmaggi) Ibid. pp. 74 and 76.. The results of causing a schism and causing harmony in the Order are given respectively in suttas 38 and 40.

In the chapter on abuse (Akkosa Vagga) only the first three suttas and the last one Ibid. pp. 77–9 and 88–91. dealing with quarrels (vivāda) have any bearing on the title whereas subsequent suttas deal with the conditions in a monk who wishes to exhort another Ibid. pp. 79–81., the disadvantages of frequenting the royal court Ibid. pp. 81–3., the advantages of observing the eight precepts on uposatha-days Ibid. pp. 83–6., some rules of conduct for him who has renounced the home-life Ibid. pp. 87–8., conditions to be remembered, conducive to fellow-feeling, peace, concord and unity Ibid. pp. 88–91..

Self-examination (paccavekkhamāna) is shown as a method of self-exhortation to put forth extra exertion and attention for the abandoning of unwholesome mental states which result from lack of self-control Ibid. pp. 92–4.. This discourse delivered by the Buddha is repeated verbatim by Sāriputta in the next sutta.

The Ṭhiti Sutta Ibid. pp. 96–8. throws an interesting light on the constant need of progress, of growth in spiritual life. For the Buddha does not speak in praise of standing still, leave alone falling off.

That introspection leads to peace of heart is the theme of the Samatha Sutta Ibid. pp. 98–102., for self-knowledge will teach a monk his shortcomings, and make him strive for perfection.

The eight items enumerated in the Book of Eights are here augmented with two further conditions: All things plunge into the deathless (amatogadha), and their conclusion is Nibbāna (nibbāna-pariyosāna) (A. IV, pp. 338–9); V, pp. 106–7.).

The Girimānanda Sutta (A. V, pp. 108–12).) is a recital of ten reflections whereby the illness of Girimānanda was allayed immediately. On this ground the recital has found a place in the Paritta suttas or Verses of Protection.

The Yamaka Vagga opens with a sutta Ibid. pp. 113–16. which has a familiar ring of dependent origination. The sutta, however, is outstanding in respect of its first term “ignorance” (avijjā) which is discussed more completely than usual. “The ultimate beginning of ignorance is not discernible which makes some people say that ignorance came into being at a certain stage, before which there was no ignorance. But, although ignorance arises in dependence on conditions, yet there was no time when there was no ignorance. Ignorance, too, I declare, monks, has its nutriment (sāhāra), namely, the five hindrances (nīvaraṇa)”.

Observations made in the following sutta regarding craving to become (bhavataṇhā) follow the same pattern as those made in respect of ignorance (avijjā) earlier.

“Those who have attained the summit through their falling in with me mayi niṭṭhaṅgati nitṭhāgatā nibbematikā: AA. V, p. 44., all of them have attained right views either having reached the goal of perfection here on earth, or reaching it on leaving this earthly life ... Similarly, those who have perfect trust in me, they all have entered the stream of holiness (sotāpanna) and will either reach the goal of perfection in this life itself or on leaving it”. Such is the gist of two parallel suttas in the Buddha’s own words (A. V, pp. 119–20).).

Other pairs of suttas in this Yamaka Vagga deal with two aspects of weal and woe Ibid. pp. 120–2., preached by Sāriputta, with twin occurrences at Naḷakapāna, when the Buddha complains of back-ache and hands over the instruction of the monks to Sāriputta Ibid. pp. 122–8., and with the ten worthy topics of talk to be engaged in Ibid. pp. 128–30..

A fine moral discourse on wishing (ākaṅkhā) has given the title to the eighth chapter: Various and worthy wishes are mentioned and how they could be fulfilled Ibid. pp. 131–3..

The Migasālā Sutta Ibid. pp. 137–44; cp. Gradual Sayings, V, Introd. pp. vii-viii. has been unduly and undeservedly criticised by the translator, F.L. Woodward, and by C.A.F. Rhys Davids. Here a woman lay disciple has expressed her failing to understand the law of karma, seeing no difference in results of two ways of living, her father dying as a pious man leading a life of abstinence, and her uncle dying as a man enjoying the pleasures of married life. The Buddha explains that it is not external appearances of bodily activity which determine the measure of a man’s perfection. “Hence, be no measurer of persons”, for, where one excels in virtue, another may excel in insight.

The Nigaṇṭha Sutta (A. V, p. 150). speaks in unmistakably depreciating terms of the ten qualities contrary to the dhamma, of which this sect of naked ascetics led by Nātaputta was possessed. It is, therefore something of an eye-opener to find that depreciating others (paravambhana) is one of these evil qualities of which the Nigaṇṭhas are accused. The commentary is discretly silent.

The ninth chapter of this Book of Tens is called the Thera Vagga as practically every sutta is connected with an event in which one or other of the great elders plays an important part. Thus Bāhuna Ibid. pp. 151–2. questions the Buddha about the states of release in which he dwells with a mind without restrictions (vimariyādikata); Ānan-da Ibid. pp. 152–4. is instructed by the Buddha on the ten qualities without which no growth, increase or perfection in the understanding of the teaching and practice of the discipline is possible; Puṇṇiya Ibid. pp. 154–5. receives from the Buddha an explanation of the various conditions necessary for him to give a discourse of this doctrine; Mahā Moggallāna, Mahā Cunda and Mahā Kassapa Ibid. pp; 155–64. speak in turn of the monk who falsely claims supernormal attainments; the Kokālikan monk comes to grief while reviling Sāriputta and Moggallāna Ibid. pp. 170–4. This well-known story occurs also in Sn. III, p. 10; (S. I, p. 148–50.; Sāriputta explains at the Buddha’s request the ten powers (dāsa balani) (A. V, pp. 174–6). Eight of these powers are mentioned earlier: A. IV, pp. 223–5).) possessed by him who has destroyed the intoxicants (khīnāsava).

Some of the discourses belonging to the tenth chapter refer to interviews with householders such as Anāthapiṇḍika and Vajjiyamāhita, and with ascetic wanderers such as Uttiya and Kokanuda, and these have given the name Upāsaka Vagga to the entire chapter. Worldly sense pleasures are discussed and only the layman, who seeks them with lawful means, makes himself happy and by sharing them with others accumulates merit; he who uses his wealth without greed or pride, and who is aware of the danger involved, only he is worthy of praise; whereas nine other types fall short of praise on one count or another (A. V, pp. 176–82).).

The discourse on the five fears of doing wrong (pañca bhayāni verāni) has been made to fit the Book of Tens by the addition of four factors of stream-entering (sotāpattiyaṅga) and the noble method (ariya-ñāya) which is the right view and right penetration by means of insight, the perfect comprehension of the law of dependent origination leading to the cessation of ill Ibid, pp. 182–4..

In the Diṭṭhi Sutta Ibid. pp. 185–9. we have a debate between Anāthapiṇḍika and a group of ascetics who are not further identified apart from their “holding other views” (aññadiṭṭhiyā paribbājakā).

The same heretical views are in the Uttiya Sutta Ibid. pp. 193–5. put to the Buddha for his comment, whether they are the truth (sacca) or a stupid view (mogha), by Uttiya, the ascetic, who elsewhere (Thag. v. 34). is mentioned as entering the Saṅgha and attaining arahantship while stricken with a severe illness. But the Buddha insists on his usual: “This I have not declared (avyākata). But I do declare my teaching for the purification of beings, for the overcoming of sorrow, for the realisation of Nibbāna”. Uttiya’s further question, whether the whole world will ultimately realise this, is met with a complete silence by the Buddha, although Ānanda tries to explain this silence by means of an illustration. As, however, the Buddha’s silence is more eloquent than Ānanda’s explanation, this attempt on his part to save the situation appears rather suspiciously as an interpolation by someone who failed to understand the import of avyākata, especially in view of the following sutta (A. V, pp. 196–8).) where Ānanda condemns all views and attachment to opinions in one who knows and comprehends the nature of the world of existence. A debate between the householder Vajjiyamāhita and some wandering ascetics of different views Ibid. pp. 189–92. follows the same outlines as the earlier debate of Anāthapiṇḍika, although the subject differs, for here the Buddha is accused of being a nihilist. Vajjiyamāhita, however, points out that the Buddha has clearly defined what is good and what is evil, and cannot, therefore, be called a nihilist (venayika).

It is not quite clear whether the various suttas and gāthās in which Upāli is mentioned all refer to the same individual. From their contradictory inclinations two or more disciples of the same name are probable. The disciple in the Upāli Sutta Ibid. pp. 201–9. of the Upāsaka Vagga (which is called by the commentary the Upāli Vagga) wishes to live in jungle-solitude, but the Buddha points out to him the danger of living in solitude, if one has not won concentration of mind. As different games are suitable to different ages, so the mind finds delight in various conditions which differ with the mental progress made. The Buddha concludes with advising Upāli to remain living with the Saṅgha. The commentary suggests a connection between the stay of this Upāli amongst the brethren and his becoming the chief exponent of the Vinaya AA. V, p. 69..

The Samaṇa-saññā Vagga has received its name from the opening sutta of the same name, which deals very briefly with three thoughts which a monk should cultivate in order to complete seven conditions (A. V, pp. 210–11). “To be without covetousness” is omitted in Woodward’s trsl. Gradual Sayings, V, p. 148.).

The next sutta enumerates the seven links of wisdom (bojjhaṅga) with threefold knowledge of former existences, of clairvoyance, of realisation.

The Micchatta Sutta Ibid. pp. 211–12. adds knowledge (ñāṇa) and deliverance (vimutti) to the eight sections which constitute the Eightfold Path (aṭṭhaṅgika-magga), wrong (micchā) as well as right (sammā), although the commentary leaves us in the dark as to the significance of wrong release (micchā vimutti), which probably refers to a deluded state of mind which erroneously assumes having attained final deliverance.

Ablutions (dhovana) 304 A. IV, p. 26–17); AA. V, p. 71, such as the washing of dead bones, do not bring profit, but the ariyan ablution which washes away all wrong views, leads to release from rebirth and fullness of culture (bhāvanā-pāripūrī). Similarly, the purging (virocana) administered by physicians may check various illnesses, but only the ariyan purge, which cleanses all wrong views, will purge all rebirth, decay and death (A. V, pp. 218–19..

The first four suttas Ibid. pp. 222–32. of the twelfth chapter of the Book of Tens deal with adhamma and dhamma in the sense of wrong and right, and with anattha and attha or uselessness and profit, without, however, adding much to the earlier exposition of wrong views, etc. The following two suttas Ibid. pp. 232–3. only introduce a new term of comparison: the near shore (orima-tīra) which is the wrong view, and the further shore (pārima-tīra) which is the right view leading to deliverance. The verses attached to these suttas are found also in the Dhammapada (85–89) and the Saṁyutta Nikāya (S. V, 24).

The two types of descent (paccorohaṇī) Ibid. pp. 233–6., a brāhman ceremony connected with fire worship, and the ariyan discipline which is a descent from wrong views are discussed by the brāhman Jāṇussoṇi and the Buddha, respectively, giving a title to the entire chapter.

Chapter xiii, Parisuddha Vagga, contains eleven suttas of bare enumerations of right views, etc., under different aspects, “not found anywhere else but in the discipline of the Blessed One” (Sugata-vinaya). Wrong views and right views together with the other nine wrong and right states of the Micchatta Sutta Ibid. pp. 211–12. remain the only topic for the next three chapters xiv, xv and xvi, comprising 33 suttas in the Sādhu Vagga, the Ariyamagga Vagga and the Puggala Vagga Ibid. pp. 240–9..

Another “descent” from wrong view is taught by the Buddha Ibid. pp. 249–51. once more to the brāhman Jāṇussoṇi through the abandoning of the ten evil actions of killing, etc. It is this substitution of the ten evil actions for the ten wrong views, etc., that marks the chief difference in the suttas of this seventeenth chapter where all the other particulars are mere repetitions of earlier suttas. But a fuller explanation of these ten evil actions (akusala-kamma) of body, speech and mind is found in the Cunda Sutta Ibid. pp. 263–8.. These evil actions lead to spheres of rebirth where no profit can be gained from offerings made here on earth Ibid. pp. 269–73..

Here follow again three chapters, xviii, xix and xx, which with their titles Sādhu Vagga, Ariyamagga Vagga and Puggala Vagga Ibid. suttas 178–99 (or rather 210, as in certain MSS.), pp. 273–82., are completely identical with chapters xiv, xv and xvi, substituting, however, the ten evil actions for the wrong views, etc.

These ten evil actions and their opposites form the basis of the next eight suttas Ibid. pp. 283–99. where they are considered from the point of view of reward in a life after death, as “beings are responsible for their deeds, heirs of their deeds, ... to them their deeds come home again”. The opening sentence of suttas 206–208 deserves some special attention, as there appears some discrepancy with subsequent doctrinal exegesis regarding the efficacy of action. “Of intentional deeds done (sañcetanikānaṁ kammāmaṁ katānaṁ) there can be no annihilation (na ... vyantibhāvaṁ) without their having caused a resulting experience (appaṭisaṁveditvā, i.e., tesaṁ kammānaṁ vipākaṁ avediyitvā)”. But we know, on the other hand, of karmic action which becomes ineffective (ahosi), either through lack of opportunity or in the face of a stronger opposition of destructive karma (upaghātaka). The commentary AA. V, p. 76., however, circumscribes intentional action as planned with determination (pakappetvā). Did the author here have in mind only such weighty action (garuka-kamma) as that the effect of which cannot be avoided?

This introduction about the efficacy of intentional deeds, as found in the last three suttas, is once more encountered in the next Brahmavihāra Sutta (A. V, pp. 299–301), but does not link up with the main body of this sutta which speaks of the mind’s release through the four so-called sublime states (brahma-vihāra) of loving Kindness (mettā), compassion (karuṇā), sympathetic joy (muditā) and equanimity (upekhā). The demonstrative pronoun so, linked with ariyasāvako, moreover, has no antecedent to refer to, which also indicates that there has been some kind of appropriation from another source. A word quite frequently used in this sutta, and one which has given a title to the entire chapter, called the Karajakāya Vagga, is “this body sprung from action” (karaja-kāya), an expression always used in a contemptible manner, therefore, implying the impure, vile, low body PED. s.v.. Another interesting expression is citantaro ayaṁ macco, which the commentary AA. V, pp. 77–8. explains as this mortal body which as a result of a dying thought moment may find itself reborn with relinking consciousness in heavenly spheres, in the underworld, in the animal kingdom; or could it be simpler: a reflection of the inner state of mind?

The final chapter of this Book of Tens has no official title, neither have the ten suttas contained therein.

Sutta 210 speaks of the ten immoral actions, the commitment of which leads to hell (niraya), the abstinence wherefrom leads to heaven (sagga). Sutta 211 speaks of the same actions through commitment and encouragement; sutta 212, through commitment, encouragement and approval; sutta 213 through commitment, encouragement, approval and praise. These forty qualities do not lead to the uprooting of self, but lead to downfall and are signs of a fool (A. V, pp. 308–9).).

The Book concludes with three sets of ten qualities, one set being reflections on the ugly, etc., another set being reflections on impermanence, on soullessness, etc., and the third set being the eight sections of the Noble Eightfold Path (ariya-aṭṭhaṅgika-magga) with the addition of right insight (sammā-ṅāṇa) and right deliverance (sammā-vimutti). These three sets lead to the comprehension, complete understanding, utter destruction, abandoning, waning and disappearing of seventeen immoral mental states, thereby constituting a synopsis of 306 suttas, although the text enumerates them as three (217–219).

XI. The final Book of Elevens (Ekādasaka-nipāta), opens with five suttas which merely repeat the first five suttas of the Book of Tens. But here the compound term “distaste-dispassion” (nibbida-virāgā) is split and counted as two.

Three suttas Ibid. pp. 318–22. on fixed perception (saññā-manasikāra) discuss and settle the problem that a monk’s concentration may be such that although he is unaware of every kind of perception, yet he is conscious of the calming of all activities of the mind (sabbasaṅkhāra-samatha) \dots, the destruction of craving (taṇhakkhaya) ... Nibbāna.

The problem-of Sandha in the Sekha Sutta Ibid. pp. 322–6. of how a “thoroughbred” man can be absorbed in mind without being absorbed in the things on which he depends, is not answered in this sutta, but a fitting answer could easily be supplied from the foregoing suttas by substituting absorption for perception.

The last sutta Ibid. pp. 326–8. of this Nissaya Vagga is made up of eleven items as follows: three qualities which make a monk fully accomplished: virtue, concentration and insight belonging to an arahant (asekha); three other qualities which are marvellous: supernormal power, thought-reading and exhortation; three further qualities of perfection: right understanding, right insight and right deliverance; and finally two more qualities of wisdom (vijjā) and practice (caraṇa).

Mahānāma, the Sākyan lay-disciple, is advised by the Buddha to develop confidence, energy, mindfulness, concentration and insight. Endowed with those five qualities he should apply his mind to the six recollections (anussati) of the Buddha, his Teaching and the Order, of one’s own virtue, liberality and of celestial beings Ibid. pp. 328–34..

The question of Nandiya, the Sakyan, has much in common with the Mahānāma Sutta, and so has the Buddha’s reply. Apart from the five qualities of confidence, energy, mindfulness, concentration and insight, however, Nandiya is asked to develop virtue. That leaves the compiler with only five items of recollection, which are given as reflections on the Buddha and his Teaching, on the value of a noble friend, on liberality and on celestial beings Ibid. pp. 334–7..

In the Subhūti Sutta Ibid. pp. 337–41. we read of Subhūti, who was a younger brother of Anāthapiṇḍika, coming to the Buddha in the company of a monk named Saddha. This may not have been his actual name, but it certainly was an indication of his characteristic virtue, according to Subhūti’s introduction. Following this the Buddha discourses on the characteristic attributes (padāna) of confidence and trust (saddhā).

The Dasama Sutta Ibid. pp. 342–7: (M. I, pp. 349–53.) will be dealt with separately under the better known name Aṭṭhaka-nāgara Sutta, under which it appears in the Majjhima Nikāya. Likewise, the Gopāla Sutta (A. V, pp. 347–53: M. I, p. 220–4), which is also found in full in the Majihima Nikāya as the Mahāgopālaka Sutta, will be dealt with under that name.

The first of the Four Samādhi Suttas which conclude the Anussati Vagga is identical with the sixth sutta of the Book of Tens. Here, however, the questions are not put to the Buddha by Ānanda, but by an assembly of monks; and to the ten items of perception is added an eleventh, the perception of what is seen, heard, imagined, cognised, obtained, desired or explored by the mind. The three following suttas have slight variations as to the person addressed, Sāriputta, and the additional eleventh item which makes these four suttas fit into the Book of Elevens A. V, suttas 19–22, pp. 353–8..

The final chapter, which has no title, is the usual summary: eleven qualities, viz., the four states of mental absorption (jhāna), deliverance of the mind through the four sublime states, and realisation through concentration on the three formless spheres of unbounded space, infinite consciousness and nothingness, these eleven qualities must be developed for the comprehension, understanding, destruction, abandoning, cessation, waning, disappearing, ending, liberation and renunciation of lust, hate, delusion, anger, enmity, hypocrisy, malice, envy, avarice, deceit, treachery, obstinacy, impetuosity, pride, conceit, mental intoxication and negligence, thereby constituting a synopsis of 170 suttas, although the text enumerates them as two Ibid. pp. 359–61..

And herewith ends the Book of Elevens (Ekādasaka-nipāta) and the whole of the Collection of Gradual Sayings (Aṅguttara Nikāya), which in a concluding verse is said to contain 9557 suttas:

Navasuttasahassāni bhiyyo pañcasatāni ca
Sattapaññāsasuttantā Aṅguttarasamāyutā ti.

One of the five hundred paccekabuddhas who were in ancient times living on the Isigili mountain in seclusion. He was seen by the people of that time entering the mountain range, but was never seen thereafter. Hence the people used to say that the mountain had swallowed up the sage (isī gīlatī ti) and named it Isigili. Over 100 names of these paccekabuddhas are given by the Buddha in the Isigili Sutta (M. III, p. 69 f.).

Buddhaghosa in his commentary (MA. II, p. 889) relates how these sages had made their dwellings inside the mountain behind a rock which would open and close like a folding door.

Rāja of Vāraṇavatī. Neither the name of the ruler nor that of his capital appears in Indian historical records. According to the commentary of the Therīgāthā, he was to be betrothed to Sumedhā, the daughter of king Koñca of Mantāvatī. But Sumedhā opposed the decision of her parents in her devotion to religion and aversion to the pleasures of the senses. When Anikaratta was on his way at the appointed time to obtain Sumedhā’s consent, she let down her long hair and cut it off with a knife. As soon as Anikaratta reached the capital, Sumedhā closed the door leading to her apartments in the palace, and in concentration on her hair she attained the first stage of mental absorption (jhāna). From there on she developed the thought of impermanence (anicca). While Anikaratta climbed the palace steps with his arms full of presents of precious stones and gold, which he offered her together with his kingdom. But she scorned his presents and the entreaties of her parents. On the contrary, she preached to them with such eloquence and persuasive power, quoting many similes from the teaching of the Buddha, that when she finally opened her door and laid her tresses at the feet of Anikaratta, he himself pleaded for her with her father:

“O suffer Sumedhā to leave the world,
That she may see the Truth and Liberty”.

Thus having converted Anikaratta, Sumedhā became a bhikkhuṇī and attained arahantship not long after (Thig. vv. 483) ff.).

Tranquillisation of the mind by fixing it on Amida and his Paradise, in faith and self-surrender. Such is the special sense of the term accepted by the Jōdo sect and frequently met with also in the texts of other sects. But, while in other sects this concentration is of an intellectually contemplative type, in the Jōdo sect this mental tranquillity involves an exclusive and absolute devotion to Amida with perfect sincerity, with a profound conviction of one’s own imperfection and of the power of Amida, and with the strong determination to be reborn in his realm (Taishō, No. 365).

(AMG.) appeared first in 1880, edited by Ernest Leroux, Paris, with a report by Mr. Emile Guimet to the Minister of Education and Art on his mission to the Far East in 1876. As a result of this cultural mission to Japan, China, India and Ceylon it was proposed to establish in Lyon a museum of religious objects for those countries and Egypt also, together with a library and a college for Oriental studies with special reference to philosophy and philology. It is this Musée Guimet which has given the name to the Annales.

The most noteworthy contributions from the Buddhist view-point are the following. Extracts from the Pūjāvaliya and the Sarvajña-guṇālaṅkāraya visits of Buddha to the island of Laṅkā (Ceylon) in Vol. I, pp. 117–38. A French translation of the Chinese version (A-mi-to-ching) of the Sukhāvatīvyūha-sūtra by Kumārajīva (AMG. II, pp. 39–44) with the Sanskrit text (pp. 45–64). An analysis of the Kangyur and the Tengyur by Alexander Csoma de Kōrōs (AMG. II, pp. 131–573). Buddhism in Tibet (III, pp. 1–218), by Emile de Schlagintweit.

Fragments, translated from the Kangyur (AMG. V, pp. 1–552), containing part of the history of Śāriputra and Maudgalyāna are found in the Dulva (I, 39–44); history of the life of the Buddha from the moment of his decision to preach his doctrine till the moment of his departure from Bārāṇasī (Dulva, IV, 58–79), the return of Śākyamuni (ibid. 93–118); the death of Prasenajit, the attack of Virūḍhaka on the Śākyas and the death of Virūḍhaka (ibid. X, 141–50 and 160); the final instructions of Śākyamuni to his disciple Ānanda regarding the compilation of the doctrine (Mdo. VI, 181–3); the events after the Parinirvāṇa, the introduction of Buddhism into Kashmir and the succession of the first leaders of the Buddhist brotherhood (Dulva, XI, 684–90).

A new and complete translation of the Lalitavistara (AMG. VI, i–xxiii and 3–398) with notes (ibid. XIX, pp. 1–210) by P.E. Foucaux. The Dāṭhāvaṁsa or the history of the sacred tooth-relic of Gotama, the Buddha, translated by L. de Milloué from the Pali epic poem by Dhammakitti (AMG. VII, 309–94) and a Mémoire on the history of the tooth-relic of Ceylon with an introductory essay on the life and teaching of the Buddha by J. Gerson da Cunha (ibid. pp. 399–482). The Avadāna-śataka or 100 Buddhist legends translated from the Sanskrit text by Léon Feer (ibid. XVIII, pp. i-xxxviii and 1–436).

The feast of the Buddha-image-baptism, as celebrated in Amoy (French; Émoui) by the Chinese Buddhists on the eight day of the fourth month, is described by J.J.M. de Groot (ibid. XI, pp. 307–12), with a general article on Buddhism by the same author in Volume XII, pp. 706–48.

Ancient Siam (Thailand) is the subject of Volume XXVII, arch\ae ologically, epigraphically and geographically, dealing with the ancient civilisations of Indo-China. The ruins of Sajjanālaya and Sukhodaya in the vicinity of Bangkok with Khmer inscriptions find special treatment (ibid. pp. 155–314). This study is continued by Lucien Fournereau in the second part of volume XXXI (1908), pp. 1–138 and 48 plates.

Concurrently with this series was started in 1892 the Annales du Musée Guimet (Bibliothègue d'études) which opened its first volume with a study on the Ṛg Veda and its sources.

The mystic gestures of the officiating priest during the ceremonies of the Tendai and Shingon sects, translated from the Japanese Si-do-in-tzū with the commentary of Hōriou Toki (vol. VIII, publ. 1899) are profusely illustrated with 390 mudrās and 18 plates of the principal Buddhas and bodhisattvas, invoked during this ritual.

H. Kern’s History of Buddhism in India (translated from Dutch into French) appears in this series in 2 volumes (Nos. X and XI, 1901–3).

Volume XII (1906) deals with Bod-yul or Tibet, the paradise of monks, by the curator (conservateur) of the Musée Guimet, L. de Milloué, discussing the country, its people, its history and religion, pantheon, religious institutions, culture and monuments (pp. 1–296).

A study of the history of the kingdom of Nepal by Sylvain Lévi in three volumes (Nos. XVII–XIX, 1905–8) is, of course, a concurrent study of its religion and culture, the third volume being devoted to inscriptions. The cult of Svayambhū Nātha and the primordial Ādi-Buddha and his incarnation as a fish, Matsyendra Nātha, are all dealt with.

The Sacred Books of Cambodia are the objects of study and translation by Adhémard Leclère in volume XX (1906): Life of the Buddha, Life of Devadatta, and the Mahā-Jinaka, Nima-rājā and Dimi Jātakas (Chéadak).

The legend of emperor Aśoka, as found in the Aśokāvadāna, is critically studied by J. Przyluski in volume XXXII (1923).

Th. Stcherbatsky’s Theory of Knowledge and Logic in early Buddhism, translated from the original Russian edition by I. de Manziarly and P. Masson-Oursel, appears in volume XXXVI (1926). Volume XXXVII (1928) gives us the Grammar of classical Tibetan of Thonmi Sambhoṭa of the 7th century.

The History of the Far East in two volumes (Nos. XXXIX and XL, 1929) by René Grousset deals with India, pre-Buddhist China, Mongolia and China under the Ming and Manchu dynasties.

Although not Buddhistic we wish to mention also Volume XLIX where Olivier Lacombe discusses the concept of the absolute according to the Vedānta, of the Brahman and the Ātman in the systems of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja.

The Dharma-samuccaya in Sanskrit with its Tibetan and Chinese versions and a French translation by Lin Li-kuang (chapters 1–5) is found in volume LIII (1946), while volume LIV (published in 1949) gives the fruits of research by the same author on Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna Sūtra.

Symbolism of the throne in ancient India is discussed by Jeannine Auboyer in Vol. LV, published in 1949.

Volume LVII (1948) is an introduction to the study of Avalokiteśvara by Marie-Thérèse de Mallmann.

Tree-worship in ancient India according to Brāhmanic and Buddhist texts and monuments is dealt with in Vol. LIX (1954) by Odette Viennot.

The first Buddhist Councils by André Bareau are discussed in full detail according to the various sources (Vol. LX, 1955).

Another series, also published under the Annales du Musée Guimet, was started in 1889 under the title Bibliothéque de Vulgarisation.

Volume VI (1893), dealing with the Cult of the Dead in China and Annam, has a chapter on the eschatological doctrines of Buddhist origin (pp. 61–73) and the possible influence of Buddhism on funeral rites (pp. 75–79), under the joint authorship of Bouinais and A. Paulus.

The place of women in ancient India is the subject of two lectures delivered by L. de Milloué, on 19 November and 24 December, 1899, from a religious and legal point of view and in literature and drama.

The secular power of the Dalai-lamas is the subject of another lecture by the same scholar on 21 Jan. 1900, and astrology and different forms of divination in India, China and Tibet were discussed in conference on 27 Jan. 1901. All these are found in volume XIV (1903) of this series.

Volume XIX, published in 1906, presents us with a lecture of Sylvain Lévi on the Jātakas (pp. 1–60).

A. Foucher (in Vol. XXX, pp. 97–148) discusses representations from the Jātakas on the bas-reliefs of the Bārhut stūpa. And the same Volume (pp. 149–76) presents us with some resemblances between Buddhism and Christianity, a lecture by L. de Milloué (publ. 1908).

The same author, L. de Milloué, discusses the Svastika (Vol. XXXI, 1909, pp. 83–103), which is followed by Sylvain Lévi’s essay on the sacred texts of Buddhism (pp. 105–29).

The east gateway of the stūpa of Sāñcī is discussed in full detail by A. Foucher in Volume XXXIV (1910, pp. 153–230) with 8 photos.

The second arch\ae ological expedition in Turfan (East Turkistan) is described by LeCoq in Volume XXXV (1910, pp. 267–89).

The Greek origin of the Buddha statue is discussed by A. Foucher in Volume XXXVIII (1912, pp. 231–72) with 12 plates.

Buddhist paintings in India by V. Goloubew (Vol. XL, 1913, pp. 1–34, with 14 plates) deals exclusively with Ajaṇṭā.

Volume XLIII of this series (1921) gives us some pages of the religious history of Japan by Masaharu Anesaki, in which he deals with prince Shōtoku, the pioneer of Japanese civilisation (pp. 7–27), Dengyō and Kōbō, the founders of the Buddhist hierarchy (pp. 29–57), Hōnen, the pious saint (pp. 59–85), Nichiren, the prophet (pp. 87–111), the introduction of Zen Buddhism and its effect on Japanese civilisation (pp. 113–41), and a phase of religious development in modern Japan (pp.
143–72).

(ABORI.) The Oriental Research Institute which took its name after Sir Ramkrishna Gopal Bhandarkar, M.A, Ph.D., LL.D., K.C.I.E., was initiated on the 6th of July, 1915, in Poona, and the first volume of its Annals for 1918–20 opens with the text of the inaugural address delivered on the 16th of December, 1918, by Sir R.G. Bhandarkar, who passed away on 25 August, 1925. Mainly concentrating on studies of Sanskrit texts, the Annals do not overlook other oriental literary work.

From a Buddhist viewpoint the following contributions are of interest: “The different strata in the literary material of the Dīgha Nikāya”, by P.V. Bapat in volume VIII (April, 1926, part i, pp. 1–16). “Magadha and Rājagṛha in the Pali literature”, by B.C. Law (ibid. pp. 159–71). “Ājīvika–-What it means”, by B.M. Barua (ibid. pp. 183–8). “Gateways of Barhut Stūpa”, by B.M. Barua (ibid. pp. 189–96). The “Earnest Wish” in Buddhism, at the hour of death, by Franklin Edgerton (ibid. pp. 231–6). “A Peep into the Later Buddhism”, by B. Bhattacarya (Vol. X, April, 1929, pp. 1–24). “The Place of the Āryasatyas and Pratītyasamutpāda in Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna”, by N. Dutt (Vol. XI, Jan., 1930, pp. 101–27), “Buddhist Logic”, by Durgacharan Chatterji (Vol. XIII, October, 1931, pp. 77–85). “Non-canonical Pali Literature”, by B.C. Law (ibid. Jan., 1932, pp. 97–143). “Pali Chronicles”, by B.C. Law (ibid. April, 1932, pp. 250–99). “The Philosophical Aspect on Ahiṁsā” by Betty Heimann (ibid. pp. 331–4). “Nirvāṇa and Buddhist Laymen”, by B.C. Law (Vol. XIV, Oct., 1932, pp. 80–88). “Geographical Data from Sanskrit Buddhist Literature”, by B.C. Law (Vol. XV, October, 1933, 1–38). “Unidentified sources of the Vimuttimagga”, by P.V. Bapat (ibid. April, 1934, pp. 207–11). “A few Parallels in Jain and Buddhist Works”, by A.M. Ghatage (Vol. XVII, July, 1936, pp. 340–50). “The Pañcaskandhaka by Vasubandhi and its Commentary by Sthiramati”, by V.V. Gokhale (ibid. June, 1937, pp. 276–86). “The Nāgas”, by A. Banerji-Sastri (ibid. Oct., 1937, pp. 338–50). “Mind in the Dhammapada”, by B.C. Law (Vol. XIX, 1938, pp. 90–2). “Side-lights on Aśoka the Great”, by H.C. Seth (Vol. XX, Jan., 1939, pp. 177–87). “Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra on non-vegetarian diet”, by P.C. Divanji (ibid. April, 1939, pp. 317–22). “Identification of Udayana of Kauśāmbi with Udayin of Magadha”, by H.C. Seth (Vol. XXI, Oct., 1939, pp. 97–9). “The Buddhist Conception of Dharma”, by P.T. Raju (ibid. April, 1940, pp. 192–202). “The Chinese Tripiṭaka” by V.V. Gokhale (Vol. XXI, July, 1941, pp. 220–35). “Saṅkha-likhita Brahmacariya”, its Pali interpretation confirmed in Chinese texts, by P.V. Bapat (Vol. XXII, Silver Jubilee Volume, 1942, pp. 61–6). “Sūkara-maddava and the Buddha’s Death”, by Fa Chow (ibid. pp. 127–33). “The supposed Identification of Udayana of Kauśambi with Udayin of Magadha”, by Liladhar B. Keny (Vol. XXIV, Jan., 1943, pp. 60–66). “Buddhist Studies 1918–1943” (substantially the same as the presidential address of the Pali and Buddhism section at the 12th session of the All-India Oriental Conference, Benares, 1943–4), by P.V. Bapat (Vol. XXV, Jan., 1944, pp. 1–35). “Aśvaghoṣa’s Philosophy”, by B.C. Law (Vol. XXVIII, July, 1947, pp. 289–93). “Another valuable collection of Buddhist Sanskrit Manuscripts, containing among others the Śrāmaṇyaphala Sūtra”, by P.V. Bapat (Vol. XXX, 1949, pp. 241–53). “The Buddhist Manu or the Propagation of Hindu Law in Hinayanist Indochina”, by R. Lingat (ibid. pp. 284–97), being a translation of a French paper read at the twenty-first International Congress of Orientalists in Paris, 1948. “Date of Kaniṣka, 1356 B.C”., by D.S. Triveda (ibid. pp. 316–25). “Dates of Lord Buddha”, by Vidya Devi (ibid. p. 346). “Brahma-Nirvāṇa in the Bhagavadgītā”, by A.P. Karmarkar (Vol. XXXI, 1950, pp. 305–6). “The Sanskrit Equivalents of two Pali words” (sammāpāsa, vassakāra) by D.D. Kosambi (Vol. XXXII, 1951, pp. 53–60), “The Sautrāntika Theory of Knowledge”, by D.N. Shastri (Vol. XXXII, 1951, pp. 122–9). “Studies in the Inscriptions of Asoka”, by C.D. Chatterjee (Vol. XXXIII, 1952, pp. 57–82; XXXIV, 1953, pp. 30–50; XXXVII, 1956, pp. 208–33). “A Pali Manuscript in an Indian Script” (Vinaya Pāli Bhāṣā), by P.V. Bapat (Vol. XXXIII, 1952, pp. 197–210). “King Parākramabāhu I of Ceylon”, by B.C. Law (Vol. XXXV, 1954, pp. 1–9). “A short note on King Parākramabāhu I of Ceylon”, by Bimbalacharan Deb (Vol. XXXVI, 1955, pp. 366–9) and B.C. Law (Vol. XXXVII, 1956, pp. 290–1). “The Concept of Ākāśa in Indian Philosophy”, by Indukala H. Jhaveri (Vol. XXXVII, 1956, pp. 300–7). “Pratītya Samutpāda” by Heramba Chatterjee (ibid. pp. 313–18). “Buddhism Recast, a philosophic analysis” by H. Vedantasastri (Vol. XXXIX, 1958, pp. 110–4). “Aśoka and the Taxilā Inscription”, by Radhakrishna Choudhary (ibid. pp. 127–32). In a review of Religions of Ancient India, a collection of six lectures by Louis Renou, the reviewer, V.M. Bedekar, notes the conspicuous absence of Buddhism, which he rightly expected to be included in this series of two lectures on Vedism, three on Hinduism and one on Jainism (Vol. XLI, 1960, p. 195).

The problem of annihilation is closely linked with the problems of existence and creation. In natural history or the science of the earth and its productions there are no absolutely new beginnings or creations and hence no absolute cessations or annihilations. There is an incessant alternation of succeeding states and conditions in a process of change which at times is so slow as to give the impression of entity, of substance, of essence, of existence. Especially in the natural process of reproduction, where a new being evolves from the parent body and continues thereafter on an independent course without apparent detriment to its source, the concept of the creation of a new existence will present itself easily to superficial mind. And, once an independent existence is granted, there is no reason why such existence should not continue indefinitely. Hence, theories about everlasting life, the indestructibility of substances or souls, the infinity of the cause of existence, have been upheld by a great variety of idealistic schools, only to be vehemently opposed and denied by as many materialistic schools of thought.

A midway doctrine which teaches complete destruction of the wicked or unregenerate and is opposed to their eternal punishment in the world to come is unfortunately biased in favour of the survival of the good only; hence it lacks consistency, even though its arguments are attractive to some extent. It has never been formally incorporated in any creed, but only taught by various individual theologians, e.g., Henry Dodwell of Oxford University (1706), Edward White in 1846 and E. Pétavel of Switzerland, towards the end of the 19th century. These views are equally referred to as Conditional Immortality and imply the view that man’s life is not inherently immortal, and that immortality is a gift bestowed on the righteous as a reward for their good lives. We need not delay ourselves with their argument that, if the wicked would live forever in punishment, the element of evil would be also eternal and creation never reach perfection; for the fact of creation itself is here presupposed in a first cause, and perfection is accepted as final attainment. But, the interesting point of this view is that it is based on the essential destructibility of whatever has come into existence. The fault in this system lies in the fact that exceptions are allowed arbitrarily, (a) as a reward for good behaviour, and (b) for the originator of this world system himself.

The Buddhist viewpoint also accepts as one of its most essential tenets the destructibility of whatever has come into existence. But the terms “destructibility” and “existence” have to be duly qualified as in sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā: whatever is of a composite nature is not permanent. First of all, “existence” is never accepted in the sense of substance, substratum, essence, entity. The entire system of Buddhist philosophy, as it is found in the earliest suttas and in the later developed Abhidhamma, is entirely analytic (Vibhajjavāda). The individual puggala is found to be a psychophysical (nāma-rūpa) process in which the psyche is an aggregation of sensations, perceptions, ideations and thoughts, as transitory as the changing nature of the physical body. All these mental and material phenomena arise end cease in dependence on conditions Cp. paṭicca-samuppāda: dependent origination.. Apart from this process there is no being, no soul, no entity, no substance. This analytical view has been further developed in the Mahāyāna doctrines of Buddhism. Without individual existence of a soul (pudgala-nairātmya) and without existence of individual substances in material things (dharma-nairātmya), everything appears empty (śūnya) and without reality. It was especially Nāgārjuna, the great teacher and scholar of the 2nd century C.E., who developed this doctrine of emptiness (śūnyavāda) in his Mahāprajñā-pāramitā-śāstra and Madhyamika-kārikā with persistent logic: there is no fire but an appearance, a process of combustion, dependent on fuel Madhyamika-Kārikā, p. 10.; “being” exists only as the opposite of “non-being” Ibid. 15.; there is nothing with an isolated and independent existence. When something is stripped of all its relative qualities, it is not only empty, but it is non-existent as an entity, although it is “becoming” (bhava) and “ceasing” (nirodha) as a process.

When the Buddha, therefore, is accused by a brāhman of Verañja of being an annihilationist (uccheda-vādin), he accepts the qualification only in respect of annihilating lust, hate and delusion, which had been fully cut off by him A. IV, viii, sutta 11; Vin. III (Suttavibhaṅga) pp. 2–5..

Similarly, the general Sīha, a disciple of the Jains, wished to visit the Buddha, but was dissuaded at first from doing so by the leader of the Nigaṇṭhas, Nātaputta, on the ground that the recluse Gotama was a teacher of inaction: (akiriya-vāda). But in the end, general Sīha’s desire became too strong and, paying a visit to the Buddha near Vesālī, he asked him about his teaching and training of disciples. Then the Buddha admitted that he taught the inaction (akiriya) of deeds which ought not to be done, the annihilation (uccheda) of lust, hate and delusion; but also he asserted that he taught action (kiriya), namely, good conduct in deed, speech, and thought Vin. I, (Mahāvagga) p. 235..

The Buddha does not deny the sum-total of experience, commonly known as existence or saṁsāra, which is certainly not purely imaginary, although conditional. The object on which the eye is focussed is not denied an existence independent of the eye, but all knowledge gathered through sight (and that applies to all other sense-organs), is surmised (parikappa) DhsA. 308., is not real, but actual. The object in itself, apart from its becoming an object of sensation, does not constitute an entity of complete or absolute independence, for its real nature, apart from its activity on reactionary sense-organs, is a process of dependent origination and cessation in its own material sphere. Upholding existence as a process, the Buddha disavows for his teaching the label of annihilationism (uccheda-vāda), even though he denies the existence of personality as an entity, a substance or a soul (anatta-vāda).

It was, and still is, a difficult point to understand for one unacquainted with the finer shades of meaning of Buddhist terminology; and for that reason many a time a noble silence (ariya-tuṇhi-bhāva) was maintained when an answer was sought for contradictory questions, where an explicit denial of one would have led to the affirmation of the opposite of the so-called undecided questions (avyākata). Khemā, the nun, was asked one day by the king of Kosala, Pasenadi, whether the Tathāgata exists after death, or whether he does not exist after death. And in either case her reply was that that had not been revealed by the Exalted One S. IV, xliv, p. 374. A positive reply to the first question would have been construed as eternalism (sassata-vāda), and a negation of the same question would have been understood as annihilationism (uccheda-vāda). Thus even the Buddha’s silence to such a question proves indirectly that his teaching was not one of total extinction.

But there is still a deeper significance to noble silence. For, the Buddha’s refusal to be committed either way brings to light also his characteristic view about individuality which is not an entity and hence cannot be said to continue, but which is a process of active becoming and, hence, cannot be said to have existence; for, a process of becoming is a process of continuous change. An entity which does not exist cannot be annihilated; a process of change which is always beginning afresh at every moment cannot have any characteristics of an abiding nature.

The individual is then a process of becoming (bhava) which is always renewed through craving (taṇhā) and which can only cease to become (bhava-nirodha) in the cessation of craving, which is Nibbāna. And thus, it is not the annihilation of existence, but the annihilation of the roots of evil as the prime movers of the continuous round of birth and death, which is the aim of the Buddha’s teachings.

The heresy of annihilation (uccheda-diṭṭhi), as well as its opposite heresy of eternalism (sassata-diṭṭhi), appear to have been burning centres of speculation and controversy during the life-time of the Buddha, for they are frequently mentioned in the most authentic texts of the Pali canon. It was the Buddha’s refusal to side with either view that caused him to remain silent when questioned by Vacchagotta, the ascetic, about the existence of the self. Only after the departure of the wandering ascetic did the Buddha explain his silence to his disciple Ānanda (S. IV, p. 401). But to each of the many questions of Kassapa, a naked ascetic, about the nature of suffering, whether it was caused by oneself or by another, or by both, or by chance, the Buddha’s reply is a negation, and this was explained by him saying that the view of suffering being caused by oneself is the heresy of eternalism, and the view that suffering is caused by someone else is annihilationism (S. II, p. 18).

The annihilationist’s view is a composite tendency (yā kho pana sā bhikkhave ucchedadiṭṭhi saṅkhāro so). It is born from craving and nourished by a feeling arisen in ignorance (S. III, p. 99), § 27.). The craving is for escape from conflict, either in a continued existence of perfect happiness or in a state of total destruction, both of which are based on ignorance, on a mistaken view of self. This total destruction was the evil heresy which had arisen in the mind of the bhikkhu Yamaka, who had misunderstood the doctrine of the Buddha, in so far as he held the view that when a bhikkhu has destroyed the mental intoxicants, he himself is annihilated and destroyed at the breaking up of the body, without existence after death (yathā khīṇāsavo bhikkhu kāyassa bhedā ucchijjati vinassati na hoti param maraṇā 'ti) (S. III, p. 109), § 2.). But Sāriputta was able to convince him that he had misunderstood the doctrine of the Buddha. Neither the body, nor the mind in its various compositions can be said to be permanent. An individual cannot be identified either with the body or with any of the mental states of development, nor can an individual be regarded as having an existence separate from those states. Thus an individual, whether Tathāgata, the Buddha, or any other being (satto), cannot in truth and reality be said to exist (saccato thetato anupalabbhiyamāno) Ibid. p. 112, § 34. and hence it is not proper to assert annihilation and destruction at the breaking up of the body.

The Brahmajāla Sutta refutes all contemporary dogmas and speculations (diṭṭhi). Here (D. I, pp. 1), 34.) seven types of Annihilationists are mentioned. Some believe in a material soul composed of material elements, the offspring of father and mother, which is destroyed at the dissolution of the body. Without denying the existence and annihilation of such a material soul, there are others who believe in the existence of a further soul belonging to the sensuous plane; but this soul, too, is annihilated on the dissolution of the body. Others, again, believe in a soul which is made of mind, yet, having form, exists complete in every organ; this, too, is destroyed at death. Then, there are those who believe in a further soul which passes beyond the ideas of form and which reaches up to the sphere of infinite space; yet, on the dissolution of the body it is completely annihilated. This, however, is denied by others who maintain that beyond this, there is a soul reaching out into infinite consciousness; but, even that does not continue after death. Still finer and subtler is the idea of the soul which reaches the spheres of no obstruction, but when death of the body occurs even this is annihilated. The final stage is reached by the soul to which there occur no ideas even, although ideas are not absent either, in the simple realisation of “this is good, this is excellent”. This, too, vanishes on the dissolution of the body. And, thus, however refined and immaterial these concepts of the soul may be, they all accept annihilation at death. Such opinion is based on personal sensations, on the worry and agitation resulting therefrom, all different forms of craving rooted in ignorance.

Ajita, an ascetic wearing a garment of hair, expounded his own theory of annihilation more from a utilitarian viewpoint, for if after death everything is cut off for fools and wise alike, then this talk of generosity is indeed a doctrine of fools, an empty lie, mere idle talk without any profit D. 1, I, p. 55. Sāmañña-phala Sutta..

Already in his very first discourse, which the Buddha spoke to the five ascetics, his erstwhile companions, when he set a rolling the wheel of righteousness (Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta), the Buddha referred to this heresy of annihilationism, when he explained the noble truth concerning the origin of suffering (dukkha-samudaya), although the terminology slightly differs. There, the heresy of eternalism (sassata-diṭṭhi) is spoken of as a craving for future existence (bhava-taṇhā), while the heresy of annihilation (uccheda-diṭṭhi) is identified with a craving for non-existence (vibhava-taṇhā). In the Saṅgīti Suttanta (D. III, p. 212). the two terms are combined as the heresy of existence (bhava-diṭṭhi) and the heresy of non-existence (vibhava-diṭṭhi). Also, in the Mahāniddesa Nd. I (I), p. 245., the heresy of no-more-becoming in the sense of non-existence (vibhana-diṭṭhi) is identified with the heresy of annihilation (uccheda-diṭṭhi).

In the Abhidhamma, however, we do not find this identification, although the flimsy distinction appears to be based on derivation only. Thus vibhava-diṭṭhi is explained as “neither the self nor the world will come to be” (na bhavissati atta ca loko ca) and uccheda-diṭṭhi as “both the self and the world are destroyed” (ucchijjissati atta ca loko ca) Dhs. §§ 1314 and 1316, p. 227..

Sometimes the heresy of eternalism (sassata-diṭṭhi) is referred to as the heresy of everlasting soul (atta-diṭṭhi) Nd. I (I), p. 248., but its opposite heresy of annihilation (uccheda-diṭṭhi), in that case, is not referred to as the heresy of no-soul (anatta), for the teaching of soullessness is the most essential doctrine of the Buddha. Hence in opposition to atta-diṭṭhi we find the term nirattadiṭṭhi, the heresy of non-existence (SnA. on vv. 787, 858, 919). Superficial translators might easily become confused here.

That annihilation could become an object of desire is also brought out by its opposition to the desire for continued existence (bhava-taṇhā); for, the desire for annihilation (vibhava-taṇhā) is an inordinate “love of the present life, under the notion that existence will cease therewith, and that there is to be no future state” Spence Hardy, Manual of Buddhism, p. 496.. Both heretical views are listed with several others, totalling sixty-two, as useless theses on the path of discussion, to be foresaken by the strenuous bhikkhu who takes seriously his effort to progress (Miln. 413). Instead, he should investigate the real nature of the components of individuality and thereby overcome all lust, hate and delusion. The various references in other post-canonical works such as the Nettippakaraṇa pp. 40, 95, 112, 127, 160. do not throw any new light on the subject. The Kathā-vattu Kvu. I, 1, 67. refers to “the Suttanta” when speaking of three kinds of teachers, the Eternalist, declaring that there is a permanent soul, the Annihilationist, maintaining that there is a soul in the present life which, however, does not survive death, and the Buddha, who denies the reality of a soul both in this and in the next life. This appears in an argument on personal entity in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, which view was supported by the Puggalavādins, i.e., the Vajjiputtakas and the Sammitīyas, two schools of thought in the Buddha-sāsana, and by many other teachers besides. The relevant passage from the suttanta as quoted by the Theravādin, however, has not been traced. But, that the heresy was considered to be a very ancient one appears from the fact that belief in annihilation at death is included in the five heresies professed by five councillors at the royal court of Bārāṇasī during the time, in some previous existence, when the Buddha was only a bodhisatta by the name of Bodhikumāra. The believer in annihilation taught that no one passes hence to another world, and that this world is annihilated. But he was refuted by the bodhisatta’s argument that if all mortals suffer annihilation here and no one goes to a future world, there cannot be any stain of guilt resulting from an immoral action (J. V, p. 239), Mahābodhi Jātaka.).

Still another name is found for this heresy of annihilationism in the Āmagandha Sutta (Sn. v. 243), viz., the nihilistic view (natthika-diṭṭhi), where it is compared with the verminous odour of a rotting corpse. As nihilists or deniers of reality are named the people of Ukkali, who, although upholding such extremist views as denying all cause, all action, all reality, still upheld the distinctions of past, present and future (S. III, p. 73)}.

Apart from philosophical distinctions it is even the common sense of the intelligent man which will reject the annihilistic view on two grounds: if there is a life beyond this world, then the annihilationist (natthikavādo) will find himself after death in a bad way, while in this life he stands condemned by others for his bad morals and false views; and even if there is no life beyond, still he has to bear in this life the condemnation of intelligent people. Thus, he is in two ways losing his throw at dice (ubhayattha kaliggaho) (M. I, p. 403), Apaṇṇaka Sutta, or faring badly in both worlds.

The Nihilists are grouped together with those who deny the conditionality of things (ahetuka-vāda) and who deny the efficacy of action (akiriya-vāda). These views are called “fixed in their consequences” (niyata) Dhs. § 1028., giving results without intervening time. “The person who has adopted and maintains such views, even a hundred or a thousand Buddhas would not be able to enlighten” DhsA. p. 358..

Speculative opinion is, therefore, rightly called an intoxicant (diṭṭhāsava Dhs. § 1099.), pervading and corrupting all action, leading to pride and infatuation and blocking the way to the Path DhsA. p. 354., for it is put away only on entering the stream of sainthood (sotāpatti magga) Ibid. p. 372..

One of the unprofitable or unskilful mental factors (akusala cetasika). It involves carelessness of blame and recklessness as to the consequences of an evil deed. No evil thought would arise in the absence of anottappa. Hence it is found among the general unskilful mental factors (sabb' ākusala sādhāraṇa cetasika), combined with the lack of internal shame (ahirika), mental agitation (uddhacca) and delusion (moha) in which it is firmly rooted. In its recklessness of consequences it is fearlessness of disapprobation and has the appearance of straightforwardness. Thereby it becomes all the more dangerous, because it presents itself as an accuser of hypocrisy or moral cowardice, of narrow-mindedness of all who are still restrained in word and action. Thus, disregarding public opinion, it does not shrink from doing evil, which thereby results as from an external cause, an objective recklessness of consequences, which is always combined with and supplemented by a subjective and intrinsic unscrupulousness (ahirika).

Thus, all evil feels itself free from shame (ahirika) and free from blame (anotappa), without discerning in its delusion (moha) the danger in evil.

A short discourse in prose, concluded with two stanzas, one monk who is unscrupulous (anottappī) and thereby cannot attain perfect enlightenment (sambodhi) and Nibbāna, the unsurpassed freedom from bondage (anuttara yogakkhema). But the monk who is full of zeal (ātāpī) and scrupulous (otappī) can attain the highest (It. pp. 27–8), sutta 34).

The uddāna (contents in verse form) at the end of the first vagga (ibid. p. 31) refers to this sutta as dve pādā. But the uddāna at the end of the second vagga which gives the contents of the entire second nipāta (ibid. p. 44) mentions the title under reference, which is obviously more correct.

(Skt. Antagrāha-dṛṣṭi), a collective name for ten erroneous extremist views (micchā-diṭṭhi). As these heretical views are always placed in contradictory pairs, such as: the world is finite, the world is infinite, body and soul are identical, body and soul are different, etc., the attribute antagāhikā, which defines diṭṭhi, indicates most probably the “extreme” of the contradictory opinions. The person holding any such view about the extremes, finiteness and infinitude, etc., may in this sense be called an extremist.

Whenever such extreme views were placed before the Buddha for his decision, he left them undecided (abyākata), because neither of the contradictory extremes could meet with his approval. The reason for his agnosticism was that either view of each opposing pair was based on an assumption of a major premise which was untenable. Both theses: the world is finite, and the world is infinite, assume as a basic proposition that the world is. But it is exactly the Buddha’s contention that there is no positive, absolute existence, but only a process of becoming, of change, of impermanence. And, as no definite quality can be attributed to an impermanent process of becoming, any question about such predicate must remain unanswered and cannot be decided, either positively or negatively.

The erroneous extremist views (antagāhikā-diṭṭhi) are (a) those of the eternalist (sassata-vādin) who proclaims that both the world and the soul are eternal and infinite, without beginning or end in time; (b) those of the opposing views, the annihilationist (uccheda-vādin), accepting the world and the soul as entities, which, however, have no duration beyond their present existence. Some others are partially eternalists, believing themselves to be finite, but created by a supreme Brahma who is infinite. Again there are others who are called extensionists (antānantikā) because they believe in the universe being without limitation in space; some of this class accept the universe with limitations all round, or only in certain directions. But all these are rejected as mere speculations without basis, problems without foundation and which cannot be solved, just because they have no ground to stand on apart from a false proposition.

“adaptation moment” in the process of consciousness. When the process of thought has risen above the subconscious level, a phase is reached where the element of volition appropriates the concept, at which stage moral responsibility (kamma) is established in thought activity, which up to now was merely a passive receptor and perceiver. But with the formation of ideations or concepts a “subject” is introduced which impulsively appropriates the experience. This impulsion is called javana and at this stage a thought reaches its climax, usually lasting seven thought-moments out of a total of 17, comprising the entire process of a single thought unit. These impulsive moments, however, are sometimes less in duration, especially when there is no karma-producing efficacy in such a thought. Thus, immediately before entering one of the four supramundane paths of holiness (ariya-magga) or just before the mind enters a state of mental absorption (jhāna), there are only four impulsive moments of preparation (parikamma), of approach (upacāra), of adaptation (anuloma) and of maturity (gotrabhū). Anuloma-citta is, therefore, the third of these four moments immediately preceding a mental state of absorption (jhāna) or an attainment of one of the four paths (magga), i.e., the flash of thought which after approaching the supramundane state adapts itself for the maturity thereof.

“insight-knowledge of adaptation”, the final stage of what is collectively called the purity of insight during the progress of the practice of discernment (paṭipadā-ñāṇa-dassana-visuddhi). This climax of discernment is called insight of adaptation (anuloma-ñāṇa), because here the meditator fits himself with the required mental qualifications which equip him to enter the path of holiness. It is followed immediately by the evolution of adoption (gotrabhū) which cuts off the heritage of the worldling (puthujjana) and evolves that of the transcendental path (lokuttara-magga). The object of the entire process of discernment during the ten modes of insight (vipassanā-ñāṇa), prior to the evolution of path-consciousness (magga-ñāṇa), is the contemplation of the three, or any one of the three characteristics (ti-lakkhaṇa), viewing all phenomena as impermanent (anicca), full of conflict (dukkha) and insubstantial (anatta).

When this process of insight has reached maturity it invariably leads to the path of sainthood and is, therefore, also called the gateway to emancipation (vimokkha-mukha). If the object of contemplation has been the impermanence of all phenomena, the mind will be freed from all hallucinations (vipallāsa) of perception, of thought and of views; and, thus, it is called signless (animitta). If the object of contemplation has been the conflicting nature of phenomena, the mind will be freed from all craving; and, thus, it is called the undesired (appaṇihita). If the object of contemplation has been the unsubstantiality of everything, the mind will be freed from all concepts of an ego, or soul, or abiding entity; and, hence, it is called the void (suññatā: Vism. xx, § 91, p. 540).

From this triple gateway, through which the mind adapts itself to transcendental freedom, emancipation itself receives the same triad of names, corresponding to the discernment from which it has arisen (vuṭṭhāna-gāmini-vipassanā-ñāṇa). It is interesting to note the similarity of terminology in the two processes, viz., the thought-process leading to mental absorption and the path-process leading to emancipation. In the thought-process (citta-vīthi) the mind-door-adverting-consciousness (manodvārāvajjana) is followed by the mental impulse (javana) or the apperceptive stage, the first moment of which is called the preliminary moment (parikamma), followed in succession by approximation or access (upacāra), adaptation (anuloma) and adoption (gotrabhū). At this stage normal consciousness is cut off by the supernormal thought-process obtaining in a state of mental absorption (jhāna). In the path-process (magga-vīthī) the preliminary contemplation of the characteristics and the approach to the path lead to insight of adaptation (anuloma-ñāṇa), followed by adoption (gotrabhū) and entrance on to the path of emancipation (sotāpatti), which cuts off the path of the worldling and evolves the transcendental path.

The abstract form of contemplating (anupassati) is found only in combinations, where it has the strength of meditative insight (vipassanā). It is not a form of concentration which leads to tranquillity (samatha) and further to the various stages of mental absorption (jhāna), but to realisation of the true nature of all things through intuitive knowledge of their impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and unsubstantiality. Hence, there are these three forms of introspection: the contemplation of impermanence (aniccānupassanā), the contemplation of conflict in impermanence (dukkhānupassanā) and the contemplation of the unreality of the conflict (anattānupassanā), also referred to as aniccasaññā, anicce dukkhasaññā, dukkhe anattasaññā (A. IV, p. 148), 465) in the sense of intuitive perception.

The ninth name in the first list of approximately 100 Buddhas (actually only 97 are named), which was recited by Mahā Kātyāyana at the request of Mahā Kāśyapa, giving the names of the Buddhas under whom the Buddha Śākyamuni acquired merit when he was advancing as a bodhisattva from the first to the seventh stage of development or bhūmi (Mhvu. I, 136).

Mental states of gradual attainment along successive ascending stages, consisting of the four states of mental absorption in the spheres of form (rūpa-jhāna) and the four formless mental states (arūpāvacara), culminating in the cessation of sensation and perception (saññā-vedayita-nirodha). They correspond to the nine attainments (samāpatti), but as they each are based on the cessation of the previous stage, they are also referred to as the nine graded stages of cessation (nave anupubbanirodhā: (A. IV, p. 409)

Exertion consisting in safeguarding one’s character, protecting virtue already acquired and maintaining the wholesome (kusala) mental states which were developed earlier. It is the last of the four great exertions (sammappadhāna), also named the four supreme efforts (uttama-viriya) of self-control through avoidance, eliminating, developing and safe-guarding. The effort to maintain proves itself also in keeping pure an auspicious object of mental concentration (samādhi-nimitta: (D. III, p. 226), which will allow the mind to maintain one-pointedness (ekaggatā).

Name of the attendant of the bodhisatta Jotipāla. He, too, was an ascetic and stayed with the bodhisatta in the Kaviṭṭhaka hermitage, provided by Sakka, when the ascetic Nārada was tempted to give up his meditations, pining away without food in the bonds of passion for seven days. In a later life Anusissa was reborn as Ānanda, the disciple who attended on Gotama, the Buddha (J. III, pp. 463, 469).

He is also mentioned as one of the seven chief pupils of the bodhisatta Sarabhaṅga (J. V, p. 183). But when the number of ascetics dwelling with the teacher increased, the other six chief disciples took up abode elsewhere with their own pupils. Anusissa, however, remained with the bodhisatta. It was he who introduced the three kings Kāliṅga, Aṭṭhaka and Bhīmaratha, and also Sakka, lord of heaven, to the bodhisatta Sarabhaṅga, when they had come to question him on the banks of the Godāvarī, “What is it that one may slay outright and never more repent”? and to which they received the reply, “Anger”.

Here, too (ibid. p. 151), Anusissa is identified in a later birth with Ānanda, the personal attendant of Gotama Buddha.

Recollection, contemplation. Under this term are grouped usually six kinds of meditation which have in common the method of concentration on an object which varies. They are enumerated in the Sutta Piṭaka as follows: recollection of the Buddha and his nine qualities (Buddhānussati), recollection of the properties of the Buddha’s teaching (Dhammānussati), of the community of noble disciples of the Buddha (Saṅghānussati), reflection on one’s own virtue and morality (sīlānussati), on one’s own degree of detachment (cāgānussati), on the reward in celestial spheres following a life of virtue (devatānussati: (D. III, p. 250); (A. III, p. 284). Details can be found under each Pali term.

Frequently, another four are added to this series, which, however, are strictly speaking not recollections (anussati) but forms of mindfulness (sati). They are mindfulness on death (maraṇa-sati), mindfulness on the body (kāyagatā-sati), mindfulness on breathing (ānāpāna-sati) and, finally, contemplation on peace which leads to the fading away of defilements (upasamānussati: (A. I, p. 30).

All are mentioned among the forty recommendations or objects for concentration (kammaṭṭhāna), although they are not all equally effective. Thus, though all may bring the mind to “neighbourhood-concentration” (upacāra-samādhi), it is only mindfulness on the body (kāyagatā-sati) that can induce the mind to proceed to the first step of mental absorption (jhāna), and only mindfulness on breathing (ānāpānasati) which can produce all the four stages of mental absorption (jhāna).

The reason why the recollections proper cannot make the mind reach any stage of absorption is that the concentration of mind is not sufficiently unified, but occupied with special qualities of many sorts (Vism, vii, § 66, p. 178).

One of the five hundred paccekabuddhas who were in ancient times living on the Isigili mountain in seclusion. He was seen by the people of that time entering the mountain range, but was never seen thereafter. Hence the people used to say that the mountain had swallowed up the sage (isī gilati) and named it Isigili. The names of these paccekabuddhas are given by the Buddha in the Isigili Sutta (M. III, p. f.).

Buddhaghosa in his commentary (MA. IV, 217) relates how these sages had made their dwellings inside the mountain behind a rock which would open and close like a folding door.

Apara is further distinguished in the Isigili Sutta by the epithet “the sage” (muni).

One of the five hundred paccekabuddhas who in ancient times lived on the Isigili mountain in seclusion. They were seen by the people of that time entering the mountain range, but were never seen thereafter. Hence the name of the mountain, that it swallowed up sages (isī gilati). The names of these paccekabuddhas are given in the Isigili Sutta (M. III, p. f.).

Buddhaghosa says in his commentary (MA, IV, 217) that these sages lived inside the mountain behind a rock, which would open and close like a folding door.

Aparājita is distinguished in the Isigili Sutta by the epithet: he who triumphed over Māra’s might (Mārabalaṁ ajesi).

Moral action which will bear fruit, not in the present or in the immediately following life-span, but in some indefinite future, whenever the opportunity is right to produce its result. In its reduplicative formation (aparāpara) the word indicates such karma as will be known (vedanīya) or experienced in any possible successive existence. A classical example of such indefinitely effective action is found in the story of the death of the arahant Mahā-Moggallāna (Sarabhaṅga Jātaka: J. V, p. ). In a previous life he wanted to put his aged father and mother to death as a result of listening to his wife. Although he did not actually kill his parents, his shameful action remained like a core of fire hidden under ashes, for ever biding its time till it could find an opportunity. Then, in the last life of the arahant, this act committed of old and carrying with it consequences to be experienced on some future occasion, got its chance for mischief, when Moggallāna’s supernormal powers failed him and he became unable to escape the seventh attempt on his life by some hired brigands. He was beaten up so severely that all his bones were crushed; but he kept his mind steady in meditation on the Buddha till he finally died.

The Milinda-pañha (p. 108) also relates of Devadatta how he heaped up karma on karma and would pass for an endless series of kalpas from torment to torment and from perdition to perdition. His suffering, however, became finite because he had entered the Order, and thereby the woe caused by previous karma would also become limited.

Aparāpariya-vedanīya-kamma is one of the sixteen kinds of karma classified in four groups according to their function (kicca), their efficacy (pākadāna), their time of taking effect (pākakāla) and the place of their effect (pākaṭṭhāna).

The 54th name in the first list of approximately 100 Buddhas (actually only 97 are named in this first list), which was recited by Mahā-Kātyāyana at the request of Mahā-Kaśyapa. The list contains the names of Buddhas under whom the Buddha Śākyamuni acquired merit when he was advancing as a bodhisattva from the first to the seventh stage of development or bhūmi (Mhvu. I, 137).

A short discourse in prose, concluded with three stanzas, on two types of people who are doomed to downfall and rebirth in hell (apāyikā nerayikā), viz., one who claims to be a saint although leading a godless life (abrahmacārī) and one who harasses another who leads a saintly life by accusations of moral lapses (It. pp. 42–3), sutta 48).

An aid to concentration by means of which a state of mental absorption (jhāna) may be obtained. There are ten devices (kasiṇa), four of which are based (kammaṭṭhāna) on the four elements (bhūta). These four elements are represented and visualised as follows: extension and solidity by earth (paṭhavī), cohesion and saturation by water (āpo), heat and temperature by fire (tejo), motion and oscillation by air (vāyo).

Āpo-kasiṇa, then, is a device using the element of water to concentrate one’s thought; and physical water becomes the material object of concentration by fixing one’s gaze on this particular object. In preparing the object of concentration (parikammanimitta) one should use a bowl or pot filled brimful with clean and colourless water (Vism. v, § 3, p. 138) for any contamination or colouring would merely distract the mind. But, it is immaterial whether water is collected from rain (ambu), from dew (vāri), from flowing water (udaka), from running water (salila) or stagnant water (āpo), as long as it is clean and colourless. The bowl or pot should be filled with water to the brim, lest the reflection of the upper edge of the bowl be seen in the water.

Just as in the case of other meditation-devices, the bowl of water should not be placed in the middle of a courtyard, but in a remote place which can be screened off, inside a dwelling or under an overhanging rock (ibid. iv, § 24, p. 100). Its size should be not more than a span and four finger-breadths, i.e., 12 inches, in diameter.

After having thus prepared the object of concentration one should sweep the place around and have a bath, so that one feels cool and comfortable. Facing the bowl of water at a distance of slightly less than four feet (2 cubits), one should prepare a low stool of about one foot in height. Seated on the stool one should next prepare the mind by concentrating for some time on the special qualities of the Buddha, his teaching and his Order of monks, leading a life of renunciation, till there arises a longing to escape from sense desires which is the only means to solve all conflicts and problems. After this when the mind is calmed and disinterested, the eyes should be opened moderately and their gaze fixed on the object: water.

Every little detail of instruction has its proper significance as explained by Buddhaghosa: if one sits too far off, the meditation object is not distinct; if one sits too near, the faults of the object become apparent and cause distraction; if one sits too high, one has to bend the head and neck low down in order to view the kasiṇa; if one sits too low, the knees will begin to ache (ibid. iv, § 26, p. 101).

Thus prepared in mind and body, no attention should be given to the qualities of the object, water, but just the general concept should be reflected on, and brought before the mind’s eye a hundred times, a thousand times, and even more than that, until the concept is established, whether the physical eyes are open or shut. This is called the arising of the learner’s sign (uggahanimittaṁ uppajjati: ibid. iv, § 29, p. 101).

From now on the material device (kasiṇa) has served its purpose, and further concentration should be developed on the mental image thereof which with the approach to the contemplative stage (upacāra-samādhi) unfolds into the transformed after-image or counter-sign (paṭibhāga-nimitta), which forms the basis of mental absorption.

Diligence, earnestness, heedfulness, lit. non-laxity, is considered in Buddhism as the foundation of all spiritual progress. “All wholesome mental qualities (kusala-dhamma) are rooted in diligence (appamāda-mūlaka), are united in zeal (appumādasaṁsaraṇa) and heedfulness is among them the most important” (appamādo tesaṁ dhammā-naṁ aggam akkhāyatī: A.V, 21).

Illustrations showing this importance are not lacking. It towers over all other mental qualities, like the Buddha over all other beings, like the elephant’s footprint over those of all others, like the main beam of a house over all rafters, like the scent of sandal-wood and of the jasmine flower over all other perfumes, like a world-ruler over all princes, like the moon at night over all stars, like the ocean over all the water of the rivers (loc. cit.).

The commentary (DA. I, 104) explains appamāda as the presence of mindfulness (satiyā avippavāsa) which is the one and only way (ekāyana magga) that leads to purification and realisation (M. I, p. ). It is called the way to the deathless (amatapadaṁ: (Dhp. v. 21); and one who delights in vigilance (appamādarato) is not liable to fall (abhabbo parihānāya) but is as though in the presence of emancipation (nibbānass'eva santike: ibid. v. 32).

Its supreme Importance, however, is shown in the fact that this was the final exhortation of the Buddha, just before he departed from all existence in saṁsāra: “Impermanent is all that is conditioned. Strive to accomplish your aim with diligence” (appamādēna sampādetha: D. II, p. ).

Hence, the wise praise diligence in virtuous deeds (appamādaṁ pasaṁsanti puññakiriyāsu paṇḍitā: (It. p. 16).

(Skt. arpaṇa), fixing of the mind in the state of ecstatic meditation (jhāna). In the process of concentration (samādhi) it is distinct from and succeeds neighbourhood or access-concentration (upacāra-samādhi) which is the final stage from where mental absorption (jhāna) is attained. The attainment of absorption itself is then the beginning of ecstatic concentration (appanā-samādhi). Hence, it is the most important step in the entire process of mind-culture (bhāvanā), which opens up a new type of mental life, in which the mind penetrates with mental application (appanā-vitakka) into the inner nature of the object of contemplation. A gradual dispensation with the constituents of the lower stages of mental absorption (application through discursive thought: vitakka-vicāra; spiritual joy: pīti; well-being: sukha) leads to a state of equanimity (upekkhā) and the fullest development in mental absorption.

Appanā, although applied to the entire process of concentration (samādhi) and absorption (jhāna), is primarily intended for the vitakka-factor in the initial stage of absorption, for it is this factor of discursive mental application (vitakka) which inserts (appeti) the mind, as it were, into the object of thought. An intensified form vyappanā, focussing, is used together with appanā, fixation of thought (Dhs. I, § 7; DhsA. 142 f.).

Buddhaghosa frequently links the terms fixation and absorption together, e.g., ekacittakkhaṇikaṁ appanā-jhānaṁ, rapt meditation on a concept induced by the momentary flash of a thought. Thus the orthodox view (Kvu. 458) upholds against the Sabbatthivādins and the Uttarāpathakas that concentration is involved in each momentary unit of consciousness, from which some heterodox teachers concluded that one could win the ecstasy of concentration (appanā-samādhi) on the actual occasion of any sense-cognition, even at the very moment of thinking immoral thoughts.

The term appanā is also used in an altogether different connection, although maintaining the meaning of fixation, in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, where “throughout Book I, in the case of each inquiry which opens up a new subject, the answer is set out on a definite plan called uddesa, exposition, and is rounded off invariably by the appanā, or emphatic summing up” (Psychological Ethics, Introd. by C.A.F. Rhys Davids, p. xxviii).

(kiñcana) the evil “something” that sticks or adheres to the character of a man, and which he must get rid of, if he wants to attain to a higher moral condition (PED. s.v. kiñcana). It is defined as the three impurities of lust (rāga), hate (dosa) and delusion (moha: D. III, p. ): opposite, “without attachment” (kiñcanaṁ n'atthi), is used as an attribute of an arahant (Dhp. 421).

(satipaṭṭhāna) the four methods of attendance (upaṭṭhāna) on mindfulness (sati) or awareness as regards the body (kāya), feelings (vedanā), thought (citta) and mental objects (dhamma). They are said to be “the only way that leads to the attainment of purity, to the overcoming of sorrow and lamentation, to the end of pain and grief, to the entering of the right path and to the realisation of Nibbāna”, (D. I, p. ; M. I, p. –6). They are four contemplations relating to the five aggregates of existence (pañcakkhandha), leading to insight into the unsubstantiality of all phenomena.

Comprises the turning of the mind towards the stimuli at the sense doors (pañcadvārāvajjana). It is the reaction of the mind which attends to or apprehends the object that impinges on the fivefold door of the senses. The two other elements of apprehension are the two recipient elements of representation (śāmpaticchana) and of examination (santīraṇa). This triple faculty of apprehension (manodhātuṭṭika) is capable of taking part only in a presentative (but never in a representative) cognition (Compendium of Philosophy, a translation of the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, London, 1910, p. 108, n. 3).

(takka) the science of logic, is not highly esteemed in the sayings attributed to the Buddha, which is no doubt due to the fact that reasoning often leads to hair-splitting sophistry. The Buddha speaks of his teaching as being “beyond argumentation” (atakkāvacara: D. II, p. ; S. I, p. ; M. I, p. ), i.e., unattainable by mere reasoning. Realisation of the truth is attainable only through insight (vipassanā) into the nature of all components as being impermanent, unsatisfactory and without substance.

On several occasions the Buddha refused to be drawn into an argument and preferred a question to remain undecided (avyākata). Sometimes he explained his silence as a refusal to take sides with either opponent, his being the middle path between eternalism and annihilationism.

Argumentation, however, is far from absent in the Buddhist texts, and especially the later works like Kathāvatthu and Milindapañha are full of striking, though not always convincing, examples.

Logic without argumentation, however, is one of the strong points of Buddhism which does not rely on faith in revealed dogmas. For example, the Four Noble Truths contain a masterpiece of deduction from the universal problem of conflict (dukkha) to its causal conditions (samudaya) and their solution (nirodha). But when argumentation becomes a means for furthering wrong ideas (takkavaḍḍhana) it is also rightly called a jungle of sophistry (takka-gahaṇa: J. I, p. ).

One of the five hundred paccekabuddhas who were in ancient times living on the Isigili mountain in seclusion. He was seen by the people of that time entering the mountain range, but was never seen thereafter. Hence the people used to say that the mountain had swallowed up the sage (isī gilatī ti) and named it Isigili. The names of these paccekabuddhas are given by the Buddha in the Isigili Sutta (M. III, p. f.).

Buddhaghosa in his commentary (MA. IV, 127) relates how these sages had made their dwellings inside the mountain behind a rock which would open and close like a folding door.

One of the five hundred paccekabuddhas who were in ancient times living on the Isigili mountain in seclusion. He was seen by the people of that time entering the mountain range, but was never seen thereafter. Hence, the people used to say that the mountain had swallowed up the sage (isī gilatī ti) and named it Isigili. The names of these paccekabuddhas are given by the Buddha in the Isigili Sutta (M. III, p. f.).

Buddhaghosa in his commentary (MA. IV, 127) relates how these sages had made their dwellings inside the mountain behind a rock which would open and close like a folding door.

The noble truth, refers to the Four Noble Truths (cattāri ariya-saccāni) which form the basis of the Buddha’s teaching. Truth here is not to be understood in its philosophically defined meaning of the correspondence between the intellect and the known object, for the distinction between the knowing subject and the known object is not actual. The passive object is the end and the aim of mental action and is, therefore, an active principle, inducing the subject to action. In the actual process of knowledge there cannot be a correspondence between the knowing subject and the known object, while outside that process there is neither knowing nor known. To overcome this difficulty a distinction has been made between relative truth and absolute truth. Relative or subjective truth is thought to be the truth in so far as it is known to a subject. It is, therefore, an act of the intellect, and thereby also a process of evolution, dependent on relative conditions, such as the correspondence between subject and object. Objective or absolute truth is thought to be true without relation to anything, i.e., absolutely true. But as any knowledge thereof would make it subjective, nothing can be known about it.

The fallacy in this speculative theorisation is that truth is taken as something final, either as an entity or as a point further than which knowledge could never reach. Frequently in philosophy and always in revealed religions, a search for truth is an essential feature and the attainment or realisation of such truth constitutes its goal. But the term sacca in Pali (satya in Sanskrit, derived from sat, being), is not an ultimate truth, but the factual truth or actuality, experienced without delusion. According to Buddhism, therefore, the truth is to be found in the relative conditions of things and events. To know the truth is to know and see things as they are (yathā-bhūta-ñāṇa-dassana), which is not a comprehension of the ultimate substance of matter, but an understanding of the phenomenal nature of material qualities. That this truth is a relative knowledge and, therefore, subject to change does not make it less true. And it can be universal in application without being absolute.

Factual truth is not dependent on the knowledge thereof or on its promulgation: whether a Tathāgata arises in this world, or whether no Tathāgata has arisen, still it remains a fact that all component things are transient (anicca), and that they produce conflict (dukkha) through being misunderstood, which conflict is as baseless (anattā) as the phenomena themselves.

The factual truth is presented by the Buddha in a fourfold way: the statement of the fact (sacca), the source (samudaya), its end (nirodha) and the method (magga). And each of these four should be contemplated in three aspects (ti-parivaṭṭa) for the factual truth must become known (sacca-ñāṇa), its function must be understood (kicca-ñāṇa) and its accomplishment must be realised (kata-ñāṇa), for the knowledge of the truth must be translated into function, if ever the task will be completed.

The first truth is the Noble Truth of suffering (dukkhassa ariya-sacca). It is a simple statement of a universal fact: All component things are disharmonious The use of “disharmonious” as equivalent to “dukkha” should be regarded only as a tentative–-G.P.M. (sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā) and, therefore, involved in suffering. This universal statement, however, is not an absolute truth, as it might appear to those who are used to see merely the opposing views: The world, Kaccāna, is accustomed to rely on a duality, on the “it is” and on the “it is not”. However, Kaccāna, he who perceives in accordance with truth and wisdom how the things in this world arise, for him there is no “it is not” in this world. And he, Kaccāna, who perceives in accordance with truth and wisdom how the things in this world perish, for him there is no “it is” in this world (S. II, p. ). Here the Buddha clearly holds the relative standpoint: things neither are, nor are not. They merely arise and cease as a process dependent on conditions. This must be applied to all his teachings, especially to the Four Noble Truths. Here we do not have an absolute truth that everything is sorrowful, but a conditional truth: If things are component, they cannot form a harmonious whole. This is not an empirical truth, for no one will ever be able to observe all or to experiment with every individual component. This truth is not based on induction either, for it is not a generalisation from some particular instances, because it does not follow that everything is unsatisfactory, when this and that are unsatisfactory. But this universal proposition is a pure analysis of the nature of composed things; for the nature of composition includes a tendency towards decomposition. About this more presently.

The statement of the first Noble Truth is thus entirely conditional and relative: if there is anything of a composed nature, then by its own nature it will tend towards dissolution, which tendency is a sign of inherent disharmony. Now, whether there are any composed and decomposable things or not, is not expressed in this statement; and hence, this truth is not dependent on actual facts for its veracity, though, of course, all actual facts will be in accord with this truth, which is a statement about their essential nature. And thus far it is a universal truth. At the same time it is also a relative and a conditional truth in so far as it depends on actuality; for if there would be no component things whatsoever, this truth would become meaningless, but not untrue. The truth as such would not be affected, even though it would not have any practical application.

As regards the contents of the first Noble Truth it comprises two terms: thing composed (saṅkhāra) and suffering (dukkha). A composition always refers to an arrangement of parts fitted together, a bringing together of two or more things, events or states, which would not have come together naturally, due to an intrinsic divergency. A composition, therefore, is never an evolution, but rather an involution, an entanglement, a complication, a complex. As a composition, therefore, always requires an external condition, acting as the factor which brings about the union, the act of composition is not according to the intrinsic nature of the two compounding elements. Thus, a composition being an unnatural complication will have the inner tendency to solve this complex, i.e., to evolve; just as plant-hybrids show an inclination to return to nature. All component things, therefore, are by nature “disharmonious”. It is this lack of harmony which is the essence of dukkha, conflict. And the first Noble Truth can be simplified in more familiar words: Every complex includes a “conflict” (sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā).

Conflict may assume different forms. It may be sorrow (soka) which is suffering resulting from loss (vyasana) of relations (ñāti), wealth (bhoga), health (āroga), virtue (sīla) or opinions (diṭṭhi: D. III, p. ; A. II, p. ; Vin. IV, p. ). Here the conflict arises from the untoward circumstances arising in life’s associations. Pain (dukkha) is a physical discomfort (kāyika asāta) in which the conflict is due to feelings repugnant to the senses. Grief (domanassa) is mental suffering (cetasika asāta), a conflict arising from regret at having failed; or it may be due to misfortunes befallen to others, in which case our sympathy is frequently projected self-pity, having placed ourselves mentally in the other’s condition of life. Despair (upāyāsa) is a mental reflection on external circumstances which have gone beyond control. It is the absence of hope, and, therefore, the conflict lies in the impossibility to bring external conditions in alignment with internal expectations, whereby all further exertion is brought to an end. Disharmony is a conflict, whether it is the dwindling of vitality (āyuno saṅhāni) which is involution conflicting with evolutionary tendencies and which is called old age and decay (jarā), or the complete dissolution of the aggregates of the composition (khandhānaṁ bheda) which is called death (maraṇa). “To be associated with things one dislikes, to be separated from things one likes, not to get what one wishes that also is conflict” (D. II, p. ).

All this, however, is suffering and disharmony in life; and that this is a conflict is so evident that it is said to be “gross and easily felt and understood by both prince and pauper”. But the first Noble Truth goes much further: Any complex is a conflict. And thus the Buddha’s first Noble Truth is not a mere statement about disharmony in life, it culminates in his statement that life itself is disharmonious: “the five aggregates of clinging, i.e., the entire psycho-physical combination of an individual life, are suffering” (pañc'ūpādānakkhandhā dukkhā). And whether it is called pleasure (somanassa) or pain (domanassa), well (sukha) or ill (dukkha), life is a conflict because life is a complex. All the different tendencies which go into the making of a character are inclinations which show the presence of a discord and a void. Nature abhors a vacuum; and hence the very presence of a tendency, the very fact of striving, proves the existence of a conflict even in happiness. That is why happiness never satisfies. One always wants more, both in depth and in duration, in space and in time. But, in the midst of enjoyment and bliss there creeps in the fear of final frustration and impermanence. That is life, the complex life, which bears in itself the seed of conflict. The struggle for life is also the essence of life. “And that indeed is called conflict” (idaṁ vuccati dukkhaṁ).

Truth itself is not objective and, therefore, not absolute, but relative. And so the truth of conflict (dukkha-sacca) does not lie in the objective world of events, and not in the nature of the subject either, but in the complex, i.e., in the mutual reaction of both, of one upon the other. Thus, the origin of such conflict (dukkha-samudaya) is to be found in the manner of apprehension of the world of events, in the act of apprehending, seizing or grasping: “This, O monks, is the noble truth concerning the origin of conflict. Verily, it is desire causing the renewal of existence accompanied by sensual delights, seeking satisfaction now here then there; that is to say, the craving for the gratification of the passions (kāma-taṇhā), the craving for an everlasting future life (bhava-taṇhā), or craving for the ending of existence” (vibhava-taṇhā: Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta: Vin. I, p. ). It is the will to enjoy life here; the will to live elsewhere; or the will to end life’s consequences, which gives rise to conflict. This will, desire, craving, clinging, or whatever name it may bear as a volitional activity of a purposeful striving, is a projection into the future, whether it is a positive striving to achieve or a negative striving to escape. As such it is a lack of actual living in the present, a lack of understanding life as actuality, by attributing to it wrong values, by creating an imaginary and ideal future, and thereby initiating a conflict. For any desire holds within its grip a dissatisfaction, without which it simply could not have arisen. The act of grasping seems actual and in the present; but the good perceived in the present is sought for the sake of security in time to come, to serve a purpose in the future. Grasping in the present has its motive in the future; and as such it is not actual, but projective.

Craving for the gratification of the passions (kāma-taṇhā) arises and becomes rooted in the senses. Enticing forms, melodious sounds, delightful tastes, alluring feelings in the senses of the body, are all perceived in the mind which through application and reflection conceives an attachment to them. On the other hand, ugly forms, discording sounds, nasty tastes, repugnant feelings cause a perception of displeasure in the mind which results in aversion. But whether it is an attachment to the pleasing sensations, or an aversion from the unpleasant ones, it narrows the mind (parittacetaso vihārati) which thereby becomes subject-conscious, while attention to actuality is relaxed (anupaṭṭhita-kāya-sati). Those sensations, approved of and welcomed, intensify the will to enjoy (kāma-taṇhā) which develops into a clinging to them (upādāna). But in this very clinging lies the fulness of the misery of bondage. For the pleasures of the senses are not lasting; they, too, are complex, leading to entanglement and disharmony, because they consist of wrong values. They are, therefore, a composition of discords, naturally tending towards dissolution. The dissolution of such a discord would be good in itself, but as the mind is clinging ta that wrong value it becomes a source of conflict (dukkha).

When craving for sense-pleasures (kāma-taṇhā) cannot cling (upādāna) any more, owing to dissolution of the senses or the fading away of the sense objects, it will renew itself in constant re-becoming (bhava), thus not quenching but producing an ever-increasing thirst for life and all it stands for (bhava-taṇhā). Then the very impermanency of all things might become a new source of fresh delight each time, which keeps away the boredom and the tedium of constant and unchanging beauty and joy. Is not the sea made beautiful by the rise and fall of her waves? Do not the different seasons add to the attraction of nature? Those changes, however, are not attractive in themselves; they are only appreciated because their beauty is so baseless and because they cannot be esteemed for long. It is only their frequent change which makes them tolerable.

In this manner then arises the craving for permanency in the impermanent, a form of idealism which in olden times was called eternalism (sassata-diṭṭhi). It is craving for permanent existence (bhava-taṇhā) which, although expressing itself in many forms, is always based on a wrong view of individuality (sakkāyadiṭṭhi). It is either matter itself which is thought of as indestructible, or some psychical functions as sensations, perceptions or ideations, or even knowledge itself, which come to be regarded as qualities of some permanent entity, or as identical with an indestructible life-principle, or as residing in an eternal soul, or vice versa as a spiritual substance residing in those phenomena. Such eternalist views of individuality, originating in a desire for permanent existence, have led in the history of philosophy to Pantheistic Monism which holds that everything is a development of an immaterial and supersensual substance; to Plato’s Animism believing the human soul to be both immortal and eternal, i.e., pre- and post-existent; to Realism, giving in its exaggerated form real existence even to universal concepts, or in its moderate version believing in a metaphysical essence, apart from individual characteristics; to Ultra-Dogmatism, accepting the reliability of first principles a priori.

There is still another way in which the mind might try to solve the conflict of life, namely, by refusing to see its complexity and conditionality. For, then, life becomes a succession of events without any consequence. It is the extreme view of Materialism, called Annihilationism (uccheda-diṭṭhi). This craving for annihilation (vibhava-taṇhā) is not so much a desire for the end of life, as a belief that actions in this life will have no further consequences. It is a view, therefore, which encourages joyful living to the utmost, as with death everything is finished. Naturally, such a view of life leads to extreme selfishness, for it stimulates the chase after individual pleasures even at the cost of loss to others. But it is impossible for an individual to break away from a life in which his process of action is so entangled with that of others, that any attempt of isolation can only complicate the complex more. Thus, even this craving for the annihilation of the consequences of action does not solve the problem, but is the source of a more intense conflict.

Thus, desire for the pleasures of the senses (kāmataṇhā) leads to conflict (dukkha), because it is an attachment to a wrong value which can never give the satisfaction hoped for. Desire for continued existence (bhava-taṇhā) is a source of conflict because it is a search for the permanent in the impermanent. Desire for the annihilation of the consequences of life (vibhava-taṇhā) produces more conflict, because of its tendency towards isolation, which produces a sharper contrast between the delusive opposites of self and others. Such is the second Noble Truth (ariya-sacca), the truth about the origin of conflict (dukkha-samudaya).

Knowledge of the presence of conflict (dukkha-sacca) and understanding of the source of its origin (dukkha-samudaya) still leave unattained the realisation of the cessation of the conflict (dukkha-nirodha): and this forms the third Noble Truth, which is the only logical conclusion to be drawn from a fact arising in dependence on a condition, namely, that with the cessation of that originating condition the effect will also cease.

The process of solving the complex and thereby ending the conflict will be, therefore, a process of eradication of the root-condition, which was stated in the second Noble Truth to be craving in its various expressions. Hence “it is the entire waning, cessation, abandoning, rejection, liberation and detachment from that craving, that is called the (third) Noble Truth of the cessation of conflict” (D. II, pp. 310–11). And where that craving has arisen, there also it must be abandoned and dissolved, viz., in the senses and in the will. For, “wherever there is in the world something enticing and delightful, there this craving will vanish if abandoned; if dissolved, it will cease” (loc. cit.). Then, “through the entire waning and cessation of craving comes the cessation of clinging (upādāna); through the cessation of clinging ceases the becoming of volitional tendencies and activities (bhava); with the cessation of this karmic action rebirth (jāti) will come to an end, and then will also cease decay, death, suffering, sorrow, pain grief and despair” (S. II, p. 70). And thus is brought about the cessation of this entire complex of conflict (dukkhakkhandhassa nirodha).

This process of cessation, removing the source of conflict, should not become a quest for happiness, which would be only a subtle substitute for the more gross kind of craving just abandoned. Any kind of happiness which possibly can be thought of, will have the hall-mark of impermanence (anicca), and hence the search for it contains the seed of conflict (dukkha). And so the quest cannot be for a positive goal, but a negative one: the cessation of conflict (dukkhanirodha). Only he who has no desire to control anything, but who is inspired by the irrepressible need to become free from all delusion, he has truly entered the path to perfect bliss in the cessation of the conflict through the solution of the problem. In recognising the source of the conflict in himself, man is able to solve that conflict in himself by removing that source. The conflict began by attaching wrong values to physical and psychical phenomena. Hence, by means of a re-valuation, that attachment will naturally cease. It is a process of cessation through understanding. Cessation is not of being, for there is no permanent soul, substance or entity to cease, but cessation is of becoming, i.e., of the arising (bhava-nirodha) of the volitional activities (kamma) which lead to the repetition or rebirth of the complex. Thus, cessation is not a doctrine of rationalised suicide, not of annihilation, and hence it does not lead to asceticism. Only in one sense does the Buddha admit to be an annihilationist, namely, in so far as he teaches the annihilation of the passions and defilements (kilesa-nirodha).

The method of achieving such cessation is the last of the four Noble Truths, the means towards the end, the path that leads to the cessation of conflict (dukkha-nirodha-gāminī-paṭipadā). It suffices to say here that this fourth noble truth which is the noble eightfold path (ariya aṭṭhaṅgika magga) covers man’s moral life (sīla), his power of concentration (samādhi) and his understanding of the truth (paññā). It is a path of understanding and practice, whereby the truth can become known (sacca-ñāṇa), its function understood (sacca-ñāṇa) so that its accomplishment may be realised (kata-ñāṇa).

An eminent monk, a scholar of the fifteenth century C.E. in Burma. He was born in Pagān and studied grammar in Sagaing under a learned monk, known as Ye-din (the Water-Carrier) from his habit of keeping water in his mouth in the presence of others to restrain his speech. Only after many days of performing all the services of a disciple was the young monk Ariyavaṁsa admitted as a pupil by Ye-din who explained to him the commentary of the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha called the Abhidhammatthavibhāvanī. Later, Ariyavaṁsa composed a commentary on this very book, calling it Maṇisāramañjūsā. Afterwards he taught at Ava where the king himself would sometimes be found among the audience. The most important of his subsequent works was a commentary on the Atthasālinī by Buddhaghosa, which itself is a commentary on the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, the first book of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. His work is entitled Maṇidīpa.:

A grammar which was re-edited recently, the Gandhabharana, and a book called Jātaka-visodhana were also composed by him. Thus he stands out in the ecclesiastical literary world of Burma as the first composer of metaphysical works in the vernacular.

In various anecdotes he is shown always as dignified scholar and a magnanimous teacher with a strong influence over the king of Ratnapura.

The ten ways of noble living of the ariyans are summarised in the book of tens (Dāsaka Nipāta) of the Aṅguttara Nikāya Aṅguttara Nikāya and detailed in the following sutta. Their occurrence in the book of tens is of course, very appropriate, and the style and composition of these two suttas agree entirely with the plan generally observed in the “Collection of Numerical Suttas”. Yet, the fact that the detailed sutta occurs also as part of the Saṅgīti Suttanta of the Dīgha Nikāya D. III, sutta 33, p. 269., where it constitutes a decided departure from the usual style adopted in those discourses, should not be taken as proof of seniority of the Aṅguttara over the Dīgha Nikāya, or of borrowing one way or the other. “Each may have incorporated the passage \dots from the common stock \dots handed down in the community” T.W. Rhys Davids, Introd. to Dialogues of the Buddha, III, P. viii.. That the text was well-known is clear from the fact that the Ariyavasāni (Aliyavasāni) were recommended by the emperor Asoka for study and recital by the monks in his Bhābru edict. The ten methods of noble living are as follows:

Formless, incorporeal. The term is variously applied in reference to the sphere of formlessness (arūpāvacara), the formless element (arūpa-dhātu), the world of the formless (arūpa-loka), the mental state of formless concentration (arūpa-jhana) and in many combinations and compounds relating to the above, such as desire for rebirth in the formless world (arūpa-taṇhā). The basic idea underlying all these concepts is the absence of form, figure, appearance, all of which are attributes of matter (rūpa). In arūpa, therefore, the concepts of beauty and its \ae sthetic opposite, the agreeable and disagreeable sensations resulting therefrom, and even the perceptive constructions such as the relations of order, purpose and logic, are transcended, as being attributes not of things, but of representative mental states. In other words the subjective finality of the “I” is discarded, and the mind as thought is lost in the planes of infinite consciousness (viññāṇañca), of unbounded space (ākāsānañca), of the experience of not being anyone (ākiñcañña), of imperceptible perception (neva-saññā-nāsaññā). Æsthetic activity ceases to be the fundamental function of the mind, and the real succeeds both the actual and the ideal in psychic activity. But even this activity is stilled in the cessation of perception and sensation (saññā-vedaytita-nirodha), when things are known and seen just as they are (yathābhūta-ñāṇa-dassana) without the colouring of previous experiences and classifications, without concepts and ideations, in pure awareness and realisation.

It is in realising that beauty and form (rūpa) have no existence either as a physical fact or as a psychic fact, but appear as the result of a close relationship between object and subject, that the formless spheres are attained as mental states, as spheres of rebirth, as states of absorption, as abodes beyond the concepts of form, where contemplation has taken the place of perception.

The immaterial world, the formless sphere of existence, the highest of the three spheres in which rebirth takes place the two lower spheres being the world of sense (kāma-loka) and the world of form (rūpa-loka).

In Arūpa-loka there is no corporeality (rūpa) whatsoever, and existence is entirely based on the corresponding attainments (samāpatti) or stages of concentration (samādhi). Thus, the four grades in this immaterial world bear the same names as the four attainments of concentration on the formless, viz., the sphere of unbounded space (ākāsānañcāyatana), where meditative thought has transcended all limitations even of space; the sphere of infinite consciousness (viñāñaṇañcāyatana), where this unbounded space itself is seen only as the product of thought which is therefore infinite itself; the sphere of nothingness or perhaps of not being anyone individually (ākiñcaññāyatana), where unbounded space and infinite consciousness are seen as truly empty; and finally the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, i.e., of imperceptible perception (neva-saññā-nāsaññāyatana) where in perfect ease and calm, the thought-process becomes so sublime and refined, that in deepest concentration the very object of thought is lost sight of (Dhs. §§ 265–8).

Beings are reborn in those spheres as a result of having practised these forms of concentration.

Still, these spheres belong to the worlds of heavenly beings, and although superior to the spheres of the brahmas, they, too, are subject to the universal laws of impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and unsubstantiality (anicca, dukkha, anatta), i.e., existence is temporary and, therefore, subject to cessation and rebirth in saṁsāra; hence it is bound up with conflict, the solution of which cannot be found in any state of mental absorption but only in the realisation through insight (vipassanā) of the unreality of the conflict caused by the non-acceptance of impermanence, which is true actuality.

The sphere of the formless, of the immaterial. Whereas loka refers to the place or locality, avacara indicates the sphere of activity (carati, to move). Thus, the sphere of formless activity is that group of concentration which has the immaterial as object, e.g., space, thought, emptiness. Such practices will result in rebirth in a corresponding realm, bearing the same name.

As such mental concentration has no element of the senses (kāma), nor even of form or beauty (rūpa), no action of the mind can be unskilful (akusala), but will be either karmically wholesome (kusala) as action, or a neutral independent function (avyākata-kriya).

Mental action in the sphere of the formless is fourfold according to the object of such concentration. And the mental absorption (jhāna) which results from such concentration is also called formless or immaterial (arūpa), although in the older texts these mental states are rather referred to as attainments (samāpatti). In a way, these four attainments in the immaterial sphere still belong to the fourth stage of mental absorption (jhāna), as they possess the same two constituents of equanimity and mindfulness.

The four spheres of immaterial mental action are the concentration on unbounded space (ākāsānañcāyatana), on infinite consciousness (viñṅāñāṇañcāyatana), on nothingness (ākiñcaññāyatana), and on imperceptible perception (neva-saññā-nāsaññāyatana).

(var. Siṁha-bhikṣu, Siṁhalaputra), the 24th patriarch of Mahāyāna Buddhism in a line of succession beginning with Mahā-Kaśyapa and Ānanda, and including Aśvaghoṣa and Nāgārjuna, with Bodhidharma as the 28th and last Indian patriarch, after which the line of succession is continued in China.

He is mentioned in the Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms (Soothill and Hodous, p. 324) as the 23rd or 24th and final patriarch according to the T'ien-t'ai school, depending on the inclusion of Śāṇakavāsa who was contemporary with his predecessors Mahā Kaśyapa and Ānanda. But the Ch'an school reckons twenty-eight, in which line of succession Āryasiṁha or Siṁhalaputra ranks 24th.

He was born from a brāhman family in central India and became a most promising disciple of the then living patriarch Haklenayaśas or Padmaratna. Siṁhalaputra (lion-son; Chinese: Shih-tzü) asked his teacher one day: To what must I give my chief attention if I would attain the true knowledge of things? And the reply was: By doing nothing you will comply with the teaching of the Buddha. The obviously implied thought is that any focussing of attention on self-attainment can never lead to true knowledge of things which are void of self.

On his teacher’s death (209 C.E. Chinese chronology) he went to Candahar (Gandhāra), where he converted many people to Buddhism. Some heretics and criminals, however, in an attempt to evade the law also assumed the name of Buddhists, whereupon the king with little or no discretion cut off the head of the patriarch (259 C.E.).

Owing to this unfortunate incident the list of patriarchs was considered by some as terminated with his death. But the contemplative school of Bodhidharma have retained the twenty-eight names. Until we come, however, to the last of the Indian patriarchate, Bodhidharma (Chinese: P'u-t'i-ta-mo) who died in 528 C.E., the historical dates given to the various patriarchs are not reliable.

That which is not produced from a combination of causes. There are two types of states to be known (ime dve dhammā abhiññeyyā): the conditioned: and the unconditioned (saṅkhatā ca dhātu asaṅkhatā ca dhātu: D. III, p. ; M. III, p. ). And of these two classes there is only one single state which is not subject to causation and conditioning and which for that reason is called the unconditioned (paccayehi asaṅkhatattā); it is Nibbāna. All other states are conditioned phenomena (saṅkhata), proceeding from causes, dependent on conditions and subject to cessation. The unconditioned (asaṅkhatā) Nibbāna is, therefore, the only absolute, unrelated (appaccaya: (Dhs. 193), uncaused (na hetu: loc cit.), without origin (na uppāda), without passing (na vaya), without change in its duration (na ṭhitassa aññathatta: A. I, p. ). Because of its not being subject to conditioning it is immovable (acala), not subject to decay (ajara), immortal (amara), unshakable (accuta) and hence stable (dhuva); it is unfading (ajajjara), undecaying (apalokita) and deathless (amata: S. IV, p. ff.). “Because there is this unborn, unoriginated, uncreated, unconditioned, it is possible to escape from this conditioning” (Ud. 81; It. 37).

The attainment of arahantship is described by Bhūta thera as the faultless path (viraja), the unconditioned path (asaṅkhata), the path of peace (santa pada: (Thag. v. 521); and the term is explained by the commentary as “not brought about by any condition” (na kenaci paccayena saṅkhataṁ). Also Adhimutta thera refers to the reaching of the goal as the attainment (lit. the touch) of the unconditioned (nibbānapadaṁ asaṅkhātaṁ: ibid. v. 725).

Thus far we have noted the orthodox Theravāda view. But the Uttarāpathakas and the Mahiṁsāsakas were of opinion that space (ākāsa) was unconditioned. They distinguished three kinds of space: limited space which is objective, abstract space and empty space. The last two being mere abstract ideas or mental fictions, were not conditioned therefore, and hence they were considered as unconditioned by them (Kvu. 329). The Mahiṁsāsakas together with the Pubbaseliyas held that the causal elements or links in the law of dependent origination (paṭiccasamuppāda) were unconditioned, because of the Buddha’s statement: “Whether Tathāgatas arise or not, the causal law of origination is fixed” (S. II, p. ). This position would make each of the eleven theses unconditioned or absolute and independent, even though each thesis expresses the dependency of a factor on the previous one (Kvu. 319–23). The Pubbaseliyas again held the belief that the Four Noble Truths were unconditioned, based on a similar text where the Buddha stated that the Four Noble Truths are constantly true, not false and unchangeable (S. V, p. ; Kvu. 323). But none of these views were accepted by the Theravādins.

The ninth part of the fourth volume of the Saṁyutta Nikāya, comprising two chapters. The first chapter (S. IV, pp. 359–61)) contains eleven short suttas, similar in structure and only differing in the subjects dealt with, which, however, are all said to be stages on the path leading to the unconditioned (asaṅkhatagāmī magga). They are: mindfulness relating to the body (kāyagatā sati), calm and insight (samatha vipassanā ca), concentration based on discursive thought and sustained application (savitakkasavicāra-samādhi), concentration that is void of lust (suññatā-samādhi), not contaminated by outward appearances (animitta-samādhi) and free from all longings (appaṇihita-samādhi), the four applications of mindfulness (cattāro satipaṭṭhānā) of body, feelings, mind and mental states, the four right exertions (cattāro sammappadhānā) of restraint, abandonment, practice and guarding, the four, bases of effective power (cattāro iddhipādā), viz., purpose, will, thought and investigation, the five controlling powers (pañcindriyāni) and psychic forces (pañca balāni) of confidence, energy, mindfulness, concentration and insight, the seven factors of enlightenment (satta bojjhaṅga), viz., mindfulness, investigation, energy, zest, calm, concentration and equanimity, and finally the Noble Eightfold Path (ariya-atthaṅgika-magga).

The second chapter (ibid. 362–8) deals first with all the above items individually and in detail in 45 sections, collectively called Asaṅkhata Sutta in the versified contents (uddāna) at the end of the chapter, all of them being shown as the path leading to the unconditioned (asaṅkhatagāmī magga).

All this is then repeated with substitution of the key-word asaṅkhata, and one finds 45 similar sections dealing in the same order with each of the following 32 synonyms for the unconditioned, viz., the end or goal (anta), the freedom from intoxication (anāsava), the truth (sacca), the further shore (pāra), the subtle (nipuṇa), the hard-to-see (sududdasa), the unfading (ajajjara), the stable (dhuva), the undecaying (apalokita), the invisible (anidassana), the taintless (nippāpa), the peace (santa), the deathless (amata), the excellent (paṇita), the blissful (siva), the security (khema), the destruction of craving (taṇhakkhaya), the wonderful (acchariya), the marvellous (abbhuta), the freedom from conflict (anītika), the state of freedom from conflict (anītikadhamma), the freedom from lust (nibbāna) the harmless (avyāpajja), dispassion (virāga), purity (suddhi), release (mutti), non-attachment (anālaya), the island (dīpa), the sheltering cave (lena), the stronghold (tāṇa), the refuge (saraṇa) and the final rest (parāyaṇa).

Each sutta finishes with that stereotyped and yet so beautiful exhortation of the Buddha: “Thus, brethren, have I taught you the goal and the way that leads to the goal. Whatever a compassionate teacher could do for his disciples that have I done for you with compassion. Here, brethren, are the roots of trees; here are lonely places. Now do you meditate without sloth, without having to look backwards in remorse. This is my exhortation to you”.

Is the collective name of 45 suttas, opening the second chapter of the Asaṅkhata Saṁyutta (S. IV, p. –8). Each of them has a different approach to the common purpose: the way that leads to the unconditioned (asaṅkhatagāmī magga), i.e., Nibbāna. The general structure of the suttas consists in the repeated question: “And what, O monks, is the way that leads to the unconditioned”? followed by the single term of the reply which varies for each section, and the repeated conclusion: “That, O monks, is called the way that leads to the unconditioned”.

The forty-five different approaches to the common goal are as follows: meditation which is peace (samatha) and meditation which is insight (vipassanā), concentration with discursive thought and sustained application of mind (savitakka-savicārasamādhi), concentration without discursive thinking, but with sustained application only (avitakkavicāramatta-samādhi), concentration with neither discursive thinking, nor sustained application of mind (avitakka-avicāra-samādhi), concentration that is void of lust (suññatā-samādhi), concentration that is not contaminated by outward signs or appearances (animitta-samādhi), concentration that is free from all longings (appaṇihita-samādhi), contemplation of the body in one’s own body (kāye kāyānupassā), contemplation of sensations when they arise (vedanāsu vedanānupassī), contemplation of thought as it arises in the mind (citte cittānupassī), contemplation of mental states and phenomena as they arise (dhammesu dhammānupassī), the right exertion of restraint or avoidance (anuppādāya chanda) of evil not arisen, the right exertion of abandoning (pahānāya chanda) the evil which has already arisen, the right exertion of practising (uppādāya chanda) the good which has not been done up to then, the right exertion of performed, the basis of effective power attended by concentration and purpose (chanda-samādhi-padhāna-saṅkhāra-samannāgata-iddhipāda), or by effort (viriya-s°), or by planning (citta-s°), or by investigation (vīmaṁsā), the controlling faculty of confidence based on dispassion (saddhindriya), or of energy (viriyindriya), or of mindfulness, or of concentration or of insight based on singleness of heart, on dispassion, on cessation, leading to renunciation, the psychic force or power or mental strength of confidence, of energy, of mindfulness, of concentration or of insight, the factors of enlightenment (bojjhaṅga) and the Noble Eightfold Path of right understanding etc.

Intoxicating secretion, discharge from a festering wound, hence psychologically “mental intoxicant”. Freedom from mental intoxication in any of its four forms constitutes arahantship (khināsava, anāsava, āsavakkhaya). The four types of mental intoxication are given as sensuality (kāma), lust of life (bhava), speculation (diṭṭhi) and ignorance (avijjā). Other renderings in English are “influx”, “bias”. They are also referred to as flood (ogha).

Describes in detail the cankers (āsava) to be got rid of by control (saṁvara) by conscious use (paṭisevanā) of the requisites, by endurance (adhivāsanā), by avoidance (parivajjanā), by ejection (vinodanā) and by mind cultivation (bhāvanā). The monk who has put an end to the cankers by these means is said to be worthy of honour and offerings (A. III, p. ).

(2) enumerates ten factors the cultivation of which leads to the destruction of cankers (āsava). They are the eight factors of the Noble Eightfold Path in addition to right knowledge (sammāñāṇa) and right release (sammāvimutti: A. V, p. ).

(3) There are two more suttas by this name found in the Itivuttaka (pp. 49–50, suttas 56 and 57). The prose texts of both are identical and refer to three cankers or mental intoxicants (āsava) only, namely, lust (kāma), becoming (bhava) and ignorance (avijjā). The difference lies in the two stanzas attached to each sutta. The gāthā of the earlier sutta speaks of the āsavas in general, their arising, their cessation and the way to make them cease, after which a monk is completely free (parinibbuta). The later sutta in its gāthā refers to the mental intoxicants individually, and says that he who has slain the cankers of lust, ignorance and becoming, wears his last body (antima-deha).

Often combined in āsayānusaya, a hankering disposition, usually consisting of a series of seven such propensities or inclinations thus called “in consequence of their pertinacity whereby they ever and again tend to become the conditions for the arising of ever new sensuous greed (kāmarāga), grudge (paṭigha), speculative opinion (diṭṭhi), sceptical doubt (vicikicchā), conceit (māna), craving for continued existence (bhavarāga) and ignorance” (avijjā: Vism. chap. xxii, § 60). Although the term anusaya is found in the suttas, its combination with āsaya is confined to the later texts and commentaries (e.g., Ps. i, p. ).

One of the five hundred paccekabuddhas who were in ancient times living on the Isigili mountain in seclusion. He was seen by the people of that time entering the mountain range, but was never seen thereafter. Hence the people used to say that the mountain had swallowed up the sage (isī gilati) and named it Isigili. The names of these paccekabuddhas are given by the Buddha in the Isigili Sutta (M. III, p. f.).

Buddhaghosa in his commentary (MA IV, 217) relates how these sages had made their dwellings inside the mountain behind a rock which would open and close like a folding door.

Or insight of discernment leading to emergence (vuṭṭhāna-gāmini-vipassanā-ñāṇa), leads invariably to the Path (sotāpatti-arahatta-magga), for which reason it is given this special designation. It is the climax of discernment (vipassanā) reached by the matured insight of equanimity (sankharupekkhā-ñāṇa) in the stage of adaptation (anuloma-ñāṇa) after the meditator has equipped himself with the mental qualifications for the Path. Because the Path is reached immediately after one more moment of adoption (gotrabhū) it is also called the gateway to emancipation (vimokkhamukha).

Is the order of enumeration in a forward direction or natural order “with the hair or grain” (anuloma) in opposition to the descending or reverse order “against the hair”(paṭiloma). The two orders are usually combined in an exposition of the 12 links of dependent origination (Paṭiccasamuppāda).

The act of investigation or examination which forms part of the process of evolution of a thought. It is a stage in the act of sense-cognition, which lies between the moment of passive reception (sampaṭicchana) and the active determination (voṭṭhapana) which immediately precedes full conscious apperception (javana).

The relationship of influence of a prior mental condition on a succeeding one by repetition, recurrence or frequency, whereby a habit may be formed, or at least a greater efficiency developed. As the prior condition leaves thus its imprint on, and gives impulse to, the succeeding one, this relationship is only established among phenomena of the same order. Thus, repeated attempts at writing will result in greater proficiency in that art, but will not assist in the development of other skills, e.g., of singing. A good action will make a succeeding good action better; an evil action will make a succeeding evil action worse. It may be called, therefore, also the relationship of gathering experience. It is the twelfth of the 24 modes of conditioned relationship.

According to Plutarch, Alexander the Great is supposed to have received in the year 326 B.C.E. in the Punjab the visit of a young person from India who had revolted against his king and who was in search of support. The unpopularity of his king, he said, was such that it could not hold together an army. This may have been due to the king’s origin, as he was not of royal birth, but of the vaiśya caste. But Alexander did not give the support; either it was beyond his plans to recover the empire of Darius or, more probably, he was prevented by the mutiny of his soldiers.

The person from India referred to was Candragupta, or as named by Plutarch, Santrakotos, the founder of the Mauryan dynasty.

Within the 24 years of his reign, Candragupta was able to expand the Magadha kingdom considerably, and when Seleucus reached the Punjab, which Alexander wanted to make into a Greek colonial outpost, he found Candragupta in possession of a vast empire, stretching from one coast to the other, commanding an army (according to Greek tradition) of 600,000 foot-soldiers, 30,000 cavalry and 9,000 elephants. Seleucus did not succeed and was forced to surrender to the Mauryan ruler some territories up to the river Indus, even concluding with him a matrimonial alliance, as contained in the treaty of 303 B.C.E. of Pāṭalīputra.

According to Sūtrabo, Sandrakottos of Palibodra (i.e., Candragupta of Pāṭaliputra) was a contemporary of Seleucus Nikator. And Seleucus ceded to Candragupta a tract of land to the west of the Indus, at the same time entering with him into a matrimonial alliance and receiving from him 500 elephants (Lassen, Indische Alterthumskunde, II, 217 f.; V.A. Smith, Early History of India, 132 f.; Krom, Hermes, 44, 154 ff.).

Candragupta’s son and successor is known in Buddhist chronicles as Bindusāra, with the Greek appellation Amitrokhates, i.e., Amittaghāta, terror of the enemy. He certainly added to his territories by further conquests, especially in the south of India, as there is no reference in any source to Candragupta having campaigned in the south.

Bindusāra is reported to have had 16 wives and 101 sons. One of his wives is referred to in the Aśokāvadāna (Przyluski, La Légende de l' Empereur Asoka, p. 320) as Subhadrāṅgī, a daughter of a brāhman of Campā. Palace intrigue had kept her away from the king Bindusāra, but at last she was able to make her presence felt and gain access to royal favour. When she bore the king her first child she is reported to have remarked: Now I am without sorrow (a-soka). And that was the name given to the child. In the Vaṁsatthappakāsinī (iv, 125), the Mahāvaṁsa commentary, her name is given as Dhamma, and the child’s name is explained as not having caused any pain to his mother at childbirth. The king, however, disliked this child owing to its rough skin, and tradition says that Asoka’s mother had to take him away to save his life. She had another son who is called Tissa in the Mahāvaṁsa and Vītāśoka in the Aśokāvadāna.

Bindusāra’s eldest son, Sumanā, was appointed by the king as vice-regent, while Asoka was still young. But when Asoka had grown up he was sent by Bindusāra to Takkasilā to quell a revolt. He was successful in doing so without arousing too much resentment on the part of the citizens. Owing to his charming ways he won the hearts of the people and peace was established without battle. An Aramaic inscription discovered in 1915 by John Marshall in Taksila mentions the name of the governor of the town as Priyadarsi. We now know that this name applies to Asoka and it is possible that this inscription refers to Asoka’s settling of the political situation in Taksila.

Having completed his work there he was, probably in recognition of his work, appointed governor or viceroy of Avanti, whose capital was Ujjeni. And it is most likely during this period that Asoka fell in love with the beautiful daughter of a merchant of Vidisā (Przyluski, op. cit. p. 106). The Mahāvaṁsa (xiii, 8 ff.) calls her Devī, the daughter of a merchant of Vedisagiri, and hence also named Vedisadevī. Reference to her as Sakyākumārī (Mhbv. p. 116) appears to be an attempt to relate her to the Sakyas and hence to the Buddha Śākyamuni, thereby paving the way to Asoka’s conversion to Buddhism and the mission of their two children, Mahinda and Saṅghamittā to Ceylon in the cause of Buddhism. But the fact that Vedisadevī did not follow Asoka to Pāṭaliputta, where Asoka’s chief queen (aggamahesī) was Asandhimittā, might rather be an indication of her ancestral social status of the merchant class not being acceptable in the royal court circles at Pāṭaliputta.

After the throne at Pāṭaliputta fell vacant on Bindusāra’s death (272 B.C.E.), there was a second rebellion at Takkasilā, according to the Divyāvadāna, when the people revolted against the maladministration of Bindusāra’s eldest son, Susīma or Sumanā. Asoka promptly contested the succession and established himself on the throne to which he was already adjudged as the fittest of all Bindusāra’s sons by the king’s preceptor, an Ājīvaka saint, named Piṅgalavatsa. The Mahāvaṁsa states that Asoka caused his eldest brother to be slain. Elsewhere in the same work (Mhv. xx, 40) and in the Dīpavaṁsa (vi, 21) it is said that he killed his ninety-nine brothers, which, however, may be dismissed as imaginary, as it is not corroborated by the text of the 5th rock-inscription at Mānsehrā, where reference is made to the “harems of my brothers and sisters”. Moreover, the tender solicitude for all his relations and expressions of affection which are to be found in several of his edicts (e.g., the 4th) would make one incline to the view that the account of Asoka’s earlier cruelty earning for him the epithet of Caṇḍāsoka, was merely an artificial background against which his conversion and future saintliness as Dhammāsoka stand out all the clearer. It is certain, however, that the change on the throne was not affected without difficulty, for there is an interregnum of four years, before the issue of succession was definitely decided. The Ceylon chronicles allow only Asoka’s youngest brother Tissa to survive Another younger brother of Asoka is mentioned in the commentary of the Theragāthā, the Paramatthadīpanī, by Dhammapāla, where he is named Vitāsoka, and described as a lay-pupil of the thera Giridatta, highly proficient in the Sutta and Abhidhamma-piṭakas. One day he observed in a mirror some grey hairs on his head. His mental agitation developed into concentration and he became a stream-winner (sotāpanna) as he sat there. He renounced the world and won arahantship not long after..

The so-called Queen’s Edict on the Allahabad pillar speaks of Asoka’s second queen, Kāruvākī, and her son Tīvara, but his chief queen (aggamahesī) in Pāṭaliputta was Asandhimittā. She is well spoken of in the Mahāvaṁsa (v, 85; xx, 2), being friendly inclined to the Order of Buddhist monks and sympathetic with the ideas of her husband. She died in the 29th year of his reign, without having borne any children. Four years later Asoka raised Tīssārakkhā to the rank of chief queen. She was too young and vain to appreciate the old king’s devotion to religious objects more than to her. In a fit of temper she attempted, but without success, to destroy the bodhi-tree at Gayā. The Divyāvadāna (xxvii) mentions another queen, Padmāvatī, mother of Kuṇāla. From the epigraphic records we gather that Asoka had at least four sons, each of whom was in charge of one of the four vice-royalties, of Takkasilā, Ujjeni, Suvarṇagiri and Tosali (Kāliṅga Rock Edicts I and II). Kuṇāla, the viceroy of Ujjeni, was, according to the Divyāvadāna, blinded by the conspiracy of his step-mother. Jalaṅka succeeded his father Asoka as an independent king of Kaśmir, according to the Rājataraṅginī, while Tāranātha mentions Virasena as the one who succeeded Asoka as ruler of Gandhāra, although the relationship with Asoka is not quite clear.

Four years after, Asoka had won for himself undivided sovereignty. Consecrated king by anointment (abhiṣeka) he raised his younger brother Tissa to the office of vice-regent.

The Mahāvaṁsa gives for this historical fact of consecration or anointment (abhiṣeka) the year 218 after the Parinibbāna of the Buddha, and from this datum is sometimes reconstructed the actual year of the Teacher’s passing away. Opinions differ about the date of Asoka’s accession to the throne, but they all range round about 270 B.C.E. (from 279 to 268).

As a ruler, Asoka assumed two other names under which he is always referred to in the various edicts, rock-inscriptions and pillars, erected during his reign. In these he called himself “the One dear to the gods” (Devānampiya) and “the One who looks on all with kindness” (Piyadassī). The identity of these names with Asoka is borne out by the inscription (No. 4) at Maski, where it is said: devānampiyasa Asokasa (See also Dīpavaṁsa, e.g., vi, 1, 2, 25). In the recently found Greek Aramaic rock-inscription in Afghanistan the name Piodases is mentioned.

The extent of his empire (see figure \ref{II_180_map} on p. \pageref{II_180_map}) can be inferred from the geographical distribution of these inscriptions, which have been found in rocks and caves and on polished memorial columns in various parts of the sub-continent, Peshāwar, Pūri, Ganja, Thāna, Bhopal, Hyderabād, Mysore, Bihār, and neighbouring countries, Afghanistan and Nepāl.
\begin{figure*}
\includegraphics[width=1.0\textwidth]{./graphics/II_180_map}
\includegraphics[width=1.0\textwidth]{./graphics/II_180_map_caption}
\caption{Asoka’s Empire}

\end{figure*}

The pillars erected by Asoka are not columns forming a part of a building or colonnade, but commemorative posts, more or less like obelisks, and we shall refer to them hereafter as thambha. Their height varies from 40 to 50 feet, with a diameter of about 4 feet at the base, slightly tapering towards its capital. The monolithic shaft is of highly polished fine sand-stone, dressed and proportioned with such utmost nicety and polish that casual observers have been deceived into thinking that it was metallic. Tom Coryate in the seventeenth century described the Delhi thambha as a “brazen pillar”, and Bishop Heber recorded his impression in the nineteenth century, that it was a high black pillar of cast metal. The dressing and polish of the stone are confined to the section appearing above the ground level, while the continuation underground and foundation of about 8 to 10 feet are undressed and unpolished.

The thambha has a capital in the form of a stylised lotus with the petals turning over and down, while from the centre of the lotus rises a carved abacus, which again serves as a pedestal for a seated lion, or as in the case of the capital of the thambha at Sārnāth, four lions seated back to back.

The particular capital at Sārnāth, moreover, has on its abacus the four animals symbolising the four quarters–-elephant, east; horse, south; lion, north; and bull, west–-which are also typical of the “moon-stones” found in Anurādhapura in Ceylon S. Paranavitana (ArtA. XVII p. 197) associates these four animals with the four or fears (bhaya) disease, old age and death, on the ground that in the “moonstones” the sequence of these four repeated several times in the semi-circle, which he says would be altogether purposeless if they had to represent the four quarters of the world. The moving position of the animals “chasing one another with the vigour of beasts in a circus ring” rather indicates the continuous stream of saṁsāra in in its endless repetition of birth, disease, old age and death..

The most characteristic monuments of Asoka’s reign, however, are his stone-inscriptions, in so far as they provide us with an inside view of the controlling power of that ancient empire. It is good to keep in mind the purpose of these inscriptions which are commonly known under the name “edicts”. An “edict” is a proclamation or order made by higher authority. Now, it would be most extraordinary to find an Indian king prescribing a course of theological study for the Saṅgha, such as at first sight some of Asoka’s inscriptions appear to have done. And even if Asoka would have dared to do so, it would not have been worth while to have his edicts carved in stone to ensure “their lasting a long time”.

Furthermore, it is not likely that the Saṅgha would have welcomed such interference in their domestic affairs, even if coming from the great Asoka, and one could well visualise the edicts being received by them with our modern remark, “to be filed”.

Asoka’s inscriptions, rock and pillar-edicts are inscribed in kharoṣṭhī, a script derived from the Persian Aramaic, as regards the two northern major rock edicts at Mānsehrā and Shāhbāzgarhi, or in brāhmī, the earliest Indian script so far known to have been used for the writing of Sanskrit and Prakrit, as regards the majority of inscriptions, even those in the southern Deccan, while the most recently discovered inscription at Kandahar (1958) is bilingual, being inscribed in Greek and Aramaic. The brāhmī script had been forgotten in India and early efforts of decyphering had been in vain, till it was finally deciphered by James Prinsep in 1837. It is only after this that the importance of Asoka’s inscriptions became obvious in our modern age.

Asoka’s inscriptions, in so far as they contain a list of literature, are a perpetuation of a pious custom. It is customary in eastern countries, even up to this present date, to have ceremonial recitations of the sacred books, either in part or in full. The very form in which the doctrine is cast was intended to assist the memorising thereof, in times when the production of manuscripts was laborious and rare. Asoka’s stone inscriptions are, therefore, to be regarded as the result of an effort to spread the existing doctrine in a manner which would ensure the endurance of the doctrine, while safeguarding its pristine purity without interpolation. One can visualise a high official reading out the text of the inscriptions and perhaps giving his commentary thereon to a vast crowd gathered together there just for that purpose.

Some scholars have called these edicts Dhamma-edicts as their main contents is concerning the Dhamma, although several other subjects, of social, cultural and political interest, are also dealt with.

Together with the instruction that certain Buddhist texts should regularly be recited for the good of bhikkhus and laymen, a list of such literature is given. The selection of those texts naturally betrays the personal interest of the selector. And it is obvious that Asoka’s selection is specially directed towards the ethical duties of men. His interests appear to be rather in the formation of good citizens and members of society than in philosophical speculation, and the selection from the Rahulovāda Sutta, in respect of the avoidance of falsehood, becomes typical. Such is the prominence given by Asoka to ethical subjects that it has even been doubted whether Asoka himself was a Buddhist, or merely an emperor interested in establishing peace in his domains and making use of the peaceful doctrine of Buddhism to gain his end.

This is sometimes referred to as Asoka’s policy of Dhamma (cp. Romila Thapar, Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas, pp. 137–81, Oxford University Press, 1961). Asoka was neither a saint, nor a scholar, and if he is considered in the context of his historical background, the relation between the fast development and spreading of Buddhism and the ideas of Asoka will become clear. The theories and doctrines of Buddhism were not exclusively concerned with philosophical innovations, giving a modern twist to ancient terms and techniques, but they certainly also influenced the general mass of people, breaking them away from the rigidly orthodox outlook of Brāhmanism. Although rooted in earlier Hindu tradition, there was a definite deviation leading on to the “middle path”, which was a clear protest against the malpractices in society and ritualistic observances. The protest against the exclusive monopolies of brāhmans is felt in the support given to the Buddha’s doctrine by the warrior and commercial castes, the Buddha himself being a kṣatriya. The king, by declaring himself in favour of the new belief, was thus able to undermine the dominance of other groups, thereby increasing his own central authority and power. Moreover, as the new beliefs were in many aspects not violently opposed to the old order, a future compromise did not appear impossible, and the practical advantage of adopting the Buddha’s Dhamma becomes clear.

Thus, Asoka’s policy is frequently called a policy of Dhamma, for although the spreading of the Buddha’s teaching was stressed, the centralisation and consolidation of the empire which consisted of a great number of different races and communities were doubtless the foremost aim of his policy.

The edicts gave Asoka the opportunity to expand his Dhamma and make use of it as a social and intellectual force upon society. That Asoka’s Dhamma, however, did not necessarily conform to the religious philosophic Norm of the Buddha has been made a point of issue by Romila Thapar (op. cit. p. 157): “Had the Dhamma conformed to any of the religions, more particularly Buddhism, the institution of the dhamma-mahāmattas would have been superfluous. Each religion had either its group of devoted believers or its order of monks who could have been organized into active propagandists with greater efficiency as they would already have been ardent believers”.

The reference here is to the fourth Bhābru (or Bairāṭ) rock inscription in which the following texts are recommended by Asoka. Scholars For identification of these texts, see H. Oldenberg, Vin. Introd. p. xi; T.W. Rhys Davids, JRAS. 1898, p. 629; H. Oldenberg, ZDMG. 52, p. 684; J. Bloch, ZDMG. 63, p. 325; A.J. Edmunds, Buddhist Bibliography (1904); Dharmananda Kosambi, IA. 41, 40; Eb. Hultzsch, Inscriptions of Asoka. have identified these texts with parts of the theravāda canon, as indicated below:

The Mahāvaṁsa (chap. xv) gives details of Asoka’s conversion to Buddhism. At first Asoka maintained the alms instituted by his father, but soon, being disappointed in the recipients, he began looking out for holy men. It was then that he saw from his window his nephew, the young novice Nigrodha. Asoka was at once drawn to him and invited him into the palace. Nigrodha preached to him the Appamāda Vagga and the king was greatly pleased. He ceased his benefactions to other religious orders and transferred his patronage to Nigrodha and members of the Buddhist Order. But, later, these benefactions were restored on the advice of the Buddhist monks themselves. There are many references in the inscriptions to confirm the tradition that Asoka had adopted the Buddhist religion in the course of his reign, apart from his recommendation of the study of the Buddhist suttas referred to above.

Asoka’s order of expulsion of heretical monks from the Saṅgha Kausambi and Sāñcī-pillars., his pilgrimage to places sacred to Buddhists E.g., Lumbinī, Gayā and Kusinārā., his observance of Buddhist uposatha days, references to himself as upāsaka Brahmagiri, 6th rock-inscription. or buddhasāke Maski, 5th rock-inscription., using the tribal name of Śākya, belonging to Siddhattha Gotama, as equivalent to Buddhist (e.g., in the Rūpnāth, Sahasrām, Bairāṭ, Maslki, Brahmagiri, and Siddāpura-inscriptions), his appointment of superintendents of the Dhamma and his zeal in its propagation cannot be explained satisfactorily, unless we accept the traditional belief of Asoka’s conversion to the teaching of the Buddha. His liberality in making donations to other religious sects and his tolerance towards them (Rock-inscription XII) do not bear sufficient weight to the contrary.

There are certain authors who go even further and who maintain that Asoka, “approaching the Saṅgha”, became a bhikkhu. We shall return to this point later but may state in the meantime that there is nothing in tradition or inscription to warrant the viewpoint of an abdication.

The 13th and 14th year after the coronation were marked by the issue of the most important set of proclamations for the whole empire, viz., the fourteen rock-edicts (which include the two Kāliṅga edicts in that district). They concern themselves particularly with the administration of the newly conquered country. In his 15th year he enlarged the stūpa of Koṇāgamana and came to the spot on pilgrimage six years later, setting up a commemorative pillar with inscription. This pilgrimage included other sacred spots such as the Buddha Śākyamuni’s birthplace at Lumbinīvana, where another commemorative column was erected.

Six years later began the issue of the pillar edicts with a series of six, to which in the following year the longest in this series was added. There are two more inscriptions, which although undated most certainly belong to the closing decade of his reign.

The contents of the rock-inscriptions, with slight variations, are found repeated in several places, more or less completely. The most important are the inscriptions which give fourteen edicts of different dates of which the last one as peroration could have served equally well as a preface.

The thirteenth rock-inscription deserves a little more detailed attention, for this deals with Asoka’s victory over the Kāliṅgas, which is not known to us from independent historical sources. Not much is known of the first eight years of his reign. But in the eighth year after his consecration occurs his conquest of the Kāliṅgas on the coast of the bay of Bengal. In history, it is not so much his victory and the incorporation of those extensive territories in his empire, that have left their imprint on all ages to come, as the reaction which the horrors of war made on Asoka, his feeling of remorse over the slaughtering and captivity of so many thousands of soldiers, and his still deeper sorrow and regret over the privation and violence, both physical and mental, to those not directly engaged in actual warfare. His delicate sensitiveness to the cruel horrors of war worked a complete revolution in his mind and his attitude towards conquest. All this is expressed in the thirteenth rock-inscription, which opposes the conquest of the Dhamma to military conquest. It is this victory of the Dhamma which alone is able to produce spiritual joy and delight. The fourteenth and final rock-inscription is in the form of an epilogue.

An important discovery was made public in 1958 (V. Scerrato: East and West, New Series 9, pp. 4–6) of an inscription of exceptional interest because of the information supplied by it and the problems arriving from it. The discovery was made in the surroundings of the ancient site of Kandahar, east of Persia and Bactria. It is a proclamation comparable to the other Indian decrees of Asoka, calling himself Piyadassī, in two languages, Greek and Aramaic, which latter one is interspersed with “Iranianisms”. Interesting deductions regarding the Hellenisation of these parts and the linguistic conditions of this western outpost of Asoka’s empire are fairly obvious. The proclamation is dated in the tenth year of Asoka’s reign to be reckoned from his “coronation” (abhiṣeka), i.e., two years after his conquest of the Kāliṅgas, and the following translation is suggested by Carlo Gallavotti (Rivista di Culture Classica e Medioevale, I, 1959, pp. 113–96). “After full ten years king Piodasse had the text of the Dhamma published to men and from this moment he made men merciful and everything prosperous all over the earth. And the king abstains from (eating) living creatures, and so also the other men; and those who are hunters and fishers of the king cease from hunting; and if there are people who are incontinent they cease from incontinence by exerting every effort, and they obey to their fathers, mothers and elders too. In present life and in future time they will find themselves in better and preferable conditions from every point of view, if they behave in that way”. In the above, the word dhamma (for the Greek eusebeia) has been substituted for Gallavotti’s “mercy”, which, no doubt fits in nicely and conveniently with the balance of the text, but eusebeia carries rather the meaning of filial piety and reverence towards the gods and one’s parents, or loyalty.

The records of Asoka have been engraved in several kinds of script. The edicts found at Shāhbāzgarhi and at Mānsehrā are in Kharoṣṭhī script, which is read from right to left. Other inscriptions are in Brāhmī script which has been recognised as the parent script of all indigenous languages used in India and south Asian countries, and which is read from left to right. Others again are found in Aramaic and Greek.

This series of fourteen rock-inscriptions was completed in the fourteenth year after Asoka’s consecration.

One may wonder whether the general tolerance advocated by Asoka in his 12th rock-inscription was abused by the various sects in order to establish themselves more firmly. However that may be, tradition, supported by chronicles in Ceylon, has placed in the seventeenth year of his reign an important fact, the third Buddhist Council, which was in session for nine months at Pāṭaliputta, modern Patna, the capital of Asoka’s empire. This Council was necessitated by the growth of heretical doctrines within the Order, causing various secessions. The thambha (pillar) inscriptions of the last years of Asoka’s reign, at Kauśāmbī, Sāñcī and Sārnāth, refer to action to be taken to prevent a schism in the Saṅgha. This was obviously not an autocratic exercise by Asoka of his sovereign powers. It was determined by the Buddhist Canonical Law (Vinaya), confirmed at the supreme session of this third Council, convened by Asoka under the presidentship of thera Moggaliputta Tissa. On this occasion the sixty-two heretical views of seventeen schismatic sects were exposed and condemned. The Council further compiled the Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa which was incorporated into the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. It contains the various points of controversy maintained by the seventeen different heretical schools, together with their refutation, and the Theravāda view-point as to the correct doctrine. Still, many scholars now hold that this “council” has no historical background and may refer to a local dispute.

At the termination of this third Council of Buddhism it was decided to send missionaries to the neighbouring lands, and the countries specially favoured were (according to Ceylon Buddhist tradition) Kashmir and Gandhāra (Peshawar), Yavana (old N.W. Frontier Province), the neighbouring lands, the Himālayan districts, the Western country, comprising Gujarāt, Kathiawār and Sindh, the country of the Marāthas, Mysore, the Kanara districts, and the gold-bearing districts of Bengal and Ceylon. Asoka made use of the channels of communication, both commercial and diplomatic, that had existed from the time of Candragupta, between India and the Hellenistic kingdoms founded by Alexander’s generals, to convey the treasures of Buddhism to the nations of the West. Vincent A. Smith says (in his article on Asoka in ERE. ii, 126, which is based on Asokan inscriptions) that missionaries traversed “the wide realms of Antiochos Theos, king of Syria and Western Asia, and penetrated the dominions of Ptolemy Philadephus, king of Egypt, those of his neighbour, king Magas of Cyrene, and even those of the European monarchs Alexander of Epirus, and Antigonos Gonatas of Macedonia”. Legends in Burma and Siam say that Asoka sent his missions to those countries, too. In any case, Asoka carried his propaganda far beyond the limits of his empire into Asia, Europe and Africa and his missions permanently determined the religious history of a large part of the world. The mission sent to Ceylon was, however, the most successful. It consisted (according to the Mhv.) of four bhikkhus, one sāmaṇera (or novice) and a lay disciple and was headed by Asoka’s own son, Mahinda or particulars of Asoka’s missions and a discussion on these see Radhakumud Mookerjee: Asoka, pp. 33 ff..

The establishment of the female section, the Bhikkhuṇī Saṅgha, required the services of a fully ordained bhikkhuṇī, and at the request of the king of Ceylon, named Devānampiya Tissa, Asoka sent his daughter to Ceylon with a branch from the original bodhi-tree under which the Śākyamuni attained enlightenment. This branch was planted in the Mahāmeghavana at Anurādhapura, where it still survives as the oldest historical tree in the world.

The fourth pillar-edict states that seven inscriptions on the thambhas were “published” in the 27th year of Asoka’s reign; they differ from the rock-inscriptions in this sense that, whereas the rock-inscriptions predominantly deal with external right conduct, the thambha-inscriptions appear to stress more the need of inner purity: utmost devotion to the Dhamma, vigilance, docility, fear of wrong and utmost application. The Dhamma is mentioned as including abstinence from evil deeds, performance of good deeds, kindness, liberality, truthfulness and purity Second pillar edict..

It is interesting to note that Asoka confined himself to the practical side of religion. No mention is made of philosophic doctrines, not even of the ultimate deliverance of Nibbāna. The doctrine of rebirth is referred to only incidentally, in so far as the consequence of good actions will be happiness in this world and in the life to come. His understanding of the deeper doctrine appears to be rather superficial, for if he had understood, e.g., that remorse (vippaṭisāra) does not lead to mind-release (see Aṅguttara Nikāya III, 166) he would not have complained in the third thambha-inscription that people consider only the good done by them, without calling back to mind the evil actions done by them.

In these thambha-inscriptions the welfare of others is not overlooked, e.g., condemned prisoners are given three days' respite, either to appeal against the judgment or to prepare themselves for their final hour Fourth pillar edict.; for it does not appear that capital punishment was ever abolished during the reign of this compassionate emperor. A long list of animals not to be killed is given in the fifth inscription. Shade-trees along the roads, wells at regular intervals for drinking-water and other comforts were arranged for with the sole intention that men would conform their lives to the Dhamma.

Minor inscriptions, at Sārnāth, Kosambi and Sāñcī, refer to the punishment of expulsion from the Saṅgha to be meted out to the bhikkhu or bhikkhuṇī who causes a schism, and we may well presume these inscriptions to have been made soon after the completion of the third Buddhist Council, referred to above.

Further, there are two separate rock-inscriptions in the land of the Kāliṅgas which may be considered a continuation of the earlier series of fourteen rock-inscriptions. They give instructions to the king’s superintendents concerning the border tribes. He wants them to be inspired with trust and to be guided in the path of the Dhamma.

A thambha, commemorating Asoka’s visit and pilgrimage to the birth place of the Buddha in the 21st year of his reign, is found at Lumbinī in Nepal, and another one, not far from there, in commemoration of his visit to the thūpa of the second last Buddha, named Koṇāgamana The discovery of two more Asoka “pillars” has recently been reported from near the site of Kapilavastu.. Further pilgrimages (dharmayātrā) of Asoka are recorded in the eleventh year of his reign to the sacred bodhi-tree at Buddhagayā, and to other places in order to proclaim his ideals to the people.

Nepalese tradition states that during Asoka’s pilgrimage, under the guidance of Upagupta, into what is now Nepal, he founded the city of Patan (two miles S.E. of modern Kathmandu) and built five caityas, one at the centre of the new city and the rest at the cardinal points of its perimeter. The latter subsist to this day and conform in shape to the Sāñcī and Gandhāra types. Many stūpas marked the route of Asoka from and to Pāṭaliputta.

The king is said to have been accompanied by his daughter Cārumatī for whom a husband, by name Devapāla, was found among the kṣatriyas of Nepal. Both Cārumatī and Devapāla resolved to spend their days in Nepal, and the city of Deopatan, one of the oldest cities of Nepal, is said to have been founded by them.

In her old age Cārumatī built a vihāra named after her (now Chabahil) to the north of Deopatan, and she lived there a recluse till her death IA. XIII, p. 412; K.A. Nilakanta Sastri, Age of the Nandās and Mauryas, Banaras, 1952, p. 221.

Two inscriptions in the Barābar Caves and the three Nāgārjuni inscriptions of Dasaratha mention in common the grant of those caves to the Ājīvikas.

From these various documentary monuments we are in a fair position to form an idea of Asoka’s administration. In the legal and political sense of the term his was an absolute monarchy. Yet there is a difference of great significance. His autocracy was not the source of the law but rather its support. He is not the maker of the law and is not placed above that law, but he regards himself as the protector of the law of the land which is based on the Buddha Dhamma. As protector rather than ruler, he feels that all men are his children “and just as I desire for my children that they may enjoy every kind of prosperity and happiness both in this world and the next, so also do I desire the same for all men” Second minor rock-inscription.. And his superintendents also he wants to be as skilful nurses eager to care for the happiness of the king’s children Second separate Kāliṅga edict and 4th pillar-edict..

Asoka then, was not so much a symbol of the law, as a direct representative of his people in so far as he felt himself at one with them in one large family. He seemed to be at pains to emphasise his own obligations towards his people: “Work I must for the public benefit ... for no other purpose than that I may discharge my debt to all living beings, and make them happy in this world and they thereby attain a heavenly rebirth in the life hereafter” Sixth rock-inscription.. And so Asoka placed himself at the disposal of his subjects at all hours and places, even while partaking of his meals or after having retired to the bedroom or the harem Twelfth rock-inscription..

Realising that owing to the largeness of his empire it would be physically impossible to supervise personally every district, he appointed various officers to be in charge of the administration. In the outlying districts a certain amount of autonomy had to be conceded and viceroys (uparāja) were placed in charge, while the more centrally situated districts were placed under governors (rājūkā or mahāmātrā). The administration of justice was in their hands and they are exhorted to look after their subjects like “skilful nurses”. All these officials were granted independence in the matter of law and justice Fourth thambha-inscription..

Asoka’s officials were required, in addition to their ordinary duties, to give instructions in morals to their subjects, and to promote piety among the people of all sects, Buddhist or others. They were vested with special powers to prevent wrongful imprisonment or corporal punishment and to investigate cases in which law seemed to press hard upon individuals. The general supervision of female morals was entrusted to a special set of officers.

Mention is made Third rock-inscription. of a council (partsā) which is to instruct the minor officials (yute). It is not certain whether here is meant a council of ministers controlling the state expenses, or a council of religious dignitaries controlling the right exposition of the Dhamma, or a council of elders controlling the day-to-day interests of community life in town or village. But, this institution clearly shows the advanced stage of democratic representation in an otherwise absolute and centralised monarchy. These councils had even the power to suspend a royal order in case of a dispute, as long as this order had been issued by word of mouth only, but with immediate reference to the king himself Sixth rock-inscription..

Asoka’s foreign policy for future conduct is clearly outlined in the 13th rock-inscription, where his successors are asked not to suppose it to be their duty to effect any new conquest. But should conquest be the result of war forced upon them, they should find their delight in forbearance and light punishment, keeping in mind that the only victory is the victory of the Dhamma.

There is a difference of opinion among the authorities as to whether Asoka at any stage of his life became a bhikkhu. In one of the minor rock-inscriptions, found in Mysore Minor rock-inscription: Brahmagiri., Asoka speaks of himself as having been a lay-disciple (upāsaka) for “more than two and a half years, although with little fervour”. But, for the last year he has “approached the Saṅgha with great zeal”. This approach to the Saṅgha, some scholars say, could be equivalent to entering the Saṅgha as a bhikkhu. Some would have this act of renunciation postponed till the last period of his life, but this is not tenable in view of Asoka’s own words of having been a lax lay-disciple for only the earliest two and a half years in his long reign of almost forty years. It is equally untenable to see Asoka as a bhikkhu while ruling his vast empire as an absolute monarch. But it would be possible that in the beginning of his fervent aspirations towards perfection Asoka donned the robes of a bhikkhu for a short period This custom still prevails in certain Buddhist countries like Burma, where even the eligibility of a young man for marriage is subject to his having spent at least a few weeks in a monastery as a monk. The present king of Thailand, Phumiphon Adulet, also has been a bhikkhu quite recently for a short period of 14 days.. This seems to be corroborated by the Chinese pilgrim I-tsing who mentions an image of Asoka dressed in the garb of a bhikkhu (Takakusu, Records of the Buddhist Religion, p. 73).

The last four years of Asoka’s life were marked by his liberality towards the Saṅgha, and legend has it that ultimately he had nothing he could call his own, apart from an āmalaka-fruit (emblica officinalis). Even of that he partook only one half and sent the other half to a nearby monastery, as “Asoka’s last gift”. According to tradition his last years indicated the beginning of the decline of the Mauryan empire and he had to divide his empire between his two sons.

Asoka died after having reigned for thirty-eight years. He occupies a unique place among the rulers of the world. His period is further important for the development of art, as sculpture, architecture, writing, literature, etc. The close contact established during Asoka’s reign with other countries made his the first consolidated empire in Indian history. In Buddhist history he ranks in importance only next to the Śākyamuni himself.

(Barua, B.M., Asoka and his Inscriptions; Basham, A.L., The Wonder that was India, London, 1953; Bhandarkar, D.R., Asoka (1925); Bloch, Jules, Les Inscriptions d' Asoka; Eggermont, P.H.L., The Chronology of the Reign of Asoka Moriya, Leiden, 1956; Foucher, A., Vieille Route de l' Inde; Geiger, Wilhelm, Introduction to the Mahāvaṁsa in New History of the Indian People, VI; Hultzsch, E., Inscriptions of Asoka: Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum, Vol. I; Lévi, S., L'Inde civilatrice; Macphail, James M., The Heritage of India: Asoka; Malalasekera, G. P., Dictionary of Pali Proper Names; Mookerjee, Radhakumud, Gaekwad Lectures: Asoka; Rawlinson, H.G., Indian Historical Studies; Rhys Davids, T.W., Buddhist India; Senart, Emile, Les Inscriptions de Piyadasi; Smith, Vincent A., Rulers of India; Romila Thapar, Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas, Oxford, 1961.)

A sectarian leader at the time of the Buddha. He and his followers were noted for their lack of discipline. Yet they were liked by the people for their pleasant ways and speech.

After being admonished by Sāriputta and Moggallāna they did not mend their ways, and some of them returned to the householders' life, while others were expelled from the Order. The followers of Assaji are always banded together with the followers of Punabbasu. Assaji and Punabbasu were the leaders of the band of six, the notorious Chabbaggiya bhikkhus.

In the process of mental evolution, which according to Buddhist philosophy is based on the expansion of the misconception of a separate I-entity (sakkāya-diṭṭhi), the tendency to “progress” employs both the method of integration as well as of differentiation.

By means of integration, the ego strengthens its concept of separate individuality by drawing into it all cognate matter, by a process of assimilation, which has greed (lobha) at its root. On the other hand, by refusing to accept within its stronghold whatever is not affiliated with it, i.e., by repelling all inimical influxes, the ego also strengthens its position through opposition and differentiation, which is a process of alienation, which has aversion (dosa) at its root. This tendency to differentiation may be summed up in the term “individuality” and the tendency to integration in the term “association”.

The process of evolution is obviously associated with change, but change immediately affects the continuity of the individual; and thus within the process of evolution with its general tendency to “progress” is also found the basic conflict (dukkha) between change (anicca) and continuity (atta), which has its foundation in the misunderstanding of the self-concept, and which conflict, therefore, can be solved only by right understanding of the entire process.

The first and main association in the mental process is the association of delusion (moha) with either greed (lobha) or aversion (dosa), although a combination or association between these two is never possible owing to their divergent natures.

All emotions are associations, according to the Buddha’s doctrine; and although not so long ago modern psychology classified emotions as primary manifestations of human activity, many psychologists are now inclined to doubt that emotion should be considered a primary category of human behaviour at all. Anger, aversion, hate are responses to an obstruction of some activity which is deemed necessary to satisfy a need. Joy, delight, zest are associated with achievement. Fear is an anticipation of frustration or injury. In short, emotions generally serve some purpose: anger brings out extra energy which may be useful in conquering the obstruction. Fear and anxiety intensify alertness and provide thereby additional protection. Joy and delight serve the purpose of an outlet to surplus energy, not required any more once the goal has been achieved. In other words, emotions are expressions and indications on the one hand of increased effort to obtain the needful, or a relaxation of such effort after attainment of the object. They are forms of desire (taṇhā) based on the misconception of individuality; they are expressions associated with need, which has become greed. Physical need has become psychological greed through the association of the experience of a physical need, say, hunger, with the psychological problem of the survival of the individual. This tendency of association is very happily expressed in the word emotion, which indicates its essential characteristic of movement towards or away from its object.

Association is one of the twenty-four modes of relative conditionality. This association-condition (sampayutta-paccaya) refers to the relationship in which phenomena are placed which arise simultaneously (sahajāta), the arising of one being dependent on the arising of the other condition; this is also a mutual relationship (aññamañña-paccaya).

As classical examples of such relationship are given the various aspects of the thought-process in which sensory reception (vedanā), sense-perception (saññā) and the mental reaction (saṅkhāra) thereto are in a co-nascent and mutual relationship of association. Saṅkhāra being the collective name for fifty mental factors or concomitants (cetasika), which together with sensation (vedanā) and perception (saññā) constitute the comprehensive total of mental phenomena, it is evident that each and every thought-unit (citta) of the mental process of thinking is primarily a “bundle of composites” (suddha-saṅkhāra-puñja: S. I, p. ). And these composites, by the very fact of their being “bundled” together, are associated in relationship. It is such association which constitutes individuality; and as this association is always changing its relationship within every fresh thought, it is obvious that there is nothing of a permanent nature in the individual. New evaluations constitute also transformation which is not a mere change of attributes of an unchanging core or substance, For, here the individual is nothing but relationship which is a constantly permuting association. The change of relationship will often be a gradual one in which association is not fully broken off and renewed elsewhere; hence, the change will pass virtually unnoticed and even leave the impression of continuance, until the shift is so marked that a new alignment becomes essential.

Thus, rebirth is spoken of when a departing thought (cuti-citta) takes up again the link (paṭisandhi) in the process of consciousness (citta-vīthi), i.e., when new associations are formed in a more general and less gradual way.

A commentary on the Aṣṭaṅga-hṛdaya-saṁhitā-nāma, both by Vāgbhata. It was translated into Tibetan by Dharmaśrīvarman and Śākyamati (Śākya blo-gros) under the title Yan-lag brgyad-paḥi sñin-po shes-bya-baḥi sman-dpyad-kyi bśad-pa and incorporated in the Gso-rig-pa (Bhaiṣajya-vidyā) section of the Tengyur. The work was revised by Vidyākumāra (Rig-pa gshon-nu) and Vasuratna (Dbyig-gi rin-chen) (TM. No. 4311; Cordier, III, p. 470, No. 5). A German translation in the form of a paraphrase has been interblended with the translation of the text by Luise Hilgenberg and Willibald Kirfel in Vāgbhaṭa’s Aṣṭaṅga-hṛdaya-saṁhitā (E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1941).

Frequently shortened to Aṣṭaṅga-hṛdaya, a work on medicine, various types of disease and the treatment thereof, as known in ancient India. The compiler is named Vāgbhaṭa and the work is thought to have been composed not later than the 8th century C.E. A large number of manuscript copies are extant according to the Catalogue Catalogorum of Theodor Aufrecht. As one of the most outstanding works of this type it was translated into Tibetan by the monks Jarandhara and Ratnabhadra (Rin-chen bzaṅ-po) and incorporated in the Gso-rig-pa (Bhaiṣajya vidyā) section of the Tengyur under the title Yan-lag brgyad-paḥi sñin-po bsdus-pa shes-bya-ba (TM. No. 4310; Cordier, III, p. 470, No. 4).

A proof of its popularity even in later times is found in the liberal use made of it by Parameśvara of south India in 1864 in his edition of Hṛdayapriya, a summary thereof.

The Aṣṭaṅga-hṛdaya-Saṁhitā-bāma has been translated also into German by L. Hilgenberg and W. Kirfel (publ. E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1941), using an earlier revised edition by Aṇṇā Moreshvar Kunte (Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1891).

The work is entirely composed in metre. Its teaching is based on the theory of tri-doṣa, connected with the three morbid elements of the body, viz., bile, wind and phlegm, which can adversely influence the chyle, blood, flesh, fat, bones, marrow and semen. The text is divided into six sections of which the first section gives the basic theories (sūtrasthāna) regarding food, diet, digestion, purging, inhalation, surgery, cauterisation, etc. The second section (śārīrasthāna) deals with conception and childbirth, the 107 vulnerable points (marman) of the body, the omens (riṣṭa) of death, etc. The third section on pathology (nidānasthāna) deals with the causes of diseases, which is followed by the fourth section on methods of cure (cikitsāsthāna), i.e., therapeutics. Section five deals with the methods of preparation of medicine (kalpasthāna). And the work ends with the final section (uttarasthāna) on methods of preventing various diseases.

The Sanskrit text of the Aṣṭaṅgahṛdaya with a commentary by Aruṇadatta was revised and collated by Aṇṇā Moreshvar Kunte and published in two volumes at Gaṇapati Krishnaji’s press in Bombay in 1880. Another publication of the text with the ṭīkā of Aruṇadatta specified as Sarvāṅgasundarākhyā was issued by Devendranātha Sena Gupta and Upendranātha Sena Gupta in Calcutta in 1832 of the Śaka era. The first five of the thirty chapters (adhyāya) of the Sūtrasthāna section of the Aṣṭaṅgahṛdaya have been printed in Sinhala script, with an explanation in Sinhala by Kīrtiśrī Upasīha of Beruwala, in Colombo in 1938.

A group of ten forms of meditation, having as their object a corpse in various stages of decomposition, each exercise terminating with the conclusion: This body of mine also has this nature, it cannot escape this fate (ayam pi kho kāyo evaṁ-dhammo evaṁ-bhāvī etaṁ anatīto ti: D. II, p. ).

Based on awareness of the body (kāya-gatāsati), which is the first of the four applications of mindfulness as found in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (D. II, p. –315; M. I, p. –63), it comprises the so-called cemetery meditations (sīvathikā), where the meditation-object is a corpse, one, two or three days old, swollen, blue-black, full of corruption, partly eaten by crows, or just a framework of bones with flesh hanging from it, hold together by the sinews, or scattered bones, bleached, heaped together, weathered and crumbling to dust.

More or less identical herewith is the description in the Visuddhimagga (chap. vi) on “foulness as a meditation subject” (asubha-kammaṭṭhāna), where the ten kinds are enumerated and paraphrased as the bloated, the livid, the festering, the cut-up, the gnawed, the scattered, the hacked, the bleeding, the worm-infested and a skeleton. The same ten appear also in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī (263–4), but in earlier suttas of the Aṅguttara and Saṁyutta Nikāyas (A. I, p. ; S. V, p. ) one finds mention of only five among the 20 objects of perception, viz., the skeleton (aṭṭhika-saññā), the worm-eaten corpse (puḷavaka-s°), the discoloured corpse (vinīlaka-s°), the dismembered corpse (vicchiddaka-s°) and the bloated corpse (uddumātaka-s°).

One who would practise these concentrations and even only for the short duration of the snapping of one’s fingers (accharā-saṅghāta-maṭṭa) abide in one of the states of mental absorption (jhāna), he may truly be called a monk, his meditation is not in vain (arittajjhāna), for he abides by the Master’s words and follows his advice; he eats the people’s food-offerings to some purpose (A. I, p. ).

Many words of sound advice are given by Buddhaghosa (Vism. pp. 146–52, chapter vi, §§ 12–55) to the monk as to what he should do before he sets out to the cemetery and after he gets there.

The meditator is even warned that it could happen that after he returns from the cemetery and tries to recall the physical scene, the dead body might appear as rising up and threatening him, whereupon his mind might be gripped by panic fear. Such fear he can remove by remembering the physical features of the surroundings, the nearby stone, or bush, or ant-hill, which will not appear in his frightened imagination. Thus, by and by he will tie up his mind for the purpose of apprehending the sign (nimittaggāho upanibandhanattho: ibid. p. 153, § 58).

Many obstructions may occur which will cause an interruption or even the total disappearance of the visualised object. One’s duty to attend to one’s teacher or to visitors may take so much time or effort that it becomes impossible to keep the learner’s sign (uggaha-nimitta) before the mind. Then it may not be feasible to return to the spot where the corpse was observed first, but it should be possible to an observant mind to retrace one’s movements from the starting point, recalling one by one the objects encountered on the path, and thus re-live every experience till again the learner’s sign (uggaha-nimitta) is clearly visualised. Thus the meditator should over and over again revert to this mental image, though hideous, dreadful and frightening, till the transformed after-image (paṭibhāga-nimitta) arises which has none of the loathsome aspects of the former.

Simultaneous with the acquisition of this after-image or counterpart sign, the five hindrances (nīvaraṇa) are abandoned, opening the doors for the manifestation of mental absorption (jhāna) which was the purpose of these ten forms of meditation on the foul (asubha-bhāvana).

Of the five hundred paccekabuddhas who were in ancient times living on the Isigili mountain in seclusion. He was seen by the people of that time entering the mountain range, but was never seen thereafter. Hence the people used to say that the mountain had swallowed up the sage (isī gilatī ti) and named it Isigili. The names of these pacceka-buddhas are given by the Buddha in the Isigili Sutta (M. III, p. f.).

Buddhaghosa in his commentary (MA. IV, 127) relates how these sages had made their dwellings inside the mountain behind a rock which would open and close like a folding door.

The difficulty of the so-called atheist view-point is that it views a negation, which strictly speaking is only possible when the positive is admitted in some form or other. The atheist who denies the existence of “God” would appear, therefore, implicitly to admit the very existence of that which he contradicts. This objection of theistic dogmatists to the concept of atheism as a self-contradiction is very superficial, as the atheist does not wage war against “God” whose existence he does not acknowledge but against the concept of God which is an actual concept in the minds of many millions, which is a dogma and an article of faith in most religious systems, which is the ideal and the goal of the aspirations of many centuries of spiritual development, and which has not been outgrown by the various religious institutions, centred around the cult of a deity.

It must be admitted at once that in modern times there are many thinkers who, feeling the need of investigating and testing even the most sacred truths, have been trying to outgrow the medi\ae val concepts of scholastic dogmatists. They would prefer to bring the concept of a “supernatural God” down to processes in nature or human ideas. Thus the inherent power in nature to propagate and to evolve would be seen by them as the action of an immanent deity. This, of course, is objected to by traditionalists on the ground that such views would invite semantic confusion and would hide heresy behind the cloak of traditional terminology. It would ultimately lead to some form of Pantheism.

It would not be helpful to the development of thought within the scope of this article, to pursue an investigation as to the genesis of the God-concept, whether it is a mere anthropomorphic projection, a self-apotheosis, a Freudian father-image substitute, or even a means of dulling the revolutionary spirit of the oppressed, “opium for the masses”. We are dealing here with the concept of “God” and its rejection in Buddhism.

The concept of “God”, if thereby is understood the absolute, is an impossibility as a self-contradiction. For, according to Buddhism, any concept must stand in relation to its object in one or more of the many modes (paccaya) of conditionality, association, dependence, predominance, foundation etc., etc. But any such relationship is inherently impossible in the absolute. And, hence, any individual attitude must be either an agnostic admission of the impossibility of knowledge, in which case ignorance logically leads to ignoring, or an atheistic attitude of a definite rejection of such a concept, as an impossibility.

As long as the term “absolute” remains precisely defined, the abstract problem does not afford any great difficulties. But, the more personal elements of devotion and emotion have introduced also that personal element in the absolute, which now represents the absolute as s personal deity with very human, concrete qualities, although with super-humanised omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence and eternity. It is concepts of this nature which are rejected by atheism and ignored by agnosticism, not superhuman power and knowledge. This must be kept well in mind when reading the Buddhist texts with their many references to gods, and at the same time their denial of a first cause.

The gods in Buddhism are in many respects superhuman; their power, their knowledge, the length of their lives all are superior to their human counterparts. And yet, they too are subject to the universal laws of impermanence (anicca), conflict (dukkha) and lack of a permanent entity (anattā). With regard to the superior lives of these gods humans are frequently exhorted to emulate them and the celibate life of a bhikkhu is called the divine life (brahmacariya). The Buddha’s teaching of the truth, as he found it, is usually described as the rolling on of the wheel of truth. This wheel of truth (dhamma-cakka) is sometimes called also the divine wheel (brahma-cakka) A. II, pp. 9, 24.. And the individual who has realised that in him rebirth is destroyed, that for him there is no state beyond, such an accomplished arahant is said to have lived the divine life (vusitaṁ brahmacariyaṁ) A. II, p. 211.. The divine, therefore, is being used as an expression of perfection. The Buddha himself was described by Mahā-Kaccāna, who was amongst the foremost of his immediate disciples, as the one “who knows what should be known (jānaṁ, jānāti), sees what should be seen (passaṁ passati), so much so that he has become vision (cakkhubhūto), he has become knowledge (ñāṇabhūto), he has become truth (dhammabhūto), he has become perfection (brahmabhūto)” Mahāpiṇḍika Sutta, M. I, p. .. There is here no attempt whatsoever, either in the text, or in the commentary, to explain this last term as some form of deification of the Buddha. In fact, in the commentaries brahmabhūto is explained as seṭṭhabhūto, who has become the highest or the best. In the Pali compounds the word brahma refers neither to the brāhmans nor to Brahma, except in so far as the latter one stands, symbolically, for perfection. In other texts we find that Brahma, the individual deity, pays homage to the Buddha, “draping his mantle over one shoulder, bending his right knee down to the ground and raising his joined hands in salutation” S. I, 137..

Brahma as an individual deity has many names, e.g., Sahampati, Sanaṅkumāra, Baka. Assuming them to be different individuals, the name Brahma joined to their respective names becomes an honorific title, indicating one who resides in the spheres of the super-sensuous called Brahma-loka. This is actually the mental condition of a state of absorption (jhāna) in which the spheres of sense-delight have been left behind. Without belittling the poetic descriptions of such attainment, we need not ascribe supernatural qualities to these divine abodes (brahmavihāra) which can be mentally attained by concentration and inducement of the first stage of absorption (jhāna).

Brahma may at first, especially in Vedic literature, have been regarded as the greatest god, but in Buddhism his name has remained attached only to the spheres of form (rūpa-loka) of the first three divisions: Brahma-retinue (Brahmapārisajja or Brahmakāyika), Brahma-ministers (Brahma-purohita) and Great Brahmas (Mahā-brahma), although later commentarial works apply the epithet “brahma” to all the heavens above the spheres of sense, e.g., the brahma-worlds of form and formless spheres (rūpārūpa-brahmaloka) Vism. xvii, p. 574..

Brahma, the divinely perfect one, has, therefore completely lost the Vedic splendour of an almighty God-Creator, and a brahmadeva has no further connotations beyond a most generous or royal gift D. I, Ambaṭṭha Sutta, p. 87. It was the best kind of gift because it was free from taxes., such as the grant of land at Ukkaṭṭha from king Pasenadi of Kosala to Pokkharasādi, the brāhman. The brahmavāda, referred to by the Buddha shortly after his enlightenment, while experiencing the bliss of freedom under the Goatherd’s Banyan-tree, although explained by the commentator as said by one who rightly can say “I am a brāhman” Vinaya Piṭaka, Mahā-Vagga, p. 8., has no deeper meaning than “right speech”.

The acquired meaning of brahma as perfect is reflected similarly in the term deva which is applied to the minor celestial beings residing in the heavenly spheres of the pleasures of sense (kāmaloka), as well as to everything supernormal, such as the divine eye (dibbacakkhu) which is the faculty of clairvoyance, and the divine ear (dibba-sota) which is the faculty of clairaudience. Long life is called divine (dībbāyu), not because it is a divine gift, for the span of life is determined by one’s own karma, but because longevity is one of the chief characteristics of celestial beings. But the very idea of rebirth in those spheres seems to have been “annoying, distressing and causing disgust” to the followers of the Buddha A. I, p. 115.. The title deva is then applied to any being above the average human level, tree-spirits as well as kings. Hence we find devas in the meaning of supermen in the physical sense J. 132; DA. I, 174; cp. PED. s.v., supermen in the spiritual sense in the highest stages of development Nd. II, 307; J. I, p. ; VvuA. 18; cp. PED.: Visuddhi. and those who are born in the heavenly spheres (devaloka). This last class, the devas proper, are, however, not free from the continuous round of rebirth (saṁsāra) and are in that respect inferior to the Buddha and arahants. In the Theragāthā particularly, several instances could be shown where devas approach an arahant in a worshipful attitude, “waiting on him morning and evening, out of gratitude” Pilinda-vaccha: ThagA. 9..

It is not proposed to enter here into a detailed discussion on the gradation and classification of gods, etc. All that is attempted is to show that the concept of deities in Buddhism has no connection with the concept of a supreme god-creator as found in theistic religions and philosophies, which try to reconcile the idea of a personal God with that of an impersonal Absolute. It is this contradiction which is refuted in Buddhism, when the evolution of a world-cycle is described and the first being who is evolved in the new cycle is held in ridicule, when he imagines himself to be the creator and lord of all D. I: Brahmajāla Suttanta..

In this article the term “theism” is used as a convenient designation for a philosophical conception of “Deity” as the single, personal, ultimate cause of the universe and source of all existence, distinct from polytheism and pantheism. And “atheism”, therefore, is the negation of such a conception. Buddhism with its many heavenly spheres, thickly populated with numerous deities of varying degrees of radiance and power, apart from the divine humans, but without the concept of a single ultimate cause and supreme God, is, therefore, atheistic in this sense. By its denial of “substance” and “soul” and by its teaching of karmic responsibility, Buddhism denies the Platonic concept of an ultimate reality responsible for the orderly motions of the universe. Substituting conditioned origination for absolute causation, Buddhism rejects the Aristotelian principle of a prime mover which was many centuries later borrowed by Thomas Aquinas, who thereby laid the foundation of medi\ae val scholastic philosophy. Buddhism rejects Kant’s idea of God, as a categorical imperative, by its denial of an absolute existence of a moral order.

In the natural order of an evolving and involving universe, as envisaged in Buddhism, the concept of a supreme deity is not only superfluous, but even wholly irrelevant. The mechanism continues to function according to its own inherent processes.

The teleological argument, trying to prove the existence of a God-Creator from the order, design and purpose found in nature, has always had a fair amount of appeal especially to those who endeavour to trace in natural events an element of law sufficiently strong to build up therefrom a planned universe. It would not be difficult to point out the many flaws in this ordered pattern, such as earthquakes, disease and perversion. Even the liberty to act against such laws constitutes a breach of that law. But, what is of concern here is: How is this argument met in the Buddhist scriptures?

The teaching of the leader of the Ājīvaka sect, tamed Makkhali Gosāla, was over and over again condemned both by the Buddha and by Mahāvīra for his lack of a sense of moral responsibility. For, his was a thorough-going kind of determinism, denying the free will of man and his moral responsibility for any so-called good or evil. In condemning this doctrine M. I, 238, 524; A. III, p. ; I, 33, 286., the Buddha does not advocate free will, for volition is an action of the mind which has no existence of its own, but which arises and ceases in dependence on conditions. It is, therefore, neither free nor determined, but arises conditionally. This attitude of the Buddha provides an answer to the teleological question. Any action performed purposefully constitutes karmic action; and hence, will or any of its synonyms, volition, purpose, plan, design (cetanā) is the chief constituent of karma. Karma is the element which keeps saṁsāra rolling, which leads to ever-repeated birth and death with all the misery and conflict entailed thereby. This purposeful volition being ego-centred does not lead to order but to conflict and chaos. Only when action is performed without ego-centric intention, will it cease to be karma, will it cease to produce karmic effects (vipāka) and the chaos (dukkha) resulting therefrom. In other words, the very idea of purpose brings planned action into the cycle of saṁsāra, not as an absolute beginning but as a further conditioning which has come into operation by its dependence on other conditions. However paradoxically it may sound: it is planned action which leads to chaos, for planning is done on purpose, with an intention to attain a pre-determined goal which is also mind-made; whereas spontaneous action, arising from the understanding of an immediate need of action, does not look beyond the present immediacy and is, therefore, without craving, without volition, without karmic effect, and without adding further conditions for the continuation of the conflict.

The problem of the beginning which caused many systems to adopt a God-Creator is not solved thereby; for still the problem remains about the beginning of God. The postulate that God has no beginning could with equal right be postulated for the process of evolution, as the beginning of either cannot be known (pubbakoṭi na paññāyati) S. II, 178.. The difference is that where God cannot be seen, the process of evolution is discernible everywhere.

Buddhism, therefore, does not wage war against “God”, but against the concept of a supreme and first cause; and in this sense it may be truly described as atheism.

There is another argument which has carried great weight, not only with ecclesiastical circles but also among great thinkers, like Immanuel Kant, who made this argument the sole basis for his belief in God, –-the so-called moral argument. For Kant, morality or a moral life consisted in doing what a priori is seen to be right without taking into account either utility or convenience. In other words: morality speaks in tones categorically imperative. According to Kant Kritik der reinen Vernunft, iii, 631–40, Leipzig. 1867. happiness is the natural accompaniment of virtue, but requires an infinite time for its realisation, and hence we have to postulate immortality as the condition of realising the demands of the moral law which holds valid for the present; but this postulate of immortality includes the postulate of the existence of God. Hence morality, to be binding at all, requires God and immortality to make its demands rational and its rewards possible, At the same time, no one is clearer than Kant himself on the point that there can be no question of demonstration. Moral law must be respected without reservation, not because we can prove that it is entitled to this respect, but because the disallowance of this respect would be immoral itself. The existence of God becomes essentially imperative, as, in the absence of God, this moral law would have no basis, no sanction, no goal.

The Buddha’s attitude to morality does not allot a place to any authority higher than one’s individual understanding. Right is straight, skilful and wholesome (kusala); wrong is wrung, crooked, unwholesome (akusala). Not every action is either right or wrong, as there are also indifferent actions without moral value. Moral value (kamma) is derived exclusively from the intention (cetanā) which is a mental factor (cetasika). Reward or punishment for good and evil are not meted out by some supreme judge according to a moral law; but each action (kamma) is the seed from which corresponding fruit (vipāka) may be expected. As the action has but limited driving force, its result too will be limited; hence the absence in Buddhism of eternal reward in heaven and eternal punishment in hell. All this is called the law of action (kamma-niyāma) which, however, is not a law laid down by a supreme law-giver, but an exposition of the order of things in the mind (citta-niyāma), in nature (bīja-niyāma), and in the change of seasons (utu-niyāma), which is neither fixed nor permanent, but dependent on the ever-varying conditions of becoming and ceasing. With the supposition of certain conditional factors, it is not difficult to “predict” the outcome of such experiment. And so the moral problem is solved in Buddhism without recurrence to the supernatural, in the simple and effective way of any physical problem.

Finally, theism has God as its goal. This goal may be conceived differently, as a beatific vision, or as a union of the individual soul with its creator, or as a re-absorption of the soul into the One from which it had been separated by illusion in its wanderings through many lives, depending on the dualistic or non-dualistic theology of a particular system.

Buddhism has no goal for individual striving, no salvation for an individual soul, and has, therefore, no place for either a goal of divine union or a scheme of salvation in which man has to co-operate with the divine. What is sometimes shown as the goal of Buddhism is a very imperfect understanding of the doctrine of Nibbāna. The perfection and bliss of Nibbāna is not an attainment to be reached by means of accumulation of individual, meritorious acts. Such accumulation must necessarily lead to intensification of individuality, although under sublimated conditions, perhaps; and that will not lead to waning of the passions and cessation of becoming. “Where there is no more being born, growing old or dying, –-that end of the world is not to be reached by going. But in this very body, six feet tall, with its perceptions and thoughts, there I proclaim is the world, the origin of the world and its ending” A. II. p. 43.. Hence striving for good may be useful to weaken evil tendencies, to overcome hindrances, to break fetters, but it cannot lead to a goal which is the cessation of a delusion of individuality. In the absence of a goal where individual attainment is perpetuated, Buddhism remains the one and only atheistic religion.

“surpassing the sun in brilliance”, name of one of the thousand Buddhas who will arise in this auspicious world-age (bhadrakalpa), named Puspika, as proclaimed by the Śākyamuni to the five bhadravargya monks. The name, thus spelled, is an emendation by Senart of the name as it appears in the Mahāvastu (III, 330), viz., Abhisūrya.

Under this title, “by way of the past”, there appear eighteen suttas or perhaps eighteen sections of one sutta, in the Saṁyutta Nikāya (IV, 151–2), many of which are almost identical except for the change of a word. It is interesting to note that this change of word sometimes affects the very nature of the short discourse, e.g., when the sense-organs, which are said to be impermanent and “of the past” (atīta), are referred to in the next sutta as being impermanent and “not yet come” (anāgata), meaning that the action done in the past has yet to be worked out; and in the third sutta as being impermanent and “a thing of the present” (paccuppanna). This alternation, is repeated in the following five sets of three suttas. Thus the title Atītena Sutta, although heading all the suttas here under review, is applicable only to six out of the eighteen.

Other variations which constitute the differences between these eighteen suttas are the introduction of woe (dukkha) in the 4th, 5th and 6th sutta, and that of insubstantiality (anattā) in the 7th, 8th and 9th suttas, instead of the concept of impermanence (anicca) expressed in the first three suttas. And, again, the replacement of the six sense-organs of the first nine suttas by the six sense-objects of the last nine suttas. These last nine suttas, like the first set of nine, are also grouped in three sets of three, with their differences based on the three characteristics of impermanence (anicca), woe (dukkha) and insubstantiality (anatta).

What all have in common is the concluding formula, given in full only in the first sutta, and merely indicated in the following seventeen by pe or la (the shortened forms for peyyāla; etcetera): The well-taught noble disciple who sees it thus becomes disgusted therewith and detached therefrom; being freed he attains insight and the knowledge that the possibility of rebirth has been destroyed, that the holy life has been lived, that whatever there was to do, has been done and that three is no more a hereafter.

Self or soul, understood as a permanent entity which supports the physical and mental phenomena as a substance, the spiritual and vital principle of all human action, abiding permanently after the dissolution of the body. Forming the basis of the doctrine of salvation in many religions, its existence is categorically denied in the Buddhist doctrine of anatta.

The state of being bound or fastened, emotionally, to a desired object or person. The very nature of attachment prevents freedom of thought and action and is, therefore, a hindrance to progress and deliverance. In the form of desire or craving (taṇhā) it leads to clinging (upādāna) and subsequent acts (bhava) of ignorance.

Its basis or origin, too, is ignorance (avijjā) and it cannot be overcome, therefore, by mere acts of renunciation. As long as attachment appears desirable, there is no possibility of liberation, but when the nature of attachment is fully comprehended, the feelings (vedanā) which brought about the state of desire earlier, will cease to have their emotional effect, and detachment (virāga) will become naturally.

The first sutta of the chapter of the same name in the Khandha Saṁyutta of the Saṁyutta Nikāya (III, pp. 42–3). The word dīpa can mean either island or light. In this particular context both meanings are acceptable, as the term is explained in the commentary with the following synonyms: shelter (tāṇa), cave (leṇa), destiny (gati), goal (parāyaṇa) and refuge (saraṇa). Here, the Buddha instructs his monks not to take their refuge in anyone else (anaññasaraṇa), i.e., not to expect a solution of life’s problems through some supernatural intervention, but to search for the source of all conflict and the cessation thereof in oneself. This is sometimes misunderstood as if the Buddha exhorted his monks to save their “souls”. That the word atta here is not to be confused with an individual spiritual soul (ātman) is immediately clear, first of all, from its synonym, which is used here anañña, not someone else. He who makes the problem, has also to solve it.

Then the Buddha explains how one makes the problem through misunderstanding, by regarding the body as a permanent entity (rūpam attato samanupassati), by belief in a soul with a body (rūpavantaṁ vā attānaṁ), by regarding the body as a part of a greater and permanent soul (attani vā rūpaṁ), or by considering such a soul to be immanent in the body (rūpasmiṁ vā attānaṁ). These four aspects of relationship between body and soul are also considered from the standpoint of sensations (vedanā), perceptions (saññā), mental formations (saṅkārā) and consciousness (viññaṇa), each in respect of the concept of a permanent entity, presumed to be the self or soul, behind, or within or enveloping and motivating all mental activity.

With one of these twenty misconceptions as basis, the natural transiency of physical and mental phenomena will be resisted by mental preoccupation and concern. (vipariṇāmānuparivatti viññaṇaṁ hoti: S. III, p. –18); and from this attitude arise grasping and worrying (upādā-paritassanā: loc. cit.) which completely overpower the mind (cittaṁ pariyādāya tiṭṭhanti), resulting in further trouble, vexation and clinging.

The present Attadīpa Sutta shows a light (dīpa) on this conflict, not by presenting a true self, over-self, soul, entity or anything of a permanent nature, but by throwing the troubled mind back on its own resources, making it its own island (attadīpa), its own refuge (attasaraṇa), without reliance on external sources (anañña-saraṇa). This is effected by considering the impermanence, the instability, the fading away and the cessation (aniccataṁ viditvā vipariṇāmam virāgaṁ nirodhaṁ) of the physical and mental components, as their very nature (dhamma). With this insight the mind will not be troubled or vexed about the vanishing of the impermanent, will not attempt to retain what is passing, will not invoke or invent the supernatural to stem the course of nature, but free from worry one will live at ease (aparitassaṁ sukhaṁ vihārati). And such a one is said to be free from all that (tadaṅganibbutoti vuccati).

Belief in the existence of a soul. This involves the speculation as to the eternity or otherwise of one’s own individuality, always presupposing the existence, permanent or impermanent, of an individual entity, apart from the physical and mental processes which constitute the individual, a substance, material or immaterial, underlying the phenomena of body and mind. As sakkāyadiṭṭhi, it forms the first and perhaps most formidable fetter (saṁyojana) which has to be broken before entering the path of holiness (sotāpatti-magga). This belief has been formulated and organised in many religious doctrines, ancient and modern, but is in direct opposition to the chief characteristic tenet of Buddhism which is based on the “no-self” doctrine (anattavāda).

(samāpatti), technical term for a stage of meditation usually given in a group of eight, comprising the four states of mental absorption in the spheres of form (rūpa-jhāna) and the four formless mental states (arūpāvacara).

Occasionally a ninth attainment is added, the attainment of cessation of sensation and perception (saññā-vedayita-nirodha-samāpatti: S. IV, p. ).

As it occurs in the Devata Vagga of the Chakka-Nipāta (Book of Sixes) of the Aṅguttara Nikāya (III, 337–8) is admittedly a difficult sutta, exegetically.

In a discussion with the Buddha a brāhman upholds the view that there is no “self-agency” (attakāra) and no “other-agency” (parakāra). This, taken out of all contexts, would appear to be the very essence of the Buddha’s teaching of anatta, of action without a doer, without a self, as expressed later by Buddhaghosa (Vism. xvi, 513; xix, 602): No doer (kāraka) is discoverable; no experiencer (upabhuñjaka). It is, therefore, all the more surprising to hear the Buddha’s retort to the brāhman: “Never have I seen or heard of such a view”. But the same terms attakāra and parakāra are also used by Makkhali Gosāla (D. I, p. ) where, in the context of his heretical views, they assume the, following meaning: “The attainment of any given condition, of any character, does not depend, either on one’s own acts, or on the acts of another, or on human efforts (n'atthi attakāre n'atthi parakāre, n”atthi purisa-kāre), which statement follows immediately his basic heresy: “There is no causation” (n'atthi hetu, n'atthi paccayo).

And so, the brāhman’s avowal in the Attakāra Sutta that it is his view that there is no self-agency and no other-agency, is but the view of ahetuvāda, denial of the doctrine of causality.

Mrs. Rhys Davids, in her introduction to The Book of the Gradual Sayings III (pp. xii–xiii), has tried to make much of the term “self-agency” to establish her concept of “the very man”, and of the Buddha’s refusal to deny such agency, which would be a wiping out of the doctrine of anattā, the bedrock of his teaching. But the Buddha’s denial is directed against the view of no-agency, i.e., non-causality.

And to further clarify his position, the Buddha introduces a new term, ārabbha-dhātu, the condition of making an attempt. The condition for initiating an action is sufficient cause without having to resort either to a “self” or “other-than-self” as agent.

The doctrines of a self or soul, as an entity or vital principle, separate from the material and mental phenomena of body and mind.

One of the basic and most characteristic principles of the teaching of the Buddha is his doctrine of “no-self” (anatta). As this doctrine is a denial of commonly accepted speculations on individuality (sakkāya-diṭṭhī), a correct understanding of such views is necessary for the comprehensive understanding of this most essential characteristic (lakkhaṇa) of the Buddha’s doctrine.

There are two kinds of personality belief. First there is the belief in personality as in the existence of an abiding ego-entity or soul, independent of those physical and mental processes which constitute an individual life, and which entity persists even after death. Such a view is called the speculation of eternalism (sassata-diṭṭhi) and is the common view of all religions and philosophies which believe in life after death as the continuation of individual existence on spiritual planes, to which this worldly life is only a preparation. The other belief in personality accepts a separate entity or soul as the principle of all physical and mental activity, but such principle does not survive after death, and therefore ceases to exist on the dissolution of life. It is Known as the doctrine of annihilation (uccheda-diṭṭhi). This latter view has much in common with the philosophical doctrine of noumena and phenomena of the early Greek thinkers, which is accepted by some schools of thought to this very day. The difference between these two views is that between idealism and materialism, or between spiritualism end rationalism, although it must be pointed out at once that not all materialists reject the substance-phenomenon doctrine, neither can the acceptance of annihilation be called rationalistic.

Now, irrespective of this individuality continuing to exist after death or not, the belief in an entity separate from the physical and mental processes is based on various presumptions, classified in four groups of five types each. They were explained by the bhikkhuṇī Dhammadinnā to the layman Visākha in the Cūḷavedalla Sutta (M. I, p. ) and by the arahant Sāriputta to the householder Nakulapitā in the first sutta of the Khandha Saṁyutta (S. III, p. f.). There are, first of all, people who regard the body as being the vital principle or soul of all action (rūpam attato); they consider material shape and the self as identical, like the flame and the brightness of a lighted lamp. There are others who believe that the self has a material shape or body (rūpavantaṁ vā attānaṁ), just as a tree has a shadow. Again there are others who believe that matter is an inherent quality of the self (attani vā rūpaṁ), as fragrance belongs to a flower, And finally there are some who regard the self as residing in the body (rūpasmiṁ vā attānaṁ), as a jewel in a casket.

Within those four groups of views on the position of the self the types vary, when the material body is substituted by the mental impressions called sensations (vedanā), or by mental reactions called perceptions (saññā), or by mental formations called concepts (saṅkhārā), or by the full-grown thought-process called consciousness (viññāṇa). When any of these twenty views on self (sakkāya-diṭṭhi) is adhered to, it is a sign of a diseased mind (āturacitta: S. III, p. ). This censure, of course, is not accepted by the followers of attavāda and it will be advantageous to analyse the grounds on which they base their opinions.

But an a priori argument, as offered by Ānanda to Channa, as he himself had heard it said by the Buddha to Kaccāyana, will serve an even better purpose; this world generally bases its views on either existence or non-existence. Yet, he who rightly sees the arising of events cannot believe in the non-existence of the world, while he who rightly sees the ceasing of events cannot believe in the existence of the world. Everything exists, that is one extreme view. Nothing exists, that is the other extreme. But, without approaching either extreme, the Tathāgata teaches the middle doctrine that events neither exist as entities, nor non-exist as hallucinations: they arise and cease as processes in dependence on changing conditions (S. III, p. –5).

With this in mind, we may now approach some of the grounds on which is based the belief in an eternal spiritual entity, independent of matter, not subject to material changes, referred to as a human “soul”.

An independent spiritual entity which is not subject to change and which, therefore, survives bodily death in a perpetually continued personality is obviously indestructible and unconditioned. As such, it is a logical absurdity, as it would constitute an individual absolute. But, individuality is essentially relative, i.e., related to other individuals and conditioned by such relationship. Yet, belief in individual indestructibility has always been so strong that throughout the ages, from Vedic times to modern philosophy, the problem has been approached in many ways.

The central idea of the soul-doctrine is that of moral requital which is not always possible in one single life-time. The theory of re-incarnation, according to which the soul passes from life to life to reap the fruits of its deeds, was known perhaps in the 7th or 8th century B.C.E. Both happiness and misery in each existence are the fruits of good and evil deeds, respectively, performed in earlier lives. Such a theory inevitably leads to the further belief that this succession of life and death cannot have had a beginning; and as the actions of every new life demand another life for their requital, an escape from this process is not possible either. This law of retribution is not controlled by a supreme law-giver and thus the eternal soul theory is not essentially linked with the concept of a God-creator. In fact, Sāṅkhya philosophy, with its realistic view of an infinite number of individual spirits (puruṣa), did not find a place for a supreme God-creator.

During the time of the Buddha, too, the eternalist view (sassata-diṭṭhi) was beaten out by argumentation (takkapariyāhata: D. I, p. ) and explored in sophistry (vimaṁsānucarita) without the need being felt for introducing a first cause.

From various suttas (e.g., S. IV, p. , 54) it is clear that the “mine”, the “I”, the “self”(etam mama, eso'ham asmi, eso me atta) was considered as something permanent (nicca), blissful (sukha) and not subject to change (avipariṇāma). It was also thought that this “self” was connected with the organs of the senses and with the mind, for the Buddha’s argument is based on the analysis of the individual body and mind, and he finds only impermanence, conflict and change, both in body and in mind, which surely (no h'etam) is not of the nature of a “soul”.

The self (atta) and what belongs to the self (attaniya) were considered incomprehensible (anupalabbhamāna), i.e., not to be known or not to be found. And, for this very reason, the Buddha censured the belief in a permanent, lasting, eternal, unchangeable self as total and complete folly (kevalaparipūra bāladhamma: M. I, p. ). The tranquil saint (santa) has no views on the existence or the cessation of a soul (attaṁ vā pi nirattaṁ vā na tasmiṁ upalabbhati: (Sn. v. 858).

We meet, however, in various texts several terms which might be mistaken for the concept under review, owing to similarity in terminology especially in different translations. There is the vital principle (jīvitindriya) which is a physical (rūpa-jīvita) phenomenon, the material quality of life, found in the simplest form of living matter, the so-called ninefold vitality unit (jīvita-navaka-kalāpa), comprising the four chief elements of extension (paṭhavi), cohesion (āpo), caloricity (tejo) and vibration (vāyo) the four derived material phenomena of colour (vaṇṇa), smell (gandha), taste (rasa) and nutritive essence (ojā), and finally vitality (jīvitindriya). As this principle of vitality is the vital force found even in plant-formation, it is never mistaken for the vital force of a permanent, intellectual soul. Material food is said to be taken for the purpose of maintaining this life-faculty in the body (kāyassa jīvitindriyapavattāpanatthaṁ; Vism. i, § 91, p. 26), thereby showing its dependence on matter. But, there is also its psychic counterpart as one of the seven universal mental concomitants (sabbacitta-sādhāraṇa-cetasika). Vitality (jīvitindriya) infuses mental life in the mental properties which constitute an act of consciousness and binds those properties together in a unit. The breaking up of the body is said to be the interruption of the life-faculty (kāyassa bhedā' ti jīvitiāndriyassa upacchedā; ibid. xiii, § 91, p. 360), proving thereby that there was no confusion in the commentator’s mind between a perishable life-faculty and a permanent soul. Although the vital principle has the capacity of maintaining, as water maintains lotuses, it does not cause the occurrence of other phenomena. It does not prolong the presence of other phenomena at the moment of dissolution, because of its own dissolution (ibid. xiv, § 59, p. 378).

Closely connected with the vital principle or the life-faculty (jīvitindriya) is, of course, life itself (jīva). Makkhali Gosāla, one of the six teachers of heresy, made use of this term as practically synonymous with satta, pāṇa and bhūta (D. I, p. ), although elsewhere (DA. I, 161; Jaina Sūtras, II, xxv) they are differentiated as sentient, insectile, animal and vegetable. But even so, life is not thought of as separate from living, in the same way as the mind (citta) is not something separate from the thought-process. The view of life as a separate soul, distinct from the body (aññaṁ jīvaṁ aññaṁ sarīraṁ: D. I, p. ), as proposed by Maṇḍissa, a paribbājaka, and Jāliya, whose teacher always used a wooden bowl, was not accepted by the Buddha, who equally rejected the opposite thesis (taṁ jīvaṁ taṁ sarīraṁ), as life is neither to be distinguished from, nor to be identified with the body.

This position was not altered in later times; for when Nāgasena was questioned about consciousness, insight and soul, whether they are different both in letter and in essence, or differ only in the letter, he replied that recognition is the mark of perception (vijānana-lakkhaṇaṁ viññāṇaṁ) and discrimination the mark of reason (pajānanā-lakkhaṇa paññā), but there is no such thing as a soul (jīva) in beings (Miln. 86).

That which forms a unit in itself, whereby it is distinct from others, is considered an individual; and it is this endurance in isolation which gives the individual the status of personality as opposed to a group as an army, or society. In early Buddhist literature the term individual (puggala), however, is just an aggregate of thirty-two parts of the body (D. III, p. ), and may be qualified in various ways such as a human individual (purisa-puggala) or a person with a foul mouth, a flower mouth or a honey mouth (gūtha-bhāṇī°, puppha-bhāṇī°, madhu-bhāṇī- puggala: A. I, p. ), or a character with one of the six predominant features (Vism. iii, § 74, p. 82). But there is no indication that these characteristic features belong to an individual soul.

The vital breath (pāṇa) is sometimes taken as symbolising life itself, as when Sakka fleeing from the pursuing asuras told his charioteer Mātali to avoid the birds' nests: let us choose rather to give up our lives to the asuras (kāmaṁ cajāma asuresu pāṇaṁ; S. I, p. ); but it is never shown as the spirit of man, as in Sāṅkhya and Vedanta literature (puruṣa, prāṇātman), the spirit which connects the totality of subtle bodies like a thread (tarkasaṅgraha: cp. Indian Wisdom, p. 114 by Monier Williams). It is thus the teaching of a separate and abiding ego-entity (atta-vāda) which is consistently avoided and repudiated in Buddhism.

Synonymously used with awareness, mental alertness, mindfulness (sati), although less appropriate. Attentive awareness is usually concerned with things happening; and unless one’s attitude is kept very strictly neutral, one’s attention is frequently prejudiced by a certain preparedness and expectation. But sati is mindfulness of reaction as a new event. Thus, alertness will be aware of an angry state of mind arising, and that is mindfulness (sati), watchfulness. Attention will also be aware of this state of mind, but will rather investigate the source and cause thereof. Thus, “attention” is to be reserved rather for sampajañña which is very frequently linked with sati (D. I, p. ) Sampajañña is a kind of deliberate, discriminative knowledge (pajānāti: to understand), which makes the mind attentive. In combination, sati-sampajañña represent a complementary bracket, alertness and attentive awareness.

With a Vedic connection artha, meaning reach, the word has come to mean in Pali the good to be gained; hence, welfare, both in the physical sense of wealth, and in the spiritual sense of the supreme good of arahantship. In its various connections it is not always easy to translate the term uniformly without the use of synonyms. And this has resulted in an abundance of terms, some of which are definitely alien to the “spirit” (attha) of Buddhism.

Fortune and loss (attha-anāttha) are described in the Kodhana Sutta (A. IV, pp. 94–8)), where an ill-disposed man bemoans the gain of another as loss to himself.

Frequently the meaning is “the correct sense” as in the Suvaca (sovacassa) Sutta (ibid. pp. 30–1) where Sāriputta gives an explanation of a saying communicated by a deva: “Of this speech so tersely put, the sense in full I understand” (saṅkhittena bhāsitassa evaṁ vitthārena atthaṁ ājānāmi). It is this correct sense or truth which is referred to in many places: “I shall learn the truth or correctness of this talk from the Exalted One” (Bhagavato santike etassa bhāsitassa atthaṁ ājānisāmi: D. I, p. ; M. I, p. ; A. IV, p. ; S. V, p. ). But, the idea of purpose is not evident as an ultimate goal. Paññāyattha (A. IV, p. 3) is not the goal of wisdom, which is perceived by one possessed of the seven powers, but real, true wisdom, discerning the real and true nature of things. Neither was the Buddha asked to teach his Dhamma briefly in order that the enquirer might understand the purpose of his words, but the essence of his teaching (Bhagavato bhāsitassa attha; A. IV, p. ). The idea of purpose conceived as a goal of striving is foreign to Buddhist teachings, where attainment itself is a negation of all that pertains to the “I”, and where the spirit of striving lies in renunciation, in the removal of hindrances (nīvaraṇa) and fetters (saṁyojana). It is in this realisation that lies the supreme good (uttamattha: Sn. 824) which is arahantship, and for the sake of which the disciples of the Buddha have left home and gone forth into the homeless state (yassa c'amhi atthāya agārasmā anagāriyaṁ pabbajito: A. IV, p. ). It is this realisation which gives meaning (attha) to the life of a recluse; for, understanding the real meaning of life, it becomes senseless to follow the pleasures of the senses; and it is that understanding which puts sense (atthe) into renunciation.

It is not a hope of attainment, held out as a bait, which motivates the living of a holy life. “The hope of attainment, in this or in a future life, of various experiences is not the reason for which a holy life is lived under the Exalted One, but for the realisation of conflict, its cause, cessation and the method of ceasing” (A. IV, p. ff.). We find in this sutta the word attha used in connection with ten different attainments which might be considered by some a goal or a motive for a holy life; but Sāriputta denies all. When he is asked what then is the reason for such a life of restraint, he drops the word attha altogether: it is for realisation (abhisamaya) of the unrealised.

Although attha should never be understood as the goal of striving, it has been used to indicate the result of action, e.g., when it is said that a monk possessing eight qualities, “obtains perfection in action and perfection in result” (kammasampadaṁ labhaṭi c'atthasaṁpadaṁ: ibid. 236). And in compounds it has assumed the meaning of right: “doing the right thing” (atthacariya) by instilling the ways of trust in an unbeliever, the ways of virtue in an evildoer, the ways of generosity in a miser, the ways of wisdom in a deluded mind (ibid. 364). There is “well-wishing” (attha kāma: ibid, 32) which does not necessarily involve the supreme weal (uttamattha), and finally the elementary meaning of “meaning” in one of the seven types of knowers: he who knows the meaning of the dhamma. (atthaññu: ibid. 113).

One of the five hundred paccekabuddhas who were in ancient times living on the Isigili mountain in seclusion. He was seen by the people of that time entering the mountain range, but was never seen thereafter. Hence the people used to say that the mountain had swallowed up the sage (isi gilati'ti) and named it Isigili. The names of these pacceka-buddhas are given by the Buddha in the Isigili Sutta (M. III, p. f.).

Buddhaghosa in his commentary (MA. IV, 217) relates how these sages had made their dwellings inside the mountain behind a rock which would open and close like a folding door.

Of the Majjhima Nikāya (I, 349 f.) recurs as Dasama Sutta in the Aṅguttara Nikāya (V, 342–7).

Dasama enquires for any one condition whereby to obtain release, to destroy the cankers, to win peace from bondage. And Ānanda teaches him eleven ways instead of one, which are the four states of mental absorption (rūpajjhana), the four abidings in divine virtue (brahmavihāra) and three formless attainments (arūpajjhāna).

Through each one of these paths one can develop a higher thought, that even that path is impermanent and by its very nature tends to cessation. It is in that realisation that one may win the destruction of the mental intoxicants and achieve the release of arahantship, or at least by breaking the five lower fetters be reborn in one of the pure celestial abodes, to pass away from there without ever returning to the world of sense-pleasure.

The Book of Eights of the Aṅguttara Nikāya (IV, pp. 149–350), contains ten chapters: on amity (mettāvagga), the great chapter (mahā-v°), on householders (gahapati-v°), on giving (dana-v°), on the observance day (uposatha-v°), on Mahā-pajāpati, the Gotami, according to the commentary (but saddhāna-v° in the text), on earthquakes (bhūmicāla-v°), on pairs (yamaka-v°), on mindfulness (sati-v°) and on passion (rāga) and other conditions, in a highly abridged summary.

The first nine chapters consist of ten suttas each, which are named in a short verse (uddāna) at the end of each chapter (vagga). The concluding chapter gives the full text of its first sutta alone on which model all the others are to be repeated with varying subjects, making a total of 510 suttas for this recital chapter.

The Noble Eightfold Path (aṭṭhaṅgika-magga) does not find a place in this Book of Eights.

One of the five hundred paccekabuddhas who were in ancient times living on the Isigili mountain in seclusion. He was seen by the people of that time entering the mountain range, but was never seen thereafter. Hence the people used to say that the mountain had swallowed up the sage (isī gīlatī'ti) and named it Isigili, The names of these pacceka-buddhas are given by the Buddha in the Isigili Sutta (M. III, p. f.).

Buddhaghosa in his commentary (MA. IV, 217) relates how these sages had made their dwellings inside the mountain behind a rock which would open and close like a folding door.

Usually referred to as ariya-atthaṅgika-magga, the Noble Eightfold Path. It is the road of moral living, the path of righteousness, having eight constituents dealing with spiritual training, mental development and moral conduct. As a whole it is the final of the Four Noble Truths (ariya-sacca), which after the diagnosis of the conflict (dukkha-sacca) and the discovery of its origin (samudaya-sacca) and its cessation (nirodha-sacca), proceeds to find out the method that leads to the cessation of conflict (dukkha-nirodha-gāminī-paṭipadā).

This road was first indicated by the Buddha in his first sermon after his enlightenment, the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta (Vin. Mahāvagga, I, 9), preached to his former five companions, as the middle course (majjhima paṭipadā) between the two extremes of addiction to the pleasures of sense and addiction to self-torment. This path, he claimed, makes for vision of the knowledge of the truths (MA. I, 104), it conduces to the calming of the passions and corruptions (AA. III, 360; SA. II, 297), to insight-knowledge (abhiññā), awakening (sambodha) and deliverance (nibbāna: Vin. I, p. ).

In the first sermon, the Buddha spoke to five ascetics who were at that moment not even followers of his. To them he showed, therefore, the right path with right understanding, right action, etc., which thence became stereotyped as the Noble Eightfold Path. Subsequently, however, in the Mahācattārīsaka Sutta (M. III, p. ), when many of his followers had progressed from right understanding to perfect insight, the Buddha made a distinction where the right Eightfold Path appears to be motivated in view of merit (puññābhāgiya) and therefore clings to rebirth (upadhivepakka) and is still intoxicated with desire (sāsava); and where the perfect Path which is not intoxicated with desire (anāsava) and which is transcendent (lokuttara), i.e., the path of sainthood (ariya-magga), is not an eightfold, but a tenfold path. It is the learner’s course (aṭṭhaṅgasamannāgata-sekha-paṭipadā) which has eight components, whereas the course of perfection has ten (dasaṅgasamannāgata-arahā hoti). In the latter one, right concentration (sammā-samādhi) leads further to perfect insight (sammā-ñāṇa) and to perfect deliverance (sammā-vimutti), the end of the Noble Path.

It is worth noting that the Noble Eightfold Path has not found a place in the Book of Eights (aṭṭhakanipāta) of the Aṅguttara Nikāya, whereas the ten states of perfection, which are utterly pure and clear (parisuddha, pariyodāta) and which constitute the perfect path, are fully dealt with in the same text in the Book of Tens (dasaka-nipāta: A. V, p. –47).

On the first occasion we are given a mere outline of the path, a bare enumeration of its eight sections, as right understanding (sammā-diṭṭhi), right intention (sammā-saṅkappa), right speech (sammā-vācā), right action (sammā-kammanta), right mode of living (sammā-ājīva), right endeavour (samma-vāyāma), right mindfulness (sammā-sati) and right concentration (sammā-samādhi). Elsewhere, this path is called the method for the realisation of certain conditions (paṭipadā etesaṁ dhammānaṁ sacchikiriyāya: D. I, p. –7) for the sake of which the brethren lead a religious life; and those conditions are more sublime than heavenly pleasures, for they culminate in the realisation, in the present life, of that emancipation of mind and heart, which is arahantship.

When the Buddha, therefore, spoke of his teaching as the middle path, he did not try to reconcile the two extremes of materialistic self-indulgence (kāma-sukhallikānuyoga) and idealistic self-mortification (attakilamathānuyoga), but avoiding both (ubho ante anupagamma) he taught the path that leads to the cessation of conflict, which produces virtue and insight, and which leads to the tranquillisation of deliverance and the supreme insight of enlightenment. This course (paṭipadā) covers man’s moral life (sīla), his power of concentration (samādhi) and his understanding of the truth (pañña).

Viewed from this triple aspect the eight sections of the path fall into these three categories: (a) Right speech (sammā-vācā), right action (sammā-kammanta) and right mode of living (sammā-ājīva) are the sections dealing with moral conduct (sīla), (b) Right endeavour (samma-vāyāma), right mindfulness (sammā-sati) and right concentration (sammā-samādhi) are the sections of mind-control and mental culture (samādhi). (c) Right understanding (sammā-diṭṭhi) and right intention (sammā-saṅkappa) lead to insight (paññā) into the truth.

(sammā-diṭṭhi). Yet, although understanding leading to insight seems to form the achievement of the goal of the journey on this road, it is mentioned first to enable one to have a view of the goal from the outset. For, unless the path is known, progress thereon cannot be assured. If the goal is self-seeking, either in indulgence or in asceticism, the path will naturally be understood in terms of self; and then the misconception of individuality (sakkāya-diṭṭhi) or self-delusion will form the most decisive step on the wrong path. Thus, where misconception of individuality (sakkāya-diṭṭhi) is the first and most formidable fetter (saṁyojana), preventing even the entry on the path of holiness (sotāpatti), the right understanding of the real nature of that “self” is sure to lead to the deliverance of such delusion, which is the realisation of the actual truth. Actuality is the complex nature of existence, the unreality of the phenomenal world, the conflict in the mental world between the universal process of change and the desire for stability; it is the conditionality of events in their arising as well as in their cessation. Thus the right understanding of actuality in the complex nature of existence is the understanding of relativity and conditionality without a supernatural cause or absolute first beginning. The unreality of the phenomenal world should be understood as its unsubstantiality, egolessness, the total absence of any kind of essence or soul or entity supporting the constantly changing phenomena. The actuality of the conflict in the mental world should be understood as “thought in action” and not as a faculty of thinking: it is thought without a potential thinker. By conditionality of events should be understood their origination and cessation in dependence of conditions which merely offer the opportunity for the arising or ceasing of an effect, without causing the effect by necessity.

Thus, it is said in the Mahā Satipaṭṭhāna Suttanta (D. II, p. ) that right understanding is the understanding (ñāṇa), i.e., conviction through insight, and not mere knowledge, of the Four Noble Truths, of the universality of conflict (dukkha ñāṇa) in whatever is complex (saṅkhāra), the internal cause of conflict (dukkha-samudaye ñāṇa) which is craving (taṇhā), of the cessation of such conflict (dukhhanirodhe ñāṇa) through the cessation of its cause, and of the course that leads to the cessation of this conflict (dukkha-nirodha-gāminiyā paṭipadāya ñāṇa).

In answer to a question of someone from the Kaccāyāna clan the Buddha replied that while people usually base their understanding either on existence or on non-existence (atthitañceva natthitañca), one with right understanding of the arising of world-events does not subscribe to the view of annihilationism (lokasamudayaṁ kho Kaccāyana sammanppañāya passato yā loke naithitā sā na hoti), while he who with right understanding sees the actual passing away of world-events does not subscribe to the view of the eternalists (lokanirodhaṁ kho Kaccāyana yathābhūtaṁ sammappaññāya passato yā loke atthitā sā na hoti: S. II, p. ; III, 135).

To possess right understanding is said of him who sees impermanence (aniccanti passati) in the physical and mental aggregates (rūpa, vedanā, saññā, saṅkhārā, viññāṇa). Through such right understanding he experiences weariness with worldly life, and through the destruction of passionate delight his mind is set free (nandirāgakkhayā cittaṁ vimuttaṁ: S. III, p. ; IV, 142).

The most comprehensive exposition of right understanding may be found in the Sammā-diṭṭhi Sutta (M. I, p. –55) where Sāriputta discourses on the subject in great detail. It is the comprehension of what is wrong and right (akusala, kusala), namely, killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying, slander, harshness, gossip, covetousness, aversion and delusion, and the ten opposite virtues which abstain from these evils; it is the comprehension of the root conditions (mūla) thereof, which are greed, hate and delusion resulting in evil actions, and the absence thereof resulting in good actions. Such comprehension will make one free from all addiction to lust (rāgānusayaṁ pahāya), will remove all inclination to repel the unpleasant (paṭighānusayaṁ paṭivinodetvā), will abolish all attachment to the latent tendency which considers the “I” as a separate and abiding entity (asmītidiṭṭhimānānusayaṁ samūhaniṭvā), will expel all ignorance (avijjaṁ pahāya), and thereby become the cause of the arising of true knowledge (vijjaṁ uppādetvā) which is the end of all conflict here and now (diṭṭhe va ḍhamme dukkhass' antakaro hoti).

Further, a monk may be said to have right understanding if he comprehends the entire process of nutrition (āhāra), its arising, its cessation and its working, i.e., nutrition of the physical body, nutrition by which the external impinges by contact (phassa) on the internal, nutrition which feeds volition (manosañcetanā) and nutrition which is mental (viññāṇa).

And Sāriputta continues his discourse, the Sammā-diṭṭhi Sutta, explaining that right understanding also means the comprehension of the Four Noble Truths of conflict (dukkha) which is found in birth and death, in all the experiences of the five groups of physical and mental aggregates of clinging (pañc'upādānakkhandāhā dukkhā); comprehension of the cause of conflict (dukkha-samudaya) which is craving for sense-pleasures (kāma taṇhā), craving for existence (bhava-taṇhā), or craving for annihilation (vibhava-taṇhā); comprehension of the cessation of conflict (dukkha-nirodha) which is the giving up (cāga), the renunciation (paṭinissagga), the release (mutti), the detachment (anālaya) from all craving, and comprehension of the method leading to the ending of conflict (dukkha-nirodhagāminī-paṭipadā) which is the Noble Eightfold Path (ariya-aṭṭhaṅgika-magga).

Right understanding, moreover, includes the comprehension of the origination, the process and the cessation of old age and death (jarā-maraṇa), of birth (jāti), of becoming (bhava) which is the process of existence, of clinging (upādāna), of craving (taṇhā), of sensation (vedanā), of contact (phassa), of the six sense-spheres (saḷāyatana), of the mentality-corporeality combine (nāma-rūpa), of consciousness (viññāṇa), of karmic formations (saṅkhārā), of ignorance (avijjā) and of the mental intoxicants (āsava) of sensuality (kāma), rebirth (bhava) and ignorance (avijjā). To this extent does a noble disciple attain right understanding (sammā-diṭṭhi), his outlook is upright (ujugata’ssa diṭṭhi), he possesses complete confidence in the Dhamma (dhamme aveccappasādena samannāgato), he is one who has mastered the true Dhamma (āgato imaṁ saddhammaṁ; ibid. p. 55).

All this is the right understanding of the goal which is deliverance from all delusion. It is the first kind of knowledge, called the general knowledge of things as composite (sammasana-ñāṇa), and it includes the understanding of the three characteristics of impermanence, conflict and soullessness (anicca, dukkha, anatta). They have to be seen as one, for he who perceives sorrow but not the intrinsic transiency and insubstantiality of the conflict, has nothing but the pain thereof without the hope of deliverance. From the realisation of the true nature of things right understanding will develop insight into the process of nature. The knowledge of composite things as waning and waxing (udayabbaya-ṇāṅa) is not a mere observation of growth and decay in nature, but it is the right and complete understanding that there is nothing but a process of becoming, which is the understanding that becoming is ceasing (bhaṅga-ṇāṅa). Though this step should follow quite logically, yet it is a difficult one for many who in the very fact of becoming find all their delight.

But when becoming and ceasing are seen as two aspects of one process, then the reaction of insight into what is to be feared (bhaya-ṇāṅa) will arise naturally. Fear should lead to understanding of the danger (ādinava-ñāṇa) which is inherent in clinging to mere processes of cessation; it should also lead to understanding of the reasons to be disgusted with such an empty show (nibhidā-ñāṇa).

With this is reached insight in the real nature of the path, for now theoretical knowledge is producing the fruit of practical understanding, which is necessary to proceed on the path. A desire to be set free and the knowledge thereof (muñcitukāmyatā-ñāṇa) will grow out into recontemplation (patiśaṅkhā-ñāṇa), that is contemplation of the same three characteristics of transiency, disharmony and insubstantiality, but with the increased insight as seen from a higher plane. With a view on the goal they constituted earlier mere general knowledge, but with the intensified view on the path to the goal they become more specified. Thus, insight of indifference to the activities of this life (saṅkhār'ūpekkhā-ñāṇa) will be a natural consequence of this disgust and deeper understanding, where even-mindedness (upekkhā) is not due to lack of interest, but to the lack of self-interest.

With this is reached insight in the delusive nature of action, that “though there is a road, there is no traveller” (maggam atthi, gāmako na vijjati); and there is no doer of a deed (kammassa kārako n'atthi: Vism. xix, § 20, p. 517). It is the knowledge which qualifies for the path of holiness (anuloma-ñāṇa); for, with this understanding is broken the first fetter of self-delusion (sakkāya-diṭṭhi), which transforms the worldling (puttujjana) into a noble one (ariya), the average person into a winner of the stream (sotāpanna), the stream of holiness which finally leads to the ocean of Nibbāna.

(sammā-saṅkappa). Understanding and misunderstanding, morality and immorality, approval and disapproval in general, depend largely on the angle from which they are being looked at. It is the view one takes (otherwise called the intention), which makes the difference. Actions in themselves are neutral, and largely mechanical reactions; but the intention of an action makes it good or bad.

There is a difference between purpose and intention, and it is that difference which makes it possible to have right intentions, while the same cannot be said about purpose. For, a purpose is always the desired effect or expected result. In other words, purpose is always something in the future, and that makes it ideal and non-actual. And what is not actual cannot be said to be good. Intentions, on the other hand, are not outward views, but inwards bendings of the mind. Purpose and intention, therefore, differ both in the nature of the action and the object. A purpose is set up beforehand and becomes the goal of striving, while an intention may be spontaneously arising according to the mind’s inclination, thereby leaving the action untainted by craving, producing a pure action (kriyā).

While developing right understanding (sammā-diṭṭhī), thoughts must also be properly co-ordinated and directed by right directions (sammā-saṅkappa). Co-ordinated thinking is the real meaning of the word saṅkappa, which indicates harmonious thinking without isolated or selfish thought. Still, not all co-ordinated thought is rightly co-ordinated. There is volitional intention (cetanā) in every physical, vocal or mental act; it is a general mental factor (sabba-citta-sādhāraṇa-cetasika) which occurs in any mental state. Therefore, intention is not always the same as desire, though sometimes it may be so.

Intention is the driving force which, if evil, will make an act evil, if good, it will make an act good, while without it there would be merely mechanical reactions. Intentions, therefore, have a creative power in them, which may be for good or for bad. Hence not all intentions, but only the right ones, find a place in the Noble Eightfold Path. A rightly co-ordinated intention is one without selfish views which would make it isolated, narrow and not in harmony with the full process of nature or with progress on the path to the goal as realised by right understanding. It is, therefore, an individual disinterestedness with regard to particular actions, as the view is taken of the whole. Hence, the Buddha spoke of right intentions as views of renunciation (nekkhamma-saṅkappa: D. II, p. ), views of good-will (avyāpāda-saṅkappa) and views of harmlessness (avihiṁsā-saṅkappa). Only a detached view, therefore, can be a right intention, as only in detachment the mind can turn away from worldly pursuits and selfish purpose, and be directed on the Noble Path.

(sammā-vācā) is placed first of the sections classified under right conduct (sīla), for if the tongue is well controlled, all conduct will be curbed. It is first of all the observance of the fourth precept which a Buddhist undertakes to observe by abstaining in the fullest sense from lying words (musavādā, veramaṇī). That includes not only lies, but all efforts made to injure the good name of somebody else (pisunā vācā) by circulating bad reports through slander, by openly advancing some serious untrue charges through defamation, or by maliciously misrepresenting another’s words or deeds through calumny. It includes further all kinds of harsh language (pharusā vācā), vulgar, abusive, quarrelsome or invective language. But, reproachful words, directed to persons deserving reproach and used by persons whose duty it is to correct them, would not be harsh language, as long as it is consistent with decency and propriety of speech. Wrongful language includes finally even vain talk or gossip (samphappalāpa) in connection with which the Buddha admonished his monks: “When you are gathered together, monks, there are two things to be done: either talk about the Dhamma or observe a noble silence” (sannipatitānaṁ vo bhikkhave dvayaṁ karaṇāyaṁ: dhammī vā kathā ariyo vā tuṇhībhāvo: M. I, p. ). Mahā Moggallāna explained this ariyan silence as the attainment of the second stage of mental absorption (jhāna) when all mental babbling ceases with the ending of reasoning (vitakka-vicārānaṁ vūāpasamā: S. II, p. ).

But the abstinence or refraining from these various types of wrong speech is only the negative aspect of right speech. Even so, for many it is already much to be sincere in this negative way. Some are not true, because they do not know the truth. In their wrong belief and constant refusal to be enlightened they miss the goal because they refuse to see the path. Their ignorance is blindness through delusion. Few are not true because they do not want to be true. That, of course, is sheer wickedness. It is intentional untruthfulness of which the Buddha said that he who can tell a deliberate lie is capable of committing any crime. A bodhisattva in all the many lives of his preparation for the highest enlightenment may commit all kinds of evil deeds, but he will never utter a deliberate lie; for that would make him turn his back to the goal in his search for truth. And again, there are many who are not true because they do not know how to be true. It is their ignorance of the path, while conventional life in the world is so hypocritical that they are not even aware of the insincere lives they are living. For many of them, untruth has become a necessity for living.

But one who walks on the path “speaks the truth, is devoted to the truth, reliable and worthy of confidence \dots He never knowingly speak a lie, neither for the sake of his own advantage, nor for the sake of another person’s profit, nor for the sake of any gain whatsoever. What he has heard here; he does not repeat there, so as to cause dissension there \dots Thus he unites those that are divided; and those that are united he encourages. Concord gladdens him, he delights and rejoices in concord; and it is concord that he spreads by his words. He avoids harsh language and speaks such words as are gentle, soothing to the ear, loving, going to the heart, courteous, dear and agreeable to many. He avoids vain talk and speaks at the right time in accordance with facts, speaks what is useful, speaks about the Dhamma and the discipline; his speech is like a treasure, at the right moment accompanied by arguments, moderate and full of sense. His is called right speech” (A. V, p. ).

To be able to speak not only with sincerity but with truthfulness, one has to live the truth for oneself. For, then alone is one able to declare from one’s own experience: “So it is”, without relying on the fickle and fallible authority of others. Right speech of this kind leaves a deep mark of conviction on a susceptible audience. The effect may be of the nature of a shock, but, it will be a salutary awakening; for the tongue of the wise is health.

(sammā-kammanta). In the purest sense there is only one kind of action deserving the name of right action (sammā-kammanta), and that is the kind of action which does not deviate from the right path with secondary or ulterior motives. An action which is done with the purpose of obtaining something to which that act is related in the same way as an instrument is associated with the material which it is going to shape, such an action is not a pure action but a means to an end. Whether there are ends and means, or whether ends are means, is largely dependent on the misinterpretation of action.

An action which is operative under a predominating control such as an ulterior motive is not a pure action, is not efficient in itself as it serves another’s purpose. Any such action, which may be good (kusala) or evil (akusala) from a utilitarian viewpoint, is a reproductive action (janaka kamma) with a willed effect (vipāka). It is a means to an end, and, therefore, not complete in itself. It is the end in view which gave the impetus to, and which became identified with, the means. In this sense, the end was the means, i.e., the condition (paccaya-hetu) which made the action reproductive.

But this is not so, if considered from another viewpoint that the means is merely instrumental to the effect without causing it in the ultimate sense; it may be fertilising but not producing it, unintentional and incidental, Such an action is done in a mechanical or purely reactionary way; and here the means and the end are not identical in any way.

Neither of these can be called right action. For an action, the end of which has become the motive of its arising, is incomplete in itself; it is projected into the future by purposeful striving. And the action, in which the end is dissociated from the means in a purely reactionary way is a mechanical action.

There is still another possible combination in which the means becomes the end, e.g., in some people who make of the act of eating, which is a means of preserving life, the chief purpose of existence; they live to eat, instead of eating to live. They confuse the instrumental conditions (nissaya) with the principal condition (uttama hetu). It does not require any explanation to understand that this, too, cannot be right action. And yet it is this type of action which is most frequently indulged in, not only in its more gross forms such as the slaughter of cattle for the sake of taste-satisfaction or the violation of another’s marital rights for the sake of one’s own gratification, but also in more refined and generalised actions which may even be legalised, such as capital punishment. All such actions are misfitting means towards a wrong end. And abstinence therefrom becomes in a way right action.

Meritorious actions (puñña kamma) are also good to some extent; but as they lead to and are intended to lead to rebirth which is a continuation of the conflict, they are means to an end, and, therefore, incomplete in themselves.

A right action in the fullest sense is beyond merit and sin, and it has in it so little of what is usually meant by activity that it can only be conceived and observed in negations: abstinence from killing (pāṇātipātā veramaṇī), abstinence from stealing (adinnādānā veramaṇī), abstinence from wrong gratification of the senses (kāmesu micchācārā veramaṇī). For, the rightness of an action does not depend on the activity itself, but on the mental attitude. Any action which is done for the purpose of acquiring merit may be a good action (kusala kamma), and under the proper conditions it may produce a good effect (kusala vipāka), but that does not make it a right or perfect action (sammā-kammana). An action which is done for the purpose of acquiring merit or for the sake of obtaining a happy rebirth may be skilful (kusala) towards the attainment of the desired end, but in the ultimate sense it is a mere reaction, because the view of the expected reward was the motive and the driving force, to which stimulus the so-called good deed was a reaction. Such actions are not complete; they are performed physically in the present, but they are enacted mentally in the future. Hence they are not completely actual and not actually complete or perfect.

Good actions, therefore, like evil actions, are reproductive, and their effects are likewise called good and evil, respectively; but as the continuation of the process of self-delusion is at the same time continuing the conflict, the difference between good and evil is only one of degree. The Buddha compared man’s actions with a raft wherewith to cross a stream; having reaches the other shore, the raft is let behind, however useful it has been. “Not only evil deeds, but also good deeds must be left behind” (kullūpamaṁ vo bhikkhave ājānantehi dhammā pi vo pahātabbā, pag-eva adhammā: M. I, p. ).

In the Mahācattārīsaka Sutta (M. III, p. ) the Buddha makes the following distinction in a twofold right action: right action that has a share in merit (puññā-bhāgiya) and which therefore clings to rebirth (upadhivepakka), is still intoxicated (sāsava) with desire, and does not appear to be very perfect; the other is right action which indeed is perfect (ariya), not intoxicated with desire (anāsava), transcending (lokuttara), and this forms part of the path (maggaṅga). The first type is good action, for it abstains from killing, from stealing, from indulgence, but with a motive. The second type is perfect action, pertaining to the path, because the restraint is a development of perfect thought (ariyacitta), of a thought free from intoxication (anāsavacitta).

A right action then must be a pure, a perfect, a complete action, an action performed entirely in the present, physically and mentally, and thus a fully actual action. Inducement by reward, restraint by fear of punishment, obedience in response to legal obligation, can never form a basis for right action. But to abstain from killing out of respect for life, to abstain from stealing out of respect for property, to abstain from gratification of the senses beyond their physical needs out of understanding that they will develop a psychological greed if indulged in beyond that limit, –-those are right actions, for they have the fulness of motive and effect in themselves. They are not mere means, but ends in themselves. Hence they do not project themselves into a further process (vipāka), as they are not reactions themselves but intelligent actions. Such right actions are pure actions which do not lead to conflict, because in their simplicity they are not complex; they do not lead to rebirth, because they are non-causal (kriyā). They may be called inoperative, as they have neither moral (kusala) nor immoral (akusala) significance; hence they are also called indeterminate (avyākata) and actions of mere doing (karaṇamatta). As all other actions have the tendency of reproductivity and, therefore, may lead to rebirth if other conditions are favourable, this is the only action which, spontaneous in its arising from the understanding of a need, does not lead to the implications and complications of greed and conflict, which will thus completely solve the problem and lead along the Noble Eightfold Path to the final deliverance of Nibbāna.

V. Right Living (sammā-ājīva) is the earning of one’s livelihood by no wrong means. Wrong means do not include wrong actions such as theft. These have been dealt with and are included in right and wrong action. But there are other actions such as buying and selling, which are perfectly justified in themselves, and which yet become wrong means of livelihood, if the articles for sale are going to be harmful. Thus the living by the sale of deadly weapons, of meat and fish, of intoxicants, of poison, of contraceptives, of pornographic literature and obscene pictures, of white slavery for the purpose of prostitution, or any kind of exploitation which is living on the labour of others while withholding from them a decent living wage, –-cannot be called right livelihood (sammā-ājīva).

And that is about all that the average man knows of this very important and practical part of the Noble Eightfold Path. One should, however, enquire deeper to find out what has brought about these wrong means of livelihood. If people sell meat and liquor, is it not because there is a demand for those commodities? Shops and markets are not charity institutions; they are run for the purpose of making profit, which, however, can only be expected by catering for the demand. Thus, the root of wrong livelihood does not lie with the salesman, who takes his opportunity together with the risk, but with the wrong living of his customers. If some do the slaughtering, it is because others want the meat. If some women are prepared, frequently constrained by circumstances, to offer their body indiscriminately for hire, it is because there are so many men who want sexual satisfaction without the bondage of a married life; or because a hypocritical society has outlawed an unfortunate girl for a mishap in her unexperienced youth. Wrong livelihood then is conditioned by wrong living. It is greed, lust, selfishness, desire for power in many, which stimulates the acquisitiveness in a few who make a profit by wrong livelihood. Our inner demands, therefore, have created the outer opportunity.

Right living is, therefore, not only a life which is harmless (ahiṁsā), but a life which is free from greed and selfishness, which is not isolating itself in self-satisfaction, which is not opposing itself to others by comparison, or placing itself above others by judgment. Right living is a life of simplicity, which, however, is not the same as renunciation. Not the fewness of possessions makes a life simple, but the freedom from possessions. True simplicity does not necessarily give up all possessions but it is not possessed by them. Right living is a life without acquisitiveness, without specialisation, without rights and privileges which are all expressions of self-deluded isolation. And when there are no rights, there are no duties either.

Such is the freedom of right living which arises in the understanding that all complex is a conflict (sabbe saṅkhārā dukkha), that rights and duties arise from opposition, that all opposition is delusion. And with that understanding come also contentment, happiness and fulness of life. Then life does not mean any more the manner of living; it ceases to be a toy thrown about by the ups and downs of circumstances; for, then it will have transcended all pettiness, all phenomenality, all misery and conflict, all isolation, opposition and delusion, And that indeed is right living on the Noble Eightfold Path.

(sammā-vayāma). Energy and effort, though frequently interchanged as synonyms, have a very different meaning originally. Energy is the capacity to produce force; it is inner work (en-ergy), mostly a latent ability which requires a suitable environment, such as an impelling condition, to become an active operation. It is not activity itself, but the power to work. Hence, one speaks of static or latent energy, which, however, is merely potential and not actual. Only when it operates actually, it obtains value. It is like an account in a bank from which moneys may be withdrawn for actual purchases. Energy, therefore, is more of the nature of a characteristic, and as such it is classified as a mental factor (viriya cetasika).

Effort (vāyāma), on the other hand, is an outgoing strength (ex fors) and the actual calling forth, of the inner force (en ergy). In appearance it is like a means to an end, for, effort is required in any attempt to reach the goal. But as in right understanding (sammā-diṭṭhi) the end calls for spontaneous action which is the means without a purposeful projection beyond the immediate need, so right effort (sammā-vayāma), as an endeavour to reach the end of the Noble Eightfold Path, does not extend itself beyond removing those obstacles on the path which have arisen (pahānappadhāna) or better still preventing them from arising (saṁvarappadhāna); or trying to bring about favourable conditions (bhāvanappadhāna) or improving the same (anurakkhaṇappadhāna: cp. D. II, p. ). Obstacles which will have to be removed (pahāna) are attachments to sense pleasures and antagonistic dispositions, which each in their own way make the mind selfish and isolated. Evil sources which should be prevented to pollute the pure atmosphere on the Noble Path are the different forms of evil company. This may be in the form of so-called friends who with their wrong example might exercise an evil influence, or in the form of pictures, books, films and songs, which produce an evil effort on the mind. Even certain tastes and smells have a tendency of weakening a person’s determination. Thus, by guarding the senses (saṁvara) and by protecting and restraining the faculties of body and mind one exerts right effort (A. II, p. ). Thus far the aspects of preventing and curing. On the other hand, right effort has also its positive applications in the culture (bhāvanā) of the various factors contributing to enlightenment (sambojjhaṅga). Favourable conditions which may be a help on the path are the cultivation of mindfulness (sati), the spirit of investigation (dhamma-vicaya), inner energy (viriya), sympathetic interest (pīti), peacefulness of mind (passaddhi), concentration (samādhi) and a balanced disposition of even-mindedness (upekkhā) in the vicissitudes of life. For, such dispositions are based on dispassion (virāganissita), lead to cessation (nirodhanissita) and end in self-surrender (vossaggapariṇāmi: loc. cit.) And if those conditions have already been brought about, they should be furthered and promoted (anurakkhaṇa) with right effort, by means of recognition-with-understanding (saññā) the grim facts of actuality, be they a skeleton or a decomposing corpse.

It should be noted that in all these four kinds of supreme effort there is nothing of purposeful striving. All right effort is entirely focussed on the present moment in order to solve the problem of the actual conflict. In purposeful striving there may be a resemblance of effort in an attempt to reach a goal; but such goal is never present, and hence the problem and the conflict are not actual. Such attempts, then, are more of the nature of a trial in the sphere of experiment. But right effort has nothing vague or experimental about it, as the purpose is well defined and understood by right insight (sammā-diṭṭhi). “The purpose of the holy life is neither gifts, nor honours, nor a good name, which are leafy twigs in a tree; neither is it excellence in regulated behaviour, which may be compared with a branch in that tree; neither the bliss of concentration which is equal to the bark; nor yet penetrating insight which is like green wood. The purpose of a holy life, its heart and its goal, which is like the heart-wood of a tree, is the fixed and unalterable deliverance of the mind” (Mahā-sāropama Sutta: M. I, p. –7).

(sammā-sati) is the most efficacious instrument to success in any sphere of work, because mindfulness means awareness and attention. It is not an instrument with a specific purpose, but assists any action to perform with greater accuracy. Thus, it can be applied to any action, physical or mental, moral or immoral. Awareness and attention will focus the thought on the work at hand and prevent distraction which is the usual cause of misapplication of energy, of accidents and failure.

Right mindfulness is a kind of direct experience which does not rely on thoughts or feelings of another person, or of tradition, or of conventional society. It is an awareness of the component parts of an action: its motives, its agencies, its constituents, its material, its background, its foundation, even the source of its origination. For all that together forms the action which is the “I”. Right mindfulness is not concerned with the outer world as such. The outer world as the world of experience is only a reflected world. It is in one’s own action that one has to solve the conflict arising from contact (phassa) and sensation (vedanā), from reaction (saññā) and ideation (saṅkhāra), which forms the conscious process (viññāṇa) of karmic action. Thus the Buddha’s way of meditation is not a method of filling a certain period of the day with beautiful thoughts, emotional sentiments or inspiring truths. His method is the method of analysis (vibhajja) through mindfulness (sati-patthāna), about which he said that it is “the only path that leads to purity of life, to the complete overcoming of anxiety and complaint, to the annihilation of conflict and sorrow, to the attainment of the goal, the realisation of Nibbāna” (M. I, p. ).

This method of right mindfulness is fourfold. (1) It is to be mindful of the body’s actions such as breathing (ānāpāna-sati), of its reactions (satisampajañña), its postures as a whole (catuririyāpathā), its formation of parts (paṭikkūla-manasikāra), its composition of material qualities (dhātu-manasikāra) and its stages of corruptibility (navasīvathikāya). (2) It is to be mindful of feelings and sensations (vedanānupassanā), to be aware of their arising, reflecting on them as just feelings, without attachment to the pleasant ones, without aversion for the unpleasant ones, without neglecting the neutral ones. It is to be independent from them, whether they originate from an external condition or from an inner disposition. (3) It is to be mindful of thoughts (cittā-nupassanā), seeing their roots of lust (rāga), hate (dosa), delusion (moha), detachment (vita-rāga), placidity (vita-dosa) or comprehension (vita-moha); seeing the character of those thoughts as recollected or distracted, attentive or fugitive, lofty or lowly, liberated or fettered; considering them one and all as just thought (atthi cittaṁ). (4) It is to be mindful of mental states (dhammānupassanā) associated with the five hindrances (pañca nīvaraṇāni) of sensuality, ill-will, sloth, worry and perplexity; to be aware of the arising of those mental states, of their continuance and of their ceasing. It is to be mindful of the mental states connected with the five factors of clinging to existence (pañc'ūpādānakkhandhā), i.e., matter, sensation, perception, differentiation and consciousness; or belonging to the six spheres of sense-organs and sense-objects (saḷāyatanā); or to the seven factors of wisdom (satta sambojjhaṅga), namely, mindfulness, investigation, energy, rapture, repose, concentration and equanimity; or belonging to the Four Noble Truths, always reflecting on the actual nature of events and experiences: “This is conflict, and this is its cause; thus it ceases, and this is the path that leads to its solution”.

It is said that whoever would practise those four methods of mindfulness, if only for seven days, may expect to reap one of these two fruits: the perfect: insight of arahantship in this life itself, or at least the state of no-more-return to this world (anāgāmi: D. II, p. ).

Right mindfulness, then, leads to insight, because it is awareness of the true nature of an action. Awareness is knowledge without assertion or comparison, without denial or acceptance; for, all these judgements are the expressions of the reflecting self, which distorts the view in isolating itself from the conditioning environment. It is the delusion of self which approves or disapproves of certain feelings. But by mere attentiveness, watchfulness, awareness and mindfulness, those feelings will be perceived as sensuous reactions to the environment. The understanding of this action-reaction-process (udayabbaya-ñāṇa) will overcome all misconceptions about individuality (sakkāya-diṭṭhi), whereby the root-cause of the conflict will have been removed. Then no thoughts will arise such as; I feel pain or pleasure; but simply: this is feeling (atthi vedanā); no thoughts as: I am freed; but simply: this is a liberated thought (atthi vimuttaṁ cittaṁ); no thoughts as: this is my body; but simply: such is matter, its origin and dissolution (iti rūpaṁ, iti rūpassa samudayo, iti rūpassa atthagamo).

Thus right mindfulness solves the problem of conflict, just because it has no purpose of its own. For, while it is through purposeful volition that opposites are created as the cause of all conflict, pure mindfulness avoids all such complications by merely seeing things as they are.

VIII. Right Concentration (sammā-samādhi). There is frequently a great deal of confusion about the words meditation, concentration and contemplation. The last term “contemplation” is etymologically and actually associated with the word “temple”, originally used for the open space for the observations of the Roman augurs who from those consecrated places watched the phenomena in the sky to predict therefrom some future events. Contemplation as watchfulness would, therefore, not much differ from mindfulness (sati), as both are essentially kinds of observation.

Meditation, too, is a form of attention and reflection. Hence the different forms of spiritual exercises (kammaṭṭhāna), such as recollection of the virtues of the Buddha (Buddhanussati), reflection on death (maraṇānussati), analysis of the four elements (catudhātuvavaṭṭhāna) or contemplation of a device as a clay disk (paṭhavi-kasiṇa-maṇḍala), are forms of meditation or mental culture (bhāvana), When they have passed their preliminary stage (parikamma), they will cease to be exercises of meditation (sati) and approach to concentration (upacāra-samādhi). It is thus through the prelimanery mental culture that one-pointedness (ekaggatā) develops into mind-concentration.

In its undeveloped state concentration is present in any thought as the mental factor (cetasika) of one-pointedness of mind (cittass'ekaggatā), but then it is a mere intellectual element without any ethical significance, to be compared with the consciousness of an amoeba; it is the germ of concentration. Both one-pointedness and concentration have, therefore, something in common, viz., the bringing together of the powers of attention in one central point. Concentration, then, is called “the power of individualising, developed by practice” (Shwe Zan Aung, Compendium of Philosophy, Introductory Essay, p. 54), for it focusses the attention on one point, whereby distracting influences are kept at a distance. This is the checking of the five hindrances (pañca nivaraṇāni), when full ecstasy (jhāna) may occur, which is truly right concentration (sammā-samādhi).

The path which leads to the different states of mental absorption (jhāna) and to the checking of the hindrances (nīvaraṇa) is called the path of calm or tranquillity (samatha), because it lulls the passions. But control or tranquillisation is still far from overcoming or uprooting. In this respect the mental culture along the way to tranquillisation (samatha-bhāvanā) cannot be the culmination of right concentration and the attainment of the final goal of the Noble Eightfold Path. This can only be reached by that kind of meditation which is insight (vipassanā).

It is of great interest to note that the Buddha in the Mahācattārīsaka Sutta (M. III, p. ), which was quoted already previously in connection with good action and perfect action, refers to the eight components of the path as the learner’s course (atthaṅgasamannāgata sekha paṭipadā), the course of perfection consisting of ten (dasaṅgasamannāgata-arahāhoti), The two further constituents of perfection are right insight (sammā-ñāṇa) which originates from right concentration (sammā-samādhi) and perfect deliverance (sammā-vimutti), the end of the path.

Mental culture through insight (vipassanā-bhāvana) has only three kinds of contemplation, each of which may lead to emancipation. These three forms of contemplation have as objects the three characteristic marks (lakkhaṇa) of all component things, namely, the mark of impermanence (anicca), of disharmony (dukkha) and of insubstantiality (anatta), But they are so intrinsically linked together, that they form only different aspects, each one implying the other two. But according to the prominence given to anyone of these aspects the process of emancipation (vimokkha) is named emancipation by the concept of the void (suññatā), of the signless (animitta) and of the undesired (appaṇihita), which are the three gateways (mukha) through which release is effected.

Release through the gateway of the void (suññatā) means the emancipation of mind through the contemplation of the insubstantiality (anattā) of all things, of the soullessness of all beings, of the emptiness of all phenomena. Release through the channel of the signless (animitta) means the emancipation of mind through the abandonment of the sign of hallucination (vipallāsa). The hallucination meant here is the perception (saññā), the concept (citta) and the opinion (diṭṭhi), which erroneously discern impermanent things (anicca) as lasting. The “sign” (nimitta) then is the appearance of permanence, which is a hallucination, abandoned in emancipation. Release through the avenue of the undesired (appaṇihita) is the emancipation of heart and mind, brought about by not hankering after things as a result of the contemplation of the conflict (dukkha) arising from craving. This right meditation (sammā-samādhi) which is truly insight (vipassanā) leads to emergence (vuṭṭhāna-gāminī), because it invariably leads to the path of holiness, the stream of deliverance (sotāpatti), ending in the emancipation of Nibbāna, the goal of the Noble Eightfold Path. It is in this Path that has been shown the way to bring about an end of the conflict. It is a path of understanding and practice, whereby the truth can become known (sacca-ñāṇa), its function understood (kicca-ñāṇa), so that, its accomplishment may be realised (kata-ñāṇa).

(S. IV, p. ) speaks of the Noble Eightfold Path as the path that leads to the unconditioned Nibbāna (asaṅkhatagāmī magga), and each of the eight sections is said to be founded on singleness of heart (vivekanissita), based on dispassion (virāga-nissita), grounded in cessation (nirodha-nissita) and ripening into total surrender (voassaggapariṇāmi).

Mentions both the wrong (micchā) and the right (sammā) sections of the Eightfold path (aṭṭhaṅgika magga), but no particular stress is laid on their connection with the Path. The sutta forms a part of the chapter on courses of action (Kammapatha-vagga) in the Dhātu Saṁyutta (S. II, p. ), and it is pointed out that the elementary nature (dhātu) introduces a set of conditions, whereby beings of like nature flock together and meet, those of wrong views with similar minded ones, those of evil intentions, those who use bad language, etc., with those of like nature. Likewise, the good-natured ones will, by their very nature (dhātuso), associate with their likes, they of right views with those of right views, etc.

The Aṭṭhaṅgika Sutta of the Aṅguttara Nikāya (II, 220) pursues more or less the same theme. The unworthy man (asappurisa) with wrong views, wrong intentions, etc., becomes still more unworthy by encouraging others to be like him; whereas the worthy man who pursues the right eightfold path increases in worthiness by encouraging others to walk the same path of virtue and insight.

The eight stages of emancipation, are frequently referred to and enumerated in the Pali texts (D. II, p. , 111; III, 226, 288; A. IV, p. ; Ps. II, p. –40; (Vbh. 342–3)) and commentaries (DA. II, 70, 512–13), and also in Sanskrit texts (Avś. 208; Sdmp. 150, 180, 202; Mhm. 1510–18). They roughly correspond to the nine attainments (samāpatti) which include the four (or five) states of mental absorption (jhāna) in the spheres of form (rūpa-jhāna) and the four immaterial attainments, sometimes referred to as absorption in the immaterial spheres (arūpa-jhāna). The stages of “emancipation” would refer to the active process of liberation, while “attainment” obviously indicates the process completed in its successive stages.

The eight stages of emancipation fall into two groups. The first three constitute a gradual emancipation from the world of sense (kāma-loka), whilst the mind still dwells in the fanciful forms of the spheres of fine material (rūpa-loka). Thus, the first stage of emancipation from the domination of the senses is still very limited, as “one perceives corporeal forms”. The first state of mental absorption in the spheres of form (rūpa-jhāna) being dominated and sustained by logical application of mind (vitakka-vicāra), one may be inclined to draw the parallel between that state and the first stage of emancipation which is the awareness of form while being conscious of oneself (rūpī rūpāni passati). It is in logic that order and the beauty of sequence are discovered, subjectively.

The contemplation of form and order external to oneself (ajjhattaṁ arūpasaññī eko bahiddhā rūpāni passati) surpasses the mental application of logic and gives rise to a kind of spiritual joy of appreciation (pīti), which is the second state of absorption and the second stage of emancipation, where the mind is free from the self-made rules of logic.

The third stage of emancipation is characterised by the abstract concept of beauty (subhan t'eva adhimutto hoti), which by now has transcended all forms and colours, all patterns and ideals, and has thereby transcended the ecstasy of joy (pīti), leaving room only for the material feeling of well-being (sukha) and of one-pointedness of mind (ekaggatā) of the third and fourth stages of mental absorption in the material sphere (rūpa-jhāna). By now the mind is completely emancipated of all forms, concepts of form and their sensory reactions (sabbaso rūpasaññānaṁ samatikkaṁā paṭighasaññānaṁ atthaṅgamā) and is “free” to enter the next four stages of emancipation which correspond with the four immaterial attainments or states of absorption in the immaterial spheres (arūpa-jhāna), viz., the attainment of the sphere of infinite space (ākāsānañcāyatana), of boundless thought (viññāṇañcāyatana), of no-thing-ness (ākiñcaññāyatana) and of neither-perception-nor-non-perception (n'eva-saññānāsaññāyatana).

By passing wholly beyond this sphere, one attains the eighth emancipation and abides in the cessation of perception and sensation (saññā-vedayita-nirodha). In this suspension of all sensory, conscious and mental activities is reached the highest attainment before the realisation of Nibbāna. It can only be attained in the meditative process of an anāgāmin or an arahant.

The “presence” condition, one of the twenty-four relationships or modes of conditionality in which mental and physical phenomena and occurrences are related to, and dependent on, one another. Atthi-paccaya refers to any phenomenon–-whether it is prenascent (pure-jāta) such as the physical eye organ in respect of eye consciousness, or co-nascent (saha-jāta) such as the simultaneous arising of indispensable conditions which are inseparably associated, e.g., the four principal physical elements (maha-bhūta)–-on whose presence the occurrence of other phenomena is dependent.

Other examples of this relationship are the mutual conditionings of the four mental aggregates, viz., sensation (vedanā), perception (saññā), ideations (saṅkhārā) and consciousness (viññāṇa); and the association of corporeal or mental phenomena, which form the mind-object (dhamma-dhātu), with the mind-element (mano-dhātu), which is advertence (āvajjana), and the mind-consciousness-element (mano-viññāṇa-dhātu), which is investigating (santīraṇa), determining (voṭṭhapana) and registering (tad-ārammaṇa).

Is the act or faculty of drawing together. On the physical plane it may exist in a magnetic field or in the sphere of gravity, or perhaps the strongest of all, in the form of molecular attraction. On the emotional plane it leads to the excitement of pleasurable feelings in living beings.

In Buddhist philosophic terminology is found the term āpo, literally meaning water or liquid, but indicating the essential cohering condition which binds and unites things together (bhūtarūpassa bandhanabhāvo: DhsA. 335). This elementary quality does not stand, therefore, for liquid only, but for all characteristics which are of a fluid condition, resisting separation, such as affinity, attachment, adaptability, attraction, cohesion, viscosity, adhesion, suction, clinging, craving, some of which find their application in the material sphere, others in the mental world predominantly.

It is a quality of internal self-preservation, a tendency to conservation of matter and energy by means of attracting reinforcements of other kindred phenomena. That such tendencies are found in inorganic matter, and, in fact, that matter would not exist as such without this characteristic property, does not attribute a spirit to matter, although the rudimentary principles of craving (which constitutes the progress of continued existence in saṁsāra) are not absent in physical adherence and attraction, which preserve matter.

Are characteristic qualities, which mark, note or predicate that to which they are ascribed and by which things and events are known. Attributes, therefore, whether they are physical or mental, are closely connected with the process of knowledge, while their objective existence has been doubted in many schools of philosophy. An independent existence of qualities and attributes would, of course, produce a large number of objections and contradictions, the most obvious and most serious of which is the fact that an independent quality would cease to be an attribute if it is not related, just as property without an owner.

The peculiar difficulty encountered in Buddhist philosophy is the denial of absolute ownership in the doctrine of non-substantiality (anatta) which is the doctrine of mere phenomena without a substance to support them. The opposite view of permanent entities as carriers of qualifying attributes has its own, peculiar difficulties in trying to establish the nature of such entity, soul or substance, the existence of which is said to be independent of all attributes. Here the attributes do not affect the substance, essentially. But what such essence is when deprived of all attributes, qualities, phenomena, characteristics, conditions, relations, etc., cannot even be imagined, still less defined.

The solution to this problem lies in the understanding of the nature of attributes. The Buddha’s doctrine of anatta not only denies the existence of a permanent soul, an abiding entity, an enduring self, an immutable “I”, an indestructible substance, but also refuses to recognise anything of a constant nature which could be called “mine” (etaṁ mama, eso' ham asmi, eso me attā ti: M. I, p. ). Phenomena themselves roll on, as quoted from the Porāṇā in the Visuddhimagga (p. 517, chap. xix, § 20):

There is no doer of a deed,
A gatherer cannot be found;
Only phenomena roll on,
Such is the truest view.
(kammassa kārako n'atthi
vipākassa ca vedako,
suddāhadhammā pavattanti,
ev'etaṁ sammadassanaṁ)

Phenomena do not exist, but arise in dependence on certain conditions. Material qualities appear by reason of moral or immoral action (kamma) or they may originate in mind (citta); they may be born of physical change (utu), or from nutrition (āhāra) and assimilation (Abhs. vi, § 6). Such origination is not an absolute creation, but a coming into being (bhava) of a new form in the process of becoming. In their various forms, which are constantly forming new combinations, these phenomena as a group (rūpakkhandha) constitute matter (rūpa), and hence they are called constituents, forming together a corporeal unit.

Similarly, the mental phenomena (cetasika) constitute in many, various combinations the different types of thought (citta). They are referred to as mental properties, but there is no separate mind as the proprietor. As mental attributes, they contribute to the unit of a mental state, with which they rise and cease, sharing its object and its base (Abhs. ii, § 1). Here too, there exists no mind as a soul or a substance, there exist no mental phenomena as individual entities, but in dependence on contact (phassa) of the senses there arise sensation (vedanā) in the organs, the reaction of perception (saññā), the intention of volitional activity (cetanā), the capacity to individualise (ekaggatā) the object of contact, the reflective attentiveness (manasikāra) and the fusion of all into a living thought (jīvitindriya). There are many more concomitants (cetasika) which add their character to the mental group (nāmakkhandha), as adjuncts and co-efficients, each and all, singly or in combination, dependent in their arising, action and cessation on multiform relations and conditions.

Plane, realm, sphere of activity or existence. Since in Buddhism cosmological concepts are based on their psychological equivalents which are their causes, one finds the various spheres of rebirth corresponding to the mental states which produced such karma as result in rebirth.

Hence, there are three realms of thought (avacara) which result in three realms of rebirth (loka) and which, in fact, constitute those realms, just as a thought is not essentially different from the resultant consciousness. The sphere of rebirth, then, is localisation of the realm of thought which produced it.

Mind (citta) is the common name for four types of consciousness, namely, as experienced in the sphere of sense (kāmāvacara), in the sphere of form (rūpāvacara), in the sphere of the immaterial (arūpāvacara), end transcendental or supramundane consciousness (lokuttara). The last kind of consciousness, cannot be called a sphere (avacara), as it does not produce rebirth, but rather expels the causes of rebirth (Dhs. § 277).

The first sphere of consciousness or realm of thought is then experienced on the sensuous plane (kāmāvacara citta), i.e., experienced through and conditioned by a stimulation in any one of the five physical senses, or in representative cognition of such stimulus. The vast majority of thoughts, in fact all thoughts, except those which arise in states of mental absorption (jhāna) or belong to the transcendental type (lokuttara), are experienced in the sensuous sphere. A total of 54 mental states, experienced in the sensuous realms of thought (catupaññāsadhā kāme: Abhs. p. 4, § 13), are enumerated and classified as follows. There are 12 types of immoral consciousness (dvādasākusala), eight of which are rooted in greed (aṭṭhadhā lobhamūlani), two in hate (dosamūlani ca dvidhā) and two in delusion (mohamūlani ca dve: ibid. p. 1, § 3). Those rooted in greed are sometimes connected with erroneous views (diṭṭhigata-sampayutta), and are always accompanied by either joy (somanassa-sahagata), i.e., by the feeling of pleasure with excitement, or by hedonic indifference (upekkhā-sahagata), simply implying the absence of pleasurable feeling. They are also either spontaneous (asaṅkhārika), i.e., manifesting themselves without prior preparation, exertion, instigation or motivation, or they arise under the influence of volition (sasaṅkhāreṇa: Dhs. § 146), i.e., determined by intention and motive.

The two types of mental states which are rooted in hate are always accompanied by grief (domanassasahagata) and always connected with aversion (paṭigha-sampayutta), one, however, is spontaneous, and the other is motivated. The two types which are rooted in delusion are both characterised by the absence of any feeling of pleasure or grief, one being conjoined with perplexity (vicikicchāsampayutta) and the other with flurried distraction (uddhacca-sampayutta).

Corresponding to the first eight immoral (akusala) states rooted in greed, the realm of sense-experience contains eight moral (kusala) states of consciousness to which class the faculty of insight (paññindriya) gives a specific character. Here, too, we find every single state either accompanied by joy (somanassa) or by hedonic indifference (wpekkha). They either spontaneously manifest themselves (asaṅkhārika) or conditioned and motived (sasaṅkhārika). And again either connected with knowledge (ñāṇa-sampayutta) or disconnected from knowledge (ñāṇa-vipayutta). All of them are connected with their root-conditions (sahetuka), i.e., with disinterestedness (alobha), amity (adosa) and intelligence (amoha), in the case of those states which are connected with knowledge (ñāṇa-sampayutta); and with disinterestedness and amity only, in the case of those states which are disconnected from knowledge (ñāṇa-vippayutta).

Then again, corresponding to these eight moral states of active consciousness (kusala-citta), there are eight types of moral consciousness which are results (vipāka) of action done in a former birth in the sensuous spheres, but in every other aspect similar to the foregoing ones. Similar to these again, there is a further class of eight which are, however, neither effective, nor resultant, but which remain inoperative (kriyā), i.e., effecting no karma.

There are further quite a number of classes of consciousness, all within the realm of sense (kāmāvacara) which are not conditioned by one or more of the six radical conditions (hetu)–-greed, hate, delusion and their opposites. They are the five states of consciousness arising from the functioning of the five physical sense-organs, sight (cakkhu-), hearing: (sota-) smell (ghana-), taste (jivhā-), and touch (kāya-viññāṇa). As they are resultants (vipāka), either of evil deeds in the past (akusala) or of good deeds in the past (kusala), they form a further ten classes of consciousness as experienced in the realm of sense. There is a point of interest here. Consciousness arising through the sense-organs of sight, hearing, smell and taste, whether conditioned by good or evil deeds in the past, is always accompanied by hedonic indifference (upekkhā). Consciousness arising through the sense-organ of touch or body sensibility (kāya-viññāṇa), however, is accompanied either by pain (dukkha) or by pleasure (sukha) and this is determined by its being caused by an evil deed in a former birth or a good deed, respectively. But the view itself that neutral feeling accompanies all sense-cognition other than touch or body-sensibility, as well as its commentarial explanation (DhsA. p. 263), are of psychological interest. It is said that only through the sense of touch is there direct contact and impact of the external elements with the internal sense-organ. And hence the impact is pleasurable with reference to a desirable object, and painful with reference to an undesirable object. Where the impact is not direct, as e.g., the sight of a flower, the consciousness arising from this function remains hedonically indifferent (upekkhā).

Recipient consciousness (sampaṭicchana-citta) is always accompanied by hedonic indifference (upekkhā), whether it has resulted from an evil (akusala) or a good (kusala) deed in a former birth. It is the receptive faculty which passively (hence its indifference) receives the sense-impression, whether the object is agreeable or disagreeable. It is differentiated, therefore, only in its source the causative action of the past.

Further, there are three states of consciousness within the field of the senses, concerning the thought of investigation (santīraṇa-citta). If such thought arises as a result of an evil act done in a previous birth, it is accompanied by hedonic indifference (upekkhā); but if resulting from a good deed, it may be accompanied either by joyful feeling (somanassa) or by hedonic indifference (upekkhā).

Finally, there are three classes of consciousness in the realm of the senses which arise independent of any root (ahetuka) and which remain inoperative, i.e., effecting no karma (kriyā). They are reflective consciousness turning to the sense-impressions at the five “doors” of the physical sense-organs (pañcadvardvajjana-citta) which is always accompanied by hedonic indifference; reflective consciousness which turns to impressions at the mind-door (manodvārāvajjana-citta), similarly accompanied; and consciousness which gives birth to mirth and laughter (hasituppāda-citta), which is, obviously always associated with a joyful feeling of excitement. All these constitute the 54 types of mental states of consciousness, as experienced in the sensuous realms of thought (catupaññāsadhā kāmā).

The sphere of form (rūpāvacara) is the realm of consciousness, of unified and exalted concentration (ekaggatā mahaggato samādhi: Vism. 70, chap. iii, § 13). Four kinds of concentration are mentioned (ibid. p. 71, § 23); concentration of the sense-sphere, however, is not a state of contemplation and absorption (jhāna), but only of access-concentration (upacārekaggatā kāmāvacaro samādhi); it is the preliminary work (parikamma) introducing the state of full, mental absorption (jhāna).

It is then in the spheres of form (rūpāvacara) that full mental concentration and absorption are to be found. These spheres are not of the senses (kāma), yet they are not immaterial (arūpa) either, and hence they are sometimes denoted as the “finematerial spheres” (Ñāṇamoḷi, Path of Purification, pp. 87, 90, 142, 161, etc.). But they are mental states with a spiritual reaction to basically material impressions, in the way of a sense of beauty and harmony which is caused by material colour and shape. And as such, they might be referred to as spheres of form, not altogether divorced from matter, yet having no physical ingredients. For it is explicitly stated that physical matter (rūpa), the first of the five aggregates of existence (pañcakkhandhā), does not belong to the realm of form (na rūpāvacaram: Dhs. § 595, Siamese edition; cp. Dhs. trsl. p. xlvi). And again, the realm of form is not related to the realm of sense (Dhs. §§ 1281, 1283, PTS. edition). The description of the dwelled in the world of radiance (ābhassara-saṁvaṭṭanikā) is really a description of the mind in the realm of form (rūpāvacara), for there they dwell, made of mind, feeding on joy, self-radiant, neither in heaven nor on earth, living on beauty (manomayā pīti-bhakkhā sayampabhā antalikkha-carā subhaṭṭhāyine: (D. I, p. 17).

There are in all fifteen mental states belonging to the realm of form (rūpāvacara), i.e., three groups of five. The three groups represent meritorious mental activity (kusalakamma), the meritorious result of such activity (kusala-vipāka) and mental states which remain inoperative (kriyā), i.e., effecting no karma. Each of these groups comprises five mental states of absorption (jhāna) with various degrees of intensity. The first stage is characterised by discursive thinking (vitakka), whereby the hindrance (nīvaraṇa) of sloth and torpor (thīnas-middha) is overcome. The second degree continues the same thought with sustained application (vicāra) and doubt (vicikicchā) is thereby inhibited. The third state of mental absorption develops an intense interest which may grow out into thrill and rapture (pīti), whereby aversion (vyāpāda) is obliterated. This is followed by a pleasurable feeling of ease (sukha) which provides the satisfaction of the earlier thrilling emotion and which prevails over distraction and worry (uddhacca-kukkucca). All this culminates in the fifth and final state of mental absorption in the sphere of form, when concentration is not marred by any distraction, but in one-pointed awareness (ekaggatā) is attentive to its one individual object. All sensuous desire (kāmacchanda) is restrained.

It is this purging from all the hindrances (nīvaraṇa) which gives the mind an experience of freedom from the senses.

In the realm of the formless (arūpāvacara) we find the same three groups of meritorious mental activity (kusala-kamma), the meritorious result of such activity (kusala-vipāka) and mental states which remain unproductive (kriyā), as in the case of those perfect ones (asekha) whose deeds do not project themselves either as cause or effect.

Each group comprises four mental states which are distinct by their respective objects all of which are immaterial (arūpa). These states are born from a reflection on the relative grossness of the spheres of form, and therefore, by means of a most severe abstraction not only are all impressions of the sensuous spheres eliminated, but even the experiences which brought the mind to rapturous concentration. When the mind is freed from all hindrances and limitations, it is natural that the object of thought should become the infinite.

Infinity of space (ākāsānañcāyatana) is the object of the first wholesome thought (kusala-citta) in the sphere of the formless, whereby access is won to the imperturbable (anejjappatto hoti: A. II, p. ). But boundless space can only be conceived by a boundless mind (viññāṇañcāyatana), and this thought itself becomes the object of the second stage in formless concentration. Thought itself, however, has no being, is no substance and does not belong to an individual entity. This realisation of the emptiness of the entire process (akiñcaññāyatana) forms the third stage in this realm of formless thought (arūpāvacara-kusala-citta), and it leaves the mind with such a subtle residue of thought that it cannot be said to be either perception or non-perception (nevasaññā-nāsaññāyatana), the final stage of mental absorption in the formless spheres (arūpa-jhāna).

Thus, whereas the realm of sense (kāmāvacara) has 54 types of thoughts in four categories, the realm of form (rūpāvacara) has only 15 types and the realm of the formless (arūpāvacara) only twelve types in three categories each, as in figure \ref{II_394_table} on p. \pageref{II_394_table}.
\begin{figure*}
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\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{./graphics/II_394_table}
\caption{Realms and Types of Consciousness}

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\end{figure*}
The eight classes of consciousness which constitute the supramundane Paths and Fruitions of perfection (lokuttara-magga-phala), although enumerated among the 89 mental states, are not classified in any realm or sphere (avacara), as they do not lead to rebirth.

A stage in the mental process when attention is drawn towards a certain disturbance in sense-contact. Derived from āvajjeti, to take notice, to advert; or, according to the commentators to the Abhs., from āvaṭṭeti, to turn round, the psychological meaning is a turning of the mind from its course, as a mere reflection without representative cognition. At this stage the object which causes the agitation is not perceived. It is a mere knock at the door of sense-perception, and lasts only one single moment in the unitary process of a thought. As a reaction to an impression, it will be immediately succeeded by the specific sensation of the particular sense-organ which was roused by the disturbance from the sub-conscious current of thought (bhavaṅga). But, at the stage of adverting (āvajjana) nothing is known of the object which impinges on the sub-conscious, and hence this type of consciousness is not accompanied by either joyous or painful reaction, but is accompanied by hedonic indifference (upekkhāsahagataṁ pañcadvardvajjana-cittaṁ, tathā manodvārdvajjana-cittaṁ: Abhs. p. 2).

Experience, appreciation and satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) are all parts of the process of cognition (javana). But in āvajjana the sense-operation is not functioning as yet; there is no representation (sampaṭicchana) and no examination (santīraṇa) which alone can lead to the fixing (voṭṭhappana) of representative cognition by means of differentiation and discrimination, of limitation and definition.

Name of a school of early Buddhism. According to the first list of Bhavya and Vinītadeva, the Avantakas, together with the Kurukulas, formed in the seventh century C.E. two divisions of the Sammatīyas, and their name may probably be explained geographically as the Sammatīyas of Avanti, the region to the north of the Narbada and east of the Indus basin. There is no evidence that the Avantakas branched off from the Sammatīyas on doctrinal differences, although the Sammatīyas as a whole broke away from the Vātsīputrīyas, explaining the Abhidharma of Śāriputra through the meaning of the sūtras (Demiéville, Origine des Sectes bouddhiques, p. 58). According to Tāranātha (Schiefner’s ed. p. 175) the school of the Avantakas had disappeared by the seventh century C.E., and only the school of the Kurukulas continued till the time of the Pāla kings (9–10th cent.), greatly influenced by Mahāyāna teachings from the 7th cent. onward (A. Bareau, Les Sectes bouddhiques du petit Véhicule, pp. 121, 122, 126). They are mentioned in the Mahāvyutpatti (9087, BHS. s.v.).

(macchariya), meanness, stinginess, one of the principal evil passions and the main cause of rebirth in the Petaloka (PED. s.v.). Usually five kinds of avarice and meanness are enumerated (e.g., D. III, p. ; A. IV, p. ) regarding one’s dwelling place (āvāsa), family (kula), profit (lābha), recognition (vaṇṇa) and mental achievements (dhamma). Being a mental disposition, avarice cannot be overcome by physical action or by word, but it can only be abandoned by comprehending it with insight (A. V, p. ). As mental concomitant (cetasika) it is always combined with hate (dosa), envy (issā) and worry (kukkucca) in a mental state associated with aversion (Abhs. p. 7, § 6).

Repugnance, resentment (paṭigha, literally: striking against), a form of hate (dosa) and ill-will (vyāpāda). The two classes of consciousness which are associated with aversion (paṭigha-sampayutta) are also accompanied by grief (domanassasahagata) and are rooted in hate (dosa-mūla; Abhs. p. 1, § 2). It is one of the seven kinds of latent bias (anusaya), for, even when not actually bursting with anger, one continues to foster a smouldering feeling of aversion (D. III, p. and commentary). In the Brahmajāla Sutta (D. I, p. ) an instance is given where some recluses (samaṇa) and brāhmans refrain from expressing any opinion, fearing to be influenced by their wish (chanda) or desire (rāga), by their ill-feeling (dosa) or resentment (paṭigha).

This ethically unskilful (akusala) mental state should not be confused with the psychologically dying-out of the consciousness of sense-reactions (paṭigha-saññānaṁ atthagama: D. III, p. ) which is a state of mind, experienced in mental absorption (jhāna) in infinite space.

(Jap. a-bi-sha; Chin. a-wei-shê), the entering of a deity or a demon in a medium which becomes “possessed”. This phenomenon is described in detail in several texts, especially Taishō, No. 1277: Method of aveśa, taught by the deity Maheśvara. If one wants to know things of the future, one has first to select four or five boys or girls, seven or eight years of age, without facial sear or mark, sharp in hearing and bright in intelligence. For at least three days or a week they should be kept on a frugal diet. Then, on a day auspicious for the ceremony, they should be bathed, perfumed with incense and dressed in clean clothes, holding some camphor in their mouth. In front of the reciter, who carries the mantras and faces the east, the child is then placed on a small white sandalwood altar surrounded with incense at the distance of as cubit (18 inches) and strewn with flowers. The reciter burns incense in a cauldron, sprinkles scented water and pronounces the “mantra of the great seal” with a sevenfold blessing. The smoke of the incense is made to rise through the hands of the child covering its face, while once more the blessing is recited seven times and red flowers are offered. Soon afterwards the child will begin to tremble, which is the sign of possession, and that is the time to put questions about good luck or ill fate in the future. This part of the ceremony is called hashina (po-szū-na) from the Sanskrit praśna, interrogation.

In Taishō (No. 2061.1) it is related that Vajrabodhi in the imperial palace of China bound by his mantras two girls of seven years, who became possessed by two deceased princesses. Similar practices are wide spread even now in China and Annam. (Cp. Hbg. s.v. abisha).

Avigata-Paccaya, the condition of continuity, one of the twenty-four relationships or modes of conditionality in which mental and physical phenomena are related to, and dependent on, one another.

Although this condition of relative continuity is very much like the condition of presence (atthi-paccaya) it is in a certain sense its complement. The relation between two states which is described as being in the presence of one another might be misconstrued as a simultaneous presence of two entities, unless this “being present” is understood as the simultaneous occurrence of two actions in the presence of one another without mutual prevention or hindrance. It is this particular relationship of non-disappearance (a-vigata) which fills the vacuum caused by the absence of any “reality” in the presence of action. For, it might be argued, how can two or more phenomena condition one another “by their presence” (atthi), if they have no real “existence” according to the doctrine of insubstantiality (anatta)? Absence of reality, of a substance, or a soul, does not involve a disappearance of actuality, i.e., of action and reaction; and thus, it is this relationship of non-disapperance (avigata), which safeguards the actual conditioning which is the relationship of actuality, i.e., of action and reaction.

Two shortened discourses given by the Buddha at Sāvatthi occur by this name in the Saṁyutta Nikāya (II, 60–64). They are based on the well-known formula of dependent origination (Paṭiccasamuppāda). The unusual treatment here of the common subject lies in the interruptions by some unidentified monk, which the Buddha dismisses as an incorrect question (na kallo pañho), pointing out that when one says that the process of birth, decay and death is different from the person who grows old and dies, they are really the same in meaning, only differing in form. The Tathāgata rejects both views and maintains that decay and death are conditioned by birth, and that ultimately the entire chain is dependent on, and originates from, ignorance (avijjā-paccaya). Only with the complete cessation of ignorance will all other dependents find no root nor arise in the future.

A common name for several discourses in the Saṁyutta Nikāya, elaborating on this most important link in the origination and cessation of all phenomena, ignorance (avijjā). Avijjā is defined by the Buddha as not knowing the nature of the five aggregates of existence, viz., the body, feelings, perceptions, ideations and conscious thought, not knowing how they arise, not knowing their cessation, not knowing how to make them cease (S. III, p. ). It is, in other words, ignorance as regards the Four Noble Truths as applied to the physical and psychic phenomena of existence.

The cessation of ignorance, then, is brought about by observing the impermanence of the six senses, their organs, objects and consciousness. And with the vanishing of ignorance, knowledge arises (S. IV, p. –1).

Again, it is said by the Buddha that ignorance is the one thing to be abandoned, and this can be done by realising the impermanent nature of the senses and their objects, by realising how all happiness and woe, and even neutral states, arise in dependence on sense-contact. The understanding of their fleeting nature dispels all ignorance (S. III, p. –50). This is further enlarged in the next sutta when someone asks the Buddha how to achieve this realisation. His reply is that by non-attachment, deep understanding will arise; and in this comprehension one will realise the otherness (aññato: ibid. 50), the changeability, the impermanence, the insubstantiality of all phenomena.

Sāriputta gives the most conventional explanation of ignorance as consisting of non-understanding the nature of conflict, its origin, cessation, and method of cessation, the approach to the abandoning of this evil being along the Noble Eightfold Path (S. IV, p. ).

On another occasion the Buddha shows the evil which will follow when ignorance leads the way (avijjapubbaṅgamā: S. V, p. ): shamelessness (ahirika) and recklessness (anottappa) follow in its train; wrong views (micchāsaṅkappa) arise and these give rise in turn to evil language, evil action evil living, wrong effort, wrong mindfulness and wrong concentration.

As long as one is in ignorance one is a victim of ignorance (avijjāgato hoti: S. V, p. ) and to realise this, an effort must be made (yoga karaṇīyo) to tread the road which leads to the cessation of all conflict.

Absence of distraction. In the Dukanipāta of the Aṅguttara Nikāya (I, 83) the term is coupled with energy (paggāho ca avikkhepo ca) in a list of paired states of mind. The commentator explains the term as one-pointedness of mind (citt' ekaggatā), The same combination is found in the Saṅgīti Suttanta (D. III, p. ) and translated as mental grasp and balance (Dialogues of the Buddha, III, p. 206).

Avikkhepa is one of the characteristic marks of mental concentration (samādhi). It is the stability, solidity, absorbed steadfastness of thought (cittassa ṭhiti saṇṭhiti avaṭṭhiti: Dhs. § 11), unperturbed mental procedure. The presence of distraction and loss of even-mindedness are attributed to the presence of excitement (uddhacca) and of perplexity (vicikicchā: Dhs. §§ 429 and 425).

(Jap. a-bi-ra-un-ken, Chinese, a-wei-lo-hung-ch'ien), one of the great formulas of the Shingon sect. Actually it is one of the formulas of Vairocana, but it is used also as a mantra for all Buddhas.

Vairocana teaches this mantra in order to subject the four Māras and to be delivered from six evil destinies, Taishō (No. 1796) gives an interpretation to each syllable, but the Kōbō Daishi tradition links them with the five elements, the five types of wisdom, and the five Buddhas (cp. Hbg. s.v. abiraunken).

Of evil through the restraint of one’s senses is the first of the four great exertions (sammappadhāna), also named the four supreme efforts (uttama-viriya) of self-control, eliminating, developing and safe-guarding. The avoidance of evil through self-control (saṁvara-padhāna: D. III, p. –6) consists in not being entranced by the general appearance or by the details of an object presented to any of the senses of body and mind, but in restraining and avoiding that which may give rise to covetousness, through watchfulness over the sense-faculties, by controlling and mastering the sense-organs. It is one of the kinds of right effort (sammā-vayāma) included in the Noble Eightfold Path.

A discourse which mentions three kinds of people. The first is likened to a drought (avuṭṭhi), because they do not help anyone, whether monks, brāhmans or beggars. Others there are who give to some but not to others; and they are likened to local showers (padesavassī). Finally, there are people who give to all without distinction, with compassion (sabbabhūtānukampaka) and gladness (āmodamāna); and they are compared with a downpour everywhere (sabbatthābhivassī: (It. pp. 64–7), sutta 75).

The unexplained, in its original sense meaning a matter on which no opinion has been expressed. There were ten questions In Sanskrit texts (e.g., Mhvyut. § 206; Dhsṁg. p. 67), avyākrta-vastūni, as they are there called, number fourteen. This is because, while the Pali sources mention only two possibilities regarding the duration and extent respectively, of the universe, the Sanskrit texts list four. which the wandering mendicant Poṭṭhapāda placed before the Buddha in the Debating Hall in queen Mallikā’s park in Sāvatthi. And on each of the questions the Buddha refused to express any opinion. The questions were: Is the world eternal (sassata)? Is the world not eternal? Is the world finite (antavā)? Is the world infinite? Is the soul (jīva) the same as the body? Is the soul distinct from the body? Does he who has won through to the truth (Tathāgata) continue to live after this life’s death (param maraṇā)? Does he not live after death? Does he both live and not live after death? Does he neither live nor not live again after death? (D. I, p. –8; M. I, p. , 484; S. III, p. ; A. II, p. ).

Then Poṭṭhapāda put the obvious question, why did the Buddha not express an opinion on such questions? The answer is given: Because such question is not calculated to bring about profit (na attha-saṁhitaṁ), it is not concerned with his teaching (na dhamma-saṁhitaṁ), it is not conducive to leading a good life, it does not induce detachment, it does not overcome lust, it does not bring about cessation, nor tranquillity, nor insight, nor realisation, nor deliverance. On the other hand, the Buddha does not withhold his views regarding those things which are conducive to a good life and lead one to Nibbāna, for he has declared what is conflict, its origin, its cessation and the path leading thereto (D. I, p. 189). These are matters of certainty (ekaṁsikā dhamma), whereas the earlier questions deal with matters to which no definite solution can be given (anekaṁsikā). A simple “yes” or “no” will not provide the answer, as the question itself is wrongly formulated and deals with matters which cannot be discussed, having no ground (appāṭihīrakataṁ bhāsitaṁ: ibid. p. 195).

Now, why are such questions meaningless? All these questions centre round the concept of personality (atta-paṭilābha) which may be thought of as material (oḷārika), mental (manomaya) or even formless and ideal (arūpa): the world as a substance, the soul as an entity, the Buddha as an individuality. But the Buddha’s teaching is intended to lead away from this self-delusion (aita-paṭilābhassa pahānāya dhammaṁ desemi: ibid. 196). And thus, it is impossible to express any opinion regarding the eternity of the universe or the opposite for the mere reason that no attributes can be ascribed to that which cannot appropriate such qualities. The world, the Buddha, life, etc., are concepts which try to represent a constant process of change and action, without any permanency, substantiality, entity or individuality. And to give to such impermanent concepts an attribute, a character, a soul, is the very opposite of the essence of the Buddha’s doctrine of anatta. Whether such attribute is of a positive or a negative nature (eternal or finite) does not alter the position of the question which assumes the factual existence of an entity with attribute. Since such assumption is marked by the Buddha as the misconception of an independent individuality (sakkāya-diṭṭhi), any question on the subject must of necessity remain unanswered.

This is clearly expressed by Mahā-Moggallāna in reply to Vacchagotta who has placed the identical questions before him, “Adherents of other views regard the eye, the ear and other senses including the mind as mine, as I, as self. But the Tathāgata does not regard the senses as belonging to an individual, and hence he does not reply to any questions which assume such individuality as basis” (S. IV, p. –7). Such questions are differently based (aññatitthiya)\footnote{A great deal has been written, by many scholars, in order to interpret the “silence” of the Buddha in to the avyākatāni. Were they unanswered because Buddha did not know the answers, or was it because, though he knew the answers, they were not relevant to the central problems of religion? Or, were they in principle unanswerable? If so, were the solutions beyond the grasp of the human intellect transcending the limits of knowledge, or were they logically meaningless and therefore not admitting of an answer? For a discussion, see K.N. Jayatilleke: Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (Allen & Unwin, 1963) pp. 471 ff. Jayatilleke’s conclusion is: “It was not that there was something that the Buddha did not know, but that what he ‘knew’ in the transcendent sense could not be conveyed in words because or the limitations of language and of empiricism”. Elsewhere, in the same book (pp. 243 ff.) Jayatilleke tries to identify the schools which put forward each of the ten theses and to examine the arguments adduced in their support.

T.R.V. Murti in his Central Philosophy of Buddhism devotes a whole chapter (chap. II) to an exposition of his view that the Buddha’s “silence” anticipated in essentials the Madhyamika dialectic. “The Madhyamikas have but systematically is suggestions and drawn out their implications fully”, and adds as footnote: “This is evident from the whole tenor of the Madhyamika system, especially from its reasoned opposition to all kinds of speculative theories” (op. cit. p. 36).–-G.P.M.).

The term avyākata has another developed meaning in ethical terminology, assuming the significance of the undecided, i.e. the un-moral in the sense of being neither morally good nor immorally bad, The question of morality is exclusively one of volitional activity (kamma); and although the results (vipāka) of such actions may be desirable and wholesome (kusala) or undesirable and unwholesome (akusala), in themselves they have no moral significance, being mere effects, and they are therefore un-moral (avyākata). Further, there are actions which function independently of volition (cetanā) and which, therefore, do not carry a karmic responsibility; they are pure activity (karaṇamatta), arising from the understanding of the need for action, and not from the projection of greed for the result. Such action (kriyā) is not transformed by volition into karma and is, therefore, un-moral or undetermined (avyākata) as regards its effects. Out of the 89 classes of consciousness there are 21 states which are karmically wholesome (kusala kamma), 12 states which are karmically unwholesome (akusala kamma), 36 states which are karmically neutral (avyākata) as results of action and 20 states which are karmically neutral (avyākata) as independent functions (kriyā). See BD. table I.

Examples of this last category are the thought-process which turns to an impression received at any of the five physical sense-doors (pañca-dvārāvajjana-citta) or to an impression received at the mind-door (mano-dvāravajjana-citta), both of which are accompanied by hedonic indifference (upekkhā-sahagata), as the object which caused the impression has not been discerned yet (Abhs. p. 2).

All actions of a Buddha or an arahant are karmically neutral (avyākata), as they are not motivated in their activity by volition, and hence constitute pure action (kriyā), not leading to rebirth, and not included (apariyāpannā dhammā) in the cycle of existence (Dhs. §§ 583, 992, 1287).

The absence of malevolence which is both a latent tendency (anusaya) and a hindrance (nīvaraṇa). The mere absence of ill-will, however, does not do full justice to the acquired meaning of this type of “hatelessness”, which is loving kindness (mettā). As such, it is one of the three kinds of good thought (kusala-vitakka), of good intention (kusala-saṅkappa) and of good disposition (kusala-dhātu), namely, the thought, intention, perception and disposition of renunciation (nekkhamma), of good-will (avyāpāda) and of harmlessness (avihiṁsā: D. III, p. ).

It is, moreover, one of the four characteristics of the Buddha’s teaching (catāri dhammapadāni: A. II, p. ) which are reckoned as ancient, of long standing, as traditional, primeval, pure and unadulterated now as then, not confounded nor despised by discerning samaṇas and brāhmans, namely, the absence of coveting (anabhijjhā), the absence of ill-will (avyāpāda), right mindfulness (sammā-sati) and right concentration (sammā-samādhi).

It is also referred to as one of the five elements tending to deliverance (pañca nissāranīyā dhātuyo: D. III, p. ); and thoughts of good-will are conducive to Nibbāna, for they lay the mind to rest, as a rain-shower lays accumulated dust (It. pp. 82–3)).

Frequently, the absence of ill-will (avyāpāda) is not in its synonyms, the absence of hate (adosa) and loving kindness (mettā), although subtle differences may be observed, The absence of hate (adosa) is a root of good (kusala mūla) and has, therefore, more general characteristics and applications with a distinctly positive meaning of loving kindness (mettā). It is due to this root that ill-feeling (vyāpāda) is absent, and good-will finds a place in the tenfold wholesome course of action (kusala-kamma-patha), among the final-triad, the absence of lust (anabhijjhā), of ill-will (avyāpāda) and of wrong views, i.e., right views (sammā-diṭṭhi), representing wholesome mental activity.

Japanese temple of Awada in the Atago district of the Yamashiro province. It was in this temple that emperor Seiwa Tennō resided as a monk after his abdication in 876, From that time onward, the temple was known as Engaku-ji. It was here that the emperor died in 880, and on the first anniversary of his death a great offering of vegetarian food (shūki gosai-e) was made to the monks by the deceased emperor’s mother (M.W. de Visser, Ancient Buddhism in Japan, p. 608).

Location of a Buddhist shrine built by the Japanese emperor Kwammu in 805 and dedicated to the spirit of Sudō Tennō, the posthumous name or title of the emperor’s younger brother, Sawara Shinnō, who had been banished by the emperor in 785, but died on the way to Awaji, the place of his exile, having refused all food and drink (M.W. de Visser, Ancient Buddhism in Japan, pp. 180, 303, 467).

Awaji was earlier, in 764, the place of banishment of emperor Junnin Tennō, who for this reason is known in history also as “Awaji-haitei”, the emperor banished to Awaji (ibid. p. 459).

To the truth or enlightenment is the supreme comprehension of the nature of all experience with its three characteristics of impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and insubstantiality (anicca, dukkha, anattā). The lack of understanding the four Noble Truths is the basic ignorance (avijjā), rooted in delusion (moha), which is the principal condition preventing the realisation of truth, which is to know and to see things as they really are (yathā-bhūta-ñāṇa-dassana). The overcoming of such ignorance is, therefore, truly an awakening from a state of delusion.

To be awake (bujjhati) is to rise from the slumber of ignorance and delusion, to perceive, to understand, to comprehend, to realise, to be enlightened. Such awakening (bodhi), although essentially one and the same in nature, is differentiated in three classes as to the method of realisation. For, a disciple may awaken to the truth on hearing the same expounded by a Buddha, and that is termed sāvaka-bodhi, whereas the independent discovery of the truth by a Buddha without external aid is called sammā-sambodhi. But if one attains such supreme enlightenment without passing on this realisation of truth to others, the awakening is individual, and is termed accordingly pacceka-bodhi.

Is mindfulness (sati) of things and events as they occur. It is not purposeful, not discriminative, not descriptive, but just alertness, watchfulness; fact-finding, but not fault-finding. In the meditation-exercise on breathing (ānāpānasati) there is no question of breath control as in the case of yogi exercises, but a mere awareness: this is a deep breath, this is a short breath. Such watchful alertness will note the arising of a new state of mind without trying to suppress it. In such awareness a new state of mind will not have the opportunity of taking subconscious roots, as the motive will stand revealed even before the completion of the thought.

In its restricted philosophical context, means sphere, region, encompassing the various sense-organs and their respective objects. Functionally the sense-spheres are, therefore, divided into two groups, the inner sphere (ajjhattāyatana) of the six organs of sense-perception, viz., the eye (cakkhu), the ear (sota), the nose (ghāna), the tongue (jivhā), the body (kāya) and the mind (mano), and the outer sphere (bāhirāyatana) of the six sense-objects, viz., sights (rūpa), sounds (sadda), odours (gandha), tastes (rasa), tangibles (phoṭṭhabba) and objects of cognition (dhamma). The inner sphere, therefore, constitutes the subjective element which is the capacity of reaction, and the outer sphere constitutes the objective element which produces the impact, Sensation (vedanā) and perception (saññā) arise as a result of the impact of the outer or objective sphere on, or the contact thereof with, the inner or subjective sphere (phassa-paccayā vedanā).

The sense-spheres are defined by Buddhaghosa as the places of productions, meaning the functional cause (kāraṇa) as well as the outcome (sañjāti: DA. I, 124). This distinction between the internal and external spheres of sense is not a later commentarial development, for it is found in several suttas of the Dīgha and Aṅguttara Nikāyas. E.g., in the Mahā-satipaṭṭhāna Suttanta (D. II 302) where mental states are proposed as the contents of consciousness and subjected to an analytical process of mindfulness, it is first the mind (citta) and then its aspects (dhamma) as actually experienced, which form the basis of watchfulness. And here already we find awareness, e.g., of the organ of sight distinguished from awareness of the objects of sight (idha bhikkhave bhikkhu cakkhuñ ca pajānāti, rūpe ca pajānāti), and it is through this attentiveness that one becomes aware of any fetter which arises on, account of them both (yañca tad ubhayaṁ paṭicca unpajjati sāmyojanaṁ tañca pajānāti). The Buddha’s teaching concerning sense-experience, the six subjective and the six objective fields of sense (chayīmāni ajjhattika-bāhirāni āyatanāni) is said to be unsurpassable (anuttariya: D. III, p. ).

On this distinction between personal experience and the external objects of experience is based the doctrine of the sixfold group of consciousness
(cha viññāṇa-kāyā), the sixfold group of contact between the subject and the object (cha phassa-kayā), the sixfold group of sensation resulting from this contact (cha vedanā-kayā), the sixfold group of perception (cha saññā-kayā), the sixfold group of volition (cha sañcetanā-kāya) and the sixfold group of craving (cha taṇhā-kāya: D. III, p. –4).

But it is, of course, not with the external objects, but with the inner attitude (chasu ajjhattikesu āyataneṣu: A. V, p. ) that one should rightly feel revulsion and develop fading interest in order to be truly released.

The five physical sense-organs are explained as the sensitivity of the organs (pasāda: Dhs. § 597) which responds to the sense-stimulus. This sensory reaction (paṭigha: ibid. §§ 265, 597) is not to be confused with the physical eye which has colour and extension, which is the physical basis (vatthu) but not the real sentient eye (DhsA. 307). The sentient organ is situated in and bound to the compound organism of the eye, that “lump of flesh situated in the cavity of the eye, bound to the brain by sinewy threads” (loc. cit.). When the sense-organ is mentioned, the commentator continues, it is not the visual organism which is referred to, but the sense of sight (pāsāda-cakkhu). This distinction between the physical basis of the sense-organism and the sentient organ which reacts to a stimulus is maintained for all the five physical senses. Thus, the sense is the agency of the organ and not the organism. Pasāda, although it literally means “brightness”, is, thus, not confined to sight, but in its meaning of “revealer”, or “that which makes clear” (Skt. prasādana) is applicable to all sense-experience, emphasising more the psychological than the physical aspect.

This should apply equally to the sixth sense, the mind (mano). The mind-sense (manāyatana) is the subjective act of cognition in response to a stimulus of mental activity, in the sphere of ideation.

In these spheres the contact of the subjective faculty and the objective impact forms the actual sensory reaction which may be intentionally produced or incidentally brought about and which is the “vital” cognitive element belonging to the sense-spheres. They are visual cognition (cakkhu-viññāṇa-dhātu), auditory (sota-v°), olfactory (ghāna-v°), gustatory (jivhā-v°), tactile (kāya-v°) and mind-cognition (mano-viññāṇa-dhātu).

A sense-sphere, therefore, includes the organism, the faculty, the stimulus, the actual impression or contact, the reaction to the stimulus in the faculty, the cognitive reaction to the contact, the concept conditioned by such reaction, and the resultant state of such concept.

The internal or subjective senses are collectively referred to as the six sense bases (saḷāyatana). They are themselves based on nāma-rūpa, the corporeality-mentality-compound which constitutes the so-called individual (nāma-rūpa-paccayā saḷāyatanaṁ). For, individuality, with its proclivities and innate tendencies grown out of past karmic action, conditions the senses even pre-nascently (purejāta-paccaya) and by way of foundation (nissaya-paccaya). These six senses, i.e., the internal sense-faculties, condition the impressions or contacts made by the sense-stimuli (salāyatana-paccayā phasso), by association (sampayutta), mutual influence (aññamañña), co-existence (sahajāta), and physically even by way of foundation (nissaya) and pre-nascence (purejāta-paccaya). And on this sense-contact depend sensation (vedanā), craving (taṇhā), and also clinging (upādāna), which leads on to rebirth (bhava) and subsequent conflict (dukkha).

The Sarvāstivādins appear to have had a slightly different view of sense-organs and sense-objects, which are all brought together under the term rūpa-dharma, which is the activity of the mind expressed through physical sense-organs and the objects affected by them. Rūpa in this context is Synonymous with karma (Yamakami Sōgen, Systems of Buddhist Thought, Calcutta, 1912, p. 225). There being only five physical sense-organs and five corresponding objects together with the sixth sense-object which is the non-manifested mental action (avijñapti), a total of eleven āyatanas is obtained.

This avijñapti of the Sarvāstivādins is included by the Yogācāra school in what they call dharmāyatana, which is fivefold, consisting of five kinds of rūpa, viz., the material paramāṇu (such as earth, stone, etc.), the abstract paramāṇu (such as light, sound, etc.), the non-manifested action (avijñapti-rūpa), the sense-objects created by the mind (such, as colour, form, smell, etc.) and illusion which mistakes something non-existent as existent, These Vijñānavādins or Yogācāras were more idealistic than the Sarvāstivādins, which is reflected clearly in their ālaya-vijñāna theory, and their assignment of 51 mental properties, 5 mental activities (rūpa-dharma), 24 phenomenal states connected with neither the material nor the mental domain (viprayukta-saṁaskāra-dharma) and 6 unconditioned aspects (asaṁskṛta-dharma) constituting the noumenal state of the universe.

All these are comprised in the twelve āyatanas, for they become objects of the mind, in as much as they become objects of mental speculation (ibid. p. 23).

Accumulation (of karma), a term used on several occasions by Buddhaghosa. Quoting the Paṭisambhidā (i, 46–7), five kinds of virtue are detailed in the Visuddhimagga (i, § 140, p. 40) in terms of abandoning (pahāna), contemplation (anupassanā) and progress on the Path (magga). It is through the contemplation of the falling away (of formations) in the case of accumulating (karma) that abandoning is virtue, and go also with abstention, volition, restraint and non-transgression (vayānupassanāya āyūhanassa pahānaṁ ṣīlaṁ veramaṇī sīlaṁ cetanā sīlaṁ saṁvara sīlaṁ avītikkamo sīlaṁ). For, he who develops the contemplation of the fall of formations, abandons accumulation of karma (ibid. xx, § 90, p. 540; cp. Ps. i, p. ). When a man sees with insight that the things for the sake of which he might accumulate karma are thus subject to falling away, his mind will no longer hanker after accumulation (Vism. xxii, § 115, p. 597).

The mental aggregate of the formation of ideation or conceptualisation (saṅkhārakkhandha) has accumulation as its function (āyūhana-rasa: Vism. xiv. § 132, p. 391). A similar function is ascribed to volition (cetanā: ibid. § 135, p. 392). Also the karma-formations (saṅkhāra) of merit and demerit are shown to partake of the characteristic of accumulation (ibid. xvii, § 61, p. 452). In fact, Buddhaghosa uses the term “accumulation” as synonymous with karma, in the same way as he identifies delusion with ignorance, attachment with craving, volition with becoming, etc. (purima-kamma-bhavasmiṁ moho avijjā, āyūhanā saṅkhārā, nikanti taṇhā, cetanā bhavo: ibid. xix, § 13, p. 515).

Knowledge of such accumulative function of karma-activity is indeed the knowledge of the danger thereof (ādīnava-ñāṇa) and thereby this accumulation becomes an object of terror (āyūhanā bhayan ti: ibid. xxi, § 37, p. 556), as it is the cause of future rebirth-linking (āyatiṁ paṭisandhihetubhūtaṁ, ibid. § 38, p. 557).

Habitual karma, another name for āciṇṇa-kamma. Constantly repeated action (bahulī-kamma) leads to development thereof. This is also applicable to concentration and the culture of concentration (samādhi-bhāvana, M. I, p. ).

The Atthasālinī (p. 406), in commenting on the power of cultivation (bhāvanā-bala: Dhs. § 1354), explains the pursuit (āsevanā) of good mental states as the initial pursuit (ādisevanā), the culture (bhāvanā) thereof as the growth or development (vaḍḍhanā) of such good mental states, and the multiplying (bahulī-kamma) thereof as the repeated action (punappuna-karaṇa).

Or perhaps °-nāma-kārikā, restored Sanskrit title of a text presumably lost in its original form, but extant in a Tibetan version Phyi-rol-gyi don grub-pa shes-bya-baḥi tshig-leḥur byas-pa, found in the Tshad-ma (hetu-vidyā, nyāya or logic section) of the Tibetan Tengyur, where Dge-sruṅs is mentioned as the author, and Jinamitra and Dpal-brtsegs-rakṣita as the translators (TM. No. 4244).

A world-ruler of lessor rank. A world-ruler who reigns over the four great continents (caturāvīpakacakravartin) appears to be of the highest rank, followed by a cakravarti-rāja who is distinguished from a bala-cakravartirāja (Divy. 139). Of still lower rank is mentioned a rājan-maṇḍalin or māṇḍalika-rājan, a regional ruler (Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, ed. Kern and Nanjiō, 6, 20, 362). The cakravarti-rāja and the bala-cakravartin appear to be equal to the dīpa-cakkavatti and the padesa-cakkavatti in Pali literature, respectively, who are said to be rulers over one continent and over a portion of one only.

(tatra-majjhattatā, literally, remaining here and there in the middle), an ethical quality (upekkhā) and one of the primary lofty mental formations (sobhana cetasika) found in all wholesome mental states (kusala citta) of consciousness. It is not the hedonic indifference which is a sensation of neither pain nor pleasure (adukkha-m-asukha), a neutral aspect of feeling, the zero-point between joy and sorrow. Balance of mind is not a mere absence of emotion, and one may easily distinguish it from indifference in their respective sources, balance of mind being, of course, the more intellectual, mental equipoise or even-mindedness, whereas the indifference or neutrality towards feelings might be considered as equanimity. Thus balance of mind is one of the seven factors of enlightenment (sambojjhaṅga) and one of the four illimitables (appamañña) and sublime mental abodes (brahma-vihāra). Unfortunately, the Pali term upekkhā is sometimes also used for indifference, but not so the term for balance of mind.

King of Suvarṇadvīpa (Sumatra) in the 9th century C.E., recorded in the Nālandā copper plate inscription of king Devapālaleva of the Pala dynasty of Bengal, as having erected a Buddhist monastery at Nālandā, for the maintenance of which five villages were granted by king Devapāla-deva.

Bālaputra-deva belonged to the Śailendra dynasty which founded in the 8th century an empire comprising the Malay peninsula, and nearly the whole of the Indian Archipelago, including the islands of Sumatra, Java, Bali and Borneo. The Śailendra kings were followers of Mahāyāna Buddhism and appear to have derived their religious inspiration from Bengal which was then the chief centre of Mahāyāna Buddhism in India.

(Majumdar, Raychaudhuri and Kalikinkar Datta, An Advanced History of India, Macmillan a Co., London, 1961; Ariyappan and Sirinivasan, Story of Buddhism, Madras, 1960; 2500 Years of Buddhism, ed. P.V. Bapat, India, 1965.)

Reconstructed title of a Buddhist Sanskrit work by Jetāri. The Tibetan translation is entitled Byis-pa ḥjing-paḥi rtog-ge shes-bya-ba and the author’s name is translated as Dgra-las rgyal-ba. The Tibetan translation was effected by Nāgarakṣita with the assistance of Dpal Mchog dan-poḥi rdo-rje. It belongs to the Tengyur, but various collections have placed it in different sections, viz., the Tshad-ma or Hetu-vidyā (TM. No. 4263), or the Mdo-ḥgrel or Sūtra-commentary (TT. Vol. 138, No. 5960).

The first (S. I, p. –40) is a four-lined verse of which the first two lines ask what binds the world and how these bonds may be broken. The last two lines give the answer that pleasure is the bond and that by the abandoning of craving all bonds can be severed.

The second sutta (S. I, p. –7) consists of a stanza of eight lines and, according to the commentary, was occasioned by a report that Pasenadi, king of Kosala, having lost a gem from his royal diadem had imprisoned many people. The Buddha remarks that there is no bond stronger than love for wealth and precious things, or attachment to wife and children. Only renunciation of the world and all its sensuous joys can loosen this mighty bond.

(S. III, p. –5), explains the psychological bonds by which thoughtless people are bound in this life and in future births by their regarding the five aggregates of existence (body, sensations, perceptions, ideations and consciousness) as an entity of “self”, or the self as possessing these aggregates, or these aggregates as being in the self, or the self or soul existing as an entity in any or all of those aggregates. These are the twenty erroneous views (micchā-diṭṭhi) about the “self”. And they constitute bonds (bandhanā) from which the noble disciple is free, free to see the other shore, free from all conflict.

Two suttas by this name occur in the Mahā Vagga of the Aṅguttara Nikāya (IV, pp. 196, 197), describing in identical terms eight ways employed by a woman to ensnare a man and by a man to enslave a woman. The means used by both sexes are appearance, smiles, speech, song, tears, attire, presents of wild fruits and flowers and contact.

Certain Burmese manuscripts have slight variations, e.g., weeping instead of looks, but this reading would merely duplicate without necessity the tears mentioned later. Others have in addition smell and taste, no doubt to complete the sense of touch.

One of the five hundred paccekabuddhas who were in ancient times living on the Isigili mountain in seclusion. They were seen by the people of that time entering the mountain range, but were never seen thereafter. Hence the people used to say that the mountain had swallowed up the sages (isi gilatī ti) and named it Isigili. The names of these paccekabuddhas are given by the Buddha in the Isigili Sutta (M. III, p. f.).

Buddhaghosa in his commentary (MA. IV, 127) relates how these sages had made their dwellings inside the mountain behind a rock which would open and close like a folding door.

Bandhumā is further distinguished in the Isigili Sutta by the epithet: he who banished pride (mānacchida).

(āyatana). There are twelve bases on which the mental processes depend, namely, the five physical sense-organs, eye, ear, nose, tongue and body, which together with the mind-base or consciousness constitute the six inner or personal bases (ajjhattika), and to which correspond the six outer or external bases (bāhira) which are the sense-objects connected, respectively, with the senses. These are the twelve bases which form the starting point of the process of cognition by the coming together of an inner and an outer base.

When Āryasiṁha, the 24th patriarch, was in danger of death, he transmitted his office to Basiasita, who thereby became the 25th patriarch of Mahāyāna Buddhism in a line of succession beginning with Mahākaśyapa and Ānanda. The line of succession includes Aśvaghoṣa and Nāgārjuna with Bodhidharma as the 28th, and last Indian patriarch, according to the Ch'an school. After this, the line of succession is continued in China.

A native of Kaśmīra, Basiasita proceeded to travel in central and south India, and appointed Punyamitra (the name is doubtful) as his successor. In Sanskrit his name is given as Vāsi-asita or Naśaśata. The date of his death is given as 325 C.E. (DCBT. pp. 22, 346).

A term of great significance in Buddhist psychology. Existence is viewed as a process of change and not as a permanent essence, in which process phenomena “become” without a substance, in which only actuality can be experienced. It is the current of actuality which is life in action, whether it is called birth or death. Becoming, then, is the very essence of existence, and the universality of this becoming lies at the root of the main characteristic of all things: all components are impermanent (sabbe saṅkhāra aniccā).

This corner stone in the foundation of the Buddha’s doctrine should be seen in its proper perspective for the right understanding of its significance. That the Buddha’s doctrine was revolutionary in more than one aspect is clear from the opposition it evoked. Many sectarians, ascetics, Nighaṇṭhas, Jains, materialists, annihilationists, spiritualists, eternalists, from the time of the Buddha, and throughout the centuries, whose doctrines culminated in the Vedanta of Saṅkarācārya, sometimes expressed their doubts about existence: Some say: there is; others say: there is not (astī-tyeke, nāyam astī-ti caike: Katha Up. 6, 12); at other times they most emphatically asserted an absolute existence with their doctrine of immanence, either positively: Thou art that (tat tvam asi) or negatively: Not that (neti).

The break with tradition which constitutes the origin of Buddhism and its continued characteristic, is not the choice between the “is” and “is not”. It lies in the rejection of both, in the new psychology of becoming, in the philosophy of actuality. Things are not what they appear to be, and it is their appearance which influences the observer. The actuality of phenomena conditions the reaction, and all knowledge is only of actuality. But action is always in action and never static, and thus phenomenal existence is always a process of becoming.

The famous questions which even the Buddha left undecided (avyākata) hinge entirely on this distinction between being and becoming. And thus the view that the Tathāgata exists after death (hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā) is equally unacceptable as the view that the Tathāgata does not exist after death (na hhoti Tathāgato param maraṇā: S. III, p. ). Likewise, the opposite views that after death the soul, not subject to decay and conscious, has form (rūpī attā hoti arogo param maraṇā saññī), according to the Ājīvakas, and that after death-the soul has no form (arūpi atta hoti: D. I, p. ), according to the Nigaṇṭhas, are again equally unacceptable, for the same reason that in the process of becoming there is neither being nor having, neither essence nor attributes, neither owner nor possessions. The phenomena do not belong to a substance, just as the current does not belong to the river, which is but a convenient designation indicating the total process of flow, i.e., of becoming.

Life, existence, the flow of actuality, is a process of conditioned reactions and reflexes, which in its very essence is based on change. Thus, essence is nature and not an absolute reality. Nature is culture, is growth, is change, is evolution and involution, all of which is expressed in the word “becoming”, That which is static, can acquire properties; but that which evolves, becomes those properties, as milk becomes curd, as the seed becomes the plant, as birth becomes death.

A small village on the Shiran river, some twelve miles by road to the north-north-west of Mānsehrā, the present fame of which exists in the find of an engraved copper ladle. The inscription marks the ladle as a “gift of Saṅgharaksita of the Uraśā kingdom to the Order of the four quarters of the Kaśyapīya school”.

The ladle is 9 in. long and has a bowl of 1.9 in. in diameter around which the dedicatory inscription runs, in Kharoṣṭhī characters, which seem to be earlier than Kaṇiṣka. It is at present in the museum of Peshawar (CII, Vol. III, p. 89).

The Kāśyapīya school was one of the early offshoots after the breaking away of the Sarvāstivādins in the third century after the death of the Buddha.

Is a set way of action and reaction under certain conditioning circumstances. This has been attributed, e.g., by Samuel Butler, to memory in its widest possible sense of ancestral experience, what one usually would refer to as instinct, and which Bergson rightly dismisses as not true memory at all. The Behaviourists, a school of philosophy which had Dr. John B. Watson as its chief protagonist, however, never speak of memory which according to them has no place in an objective psychology, memory being the retention of a habit.

While reserving a discussion on memory for that term in its due place, it is possible to deal only with the settled tendencies and formed practices which constitute behaviour. In the Buddhist texts and commentaries conscious experiences are not accounted for by bodily movements. The mental process is not a mere by-product, an epiphenomenon, which accompanies the complex nervous and muscular processes, and which reduces a rational being to a mere automation (cp. Bertrand Russell, Analysis of Mind, pp. 157 ff). Both in the Visuddhimagga (iii, § 80, p. 83) and in the Vimuttimagga (trsl. The Path of Freedom, pp. 57 ff.), the causes of behaviour are enumerated as deeds done in the past, i.e., they have their source in previous habit; or as excessive proportion of some of the chief elements, and lack of others; or as excess of some of the cardinal humours and the respective lack of the others. But it is asserted at the same time that, as not all of those who have had plenty of desirable tasks and gratifying work to do are of greedy temperament, and as there is no fixed law of prominence of element, or of humours, this cannot be held as a decisive definition (aparicchinnavacana: ibid. § 82).

Still, a person’s temperament (cariya) may be known from his behaviour. And for purpose of self-diagnosis, various types of temperament are distinguished, essentially based on the presence of the three roots of evil: greed (rāga), hate (dosa) and delusion (moha); and on the three parallels thereof, when considered in a profitable way (kusalapakkhe), viz., devotion (saddhā), intelligence (buddhi) and a speculative temperament (vitakka).

As the choice of a subject of meditation should be based on and agree with one’s temperament and character, it is of great importance to know one’s temperament. And this may be recognised from the way one walks or sits, etc., from the way one acts, or eats, from the occurrence of thoughts; in other words, from one’s behaviour:

iriyāpathato kiccā bhojanā dassanādito
dhammappavattito c'eva cariyāyo vibhāvaye ti Vism. iii, § 87, p. 85..

As regards the manner of walking, one who has Passionate temperament, i.e., a character which is predominantly greedy, will walk carefully, evenly, gracefully, with springy movements and divided footprint (asamphuṭṭamajjha: VismA. 106). One who walks in hate, lifts up his feet jerkily and, aggressively, digs with his toes in the ground. He who walks in infatuation, i.e., with deluded temperament and bemuddled mind, will move with hesitation with a perplexed gaits, shuffling along (Vism. ibid. § 88; Vimuttimagga, trsl. p. 59).

In sitting and sleeping the same characteristics may be observed, for, one with greed will sit and lie down gracefully, composed, without hurry and with confidence. One with hateful temperament will hastily lie down; curling up his body and waking up with sudden movements. One with deluded character will not prepare his bed in an orderly manner, his limbs are stretched and spread out, lying down either flat on his back or with face down. He takes a long time to become fully awake.

In actions, such as sweeping the room or the garden, washing of clothes, dressing, etc., a greedy temperament will be clean and even in his actions gentle, careful, graceful. But a hateful character will act hurriedly, unevenly, noisily, tensely, stiffly. And one with a deluded mind will dress in a slovenly way and unevenly; untidy and irregular, incomplete and tardy in his actions, he will betray indecision and lack of skill.

Similarly the preferences for certain types of food are joined with mental preferences conditioned by temperamental inclinations. A greedy temperament will like rich and sweet food; such a one will partake of his food, savouring the various tastes and enjoying good food. A character steeped in hate will prefer hot spices and sour food, filling his mouth and swallowing big mouthfuls without tasting. A deluded mind has no settled choice as to taste; he eats, scattering his food all round, his mind oblivious to what he is doing.

Also as regards the perception of visible objects, or sounds, or smells, a passionate or greedy temperament will attach itself to the slightest pleasure, discounting genuine faults, and lingering as long as possible. A hateful temperament will be fault-finding while overlooking genuine virtues, always anxious to abolish or change. A deluded mind is not interested either way, and prefers to follow the opinions of others, to copy others' actions, and does not feel inclined to form its own judgement.

However, there are few characters with temperaments unmixed and thus one’s behaviour is not always an absolutely sure pointer towards a definite temperament. For, although a greedy temperament will frequently betray characteristics of personal vanity, pride, and even deceit and fraud, such trends may be found in others, too. Thus there will be general tendencies of domineering, envy and avarice in s hateful temperament; and of worry, hesitation, sloth and torpor in a temperament of infatuation.

(Pali: satta; Sanskrit: sattva), always in the sense of living, sentient, rational being. In the suttas a “being” is explained as “that desire, lust, craving or lure which is concerned with the body, with feeling, with perception, with mental formations and with consciousness which (five aggregates) become thereby entangled” (S. III, p. ). Hence, whatever is capable of becoming entangled (satto, visatto) by craving, is called a being (satta). It is, therefore, consciousness which differentiates being (satta) from non-being (asatta), for only consciousness enables a being to be held (satta) and gripped (visatta) by desire and greed for the aggregates (Vism. ix, § 53, p. 257).

“Being” is also distinguished from mere “existing” by its faculty of breathing. Hence animals whose existence depends on the inhaling and exhaling of breath (pāṇa) are considered as beings. Plants do not come under this category.

Beings are also referred to as creatures (bhūta), which have animate nature as principle on account of their being generated (abhinibbattatā). A being has individuality (puggala), as opposed to a group; he has individual characteristics and behaves accordingly with intention and volition (cetanā). And finally a being has personality (attabhāva), or individual nature (ibid. § 54).

All this, however, does not give any permanence to an individual being. With its capacity to act consciously, it also has the liability of reaction and responsibility. Thus, all beings are subject to the law of karma, to birth, sorrow, decay, death and rebirth in the various spheres of existence, in the animal and other subhuman regions, in the human realm and in the spheres which constitute the materialisation of conscious states of graded perfection.

Is of various types. Purely religious benefits (hita) are those which are beneficial to oneself (attahita) or to others (parahita), while assistance is a benefit in the meaning of service (upakāra).

In Mahāyāna this division is stressed in view of the bodhisattva-ideal, considered superior to the arahant-ideal of the Theravāda.

Another division on the same basis distinguishes svārtha (Pali: attattha) and parārtha (Pali: parattha) in the ethical sense.

One of the sixteen arhats, according to the Nandimitrāvadāna, as translated into Chinese by Hsüan-tsang. In this work, compiled about 800 years after the Buddha’s Nirvāṇa by Nandimitra, an arhat from Siṁhala (Ceylon), Bhadra is the sixth arhat who with his retinue of 900 arhats lived mostly in the Tamara continent.

According to the Ratnamegha Sūtra (fasc. vii), as mentioned in the Notes on the Analytical study of the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka Sūtra, Bhadra and the other fifteen arhats were ordered by the Buddha to sustain Buddhism and not to enter Nirvāṇa until the coming of the next Buddha, They took an oath to this effect in the presence of the Buddha.

The veneration of these sixteen arhats became widely prevalent in China after the translation of the Nandimitrāvadāna during the T'ang dynasty, and many pictures are recorded to have been made by Lu Lêng-ch'ieh of the Ch'ien-yüan period (758 C.E.).

It is obvious that the concept of “arhatship” in respect of these sixteen disciples of Śākyamuni is not in total accord with the Theravāda doctrine. Neither is it possible to identify the arhat Bhadra with any of the Buddha’s disciples as known from Pali literature.

(Arya-bh°), a reconstructed title of an original Sanskrit work, which is found in its Tibetan translation in the Mdo-sde (sūtra) section of the Kangyur (TM. No. 94), under the title Ḥphags-pa bskal-ba bzaṅ-pa shes-bya-ba theg-pa chen-poḥi mdo (TT. Vol. 27, No. 762). The translation was effected by Vidyākarasiṁha and Dpal-gyi dhyaṅs, and later revised by Ska-ba Dpal-brtsegs.

A Sanskrit text by Haribhadra. It has not been found yet in its original form, but exists in a Tibetan translation, entitled Bcom-ldan-ḥdas yon-tan rin-po-che sdud-paḥi tshigs-su bcad-paḥi dkaḥ-ḥgrel-shes-bya-ba. Here the author’s name is translated as Seṅ-ge bzaṅ-po, The Tibetan translation was effected by Jetahandu Śāntibhadra with the assistance of Ḥbro Seṅ-dkar Śākyahi ṇod. The work is incorporated in the Tengyur under the Śes-phyin or Prajñāpāramitā section (TT. No. 5190; TM. No. 3792; Cordier, III, No. 277).

A Sanskrit text ascribed to Jagaddala (Srirāja Jagaddala-nivāsin) which has not been found yet in its original form. It exists, however, in a Tibetan translation, entitled Bcom-ldan-ḥdas-maḥi man-ṅag-gi rjes-su ḥbraṅ-ba shes-bya-baḥi rnam-par bśad-pa. The author’s name is translated as Dpal-ldan Regyal-po Jagattalar gnas-pa. The Tibetan translation was effected by Alaṅkadeva (or Alaṅkāradeva) with the help of Ga-rod Tshul-khrims ḥbyun-gnas (sbas-pa) and incorporated in the Śes-phyin, i.e., the Prajñāpāramitā section, of the Tengyur (TT. No. 5209; TM. No. 3811).

Germ letter (bījākṣara) or mystical syllable in the Garbhadhātu maṇḍala, representing Śākyamuni, presiding over the hall bearing his name. This hall appears in the maṇḍala above the Parijñā hall which is directly above the Lotus centre of Vairocana, In Śākyamuni’s hall in the Garbhadhātu maṇḍala are found thirty-four names referred to by their respective mystical syllables, amongst whom are mentioned the better known disciples of Śākyamuni, several Tathāgatas and cakravartins.

Name of three of the five hundred paccekabuddhas who were in ancient times living on the Isigili mountain in seclusion. They were seen by the people of that time entering the mountain range, but were never seen thereafter, Hence the people used to say that the mountain had swallowed up the sages (isi gilati ti) and named it Isigili. The names of these paccekabuddhas are given by the Buddha in the Isigilé Sutta (M. III, p. f.).

Buddhaghosa in his commentary (MA. II, 889) relates how these sages had made their dwellings inside the mountain behind the rock which would open and close like a folding door.

One of these Bhāradvājas is further distinguished in the Isigili Sutta by the epithets: the good and the unrivalled (sundaro) which last one he shares with the paccekabuddha Sikhī. Of another of these Bhāradvājas it is said there that it was his last birth (antimadehadhārī), which, of course, is true of any paccckabuddha.

Becoming, is the process of change, of development, of evolution, of growth. It is never existence in the sense of finality, of being, of essence, of substance.

It is culture in training: It is thus that monks should train themselves: Having pursued the powers of confidence, conscientiousness, discretion, energy and wisdom, we will become thus (saddhābalena, hiribalena, otṭappabalena, viriyabalena, paññābalena samannāgatā bhavissāma sekhabalena: (A. III, pp. 1–3)). It is not as if the disciple obtains virtue, but he becomes virtue. The commentary to (A. III, p. 75) explains bhavissanti not as a mere future of existence, but as vuḍḍhissanti, will grow, will flourish, in the same way as the king’s greeting to Jotipāla (D. II, p. 231: Mahā Govinda Suttanta) is explained as, “May there be increase or success”, the commentary equating bhava with vuddhi. Also we find references to the mind in training not becoming upset or perverted (M. I, p. 123): na c'eva me cittaṁ vipariṇataṁ bhavissati), where “the future is viewed not so much as an impending change ...label{page_iii-11} but rather as a change in a man’s life for the better or the worse, for growth or decline” (Mrs. Rhys Davids, To become or Not to become, London, 1937, p. 106). Again, the question is not “which one” (katama), but “how” (kathaṁ) to become. “How do wrongs and failures arise”? (kathañca bhākkhave micchattaṁ āgamma virādhanā hoti: A. V, p. 211). “From wrong views come wrong intentions” (micchādiṭṭhikassa bhikkhave micchāsaṅkappo hoti: ibid.). The Noble Eightfold Path does not lead to a goal to be achieved as a crowning glory, but is a method leading to cessation of conflict (dukkhanirodha-gāminī-patipadā); and the highest “achievement” is the cessation of becoming (bhavanirodho nibbānaṁ).

Thus, bhava is development through action (kammabhava), and in so far as action leads to reaction (vipāka) growth is also a kind of birth and rebirth (uppatti-bhava), but always as a process of becoming, of change, of evolution, never as transmigration of an entity or soul.

In the chain of twelve links in the doctrine of dependent origination (Paṭiccasamuppāda) there are two links which are identical apart from the time-element. There are the karma-formations (saṅkhārā) conditioned by ignorance (avijjā) in the past, which are the past causes of five results in the present, namely, relinking consciousness (paṭisandi-viññāṇā), the corporeality-mentality group (nāma-rūpa), the six bases of sense (salāyatana), contact (phassa) and sensation (vedanā). These five constitute the-rebirth-process(uppatti-bhava) in the present, as the result of past action. This present process, if cultured and developed, will further evolve and become an active process with craving (taṇhā), clinging (upādāna) and new karma (kamma-bhava). This becoming of karma in the present is a repetition of the formation of karma (saṇkhāra) in the past, and it will produce similar fruits in the future, such as birth (jati), old age (jarā) and death (maraṇa), which is the subsequent process of rebirth (uppatti-bhava).

There is, however, a great difference in views between the Upaniṣadic aspect of becoming and the Buddha’s. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad (I, 5, 200) makes “becoming” culminate in the Self (sarveṣāṁ bhūtānāṁ ātmā bhavati), which is the goal. The Buddha’s doctrine of becoming remains that of a process which has to cease. It is the craving for becoming (bhava-taṇhā) which causes the continued rolling on of the wheel of saṁsāra through repeated births and deaths. It does not make any essential difference whether this craving for becoming is of the gross sensuous type (kāma-taṇhā), of a more \ae sthetic and intellectual type of form and or of the most subtle spiritual type (arūpa-taṇhā); for the process of becoming continues. And continuation of the process of becoming is birth and conflict and death, i.e., saṁsāra, whereas the cessation of this process of becoming is also the cessation of all conflict (dukkha nirodha).

The causative of “to become” (bhavati) is “making become” (bhaveti), which is the precise meaning required instead of a mere future. Thus practice, culture, growth, evolution have that little extra which cannot be found in a mere “shall be”. Hence in meditation one should cultivate thoughts of loving kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity, and make them grow till they pervade the entire universe.

Derived from the causative verb bhāveti, causing to become, producing, cultivating, has the pregnant meaning of mind-culture in Pali as well as in Sanskrit literature. It is the most general term, usually translated by meditation, embracing the various methods of mind-culture (kammaṭṭhāna) or instruments of meditation, and the two types of meditation which lead either to the quietude (samatha) of heart and mind, experience in the states of mental absorption (jhāna), or to insight (vipassanā), which is the inward vision into the true nature of all phenomena as impermanent, causing conflict and being without substance (anicca, dukkha, anatta).

Various ways are indicated as so many methods to be adopted by different temperaments to suit their individual needs. But although the methods may differ, the object of this mind-culture is the same throughout: to learn to see things as they are. External suggestions and influences will always be manifold, and a total exclusion thereof not always be practicable. And even if one were to succeed in completely isolating the mind, the mental process would continue to feed on its impressions, assimilations, ideations and concepts.

Mental culture, therefore, while excluding the incursions of detrimental distractions, such as diversions, amusements, excitement, intoxication, argumentation, search for the pleasurable, etc., will not exclude mental reactions as they arise. It is rather in understanding and comprehending such reactions, their causes, their dependence on other factors, that is revealed the true state of mind at the moment, which is the object of mind-culture.

The cultivation of loving kindness by a mind which is inflamed by passion and anger might suppress and even sublimate such unbecoming feelings, but would not alter the structure of one’s character which is inclined to passion. Similarly, the concentration on sublime spheres may temporarily work as an escape from mundane conflicts without, however, providing a solution.
But as all things are made by the mind (Dhp. v. 1) all problems can also be solved in the mind. And to attempt a solution without understanding the problem can never lead to anything but to greater conflict and confusion. Thus, the first step in mind-culture is the understanding of what is. This is not a method of cultivation which is artificial, but it is mindfulness and awareness of conditions which influence the mental process.

These influences may be physical conditions; and awareness is, therefore, focussed on physical actions (kāyagata-sati) and reactions, both physical and mental (vedanānupassana). Mental conditioning through memory and attachment is watched (cittānupassanā) as well as mental objects (dhammānupassanā) which constitute the process as aggregates (khandha) or hinder the process in its natural course (nīvaraṇa).

When such hindrances have been noticed, several methods are shown to overcome the obstacles. Thus, the five states of mental absorption (jhāna) are the antidotes to the five hindrances (pañcanīvaraṇa). Still, that is not the goal of mind-culture. For, even the tranquillity (samatha), produced by these states of absorption, excluding in their various degrees all discursive thinking (vitakka-vicāra), spiritual joy (pīti) and satisfaction (sukha), is not lasting and does not give to the mind more than the rest given to the body by sleep.

The aim is insight, which cannot be pursued as a goal, but which arises by itself when the conditions are favourable as the maturing of a fruit. “It will come in the degree in which, through sharpened awareness, features of the observed processes appear which were hitherto unnoticed” (Nyāṇaponika thera, The Heart of Buddhist Meditation, Rider & Co., 1962, p. 94).

The culture of meditation (bhāvana) is, therefore, the bringing into being of such conditions as are favourable for the maturing of the mind.

The way of meditation, the sixth of the seven preliminary stages of a disciple training his faculties in his endeavour to become a future Buddha. It is followed by the path of insight (darśana-mārga), on completion of the various stages belonging to the penetration of the Truths (nirvedhabhāgiyā). Such is the exposition of the Vaibhāṣikas according to Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa (ch. vi, § 70). In this path of meditation are included the factors of enlightenment (bodhyaṅga) as this way is approaching enlightenment (bodhyāsanna).

There are several suttas of this name, both in the Aṅguttara and in the Saṁyutta-nikāya. The sutta in the Mahā-vagga of the Sattaka-nipāta (A. IV, pp. 125) ff.) speaks of the lack of application (ananuyutta) in respect of culture (bhāvanā) of the 37 contributory factors that lead to Enlightenment (bodhipakkhiya dhammā). It is made clear that mere aspiration (icchā) does not lead to freedom of the mind; the four methods of mindfulness, the four right kinds of effort, the four bases of psychic power, the five controlling faculties, the five kinds of spiritual strength, the seven factors of enlightenment and the Noble Eightfold Path, all have to be cultivated, made to develop, just as a hen has to sit on and warm her eggs fully to make it possible for the chicks to break the shells and hatch out safely.

Having cultivated (bhavitā) and developed (bahulī katā) the four applications of mindfulness, one will be able to attain that state where there is neither a hither shore nor a beyond (aparāparaṁgamana), i.e., a state where there is no more crossing of saṁsāra (S. V, pp. 180), 182).

Another sutta of the same name in the Saṁyutta nikāya is sometimes called also the Desanā Sutta in certain Sinhalese manuscripts. This deals with the culture (bhāvanā) and the practice that lead to the development of psychic power (iddhipāda-bhāvanā-gāminī paṭipadā: ibid. p. 276). This culture is said to consist of desire (chanda), energy (viriya), thought (citta) and investigation (vīmaṁsā), each one combined with concentration (samādhi) and striving (padhāna). This culture is best practised on the Noble Eightfold Path.

The first one is the Buddha’s reply to Ānanda’s question: To what extent is there becoming? (kittāvatā bhavo hoti?). In the lower worlds (hīnāya dhātuyā), i.e., in the spheres of sense-pleasures (kāma), consciousness as the seed is established in the field of action and made to grow by the moisture of craving in the world of sense-desire where action ripens accordingly. And that is repeated rebirth (punabbhavābhinibbatti), that is becoming (bhava). Similarly, there is becoming of form and beauty (rūpabhava) in the spheres of form (rūpadhātu), where consciousness is established in the intermediate worlds (majjhimāya dhātuyā). And again, there is becoming of the formless (arūpabhava) in the formless spheres (arūpadhdātu), where consciousness is established with repeated rebirth in the more excellent worlds (paṇītāya dhātuyā). Yet all those beings are hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving (A. I, pp. 223–4)).

Another sutta of the same name, also in the Aṅguttara-nikāya (A. III, p. 444), refers to the same three spheres of becoming, how they should be given up (pahātabba) and replaced by training in more perfect virtue (adhisīla), in purer thought (adhicitta) and in deeper insight (adhipaññā).

The same three spheres of rebirth in the world of sense-pleasures, in the world of form and in the formless world are discussed by Sāriputta (S. IV, pp. 258–9)) who also shows the approach-road to the abandoning of these “becomings”, namely, the Noble Eightfold Path.

This theme is again encountered in (S. V, p. 56), where the Noble Eightfold Path is said to be developed (bhāvetabba) for the purpose of the comprehending and laying waste of the same three spheres of becoming.

One of the five hundred pacceka-buddhas who were in ancient times living on the Isigili mountain in seclusion. He was seen by the people of that time entering the mountain range, but was never seen thereafter. Hence the people used to say that the mountain had swallowed up the sage (isi gilatī'ti) and named it Isigili, The names of these pacceka-buddhas are given by the Buddha in the Isigili Sutta (M. III, p. 69 f.).

Buddhaghosa in his commentary (MA. IV, p. 217) relates how these sages had made their dwellings inside the mountain behind a rock which would open and close like a folding door.

Fear, although a fundamental psychological state, underlying practically all unskilful mental concomitants, is never mentioned even as a mental property (cetasika) or basic principle. It is found in many lengthy enumerations of objects causing fear, such as the fear of self-reproach (attānuvāda-bhaya) which is also called the sense of internal shame (hiri), the fear of others' reproach (parānuvāda-bhaya) which is synonymous with the sense of external blame (ottappa), the fear of punishment (daṇḍa-bhaya) and the fear of an evil destiny (duggati-bhaya: (A. II, pp. 121–3)). Sometimes these objects are physical only, as mentioned in the Sāriputta Sutta: mosquitoes, gadflies, snakes, assaults of men, and beasts (Sn. v. 964), without touching on the psychological basis underlying this phenomenon.

In the Bhayabherava Sutta (M. I, pp. 16–24)), however, many instances are given why certain recluses living in lonely places call upon themselves an “unholy fear and dread” (akusalaṁ bhayabheravaṁ avhayanti). They live in fear, because they are not wholly pure in bodily actions, or in speech, or in thought, or in their mode of living; because they are covetous and passionate in their sensuous desires; because they are corrupt in heart, wicked in thought and purpose; because they are obsessed by sloth and torpor; because they are unbalanced and unallayed in mind; because they are full of doubt and perplexity; because they extol themselves and disparage others; because they strive after gain, honour and fame; because they are indolent and devoid of zeal; because they are muddled in mind and inattentive; because their thoughts are uncomposed and wandering; because they lack spiritual insight and are mentally deaf and dumb.

From this it is clear that fear arises in the deluded mind, experiencing a sense of insecurity. Thus, bhayabherava is to be understood as insecurity (akkhemaṭṭhena veditabba: MA. I, p. 114), which view is further strengthened by the ultimate safety (khema) being shown as a synonym for Nibbāna which is entirely devoid of fear: The further shore, brethren, secure and safe from fears, that is a name for Nibbāna (S. IV, p. 175).

That the psychological basis of fear is the sense of insecurity is fully borne out by the explanations in the Bhayabherava Sutta; for, each one of the grounds given there is a concealed or overt self-assertion, an attempt to vindicate the imaginary rights of a deluded ego. Thus, as much as the erroneous view of separate individuality (sakkayādiṭṭhi) is at the root of all acquisitiveness and assertion, whether it be greed or hate, so is fear at the root of this view which cannot find stability and security in the universal stream of impermanence. The very clinging to this misconception of self brings with it the fear of losing this foothold, whereas the clear understanding of this erroneous view not only dissolves the possibility of craving, but also the fear connected therewith.

Fear, therefore, is not in itself an unskilful mental state (akusala-citta), but it constitutes a state of motivation, increasing the tendency to react, which is usually directed towards avoidance or escape, this being the only way towards relief, as seen at that moment. Hence, fear may create a sense of helplessness, implying perplexity, or even fright and panic.

Fear and the understanding of fear are so extremely important because fear forms psychological basis of all conflict (dukkha). Conflict arises when a twofold approach is envisaged, e.g., when the fact or actuality of impermanence (anicca) is met with the ideal concept of individuality as a permanent substance or soul (atta). It is the fear of losing an ideal which causes a conflict by non-acceptance of the factual. Here, fear can be overcome by understanding the opposing factors in the conflict, by seeing night as night.

But there are certain phenomena which should be avoided, in which case fear becomes a “holy fear”. Thus insight into what is to be feared (bhaya-ñāṇa) will see the danger of attachment to things which are subject to decay; and here the development of fear of such danger is reckoned as one of the ten modes to insight knowledge (vipassanā ñāṇa). Those who fear when they need not fear, and who do not fear when they ought to, they are the two people who are heading for an evil birth, for their views are wrong (Dhp. v. 317).

Jāṇussoṇi, a brāhman by birth and a chaplain of the royal household, is impressed by the devotion (saddhā) of many sons of respectable families to their leader, the Buddha. But their living in seclusion seemed to him less of an aid to secure concentration than a mental distraction. And the Buddha agreed with him, for such a life is hard to put up with, as long as fear of insecurity obsesses the mind. Not all fear is undesirable; but such fear as is based on the sense of insecurity (akkhema: MA. I, p. 114), which is nothing but the erroneous view of a separate individuality (sakkāya-diṭṭhi), is both unskilful (akusala) and blameworthy (sāvajja). And it is this kind of unholy fear which makes life in solitude difficult to delight in. But this fear and dread are produced by actions of body and mind which strengthen the I-concept in fear of psychological aloofness.

Then the Buddha relates how, before he had attained Enlightenment, such fear and dread used to come upon him, how he used to be on the look-out for them during his meditations without trying to escape even by altering his posture.

Already at that time the bodhisatta was accustomed to call a spade a spade, or to put it in his own words: I perceive the night as night and the day as day (M. I. p. 21). And by thus looking fear in its face, he discovered the insecurity of a misconceived self at its root; and thereby fear vanished. Thus was laid the foundation to the four stages of mental absorption (jhāna).

If ever afterwards the Buddha frequented remote places in forest and wilderness, it was not to overcome in himself attachment, or aversion, or confusion, but to experience actual ease of mind and to show the way to his followers, out of compassion for them (ibid. p. 23).

There are several suttas in the Pali texts dealing with various types of fear (bhaya). On the occasion of a great fire or a mighty flood, or when people flee because of the threat of robbers, on such occasions a mother may become separated from her son, while they are unable to give one another their mutual protection. It is then that in the average worldling (puthujjana) fear arises. But there is a terror which is more real, because there is no possibility of escape; and that is when a mother begins to fear separation from her son, because she is growing old or he is falling ill. It is the fear of the certainty of death. But all these fears can be put away in the practice of the Eightfold Path, which through right understanding, etc., leads to abandoning and passing beyond all fear (A. I,- pp. 178–80).

Suttas Nos. 119 and 120 (A. II, p. 121) give mere enumerations of types of fear, fear of birth, of old age, of disease and of death, and of fire, of flood, of kings and of robbers.

Four other types of fear are explained in greater detail in the following sutta (A. II, pp. 121–3).

At (A. III, p. 310), fear is said to be a synonym for sense desire because one who is bound by passionate desire is never free from fear, either in this world or in the next. But, this sutta concludes with a verse:

Those who see fear in clinging,
That source of birth and death,
Are freed without desire,
Destroyed are birth and death.

The Bhaya Sutta occurring at (S. V, p. 389), is a repetition of the Duvera Sutta, on guilty dread, immediately preceding it. The five types of fear (pañca-bhayāni) which result from transgressions of the five rules of moral conduct (killing, etc.) are allayed in the noble disciple, possessed of the four qualities of one who has entered the stream of holiness (sotāpattiyaṅga), namely, perfect faith in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Saṅgha, and the unbroken virtues dear to the Noble Ones.

The thirteenth chapter in the Catukka-nipāta of the Aṅguttara-nikāya (A. II, pp. 121–33)).

Although, according to the uddāna at the end of the chapter, none of the ten suttas bears the title bhaya, the chapter itself is thus named in agreement with the contents of the first two suttas, which are called Attānuvāda (self-reproach) and Ūmi or Ummi (wave), these being two causes of fear. Two suttas deal with different types of people (nānā) and are referred to as Nānā Sutta. Two suttas are called Mettā Sutta, as their subject is the four sublime states, the first of which is loving kindness (mettā). The final four suttas are called Ācchariyā-abbhuta-dhammā Sutta, each one dealing with marvellous manifestations of the Tathāgata, of his teaching, of Ānanda and of a world-ruler, respectively.

Derived from bhavati, to grow, to become, is frequently used for “nature”, the result of such becoming. Thus, it stands for the process of actuality, to see and comprehend which (yatha bhūta-ñāṇa-dassana) is the realisation of the truth. And so, bhūta becomes synonymous with the “true” as opposed to the “false” (bhūtaṁ va: Sdmp. p.: 227). Reality in Buddhism is not a hypercosmic entity, but the natural process of the arising and cessation of phenomena without the abiding substance of a soul or self. The understanding of the universality of impermanence (anicca), coupled with the comprehension of soullessness (anatta), leads to the realisation that all conflicts (dukkha), although actual, are based on a misconception (sakkāya-diṭṭhi), and have no “real” existence. Such is the true nature of life in all its aspects. This “such-ness” (bhūtatathatā) forms the quintessence of Mahāyāna according to Aśvaghoṣa (Mahāyānaśraddhotpādaśāstra, Suzuki’s trsl. p. 53, Awakening of Faith). For, it is that which all aspects of the process have in common, whether they are stirred up like waves in the water of the stream of actuality, or submerged in the tranquillity of the void.

Bhūta, as past participle of bhavati, means literally “that which has come into existence”. There are, however, several specialised meanings of a technical character, such as nature itself, or the group of five aggregates of existence (pañcakkhandha: (M. I, p. 260); PED. s.v.), or beings of non-human nature, such as “ghosts” (amanussā: (Sn. v. 222). Sometimes the term bhūta is limited in its context to the animal kingdom (e.g., (D. II, p. 157) or to the vegetable kingdom (e.g. Vin. IV, p. ). But, most frequently, and in particular in its neuter plural form, bhūtāni or mahā-bhūtāni, the term has acquired the meaning of “great” or “chief essentials”, indicating the four primary qualities inherent in all corporeality. Another similar word is (dhātu) “element” which, however, has wider application and is better discussed under that name. Bhūta is entirely material, whereas dhātu may be also mental, and hence a clear distinction is desirable.

The four primary physical essentials (mahā-bhūta) are the essential characteristics of matter, present in every material object, although in varying degrees of predominance. They are not elements in the sense of the ultimate substances in chemistry which defy further analysis, but rather in the sense of rudimentary principles of essential characteristics. Matter (rūpa) cannot be analysed in the sense that it cannot be separated and divided into its principal component parts, for these essentials (bhūta) do not have an individual existence independent of each other. Of the 26 characteristics of matter the four primaries are non-derived (anupādā) and each has the other three as its proximate cause (padaṭṭhāna: Vism.\ xiv, § 35, p. 375). They are not found inside each other or outside, although they are dependent on each other for support, and each becomes for the others a condition of conascence (Visuddhimagga-ṭīkā, Vidyodaya Ed. 363).

The four principal characteristics of matter (mahabhūtani) are referred to and enumerated in many canonical texts, e.g., in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta (D. I, p. 76), in the fifth sutta of the Ānanda-vagga (A. I, p. 222), in the Upādāna-parivaṭṭa Sutta (S. III, p. 59), in the Natthi Sutta (ibid. p. 207), in the Āsīvisa Sutta (S. IV, p. 174), in the Saṅka Sutta (M. I, p. 515), etc., and such commentarial works as the Atthasālinī and the Visuddhimagga abound in further explanations. But they are never referred to as purely concrete elements, or as purely abstract essences. The name “matter” (rūpa) is given to certain mechanical, chemical, electrical or organic phenomena which produce the appearance and disappearance of material. “things”. “Matter is that which appears or manifests itself (to the senses)” (ruppatī'tirūpaṁ) The meaning of ruppati is not clear. Etymologically it seems to mean that which disintegrates, breaks up, destroys itself.–-G.P.M. without ever suggesting either reality or stability, substance or substratum, essence or entity.

Hence, the “constituents” of such matter although elementary in their basic functions, are only components in the sense of co-operative factors in the “appearance” of actuality. Though devoid of discriminative consciousness (avinibhoga), yet matter and material elements are not segregated from the mental, for the components are appearances, i.e., sensations and perceptions. Matter is the external, not opposing the internal, but affecting it. And, the material essentials are not mere abstract ideas, even though they are not real in themselves; for they are actual, they are food for the mind, the object for the subject, which cannot be segregated in actuality.

Contemporaries of the Buddha in West Asia and in Greece, and Indian sages many centuries before them, formulated various speculations regarding the constitution and properties of matter. Thales of Miletus (640–546 B.C.E.) sought amid the variety of things a single material cause. Observing the three stages of water in its solid, liquid and gaseous forms, as ice, water and vapour, respectively he concluded with typical induction that all degrees of condensation were due to the element of water in them. Aristotle suggests that Thales was led to his fundamental dogma that “all things are water” by his observation of the part which Moisture plays in the production and maintenance of life. Anaximenes, also from Miletus (second half of the 6th cent. B.C.E.), was struck more by the perpetual movement in matter, expanding with heat and contracting with cold; and he held that in these changes of density are to be found the source of all that exists. Thus, he held that air was the primary substance, for, continual motion and change, although characteristic of all matter, are most evident in air. Yet this very instability of matter impressed Heraclitus (540–475 B.C.E.). In his acceptance of the unity of nature, although denying the “theory of being of the Ionian” school, he maintained that the very opposites maintain the unity of the whole. And the sole activity of the whole is its constant change, the incessant process of evolution and involution: all things are becoming. Now, according to Heraclitus that which has least stability and tolerates it least in others, must be the essence of all things: and that is fire. As the world arose from fire, so it will return to fire by conflagration. The Atomists explained differences in size and weight as being due to the manner of combination of atoms which leave more or less empty inter-space. According to them only weight, density and hardness belong to the things themselves. Now, these terms earth, water, fire and air as the primary elements of matter do not have in Buddhism the same meaning as was adopted by Atomists and Physicists. There is also a definite advance from the doctrine of the Upaniṣads where we find an enumeration of the three guṇas, fire, water and earth, produced from the absolute (Chāndogya Upaniṣad, vi, 2), for, in the teaching of the Buddha they are not the constituent elements of matter, but essential qualities, “that stretch and cleave and burn and move” (Kindred Sayings, I, p. 23). They are not projections of an unformed primitive matter which is without beginning, and which is an ultimate reality in nature (Ṛgveda, x, 129), also adopted in the Sāṅkhya philosophy, as prakṛti. For, there is in Buddhism no absolute (asaṅkhata), i.e., no unconditioned, no unformed, no uncomposed, apart from Nibbāna, which is transcendent (lokuttara) to all matter and mind.

Thus, the bhūtani of Buddhist conception are elementary material qualities, which are different forms of energy. These forms cannot exist individually and separate from each other. They are not produced by one another, but in their different proportions they qualify energy and give it the form known to us as matter. They are functional qualities and characteristic marks of an essential nature. They continue to bear the ancient names of earth, water, fire and air, although these are merely indicative of their respective functions of extension, cohesion, caloricity and oscillation.

Thus, the characteristic of earth (paṭhavī), i.e., of extension, is the primary material quality of impenetrability, a property in virtue of which two bodies cannot occupy the same place at the same time. It does not stand only for geometrical extensions of length, width and height, but also for solidity and hardness. “Whatever is hard and solid is the element of earth” (kakkhaḷaṁ kharigataṁ ... ayaṁ vuccati paṭhavī dhātu: (M. I, p. 185). And thus the various degrees of being hard and soft, smooth and rough, heavy and light, rigid and slack, polished and jagged are all included in the primary quality of extension, which gives the power of resistance due to impenetrability and a more or less fixed locality to solid bodies. It is a repellent energy which gives to matter the characteristics of dimension, expansion, weight and pressure.

Tho characteristic of water (āpo) is the primary material quality of cohesion, a property in virtue of which the different particles of a body are not scattered about, but cling, cleave and adhere together. It is the binding quality of matter (bandhanattaṁ rūpassa: Dhs. § 652; DhsA. p. 335). It is this quality which gives a body its density and its quantity in a unit of bulk, conserving its internal nature and resisting any interference and change through its character of viscosity. “Cohesion is that which diffuses itself throughout its co-existent qualities; or that which increases the bulk of them” (āpetī sahajãtarūpãni pattharati; appāyatī vā bṛūheti vaḍḍhetīti āpo: Abhidhammattha-vibhãvaṅĩ p. 167). Thus, although fluidity (paggharaṇa) is its distinctive characteristic (lakkhaṇa), yet cohesion is its particular function (kicca: Dhs. loc. cit.). It is interesting to note that this quality of cohesion is not perceptible to the sense of touch or sense contact, for it is an entirely “internal” quality which does not exert its energy in a way which can be apprehended by the sense organs. Therefore, if one were to dip one’s hand in a bucket of water one will perceive the quality of extension (paṭhavī) in resistance, the quality of temperature (tejo) in the heat or coldness of the water, and the quality of oscillation (vāyo) in the pressure exerted by the water; but one does not feel the water-element (āpo) as this is only the internal cohesion of matter.

Caloricity (tejo) is the essential material quality of thermal energy or temperature in its various aspects and degrees of cold (sītatejo) and heat (uṇhatejo). This, too, is a primary quality inherent in all matter. Both extension (paṭhavī) and cohesion (āpo) are essentially affected by changes in temperature; for heat can expand and even melt solids, while liquids are congealed by cold; evaporation and condensation are produced by changes in temperature and variations of caloricity. It was only in the 19th century that science found it possible to agree with Buddhism, when it was discovered that temperature was due to motion: the kinetic theory. Caloricity, then, is that essential material quality which gives “life” to matter, without which the other primary qualities could not function. It stands for the maturation of diseased matter, for digestion and assimilation of food, for evolution as well as involution. Where extension and cohesion gave rise to a certain stability in matter, there caloricity is the primary condition for change in mutation and oscillation.

The last of the four primary material qualities is the essential characteristic of oscillation (vāyo) or vibration, both internal and external. This is not to be understood merely as the movement of air, or of an object in space, but far more as the continuous adjustment between the two opposing forces of extension (paṭhavī) which repels and cohesion (āpo) which attracts. This oscillation between attraction and repulsion causes a natural friction which is the generator of heat. Thus oscillation (vāyo) is as much a condition for the arising of caloricity (tejo), as caloricity, is a condition for the origination of movement. It is through vibration that extension is felt as pressure; through vibration also cohesion becomes magnetic and centripetal. In a way, vibration is the most important of the four bhūtas as it is mainly through this essential quality that matter is known to us. Objects are seen by the eye not through contact with the solid aspect but through light radiation. Sound is perceived in the ear organ, not through contact with the source but through medium of sound waves.

But although each of those four essentials seems to be most important in its particular sphere, none of them is dispensable and the characteristic functioning of each is dependent on the co-nascence (sahajāta) and the mutual association (aññamañña) of the other three related, conditioned and yet essential, material qualities. Frequent reference is found, in later works and commentaries, of five elements when the element of space, (ākāsa) is added to the usual four essential qualities. A hint of this, however, is already found in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta (D. I, p. 55). There Ajātasattu, the reigning king of Magadha, relates to the Buddha his experience with various teachers, and gives as part of the teaching of Ajita Kesakambalī his theory of annihilation: A human being is built up of four essential qualities (cātum-mahābhūtiko ayaṁ puriso), but when his time is fulfilled whatever there is solid in him returns to and relapses into the earth, liquid to water, heat to fire, vibration to air, while his sense-faculties pass into space (ākāsaṁ indriyāni saṅkamanti). It is quite obvious that Ajita, the annihilationist, did not take “space” as an element not even as an essential quality, but rather as a synonym for emptiness, void, nothingness. And it is exactly in this sense that ākāsa is later adopted as an element (dhātu) together with the other four essential qualities, and yet remains sharply distinct from them as space from air.

(Pitta), secretion of the liver through the gall-bladder into the intestines, to aid digestion. Buddhaghosa distinguishes two kinds of bile: localised, (baddha-pitta) and free (abaddha-pitta: Vism. viii, § 127, p. 215). The localised bile is said to be situated near the flesh of the liver, between the heart and the lungs, and is found in the gallbladder (pitta-kosaka). The free bile spreads like a drop of oil on water. When the secretion is not properly functioning (lit., “disturbed”, kupita), there is a tendency of the eyes becoming yellow, a symptom of jaundice which is caused by obstruction of bile. A psychological result of such disorder is the excitability of a choleric temperament, or a melancholic depression. Having an “upset bile” (pittaṁ te kupitaṁ: (J. II, p. 114) is synonymous to being in a bad mood.

Bile is one of the thirty-two parts of the body, on which one is to concentrate in the meditation exercise of mindfulness on the body (Kāyagatasati Sutta: M. III, p. ), which leads to awareness of the repulsive nature of the body and, through analysis, to the realisation of its insubstantiality (anatta).

In connection with the use of a tooth-stick (dantakaṭṭha), pointed at one end as a tooth-pick and frayed at the other end as a tooth-brush, this was recommended by the Buddha to his monks, as it purified the channels of taste, preventing bile and phlegm being attached to the food (pittaṁ semhaṁ bhattaṁm na pariyonandhati: (Vin. II, p. 137).

King of Magadha. During his entire life of 67 years he was contemporaneous with the Buddha who was born five years earlier and survived him by eight years.

The name of Bimbisāra’s family is not known for certain. The old orthodox view, based on Purānic evidence, is that Bimbisāra was a descendant of a king named Śiśu-nāga, and belonged to what is known as the Śaiśu-nāga dynasty. But the Pali chronicles of Ceylon clearly distinguish the royal line of Bimbisāra from that of Susu-nāga, according to Geiger and Bhandarkar, by representing Sisu-naga as a late successor and not as an ancestor of Bimbisāra (cp. H.C. Raychaudhuri, IHQ. 1925, p. 86).

Bimbisāra’s father, Bhāti, and Suddhodana, the Sākiyan rājā of Kapilavatthu, politically subordinate to the king of Kosala (A. I, p. 276; Sn. v. 422), were friends, and so were their sons, Bimbisāra and Siddhattha (Mhv. ii, v. 25). According to Tibetan sources (W.W. Rockhill, Life of the Buddha, Trubner, 1884, p. 16) Bimbisāra’s mother was called Bimbī.

At the age of only fifteen years Bimbisāra was anointed king by his father, and when after almost another fifteen years it happened that Siddhattha as an ascetic passed through Rājagaha, it is not surprising that Bimbisāra did not recognise his childhood playmate, although he was greatly struck by

“that man, so handsome, tall and calm, of goodly gait, with gaze a plough’s length on, with eyes on earth downcast, of set intent”! (Sn. vv. 410–1), trsl. Chalmers, HOS. xxxvii, p. 99.).

Refusing the king’s offer of wealth, the bodhisatta nevertheless promised to return to Rājagaha after he had attained the goal of his struggle for truth. In fulfilment of this promise, the Buddha with the thousand monks converted by his preaching of the “Fire Sermon” (Ādittapariyāya Sutta) visited Rājagaha again, and stayed at the nearby Palmgrove gardens at the Supatiṭṭha shrine (Vin. I, p. 35).

King Bimbisāra, frequently called Seniya Bimbisāra, this being his personal name according to Buddhaghosa (MA. I, p. 292) or his clan name according to Dhammapāla (UdA. p. 104), went to this place in the company of twelve myriads (nahuta) of brāhmans and householders, all paying their due respects to the Buddha. No question was asked, but on seeing Kassapa of Uruvelā, the former ascetic with the matted hair, now with his following of 500, as ordained monks with shaven heads in the company of the Buddha, doubt arose in his mind as to who was the teacher and who the disciple. This doubt was dispelled by Kassapa himself, who bowing down with his head at the feet of the Buddha declared his discipleship (satthā me bhante bhagavā, sāvako ham asmi: (Vin. I, p. 36).

Thereupon the Buddha spoke to Bimbisāra and those who had come with him on the value of generosity and morality, on heavenly reward, on the dangers, the vanity and the depravity of the sense pleasures, and on the advantage of renouncing them. And when he knew that their minds had become pliable and pleased, he spoke to them of the Four Noble Truths, of conflict and its cause, its cessation and the method of cessation. Still seated, Bimbisāra obtained insight into the truth that whatever has originated will by its own nature also cease. There by he entered the Path of Holiness (sotāpanna), put aside all doubt and uncertainty with the most complete confidence in the Buddha’s teaching. He invited the Buddha and his thousand monks for a meal on the following day, on which occasion he donated the park in the Bamboo grove, Veḷuvana, to the Order of monks with the Buddha at its head.

“From this moment up till the time of his death, a period of 37 years, Bimbisāra did all in his power to help on the new religion and to further its growth” (DPPN. ii, p. 286).

Time and again Bimbisāra would turn to the Buddha for advice and a ruling with regard to monastic conduct. Thus the rules that no one in the king’s service should be ordained as a monk, nor one who, having committed theft, had broken jail (Vin. I, pp. 74–5)), were laid down at Bimbisāra’s suggestion.

The recital of the rules of discipline (pāṭimokkha) on the eighth and the last days of each half month was also initiated on a suggestion of Bimbisāra, who had seen wandering ascetics belonging to other sects meeting and discussing their doctrines on those days (ibid. p. 101). Also, the permission to start the observance of the retreat during the rain-period from the second full moon was given in deference to a wish of Seniya Bimbisāra (ibid. p. 138).

On another occasion, Bimbisāra had convened a meeting of all the superintendents of the 80,000 villages coming under his authority; and after having instructed them in matters concerning this world, he sent them along to pay homage to the Buddha, who happened to be staying on the Vulture’s Peak near the capital Rājagaha, to receive his instructions in transcendental matters (ibid. pp. 79–80).

Not only to the Buddha personally did king Bimbisāra show his affection and respect. Piliṅdavaccha thera was honoured and served by the king on several occasions. Although a monastery attendant was promised by the king, it was forgotten till five hundred day’s had passed, after which Bimbisāra sent 500 attendants to Piliṅdavaccha thera’s residence. Thereby a distinct village was established which was called the village of the monastery-attendants and also Piliṅdavillage, where the thera would go for his daily alms-round (ibid. 207).

On the other hand Bimbisāra did not overlook the fact that the monk’s life should be a life of renunciation; and thus, when he noticed that redundant offerings were stored up by some monks, he was responsible for the rule of discipline that certain medicine should not be stored for more than seven days.

That Bimbisāra did not neglect the material welfare of his capital is shown by the fact of his permission to establish in Rājagaha a courtesan, beautiful, charming, with a perfect complexion, clever at dancing, singing and playing the flute, named Sālavatī, in emulation of the, famous Ambapālī of Vesālī, who made that town prosperous. Where Ambapālī’s fee was, 50 kahāpanas per night (VinA. 1114), Sālavatī asked for a hundred (Vin. I, p. 268). Sālavatī, however, was a little careless and had to feign illness to hide her pregnancy. She had finally to abandon her child at birth and had it placed in a winnowing basket. The boy was found by prince Abhaya, Bimbisāra’s son, who had him taken into the palace to be brought up. The child grew up to be the famous physician, Jīvaka. It has been suggested that Bimbisāra was Jīvaka’s father and that Sālavatī abandoned the child at the palace gate to ensure for him a prosperous future.

This reference to king Bimbisāra’s son, Abhaya, brings us to the king’s personal relations. His chief queen was the daughter of the king of Kosala and she is known as KosaladevĪ who gave the king a son and successor.

Another name in the royal household was Khemā, daughter of the king of Madda in the Punjab, one of the principal consorts of Bimbisāra who was exceedingly beautiful and had a golden complexion. She was so infatuated with her own beauty that she refused to visit the Buddha, lest he should speak disparagingly thereof. But Bimbisāra was able to make her visit Veḷuvana, where she was brought face to face with the Buddha who showed her the transiency of beauty and the vanity of lust. There itself she became an arahant and with the permission of Bimbisāra she entered the Order of nuns. She was ranked by the Buddha as foremost among the women for her great insight (mahā paññānam agga: (A. I, p. 25). She does not appear to have given a child to Bimbisāra.

Padumavatī was a courtesan at Ujjenī whom king Bimbisāra went to see, and who bore him a son, named Abhaya. This lady, too, later joined the Order and became an arahant after listening to a discourse of her son who by that time was himself an arahant thera. As a therī she was known as Abhayamātā, Abahaya’s mother.

Ambapālī, the courtesan of Vesālī, too attracted the attention of king Bimbisāra, and she gave him a son, known as Vimala Koṇḍañña. On an occasion of the Buddha’s visit to Vesālī, Vimala entered the Order of monks and became an arahant soon afterwards (ThagA. I, p. 145 f.). A sermon preached by him helped his mother Ambapālī to develop insight and attain arahantship (ThīgA. p. 207).

An unnamed sister of king Bimbisāra was married to the king of Kosala, Pasenadi, whose sister, Kosaladevī, was Bimbisāra’s chief queen. The great cordiality between the two kings remained unbroken and was reflected in the peaceful relations between the two countries, Magadha and Kosala.

Sīlavā was a son of Bimbisāra and although the name of his mother is not mentioned (ThagA. I, p. 536), it may be inferred that he was a son of Bimbisāra and Kosaladevī, for otherwise it is difficult to understand the continued persecution by Ajātasattu, who was at any rate, the legal heir and well established on the throne of Magadha. Sīlavā’s life was threatened as soon as he had come of age, but the intervention of Moggallāna, the arahant, saved him. He entered the Order, became an arahant, but did not reside in Magadha. Still, even in Kosala, an attempt was made on his life, but Sīlavā converted these men sent by Ajātasattu, and they, too, became monks.

Prince Jayasena, featuring in the, Dantabhūmi Sutta (M. III, p. 128) and the Bhūmija Sutta (ibid. p. 138), is said by Buddhaghosa to have been Bimbisāra’s own son (MA. II, p. 932). Living in the midst of sense pleasures and being eagerly in search of them, he was unable to realise that which can only be known by renunciation.

Cundī and her brother Cunda have also been mentioned as possible children of Bimbisāra (AA. II, p. 596), for Cundī, the rāja’s daughter, comes to the Buddha when he is at Rājagaha, to discuss with him certain statements of her brother Cunda (A. III, p. 35).

In the Jaina-Sūtras (ed. Jacobi, I, xii–-xv) Bimbisāra’s queen is named Chellanā, a daughter of a chieftain of the Licchavis. Ajātasattu is her son who is called sometimes Vedehi-putta on that ground. His personal name is given as Kūṇika.

It was this Ajātasattu who became responsible for his father’s death, as it was already predicted before his birth. Under the evil influence of Devadatta, he began to thirst for power. And even when power came to him on the abdication of king Bimbisāra after an abortive attempt on the king’s life, he did not feel secure until he had Bimbisāra imprisoned with the intention to starve him there to death. Only the queen Kosaladevī was allowed to visit the royal prisoner. But the queen smuggled food into the prison chamber, first in vessels hidden among her clothes, then concealed in her head-dress, and even smeared over her body, so that Bimbisāra could obtain sustenance by licking it off. When all this was discovered the queen was not allowed to continue her visits.

But Bimbisāra continued to live by walking about his cell meditating. Ajātasattu, hearing of this, sent barbers to cut open his feet, fill the wounds with salt and vinegar, and burn them with coals. (In a previous birth he had walked about in the courtyard of a cetiya with shoes on, hence this punishment! DPPN. II, p. 287). It is said that when the barbers appeared, Bimbisāra thought his son had relented and had sent them to shave him and cut his hair. But on learning their real purpose, he did not show any resentment, but urged them to do their work as ordered, much against their will.

Soon after, Bimbisāra died and was reborn in the deva-loka of the Four Great Rulers (cātummahārājika) in the retinue of Vessavaṇa, with the name Janavasabha (D. II, p. 200), having only one wish, to become a sakadāgāmin and then to attain the supreme deliverance of Nibbāna.

The science of life, when seen from a religious and, in particular, from a Buddhist point of view, cannot be content with general scientific conclusions relating to life that may be drawn as the result of study of the structure and activities of all living things.

For, life seems to be more than organic activity as observed in the vegetable and animal kingdoms, in botany and zoology. It would be equally correct to say that the purview of life according to Buddhism is more restricted than the sphere of observation of Biology as a modern science.

Just as Buddhism deals with matter (rūpa) and material forces, and yet is not a science like physics and chemistry–-for Buddhism is interested in matter only in so far as it is conceptualised (nāma-rūpa), and in material qualities only as phenomena which constitute this mentalised matter so Buddhism deals with life and life’s forces only in so far as these are conscious in action and reaction, in the sequence of activities and experiences.

An automatic reaction is in Buddhism not a subject for investigation, even though they are admitted in analysis of “thoughtless” deeds.

Hence, the necessity to define “life”, before any further comparative study of Biology and Buddhism can be made.

Life is not the same as vitality (jīvitindriya) which is a partly physical partly mental phenomenon. As a mental phenomenon (nāma-jīvitindriya) it is one of the seven mental factors inseparably associated with all consciousness, viz., sensation (vedanā), perception (saññā), mental impression (phassa), volition (cetanā), vitality (jīvita), concentration (samādhi) and advertence (manasikāra). As a physical phenomenon (rūpajīvitindriya) it is one of the 24 secondary or derived (upādā) phenomena which together with the four essential or elementary qualities constitute the corporeality group (rūpakkhandha).

Life (jīva), as a vital principle or individual soul, is categorically and repeatedly denied in the teaching of the Buddha, which is referred to as the doctrine of anatta. Such a principle of life, as an independent, permanent entity, as a substance supporting all properties and phenomena, lies outside the pales of natural and exact sciences and is of no concern to either Biology or Buddhism.

“Life (jīvita) is bound up with breathing, it is bound up with the postures and movements of the body, it is bound up with cold and heat, it is bound up with the primary, elements and it is bound up with nutriment” (Vism. viii, § 27). Any serious interruption causes a failure of the life-process. And failure too may occur owing to excess (ibid. § 28). The faculty of life (jīvitindriya) is one of maintenance of conascent kinds of matter (sahajarūpānupālanalakkhaṇa: ibid. xiv, § 59) and one of the 27 constant and associated factors in various states of consciousness, where, too its characteristic should be understood as its function of maintenance in material composition (ibid. § 138). It is self-preservation, including assimilation growth, movement, etc., but it has no moral connotation as it is essential to every kind of thought, whether rooted in greed, hate, delusion, or their opposites (ibid. §§ 159, 170, 176).

This life-faculty is considered important enough to give its name to a group of nine, the ninefold vitality-unit (jīvita-navaka-kalāpa), which without the life-faculty represent the pure eightfold unit (suddhaṭṭhaka kalāpa), the most primitive group of so-called dead matter, viz., extension (paṭhavī), cohesion (āpo), caloricity (tejo), oscillation (vāyo), colour (vaṇṇa), odour (gandha), flavour (rasa) and nutriment (ojā). In other words, it is this jīvita which makes all the difference between life and death, biological death being the cessation of organic activity.

Now, the initial question of Biology is the search into the nature and characteristics of living matter in order to determine what constitutes life. It is well known that some protein DNA complex holds the basis of life in plants and animals, but that does not give an answer to the question: what is life? The most common answer is change either as self determination, or in the nutritive process, or in the process of growth and reproduction. Still, there are many instances, where any change of the above description cannot be observed, even under the closest scrutiny, for a long period. Such is the condition of seed, stored in a sealed container, which to all appearances gives no sign of life, where even the production of carbon-dioxide appears to be at a standstill and which yet proves to be fertile and reproductive when afterwards placed in conditions favourable to growth. Here, the mere absence of decay would indicate the presence of life at least in a dormant manner.

But, does not the expression “dormant life” involve a contradiction, just as “static energy”? And can a total suspension of all chemical changes be called life? In so far as there is no decay, there can be no question of death either. It is more probable that the suspension of change was not complete, and that the process of change which might be an indication of life went on imperceptibility. This would confirm the Buddhist point of view that life is not an entity, but a process, rather than a condition, property or qualification; it is the action upon and reaction to environment.

Conditions can vary, and only when conditions are favourable the process of life starts functioning. Here is no infusion, no agency required, no ultimate beginning of life as a principle, but a constant, beginning of life as a process. What is it that constitutes this process which cannot be analysed, in the same way as the process of a wave cannot be analysed without causing the cessation of that very process?

Life then is a process, evolved and constantly evolving from a group of conditions, which are constantly being regrouped in dependence on other conditions, and what is known of life is only its manifestations. And thus, when a group of phenomena, constituting for the time being an individual process of growth and decay, comes to an end, this is not a cessation which is annihilation, but only-a regrouping of phenomena, in which death gives rise to birth. This process is continuing all the time, even within a so-called living organism, where waste matter is being replaced. This process, referred to as metabolism, is sustained by nutrition, which in Buddhism is of prime importance. “All life is sustained by nutrition”: (sabbe sattā āhāraṭṭhitikā: (D. III, p. 211), by food for bodily growth, contact (phassa), consciousness (viññāṇa) and volition (cetanā) for individuality.

It is this last kind of nutriment which is the will to-live, the will-to-express, the will-to-reproduce. When this will-to-live is psychologically dead, a doctor’s medicine has no chance to cure a patient, and natural food will no longer be absorbed by the body. The closed circuit of physical and mental co-operation is broken; and with the running-down of reserves the destructive process will predominate.

But this is only so from the relative angle of the individual, for, involution (vivaṭṭa) is only a different view of evolution (saṁvatta). Death is not essentially different from life, the most important distinction lying in their non-identity.

It is the identity of an individual which has given to life its supreme importance, and hence it follows that the less identity is observed, the less importance is-attached to such individuality. Mineral and vegetable life are of less value than conscious life in animals and rational life in humans. And thus it happens that although the faculty of life (jīvitindriya) is a physical constituent of the corporeality group of phenomena, it is only as a mental factor (cetasika) that it finds an honoured place among the seven general psychical constituents which go into the making of any thought (sabbacittasādhāraṇa-cetasika). This is so quite rightly, for only as a mental factor, combined with volition (cetanā), does it have the reproductive force of karmic activity.

The capability of reproduction is generally accepted as a definite condition of living existence, for without reproduction the organic kingdom would soon pass out of existence. It is the universal law of change according to which involution (decay, death) necessitates evolution (birth). This capability of reproduction in its simplest form is brought into effect through cell-division. Assimilation through respiration and nutrition brings about growth, which results in cell-division, in which the parent-cell loses its identity in its progeny.

It is the process of differentiation which brings about individualistic characteristics, which are further refined by a process of selection. Nutriment being the most essential condition for existence, it can be seen that–-whereas the inorganic nutriment required by plants are everywhere present. (in the air that surrounds the leaves, in the rain-water that bathes the roots and in the soil of their natural environment)–-animals have to search for their food which does not come naturally to then. Thus animals, apart from their digestive organs, all require the means to carry their body in search for food, and organs to seize it when found. The characteristic of selectivity is still more developed in man and has made him also more individualistic. It does not make him dependent on the food as he finds it, but enables him to prepare that food according to his special requirements, which include taste.

Thus, physically as well as psychologically, the faculty of vitality in its various degrees is characterised by the need to survive and the greed to survive. The need to survive is expressed in absorption and the greed to survive in reproduction. The satisfaction of a need may be a purely passive implementation of a natural and physical reaction but the satisfaction of greed is an active projection and self-reproduction with the aim of affirmation, continuation and securing of permanency. It this conscious effort. (chanda) of the will to live (cetanā) which provides a thought with the volition component (kamma) which makes it reproductive (vipāka).

Here it may be repeated what was said in the beginning: an automatic reaction is in Buddhism not a subject for investigation, but Buddhist deals with life and life’s forces only in so far as these a conscious in action and reaction. From any other aspect, “the life of man is like a dew-drop, insignificant, trifling, fraught with much ill and trouble” (ussāvabindūpamaṁ jīvitaṁ manussānaṁ parittaṁ lahukaṁ bahudukkháṁ bahūpāyāsaṁ: (A. IV, p. 137). “Like a bubble on water” (udakabubbulaṁ), “Like a line drawn with a stick on water” (udakadaṇḍarājūpamaṁ: ibid).

But as an opportunity for moral action it is man’s most precious possession, and when a Tathāgata, mindful and self-possessed, cast aside the sum of this life (āyusaṅkhāraṁ ossajati: A. IV, p. ) this earth trembles. It is not a thing to give or take in vain, even though the danger of the span of life is hard to know (dujjānaṁ jīvitiantarāyānaṁ: (Ud. pp. 7), 8).

Generalising from results of scientific research during the last forty years, it appears highly probable that, when placed under conditions where appropriate food is supplied in the correct amount and where deleterious products in the process of change are promptly removed, all the essential tissues of the body are potentially immortal. The fundamental reason why organisms do not live for ever appears to be that in the organised system as a whole those conditions necessary for continued existence do not always prevail. In other words, biological immortality is not impossible under ideal conditions, but, as in actuality ideal conditions do not exist, the fact of immortality is not actual. Even logically, the fact that all one’s ancestors have died is not proof for the mortality of the last survivor. The fact of life is not proof for the fact of death.

But the condition of life, its composition and dependence on conflicting and changing conditions, are such that no living organism in fact does survive for ever. Conditions are so general and universal that even the duration for life can be prognosticated, although statistics can only provide a general average.

“To him that is born there is no immortality” (natthi jāṭassa amaraṇaṁ: (A. IV, p. 137) is a statement based on the knowledge of birth, which is a result of conflict: dependent on the will-to-become arises birth (bhava-paccayā jāti). When the will-to-become has ceased, there will be also cessation of birth and death. (bhava-nirodhā jāti-nirodho, jāti-nirodha jarā-maraṇaṁ nirujjhanti). And that is the immortality of Nibbāna (amatapada: (S. I, p. 212).

Life is a struggle for life, a natural, process, in which birth leads to death. For the born there is no immortality (natthi jāṭassa amaraṇaṁ: (S. I, p. 108); there is no man to whom death cometh not (natthi maccussa nāgamo'ti: ibid.), and even though life last a hundred years or more \dots man yields his life at last (jahāti idha jāvitaṁ: Sn. v. 589); death is by nature inherent in life (maraṇadhammojīvite) as old age is in youth and sickness in health (S. V, p. 217).

While it is true that it is birth that leads to death, it is also true that it is death that leads to birth. Physically, of course, according to the law of preservation of energy and matter, nothing is lost in a process of change, not even in the greatest of all, in death. For, biological death is only the end of a cycle of individual life, which normally passes through the successive phases of fertilisation, birth, puberty, growth, senility and death. But, though death marks the end of one cycle, the process moves on and in death itself is found the genesis of many new cycles. In fact, during the process of a single cycle of life, reproduction of cells is a continuous process, fission of single-cell organisms continues its course independently, and the total process of change is one long series of repetition of origination, growth and cessation.

None of these origins is primordial in the sense of creation; and none of these cessations is final in the sense of annihilation. In other words, both birth and death are various aspects of the process of life, just as much as other phases of that process. And it is indeed in this light that Buddhism views the process of life in the cycle of origination (Paṭiccasamuppāda), which has no primordial origin of absolute beginning, no starting point in time of creation, no bringing into existence without a relative cause, but an arising which is dependent on conditions. The scheme, as usually presented, consists of twelve links, each one dependent on the previous one without there being a first, and which for easy understanding is spread out over the three phases of time, past, present and future: conditions in the past have given rise to effects in the present, these effects can become in the present further causes for future effects. There is not unity which binds all these events together but as in fission the parent-cell becomes its off spring.

Here the biological field is enlarged to encompass also the psychological, for life is not merely the result of copulation or fission. The volitional fact or which, in inorganic matter, expresses itself as repulsion and attraction, has become relative in organic matter of plant, animal and man. But the basic functions of attraction and repulsion which are the mainstays of individual existence remain the same throughout. The attraction may be only physical, as two drops of water tend to unite; it may be a sense of completion which attracts the opposite or a lacking quality; it may be a need of security for an unknown self, or a satisfaction of a basic sex-urge; but the subsequent activity of a compound nature (saṅkhāra), if based on ignorance (avijjā), can only lead to an effect which has the full fertility of vitality, resulting in further becoming (bhava) in mental and material spheres (nāma-rūpa) with its appropriate organs (salāyatana), contact (phassa) and sensation (vedanā). These effects can become now new conditions for further action, when the sense-organs grasp at (taṇhā) and cling to (upādāna) their sense objections. This renewed activity (kamma-bhava) leads to the subsequent reaction of further birth (jāti, maraṇa).

Complexity of wilful action is the cause of conflict (sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā), and this complexity will persist as long as there is a wrong understanding (avijjā) of duality, i.e., of self and non-self. For, it is on this duality that all likes and dislikes are grounded. Likes are the nutriment of the self; dislikes are the defensive weapons against the non-self. Thus, the instinct of self-preservation becomes the greatest stimulus for selective activity. Even the natural impulse for propagation of the species is but an extended self-projection into an indefinite future, struggling for survival.

Such activities which are self-produced (attaja: (Dhp. v. 161) are also born in the same form (itoja: (Sn. v. 271) for “self breeds dislikes and likes”.

Buddhism recognises the biological distinctions between oviparous (aṇḍa-ja) and viviparous (jalābu-ja) generation, between the once- born beasts (eka-ja: (Sn. v. 117) and the twice-born birds (di-ja) which, although independent of the hen as soon as the egg is laid, still have to be hatched to be fully born (J. I, p. 152). The brāhmans, however, who claimed to be twice-born, from Brahma’s mouth and from their mother’s womb, were ridiculed by the Buddha who did not see any difference between them and other humans (Thag. pp. 2, 430). Parasitic plants are said to be born from the trunk of a tree (khandha-ja: (S. I, p. 207) and lotuses from water (vāri-ja: A. IV, p. 26). There are also the moisture-born (sineha-ja: (Sn. v. 272); S. I, P- 207).

Apart from all these biological possibilities there is also spontaneous generation (opapātika) which is the way celestials and also some Pacceka-buddhas are born.

Rebirth in Buddhism, however, does not follow any biologenetic laws, for rebirth is not of an individual body. Rebirth is not a biological fact at the advent of life, but a reaction to a volitional, conscious act. Such reaction may not have the opportunity of immediate rebirth, and its reproductive energy will pass on into the next action which may still further strengthen the wilfulness of the act, till once the time may come for that vitality to express its own energy in conditions more appropriate for its taking shape. That may not be in similar surroundings, but in the best available. There is always a place where a falling stone comes to rest, although it hardly ever will be a perfectly fitting receptacle. Thus rebirth needs no time, yet the complexity of an expiring life will be so great that practically there will be no one reborn who is not a misfit from certain aspects.

Still all the tendencies (anusaya) acquired will be there and such tendencies will seek out a proper environment for expression. At different times a person might show inclinations according to the opportunity offered. This kind of heredity does, therefore, not operate according to Mendelian laws. The psychic tendencies and proclivities (anusaya abhinivesa) requires physical media for expression, whereby a living organism appears to acquire psychic properties. These physical media would be inherited according to Mendelian laws Certain physical properties of living organisms, moreover, appear to be more suited than others to allow expression of psychic tendencies, and thus a mutual attraction is inherited in this process of natural selection.

Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919) gave his wholehearted adherence to the doctrine of organic evolution, and attempted to apply this doctrine to the probable of philosophy and religion (The Riddle of the Universe English trsl. (1900) of Die Welträtsel, 1899.). His monistic naturalism sees the cosmos as an infinite whole. Yet, several of his views are corroborated neither in Biology nor in Buddhism. One of the most outstanding is his view of the infinite substance of nature which is not endowed with either genesis or the possibility of annihilation. Still there are many points of great interest and, more than that, of contact with various doctrines as found in Buddhism. The unity of matter and energy appears as a mirrored reflection of the Buddhist unity of nāma-rūpa, but should not be considered as a substance, just as the mind-body unit should not be thought of as a “soul”. His views on ether as filling any part of space which is not occupied with ponderable atoms (chap. xii) are not acceptable and not proved. But his hylozoistic view that organic life is present in some form in matter itself would not, appear so extravagant when it is seen that vitality (jīvitindriya) is one of the 24 component phenomena of pure matter, according to Buddhist Abhidhamma. His suggestion that consciousness ultimately develops out of atoms, molecules, cells etc., is a far-reaching truth which is expressed in the Buddhist theory of the five aggregates of clinging (pañcūpadānakkhandha), according to which neither the passive reception of sensation (vedanā), nor the neutral reactive perception thereof (saññā), nor the subliminal formative conception (saṅkhāra) is to be considered as a developed conscious, morally active thought (viññāṇa), although reception, perception and conception are three forms of capturing (upādāna) the mental object.

The passive reception of a stimulus which is called sensation (vedanā) may not reach the conscious level at all, and will therefore be received and sensed in the material organ without penetrating further. Likewise the neutral reaction to a stimulus at the sense doors (saññā) is nothing but an awareness of a disturbance (dvārāvajjana) and even if this is followed by discrimination of formative ideation (saṅkhāra) it is still but an unconscious reflex of reference to prior experiences for purpose of investigation, comparison and classification (santīrana), but without acceptance or judgement, which alone could form a volitional act of consciousness (viññāṇa).

The passive reception of a stimulus is found even in inorganic matter. The passive reaction to a stimulus without the wilful ability to reject it if harmful, is typical of plant life.

The formation of concepts and development of association of ideas is characteristic of animal life. And only the conscious acceptance with moral responsibility is found in the fully developed mental states of consciousness.

That “sensation” permeates existence was asserted also by the ancient Greek philosopher, Empedokles. Consciousness, and that applies to the conscious reaction of a sensation, requires a central nervous system which in Buddhism is referred to as the physical sense-organ of touch (phassa) which is the sensorial impression from contact with tangibles. And thus it is generally denied that consciousness must be attributed to all existence.

“Consciousness”, like “mind”, is but an abstraction for the activities of the brain-related organs. It has no existence, but only action. A volitional conscious action is called karma (cetanā'haṁ bhikkhave kammaṁ vadāmi) and as such, karmic action is a psychical activity dependent on physical activity. But there is no need to have this physical action performed by a physical “substance”, or this psychic activity to be dependent on a psychological “soul”. In this unique stand, which forms the basis of the Buddha’s doctrine, the teaching of non-entity (anatta), the Buddha is more of a naturalist and a realist, than many so-called materialists who, while rejecting the very possibility of other worlds and of any forces beyond nature, do not hesitate to introduce concepts of substance of ponderable matter and even “ether” to fill the vacuum of empty space in order to accommodate their theories of contact in activity. For the Buddha has brought those other worlds into this universe by showing their subjection to the same laws of impermanence, conflict and unsubstantiality, while whatever forces there be, they are mere changing phenomena operating under the same laws. And that applies foremost to the mind, which is a process of action and reaction, dependent in its operation on varying conditions, constitutional as well as environmental, physical as well as mental, without anything of the nature of an abiding entity.

For Buddhism, which is an ethico-philosophical doctrine, the question is not whether this plant or that animal has life, but the more fundamental question about life. Scientists may, if they wish and if they can, draw a line between the living and the dead, or may conclude that there is life in all that is. In the teaching of the Buddha everything is focussed on the concept of conflict (dukkha) and its solution. Conflict is caused by and originated in the process of thought which centres around the I-concept, And thus, whatever is capable of culturing this I-concept comes within the purview of life.

One of the two main divisions of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka, the other being Bstan-Ḥgyur. In its simplified form the Bkaḥ-Ḥgyur spelt Kangyur Material for this article has been obtained from an article by Jean Filliozat in L'Indo Classique, Tomo II, Hanoi, 1953, pp. 191–94..

Outside Tibet it is found in manuscript form in Berlin. And various editions are extant, printed by means of engraved wooden blocks (xylographs), rectangular in size like palm-leaf manuscripts measuring about 30” $\times$ 1”. Several editions were published in China in the years 1410, 1692 and 1700. The most important editions in Tibet itself are those of the monasteries of Snar-thaṅ (Narthang), Kumbum and Sde-dge (Derge). The National Library of Paris has the Snar-than edition, printed in black, and a Peking edition, printed in red. It is now available in a photographic reprint of the Peking edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka edited by D.T. Suzuki and published by the Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Institute, Tokyo-Kyōto, 1955.

A translation of the Bkaḥ-Ḥgyur (by F. Anton von Schiefner in German) has been rendered into English from the German (by W.R.S. Ralston in Trübner’s Oriental Series 1878).

The Bkaḥ-Ḥgyur (Kangyur) comprises 100 to 108 volumes according to different editions, covering about 700 works, usually divided into six sections. (1) Ḥdul-ba (Dulva) corresponds to the Vinaya; (2) Śes-phyin, abbreviation for Śes-rab kyi pha-rol tu phyin-pa, conforms with the Mahāyāna Prajnāpāramitā literature; (3) Phal-chen, abbreviation for Saṅs-rgyas-phal-po-che, or the Buddhavataṁsaka; (4) Dkon-brtsegs, abbreviation for Dkon-mchog-brtsegs-pa, or the Ratnakūṭa; (5) Mdo, containing the sūtras; and (6) Rgyud, the tantra section. The Peking edition places the tantras first with a special volume of symbolical formulas. This section is subdivided in the Sde-dge edition into four, comprising many repetitions from the sūtra section, especially a large number of dhāraṇī.

The better known Snar-thaṅ edition comprises in the Dulva the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya in thirteen volumes, divided into seven parts as follows: Ḥdul-ba-gzi (Vinayavastu), So-sor-thar-paḥi mdo (Prātimokṣa Sūtra), Ḥdul-ba-rnam-par-byed-pa (Vinaya-vibhaṅga), Dge-sloṅ-maḥi so-sor-thar-paḥi mdo (Bhikṣunī-prātimokṣa-sūtra), Dge-sloṅ-maḥi dul-ba-rnam-par-byed-pa (Bhikṣunī-vinaya-vibhaṅga), Ḥdul-ba-phran-chogs-kyi-gzi (Vinayakṣudraka-vastu) and Ḥdul-ba-gzuṅ-bla-ma (Vinayottaragrantha).

The section on the Prajñāpāramitā contains 21 volumes, translated into Tibetan in the 9th century C.E. by different scholars from India and Tibet. Some of these translations have been revised later, e.g., the Aṣṭasāhasrikā, a text of particular importance, up to six times.

The Avataṁsaka section comprises six volumes which are indicated only by their Tibetan titles without their Sanskrit equivalents as in other texts. Thus, e.g., the Gaṇḍavyūha, although belonging to this section, is not mentioned by this title.

The Ratnakūṭa embodies in six volumes 49 Mahāyāna sūtras which are also found in their Chinese translations in the same order. One may, therefore, conclude that there was a Sanskrit collection which served as basis for both translations. But Sakurabe is of opinion that the Tibetan version is based on the Chinese translation. The largest work of this section is the Byaṅ-chub-sems-dpaḥi sde-snod (Bodhisattva-piṭaka) which by itself occupies one sixth of the entire collection. The Bhadramāyākāra-vyākaraṇa is of special interest as it narrates without the usual embellishments the story of the magician Bhadra who wanted to prove his superiority to the Buddha by means of his clever feats. But he was conquered and converted by the Buddha. This text, moreover, has served as basis of a Khotanese Buddhist work.

The Mdo or Mahāyāna-sūtra section comprises about 270 texts (the number varies with different editions) in thirty volumes, of which the first twenty-one contain the Mahāyāna-sūtras proper, beginning with the Bskal-ba bzaṅ-po (Bhadrakalpika), an exposition of Śākyamuni during his sojourn at Śrāvastī on the 1000 Buddhas of this “auspicious world-cycle” (bhadrakalpa). This is Buddhahood, arahantship, rebirth in heaven or followed by translations of the Lalitavistara (Rgya-cher-rol-pa) and of numerous important sūtras, recounting the splendours (vyūha) and further elucidations (nirdeśa) of the domains (kṣetra) of Buddhas and bodhisattvas such as the Buddhakṣetra-nirdeśa-vyūha, the Sukhāvativyūha, and the Karaṇḍa-vyūha. Among these are found the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, (the Lotus of the Good Law), exalting the miracles of Buddhas and bodhisattvas, and some doctrinal treatises such as the Ghanavyūha, the Sandhinirmocana and the Laṅkāvatāra. The events which took place at the passing away of the Buddha are described in the Mahā-parinirvāṇasutra and also together with other subjects in the Karuṇā-puṇḍarika. Translations of sūtras concerning samādhi, such as the Samādhirāja, Mayopāmasamādhi, Sūraṇgama-samādhi are grouped together in volumes IX and X of the Snar-thaṅ edition. The subsequent volumes are dedicated to dhāraṇī (gzuṅs), paripṛcchā and nirdeśa of a great variety of texts. In general, the more important texts are dealt with first.

With volume XXII commences a series of texts belonging to the earlier schools, the first of which is the enormous compilation carried over into volume XXV, the Dam-poḥi-chos-dran-pa-ñe-bar-bzag-pa or the Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna, constituting an encyclop\ae dia of Buddhist knowledge. Of this work more than 2500 stanzas have been extracted and placed in a different order by Avalokitasiṁha to form the Dharmasamuccaya, which work has been found in Nepal. This is followed by a collection of 47 short sūtras, not belonging to the Mahāyāna, among which is found the Ched-du-brjod-paḥi-tshoms (Udāna-varga) corresponding to the Pali Dhammapada. The series terminates with two versions of the Karma-vibhaṅga, one of which is preserved in Sanskrit in Nepal. This popular work has been translated not only into Tibetan, but also several times into Chinese. Central Asia has its Kucha version, and its stories have been illustrated in bas-relief on the Barabuḍur in Java. This is followed by a group of stories illustrating the consequences of actions in successive rebirths, the Karma-śataka (Las-brgya-tham-pa), the sūtra of the wise man and the fool (Mzaṅs-blun) which has no known corresponding Sanskrit original, the Dīrghanakha-parivrāṭaka-paripṛcchā, the Maitrī Sūtra and the Maitreya-vyākaraṇa. Most of these texts have served as the foundation of the important Buddhist literature in Khotān and Mecha of Central Asia. Then come the Avadānaśataka, a hundred examples of deeds which led to in the underworld, some of which have been preserved in Sanskrit, e.g. the Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna, included in the Divyāvadāna, the Sunnāgadhāvadāna, etc., followed by the Brahmajāla Sūtra, which corresponds to the Pali sutta of the same name, although differing in details.

The Mdo or sūtra-section ends with a series of texts translated from the Pali. In the Sde-dge edition they are placed at the end of the Prajñāpāramitā section. Their restored Sanskrit titles are: Dharma-cakra-pravartana, Jātaka-nidāna, Ātānāṭiya, Mahāsamaya, Maitrī, Maitrībhāvanā, Pañca-śikṣānuśaṁsa, Giri, Ānanda, Nandopanandanágarājadamana, Mahākāśyapa, Sūrya, Candra and Mahāmaṅgala Sūtra. Many of these texts form part of the “verses of protection” (paritta) in Pali, but corresponding renderings in the Sanskrit canon have been translated in the Rgyud or tantra section of the Bkaḥ-ḥgyur (Kangyur).

The final division of the Bkaḥ-ḥgyur (Kangyur) is called the Rgyud which contains 300 texts in 22 volumes. They appear to have been classified although the method adopted is not clear. Thus, beginning with the Aparimitāyur-jñāna-mahāyāna-sūtra, there are three consecutive volumes (xiv–-xvi) with regard to Avalokiteśvara, his various forms and Tārā, his consort, either dedicated to their praise, or describing their rituals, or the teachings given to him by the Buddha.

The opening text of the Rgyud is the Parāvnārthā-nāma-saṅgīti, or in its full title, the Mañjuśrī-jñānasattvasya Paramārthā-nāmasaṅgīti, composed of verses spoken by the Buddha and corresponding to the various stages of his acquisition of insight-knowledge (jñāna), such as the invitation to instruction (adhyeṣaṇā), arrival at realisation of the net of illusion (māyājālābhisambodhi-krama), basis of the element of the diamond-knowledge (vajradhātu-maṇḍala), knowledge of the essential purity of all things (suviśuddha-dharma-dhātu-jñāna) and knowledge of the five Tathāgatas (pañca-tathāgata-jñāna). This is followed immediately by a series of texts of the school of Kālacakra and by some of the principal tāntric texts of Vajrayāna on Heruka, Hevajra, Ḍāka, Saṁvara, the Abhidhānottara-tantra, the Mahākāla-tantra, the Caṇḍamahāroṣaṇa-tantra, the Guhyasamāja, etc. The first eight volumes contain mostly texts with the qualifying title of tantra or tantra-rāja (rgyud-kyi, rgyal-po), but later on the more frequent appellation is kalpa, kalparāja, mahāyāna-sūtra and, above all, dhārani (gzuṅs).

The names of the Tibetan translators of the individual texts, together with those of their Indian collaborators as well as any further available details, are mentioned under the Sanskrit original or restored titles of such texts.

Fear of–-(ottappa)–-can be understood best in conjunction with conscientiousness (hiri) with which it is always linked both in its positive aspect (hiri-ottappa) and in its negative form (ahiri-anottappa). The fact that the two concepts are thus associated does not make them synonymous but rather complementary.

In their positive aspect, conscientiousness (hiri) as well as fear of blame (ottappa) are powerful incentives to the avoidance of evil, but they differ widely in their source, as it is clearly shown by Buddhaghosa (DhsA. pp. 125–7). Conscientiousness or the sense of shame (hiri) has a subjective origin, is influenced by oneself (attādhipati): “It is not fit that a man such as I who have renounced the world and lead an ascetic life, should do evil”. A fourfold consideration may thus be the cause of the subjective origin of this sense of shame (lajjā), viz. consideration of birth, of age, of attainment and of experience. Thus, conscientiousness is rooted in the intrinsic nature of shame, has the characteristic of respectful obedience, and presents the emotional aspect.

Fear of blame (ottappa), on the other hand, has an external cause and origin and is influenced by public opinion (lokādhipati).

(lohita) is frequently mentioned in the texts as one of the 32 constituents (dvattiṁsākāra) of the body, when “mindfulness of the body” (kāya-gatāsati) is explained, e.g., (M. III, p. 90). It is described in detail in the Visuddhimagga (Vism. viii, § 130, p. 216; xi, § 72, p. 301) where a distinction is made between the blood in circulation. (saṁsaraṅa lohita) and accumulated blood (sannicita-lohita). The mobile blood follows the network of veins (dhamanijālānusārena), permeating the whole body, except for the hair on the head and on the body, teeth and nails, bones and dry skin.

As to the colour, although blood is always red, it is said that its particular hue depends on the actual state of mind: when there is joy in the mind, blood will be red like the berry of the banyan tree; grief darkens the blood, like the colour of the rose apple fruit; and when the mind is clear and calm, the blood will be like sesamum oil (Vism. xiii, § 9, p. 345). - This, of course, cannot be discerned under normal conditions, but only through clairvoyance (dibbacakkhu).

Blood-letting was well known as a cure for snake poisoning (Vin. II, p. 109), although as a cure for rheumatism in the joints it seems unusual (ibid. I, p. 205).

Blood-sacrifices (lohita-homa) are, entirely forbidden, even if it is only low art (tiracchāṇa-vijja: (D. I, p. 9) by which blood is drawn from one’s right Knee for the purpose of sorcery (DA. I, p. 93). Diarrhoea with the passing of blood, or dysentery having weakened the bowels to the extent of course, of a h\ae morrhage (lohita-pakkhandika), appears to have been the final illness of Gotama, the Buddha (D. II, p. 127).

Translation by George N. Roerich of the historical chronicle of Tibet, usually referred to in its abbreviated title Deb-ther. The Blue Annals or the Stages of the Appearance of the Doctrine and Preachers in the Land of Tibet (Bod-kyi yul-du chos-daṅ chos-smra-ba ji-ltar byuṅ-baḥi rim-pa deb-ther sṅon-po) form the main source of information for all historical compilations which followed it. The Blue Annals or Deb-ther were composed between 1476–78 by the well-known scholar Gos lo-tsāba Gzon-nu- dpal. The English translation by George N. Roerich was published in two parts: Part I in 1949 in the Asiatic Society of Bengal Monograph Series, Vol. VII, and Part II in 1953 in the Asiatic Society Monograph Series Vol. VII.

One of the five hundred pacceka-buddhas who in ancient times lived on the Isigili mountain in seclusion. These pacceka-buddhas were seen by the people entering the mountain range, but were never seen thereafter. Hence the name of the mountain Isigili. The names of the pacceka-buddhas are given in the Isigili Sutta (M. III, p. 69 f.).

Buddhaghosa in his commentary (MA. IV, p. 127) relates how these sages had made their dwelling inside the mountain behind a rock which would open and close, like a folding door.

(Hen-ji), a name for Amida’s Transformed Land, in which are reborn those who practise nembutsu without faith but for the purpose of acquiring power. Here they have to pass a certain period of time without seeing the true Buddha or hearing the right Dhamma, until they finally repent the sin of doubt and advance to the true Land of Reward, or the Pure Land. Other spheres in this purgatory are the Land of Sloth and Pride (keman), the Castle of Doubt (gijō) and the Womb-palace (taigu).

Donran, commenting on the term Henji, says in his Ryakuroa Anraku Jōdo Gi that those born in the Border-Land neither see nor hear the three Treasures for 500 years (Shinshū Shōgyō Zensho, I, p. 370, Tanni Shō, trsl. by R. Fujiwara, Kyōto, 1962, p. 95).

There are two suttas by this name, both occurring in the Saṁyutta-nikāya (S. V, pp. 167–8) and 232–3). Both were delivered under the Goathard’s banyan-tree near Uruvelā on the bank of the river Nerañjarā, just after the Buddha’s Enlightenment, while he was meditating in solitude. The title in both cases is derived from the fact that Brahma Sahampati appears on the scene and confirms the thoughts of the Buddha.

The difference of the suttas lies in the different contents of the Buddha’s thoughts.

In the first sutta the Buddha’s reflection was as follows: This is the only way (ekāyano 'yam maggo) that leads to the purification of beings, to the complete overcoming of sorrow and grief, to the utter dissolution of conflict and suffering, to the attainment of the truth (ñāya) and the realisation of Nibbāna, namely, the fourfold application of mindfulness (cattāro satipaṭṭhānā). It is awareness that the body is just the body (kāye kāyānupassī), feelings are just feelings (vedanāsu vedanānupassī), mind is just thought (citte cittanupassī) and mental states are just mental phenomena (dhammesu dhammanupassī). The theme is here only outlined, but is later worked out in detail in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (M. I, pp. 55–63)).

In the second sutta the Buddha’s reflections are mentioned as being directed to the five controlling faculties (indriya) which, if they are cultivated and practised make one dive into the stream of deathlessness (amatogadha). The five are: confidence (saddhā), energy (viriya), mindfulness (sati), concentration (samādhi) and insight (paññā). Here too, Brahma Sahampati confirms the Buddha’s reflections, and recalls how in some previous life he had been a monk, named Sahaka, during the time of Kassapa Buddha. It was due to his cultivating these five controlling faculties at that time that he was reborn in the happy spheres of Brahmaloka and became known as Brahma Sahampati.

Another Brahma Sutta, thus named in the uddāna (contents of the chapter, in verse), is found in the Itivuttaka (pp. 109–11, sutta 106), which is identical with the first sutta of the Devadūta Vagga (A. I, p. 132) and, apart from a slight variation, also with the third sutta of the Pattakamma Vagga (A. II, p. 70).

Families where mother and father are respected in the home are reckoned like unto Brahma. Such families are ranked with the teachers of old; they are indeed worthy of offerings. Parents are called Brahma, it is said in the concluding gāthā, because of their compassion unto their tribe of children. Wise people worship them, give them all honours due, serve them with food and drink, clothing and lodging; they anoint their bodies, bathe and wash their feet. And, for such service one may expect reward of joy in heaven.

The gāthā is part of the poem occurring in the Soṇa-Nanda-Jātaka (J. V. p. 313 ff.).

F.L. Woodward in his translation Minor Anthologies of the Pali Canon (p. 192, note 3) mentions a quotation in part by Nāgārjuna (Friendly Epistle, JPTS. 1886, p. 8) and refers also to the Taittirīya Upaniṣad (1, 11, 1).

Is one of the forty subjects of meditation and is grouped among the ten recollections (anussati) according to Pali sources, whereas it is a yogic exercise according to various traditions of Hindu and Mahāyāna schools.

As a “recollection”, it is mindfulness of inhaling and exhaling (ānāpāna-sati), awareness of the duration of a breath, i.e., a mere observation of the process, whereby the flow of thoughts becomes unified and concentrated. It is entirely introspective and no physical or mental interference is intended. “During in a long breath, one knows: this is a long breath” (M. I, p. 56). Here, therefore, breathing is an object of concentration, whereby to bring the mind to one-pointedness (ekaggatā).

In Tibetan Buddhism (cp. Lama Anagarika Govinda, Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism, London, 1959, p. 152 ff.) “breathing” has become a technique in which the regulation of the physiological process leads to control over the vital forces (prāṇāyāma).

Recollection of the Buddha, a type of meditation with the Buddha’s special qualities as its object (Vism. vii, §§ 2–67, pp. 162–76; Vimuttimagga, trsl. The Path of Freedom, Colombo, 1961, pp. 140–8). Those good qualities of the Buddha which function as a topic for meditation (buddhagunārammaṇa) are enumerated frequently in the Pali texts, e.g., (D. III, p. 76); (M. I, p. 37); (S. V, p. 197); (A. III, p. 285); (Sn. p. 132); while commentarial works explain them in full (SnA. p. 442; Vism. loc. cit.). They are nine: arahant, arahant, sammāsambuddha, vijjā-caraṇa-sampanna, sugata, loka-vidū, anuṭṭara purisadamma-sārathi, satthā deva-manussānaṁ, buddha, bhagavant.

Many are the explanations, in which Buddhaghosa appears to revel, giving them sometimes an undeserved status, etymologically. But, as the purpose of this meditation is to bring about a mental state of peaceful devotion, the value of his statements should not be examined too critically.

And, thus, the Blessed One is called (1) arahant, literally, one who deserves (arahati) honour, but with the acquired technical meaning, one who has attained the goal of all striving, who has accomplished his task to perfection, who has achieved the supreme good of Nibbāna, and has destroyed (hanati) the pokes (arā) of the wheel of rebirth (Vism. vii, §§ 4, 22).

(2) Sammāsambuddha, supremely enlightened, by himself, which quality distinguishes the Buddha from his accomplished disciples who become enlightened arahants by their listening to and following the teaching of the Buddha.

(3) Vijjā-caraṇa-sampanna, endowed with true knowledge and virtuous conduct. This refers to the direct knowledge of insight (vipassanā-ñāṇa) as well as to supernormal psychic powers (abhiññā), and to the virtuous conduct of moral restraint (sīlasaṁvara), guarding the sense-doors, acquiring the seven virtues and the four states of mental absorption in the sphere of form.

(4) Sugata, literally, who has happily attained, and, therefore, one who will not return again to saṁsāric existence. Excellent in this achievement, the Buddha is called sublime, but also sublime in his teaching.

(5) Loka-vidū, knower of the world, i.e., he knows the world as regards its essence, its origination, its cessation, and the method thereto, for “not by going can world’s end be reached. For the world is in this body, a fathom long, with all its percepts and concepts \dots And until this world’s end has been reached there cannot be a cessation of conflict” (S. I, p. 62). The world is of beings (satta-loka) and that is known to the Buddha through their varying desires, habits, tendencies, temperaments, faculties, behaviours and achievements. The world is also of formations (saṅkhāraloka), and that world is known to the Buddha through sensations, mental aggregates, sense-organs and bases, types of consciousness, etc. A third type of world (not mentioned in the Vimuttimagga) is that of location (okāsa-loka); it is the physical world in which the sun and moon rotate and shine their light in all directions; and that world, too, is known by the Tathāgata (Vism. vii, 37, p. 169).

(6) Anuttara-purisa-damma-sārathi, incomparable trainer of men to be tamed, for the Buddha surpasses all in virtue and understanding, and hence he is matchless. He tames all who are fit to be tamed, i.e., he guides them with his discipline.

(7) Satthā devamanussānaṁ, teacher of heavenly and human beings. Buddhaghosa stresses the point that the Buddha bestowed his teaching upon animals as well, but here only gods and men are referred to, as they are in general best capable of progress. This he illustrates with the story of the frog (maṇḍūka) which was crushed to death while listening to the voice (sara) of the Buddha preaching to the people of Campā (Vvu. p. 49) and was born in heaven.

(8) Buddha, the enlightened one, because he has acquired the knowledge that belongs to the fruit of deliverance (vimokkhantika-ñāṇa); he discovered the four truths by himself (cattāri saccāni attanā pi bujjhi) and brought Enlightenment to others (aññe pi satte bodhesi).

(9) Bhagavant, deserving respect, a designation based on his realisation (sacchikā paññatti: (Ps. I, p. 174); (Nd. I, p. 143). Buddhaghosa goes into many detailed and analytical explanations of this epithet, some of them based on the Mahā Niddesa (I, p. 142) and its fanciful etymological exegesis. In Vedic literature the term bhagavat occurs also, frequently applied to gods, demigods and saints, with the meaning of glorious, illustrious, venerable, prosperous, auspicious; and that is indeed the basic meaning of the epithet as applied to the Buddha, usually translated as the Blessed One.

Now, while the mind is concentrated on these various good qualities of the Buddha, there will be no occasion for the arising of greed, hate and delusion (A. III, p. 285). And further, when these mental obsessions (pariyutthāna) are thus prevented from being effective, the hindrances (nīvaraṇa) to spiritual advancement are suppressed (literally, paralysed, vikkhambhita: Vism. vii, § 66, p. 175), whereby is created the proper atmosphere for the arising of spiritual zest (pīti) and tranquillity (passaddhi), culminating in that mental ease (sukha) which is the absence of conflict (dukkha).

The following 13 benefits are mentioned in the Vimuttimagga (loc. cit.), although it is said there that 18 benefits accrue: fullness of confidence, abundance of mindfulness, completion of wisdom, reverence, plenty of merit, great joy, ability to endure hardship, fearlessness, steadfastness in the presence of evil, the state of living near the Teacher, enjoyment of activity belonging to the ground of the Buddhas, (the happiness of) faring well and approaching the deathless state. The list in the Visuddhimagga appears to be more complete when it adds: When he encounters an opportunity for transgression, he has awareness of conscience and shame as vivid as though he were face to face with the Master; and even if he penetrates no higher, he is at least headed for a happy destiny (trsl. Nāṇamoli, Path of Purification, Colombo, 1946, p. 230).

In the suttas (e.g., Mahānama Sutta: (A. III, p. 285) we are given another set of gains: And at whatever time a noble disciple concentrates with mindfulness on the Tathāgata, his mind will never be swamped by lust, hate or delusion, but will be directed (ujugata) on to the Tathāgata; and thus straightened, he is filled with enthusiasm concerning the goal and the teaching (labhati atthavedaṁ, labhati dhammavedaṁ), from which arise joy (pāmujja) and delight (pīti), tranquillity (passaddhi) and ease (sukha); and thus the mind is concentrated (cittaṁ samādhiyati).

Here are outlined the various stages of mental absorption (jhāna), the principal goal of this type of meditation. Yet, according to Buddhaghosa (Vism. vii, § 66, p. 175), these jhāna factors arise for a single moment only (ekakkhaṇe jhānaṅgāni uppajjanti); and thus the state of concentration does not reach full absorption, but remains as access-concentration (upacāra). Due to the profundity of the object of meditation and to the variety of the Buddha’s great qualities which are contemplated, one-pointedness of mind (ekaggatā) is not attained. Also Upatissa’s Vimuttimagga (op. cit. p. 148) agrees that one who meditates on the Buddha attains to access-concentration, and not to fixed mental absorption (jhāna), owing to the abstruseness of the object of the Buddha’s virtues and because one has to recollect not merely one virtue. Even so it is admitted (loc. cit.) with reference to the Mahānāma Sutta (A. III, p. 285); cp. AA. III, p. 337): “Again it is taught that from the recollection of the Buddha, the four meditations, jhānas arise”.

Intellect. In the Lakkhaṇa Suttanta (D. III, No. 30) intellect (buddhi) is used in a stanza (p. 165) as synonymous with insight (paññā), earlier in the text (p. 164) in an identical series, comprising also confidence (saddhā), moral virtue (sīla), learning (suta), charity (cāga) and righteousness (dhamma). But, in later works, e.g., Milindapañha (Miln. p. 93) the term buddhi is taken only in the sense of intellectual understanding, for the eight conditions which promote the ripening of intellect (buddhi) are not essential requisites for the opening up of insight (paññā): the advance of years, growth of reputation, frequent questioning, association with one’s teacher, proper attention, converse with the wise, cultivation of the loveable and dwelling in a suitable district. Although T.W. Rhys Davids (Questions of King Milinda, SBE. XXXV, part I, p. 141) translates buddhi by “insight”, I.B. Horner (Milinda’s Questions, SBB. XXII, Vol. I, p. 130), is more accurate in her rendering of buddhi by “discretion”.

Buddhaghosa, too, treats buddhi as a characteristic than an attainment. According to his psychological analysis, a prototype of behaviourism, an individual’s character is one of six types, six kinds of temperament; greedy (rāga-cariyā), hating (dosa-c°), deluded (moha-c°), faithful (saddhā-c°), intelligent (buddhi-c°) and speculative (vitakka-c°: Vism. iii, §74, p. 82), although, by means of combination, many more types could be admitted. An intelligent temperament, he says, is without affection (asiniddha or nissineha) and does not covet its object (na ārammaṇaṁ allīyati). It is not fault-finding but, like insight (pañña), investigates principles (bhūtam parīyesati) while avoiding complications (saṅkhāra-parivajjanākārena).

In many ways the intelligent temperament is parallel to the hating temperament, and shows itself in its behaviour, assuming a rigid posture while standing, keeping a firm grip on objects and eating not so much for taste as out of necessity. An intelligent person is selective in friendship, alert, devoted to duty, and so forth (ibid. § 95, pp. 86–7).

(lahutā) is a mental property (cetasika) common to all mental states that are morally clean (sobhaṇa-sādhāraṇa). Its presence in every one of those fifty-nine classes and its constant conjunction with other concomitants, such as pliancy (muduta), fitness (kammaññata), proficiency (pāguññatā), and rectitude (ujukatā), do not give this property much individual character. Thus, it is not found in corresponding lists of caitasikas or citta-samprayuktasaṁskāra in the Sanskrit traditions of the Sarvāstivāda, of the Sautrāntika, or of the Yogācāra Schools.

Two kinds of lahutā are distinguished in later Theravāda literature (e.g., Visuddhimagga, Atthasālinī, Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha), namely buoyancy of the mental aggregates (kāya-lahutā) and buoyancy of thought (citta-lahutā). Its function is to dispel, by its lightness, the instinctive sluggishness of the mental process. Therefore, this property assists the mind in its process of thinking to effect quick alterations (Vism. xiv, § 65, p. 379); and it manifests itself as non-sluggishness in its opposition to the defilements of sloth and torpor (thīnamiddhādikilesa: ibid. § 145, p. 394). In this connection, the three mental aggregates of sensation (vedanā), perception (saññā) and ideations (saṅkhāra) are collectively referred to as material (kāya), though not physical (rūpa); they form the mental “body” in the sense that they give shape to the mind. But they remain mental aggregates (arūpa-khandha), throughout, and are the mental object of the thought (citta). Lahutā of the mental “body” and of thought is originated by consciousness (citta samuṭṭhāna: op. cit. xx, § 32, p. 528).

Born at Albany (N.Y.) in U.S.A. on 5th August, 1878, had his preparatory education at the Albany Academy and graduated in 1898 from Yale University, where he also received his M.A. degree in 1902.

Under Professor Lanman he was engaged in research in Sanskrit and Pali. After two years as Harrison Fellow in Sanskrit and comparative philology at the University of Pennsylvania, he obtained there his Ph.D. in 1910. During this time he also did research work in Indic philology at Harvard. The next four years of his teaching work were at Haverford school, being concurrently Fellow at John Hopkins and Harrison Research Fellow in Indo-European philology at Pennsylvania. After spending two years as Johnston scholar in Sanskrit at John Hopkins, he returned to Yale as lecturer in Pali in 1917 and 1918. From then until his death (3 August 1932) he was engaged in original investigations in Indic philology and Hindu fiction, together with independent literary work.

He was the author of Act of Truth (1917) and of translations from the original Pali, Buddhist Legends (3 volumes in the Harvard Oriental Series, 1921); Buddhist Parables (1922); The Grateful Elephant and other Stories (1923); and Parabole Buddhista (1926).

Burlingame was a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a member of the American Oriental Society.

(1801–52) born in Paris on the 8th of April 1801 as the only son of J.L. Burnouf, a well-known authority on grammar. He was a brilliant student of Louis-le-Grand College, and took his degree in literature and law in 1824 at the École des Chartes. From then on he devoted himself to the study of Sanskrit.

In 1826 he published together with Chr. Lassen his Essai sur le Pali ou langue sacrée de la presqu'île au delà du Ganga (Essay on Pali, the sacred language of the peninsula beyond the Ganges), at a time when Pali was still so much unknown that it was frequently confused with Pehlvi, a semi-semitic language which in Persia had succeeded the ancient Zend. Burnouf proved philologically that Pali was as closely affiliated with Sanskrit as Italian with Latin, with its softer articulations, but similar declensions, conjugations and syntax. But, at that time Burnouf himself was not aware of the wealth of material he had just opened up.

His knowledge of the Zend language was sufficiently acknowledged by the worshippers of Ormuzd that his Commentary on the Yasna (Izeschné) served as authority in a religious disputation between the Parsis of Bombay and some Protestant missionaries.

Three volumes still leave incomplete his work on the Bhagavata-purāṇa. Also, his Introduction á l'histoire du Bouddhisme Indien (analysed in April 1845 by Biot in the Journal des Savants) requires a second volume which he was not able to complete. His translation of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka (Lotus de la Bonne Loi, Paris, 1852) forms part thereof.

It is unfortunate that J. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire in his commemorative volume on the works and correspondence of Eugéne Burnouf (Paris, 1891) has found it necessary to draw unwarranted inferences which do not reflect well on the scholarly labours of Burnouf and on the tenets of Buddhism.

The introduction of a chronological element in the history of India is due to the investigations of Burnouf, and even if no absolute certainty has been achieved his service to subsequent studies will always be appreciated.

Among his works the following are related to Buddhism: a Pali grammar, almost complete, in which is found only the section dealing with verbs; a literal translation of the Sandhikappa, a Pali grammatical theory as regards sandhi; a transliteration in Roman characters and translation of the Abhidhānappadīpikā, a Pali lexicon; a transliteration in Roman characters and translation (almost complete) in Latin of the Mahāvaṁsa, the Ceylon chronicle; a translation, with explanations and a foreword, of the Bhūridatta Jātaka, the Nemi Jātaka, and the Suvaṇṇa Sāma Jātaka, from the Pali text in Burmese characters; fragments of the Mahājanaka Jātaka, also from the Pali text in Burmese script; a translation of the Pātimokkhanissaya, the rules of monastic observances, from Pali in Burmese script.

He did further some research on the ancient geography of Ceylon in connection with the history Burnouf, of the island, but was not able to complete more than a first part in a memoir on ancient names in Ceylon which was read in 1836 for the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-lettres. He also commenced a translation of the Lalitavistara and compiled eight collections of translations of Buddhist legends in Nepal.

His services rendered to Oriental studies include an inspectorate of oriental typography, succeeding Silvestre de Sacy, supervising the engraving and casting of several hitherto unknown characters and scripts.

It is hardly necessary to say that such admirable pioneer work opened for Eugéne Burnouf the gates of most scholarly academies and societies in Europe. Thus, he was Correspondent of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Turin, Doctor of the Christine-Albertine Academy of Denmark, Member of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Bavaria, of the Royal Academy ot Prussia, of the Imperial Academies of Sciences of Vienna and St. Petersburg, of the Royal Academy of Lisbon, of the Royal Society of Sciences of Göttingen, etc. He was a Member of the Institute of France from 1832 and was appointed permanent Secretary of the Academy of Inscriptions and Literature a few days before his death. In 1845 he was made officer in the Legion of Honour.

It is generally agreed that the two magnificent volumes, the result of his twenty years' labour in Buddhism, viz., Introduction and the Lotus (Saddharmapuṇḍarīka), not only brought Buddhism to the notice of the West, but also remained for more than a quarter of a century the chief authorities on the entire subject. But, as a scholar he was more a linguist than a philosopher and hence, his greater interest was in the comparison of manuscripts, rather than in the publication of their doctrines.

A comprehensive bibliography of his works can be found in Eugène Burnouf, ses travaux et sa correspondance by J. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, Paris, 1891, pp. 121–58.

Vibration, has acquired a specialised technical meaning in later Buddhist psychology. A thought-unit (cittuppāda) has been analysed into a maximum of seventeen moments (khaṇa) which only occur, however, in a complete and full-grown
(atimahanta) thought. But even when a thought does not reach the stage of maturity of consciousness (viññāṇa) and remains at the submerged level of sensation and perception, when thought is mere reaction, even then there is the vibration in the subconscious stream (bhavaṅga-calana) which is the impact, the disturbance, caused by the introduction of a new object or event.

Such vibration may be a weak impact and then the disturbance of the thought-current does not become an obstruction. But when the vibration, the impact, the disturbance, is great, it will force the mind into new lines of thought. Then the calana becomes upaccheda, interruption.

Therefore, although calana (as the second moment in a thought-unit) is there always at the arising of a new thought, such thought sometimes does not develop into full consciousness, and then the vibration subsides without its impact being felt at any of the sense-doors. Swept away by the current, it is received, but not perceived. And such a short-lived unit is called empty or vain (moghavāra).

A Sanskrit text which has not been found in its original, but which is extant in its Tibetan translation under the title, Rgyal-po-zla-ba-la spriṅs-paḥi sprib-yig. It belongs to the Spriṅ-yig (lekha, literary-) section of the Tibetan Tengyur, where the author’s name is given as Śrījaganmitrānanda, It is said that the author himself translated the work into Tibetan with the: help of Gnubs Tshul-khrims śes-rab (Śīlaprajñā: TM. No. 4189; Cordier, III, p. 430, No. 34).

The philosophy of René Descartes (1596–1650), deserves the attention of being compared with Buddhist philosophy as their main tenets are directly opposed to one another, whereby Buddhism provides the most efficient refutation of the method in which Descartes attempted to obtain real knowledge by the natural light of reason.

Descartes was a revolutionary against the prevailing reliance of scholasticism on authority and dogma. The certainty of mathematics he attributed to the character of its method which, especially as in analytical geometry, appeared to him to be applicable to all forms of science. Hence, a random search for knowledge was condemned by him as fruitless, and pure knowledge could be obtained only by proceeding cautiously by inference from the simplest and elementary notions. This inference can be made through experience or by means of deduction. Experience involves many complex objects, and inference from experience (which is always partial, however extensive) may, therefore, lead to false conclusions. Hence, inference through deduction appeared to him the safest and only reliable method for obtaining knowledge. But the very basis of such analytical knowledge cannot be deducible, and has, therefore, to rely on intuition. It is admitted that if the initial premises, as understood by intuition, are false, even the soundest deduction cannot lead to knowledge. And it is here at the very basis that Cartesianism and Buddhism stand as opponents, although the subsequent method of analytical deduction is approved by both.

Descartes' intuition, which is the direct and immediate apprehension by a knowing subject of itself or of objective states and values, gives him the perception of the ego in the very act of thinking: “I think; therefore, I am” (cogito ergo sum). Without this initial deduction the entire system becomes baseless.

His Discourse on Method begins with a methodical doubt which is intended to serve as a starting point and testing ground. “Everything must be questioned (de omnibus dubitandum) so that we may discover something that is beyond doubt”. Well, the fact of doubting this is beyond doubt. And doubt is an act of thinking. And thinking implies a thinker. And, therefore, I doubt, I think, I am.

It will be noticed immediately that the Buddhist viewpoint does not reach similar conclusions from the premise that doubt is an act of thinking, because in the act of thinking no thinker is implied, just as there is no fire apart from the act of burning. There is no subject apart from the action, no substance apart from the phenomena, no static “I” or “self” or “soul” which agitates the varying moods, acts and states of the mentalised body. In stating the premise “I think”, Descartes has already introduced the “I”-concept, and it is, therefore, quite logical that the “I” is found also in the deduction: “therefore, I am”.

With the collapse of this initial thesis, the entire dualistic system of Cartesianism lacks a foundation, which has not been provided even by succeeding adherents of this school, Geulincx and Malebranche.

The second sutta in the Catukka Nipāta of the Itivuttaka (It. pp. 102–3)) and thus named in the Uddāna (ibid. p. 124), the versified table of contents at the end of the chapter, occurs also in the Aṅguttara-nikāya (A. II, pp. 26–7)).

Four things are said to be of little value, easily obtainable and not incurring censure for the one who possesses them. They are rag-robes, alms-food, lodging at the foot of a tree and ammonia derived from cow-urine (pūti-mutta) as medicine. A monk who is content with such trifles (appa) has in him the making of a true recluse (sāmaññaṅga).

The final word of the concluding gāthā refers to the zealous monk (appamatta bhikkhu) in the Itivuttaka, but the Sinhalese text and the Aṅguttara-nikāya mention instead the one who has been diligently trained (appamatta sikkhata). The two terms are obviously synonymous.

“the Book of Fours” of the Aṅguttara-nikāya (II, pp. 1–257). It contains 27 chapters (vagga). The first twenty chapters are collected in four groups of five chapters each, each chapter containing ten suttas. The remaining seven chapters, containing 71 suttas, from the fifth and last group of “fifty” (paññāsakaṁ pañcamaṁ) bringing the total of suttas in this nipāta to 271.

Conspicuous by its absence in this “Book of Fours” is any reference to the Four Noble Truths. The four “brāhman truths” (cattari brāhmanasaccāni), put forward by the Buddha, are harmlessness towards all living beings, the recognition of the impermanence of all sense-delights, in fact of all becoming, and perfect detachment (A. II, pp. 176–7). The only other reference to sacca is found in the description of a true monk who has put away sectarian opinions (panuṇṇa-pacceka-sacca: A. II, p. 41). Neither reference is to the Four Noble Truths. Mrs. Rhys Davids who always had a keen eye for “editorial handling” and “creeping in” of “glosses”, has no suggestion to explain the creeping out of this fundamental doctrine.

The four “divine” virtues (brahma-vihāra) of loving kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity are fully dealt with (A. II, pp. 128–30)).

But one unexpectedly meets in this book (A. II, p. 141) the set of four controlling powers (indriyāni) which are usually enumerated as five. They finding a place here by the omission of insight (paññā). This applies also to the usual set of five sources of strength (balāni), mentioned in the very next sutta, also omitting insight (paññā). Yet, the strength of insight (paññābala) occurs as the first in a new set of four, together with energy (viriya), innocence (anavajja) and collectedness (saṅgāha) in the succeeding sutta (A. II, p. 142) to be further supplemented by computation (paṭi-saṅkhāna) and mind-culture (bhāvana) immediately thereafter, which leaves us with a total of nine sources of strength spread out over four suttas Woodward’s translation (Gradual Sayings, PTS. London, 1962, II, p. 145) gives by oversight “the; power of faith”, instead of insight (paññābala).. This is a typical instance of the casual complication of several instances, in which a well-known series is either truncated or expanded to make it fit into a particular nipāta in the Aṅguttara-nikāya, where each book deals with subjects numerically increasing from one to eleven.

Editorial handling is also evident, not only by the Pali compilers, however, but also by the English translators and commentators. Thus, sutta 87 (A. II, pp. 86 ff.) in the Macala Vagga (which should read Acala Vagga, as derived from samaṇa-m-acala: the unshaken recluse: (A. II, pp. 86), 88, 89, 90) deals with four kinds of recluses. In along footnote the translator (F.L. Woodward, Gradual Sayings, PTS. London, 1962, II, p. 96) forces a comparison of these four kinds with the four stages of sainthood–-stream-enterer (sotāpanna), once-returner (sakadāgāmi), non-returner (anāgāmi),–-and the perfect saint (arahant), whereas the unshaken recluse (samaṇa-m-acala), although referred to as a learner on the path (sekho paṭipado), need not exclusively refer to a stream-enterer (sotāpanna). The term sekha includes both the path (magga) and the fruition (phala) of the stream-enterer (sotāpanna), the once-returner (sakadāgāmī), and the non-returner (anāgāmi), as well as the path of arahantship (arahatta-magga). The term paṭipadā, in its most pregnant meaning, refers to the Noble Path of sainthood. And until fruition thereon is attained, one remains a learner. The remaining three types of recluses, viz., the blue-lotus one (samaṇa-puṇḍarīka) the white-lotus one (samaṇa-paduma) and the exquisite one (samaṇa-sukhumāla), are all referred in the identical description of the arahant: having destroyed the mental intoxicants (āsavānaṁ khayā), with emancipated heart (ceto-vimuttim), released through insight (paññā-vimuttiṁ), and abiding in such realisation (abhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja viharati). They are distinguished, not in a degree of sanctity on the Path, but in the method of their achievements. The blue-lotus recluse does not experience the eight deliverances (no ca kho attha vimokhe kāyena phassitvā viharati) which include the four states of immaterial mental absorption (arūpa-jhāna) and the state of cessation of both perception and sensation (saññā-vedayita-nirodha: A. IV, p. 306); whereas the white-lotus one experiences these eight deliverances in himself (attha ca vimokhe kāyena phassitvā viharati). In other words, the blue-lotus recluse is a “dry-visioned” arahant, who is supported by mere insight (sukkhavipassaka), and the white-lotus recluse has the attainment of mental absorption as the means of his deliverance.

The exquisite one among recluses (samaṇa-sukhumāla) is likewise free from the mental intoxicants, emancipated at heart, released through insight; he has, moreover, every blessing in this life, is free from illness and enjoys a plentiful supply of requisites. None of them is referred to as a learner (sekha), for they are accomplished and perfect.

Of greater interest is the so-called internal evidence of antiquity. Thus, a quotation of verse 1048 from the Pārāyaṇa Vagga of the Suttanipāta in this Catukka Nipāta of the Aṅguttara-nikāya (A. II, pp. 45–6)) proves the greater originality of the earlier work. On the other hand, (A. II, p. 18) is quoted at (Nett. pp. 129), 162., (A. II, pp. 47–8) at (Kvu. p. 344). Many are the parallel passages among which the Itivuttaka appears the most frequent.

(or Catuṣparṣada sūtra), a canonical Sanskrit text of the Mūlasarvāstivādins, dealing with the origin of the four groups of Buddhist community, monks, nuns, male and female lay disciples. The text begins with a description of the events which took place immediately after the Buddha’s Enlightenment and ends with the conversion of the Buddha’s two chief disciples Upatiṣya (Śāriputra) and Kolita (Maudgalyāyana). The largest section deals with the meeting of the Buddha with king Bimbisāra of Magadha. This episode is found elsewhere also in different versions, and is even handed down independently as the Bimbisāra sūtra.

The text is referred to in the Karmavibhaṅgopadeśa (ed. S. Lévi, Paris, 1932, pp. 10, 161) as the Catuṣparṣada sūtra which according to E. Waldschmidt is the hybrid form of what would be read in correct Sanskrit as Catuṣpariṣat sūtra (Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1952). The description of the four groups of the Buddhist community as found here corresponds with the Sobheti sutta of the Pali Aṅguttara-nikāya (A. II, p. 8).

Fragments of various manuscripts have been dovetailed to ensure coherence of the detailed history of those early days. The principal manuscripts which are part of the text of the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra were discovered during the third Turfan Expedition in Sorcuq, while other finds were made in the ruined stūpas of Tumsuq near Maralbashi during the fourth Turfan Expedition in Eastern Turkestan in the present Sinkiang Province of China, north of Tibet.

These three manuscripts cover the events classified by Waldschmidt as Nos. 1–26 and parts of Nos. 27–28 which conclude the sūtra while relating the events which took place in Rājagṛha.

Numerous other fragments of manuscripts were found in Kyzyl in the Kuch area, in Bäzäklik near Murtuk and in the ancient ruined city of Chotscho (Khocho), to-day called Karakhoja.

As regards the contents, the following are recorded by Waldschmidt in his edition of Das Catuṣpariṣat sūtra (Berlin, 1952); the events which took place near the Bodhi-tree at Gayā; the Buddha’s first visit to Bārāṇasī, including the events from the meeting with Upaga, the ājīvaka, till the sending out of the first 60 missionaries; the return to Gayā and several conversions accompanied with miracles at Urubilvā, concluding with the sermon on Gayāśīrṣa; the conversions at Rājagṛha of king Bimbisāra, and of the two chief disciples, Upatiṣya and Kolita.

The complete texts of the events, up to the sending out of the first 60 missionaries who had become arahants and the subsequent fruitless attempt of Māra to restrain the Buddha, have been critically edited by Waldschmidt in the second volume of the work mentioned above, giving in four parallel columns the Sanskrit text of the Catuṣpariṣat sūtra, and the corresponding passages of the Mahāvagga of the Pali Vinaya, the Tibetan Dulva (Vinaya) and the German translation of the Chinese Mūlasārvasṭivāda Vinaya.

Volume III, deals with the sections concerning the conversions in Gayā and Rājagṛha.

For details of the expeditions and discoveries see Turfan, Burial Treasures of Chinese Turkestan by Albert von le Cog (Allen and Unwin, London, 1928), and the various works on the explorations in Central Asia by Sir Aurel Stein.

(Skt. darśana), “seeing”, “sight”, in its literal, physical meanings which is preserved in the applied and developed meaning in the theory of perception as insight, understanding, comprehension and intuition. It is mostly used in combination with knowledge (ṇāṇa). This “knowing and seeing” (ñāṇa-dassana) or the insight arising from knowledge is the perfect realisation of the true nature (yathā-bhūta) of phenomena and events to be impermanent (anicca), the realisation that misunderstanding (avijjā) in this respect can only lead to conflict (dukkha), the realisation that such conflict is created by the imperfect understanding of the total insubstantiality (anatta) of all phenomena, which is due to a desire for substantiality, stability, permanence, personality, individuality, essence in existence, all of which oppose the impermanence and instability which is characteristic of bhava or existence.

This insight (dassana), therefore, is an awakening (bodhi or bodha) to the truth, a release (vimutti: (S. I, p. 139) from bondage, a purification (visuddhi: (M. I, p. 147) from all that is wrong.

Name given to the first discourse of the Buddha. It is recorded in the Pali tradition of the Mahāvagga (Vin. I, pp. 10–1) and in the Sacca-saṁyutta (S. V, pp. 421–4)). An abridged version is found in the Gāmaṇi-saṁyutta (S. IV, pp. 330–1)) and the section of the “middle path” is inserted in the Dhammadāyāda Sutta (M. I, p. 15), and referred to frequently elsewhere; the account of the noble quest including the gist of this discourse is found in the Ariyapariyesana Sutta (A. IV, p. 26) ff.).

Apart from being the first discourse chronologically, it is also first in order of importance, as it outlines the basic truth of the new doctrine and is drafted like a manifesto at the beginning of the mission, stating the points of divergence from existing systems and declaring the new course promulgated.

For the full understanding of this all-important document the actual background and the significance of the circumstances, immediately leading up to the event, have to be perceived.

The Vinaya account (Mahāvagga) opens with the Buddha, immediately after his enlightenment, spending seven days at the foot of the Bodhi tree “experiencing the bliss of emancipation”. Then, during the night following, he pondered over (manasikāra) the origination and the cessation of all phenomena.

Subsequent weeks were spent in the neighbourhood, experiencing the bliss of emancipation, when, on one occasion, two merchants requested to be accepted as his lay-disciples, although the teaching had not yet been promulgated. And immediately after their departure, a doubt arose in the Buddha’s mind which was now averse from exertion and inclined to remain quiet (appossuka):

What I through painful striving gained
Why would I now proclaim?
For, those with lust and hate beset
Will fail to grasp the truth.

That which was “deep and hard to perceive and comprehend, too sublime for mere logic” would never be grasped by people whose grasping was bent towards objects of sense.

At this stage the most senior of the Brahmnā-gods, Sahampati, drew the Buddha’s attention by pointing out that there might be a few, not fully submerged in the mire of lust and hate, but whose eyes were only slightly covered with a little dust of ignorance. If they were not told the new message, they would decay. There would be some who would understand the doctrine.

With compassionate eye of insight in human nature the Buddha now sees the various types of beings, some of little, others of much impurity, some with keen and others with dull intellect, to teach whom would be rarely easy and mostly hard. But, out of compassion for those few, the Buddha finally overcomes his hesitation and declares his intention to preach his noble doctrine:

“Open are the doors to the deathless state; Ye that have ears, place your trust therein”.

It was indeed hard to understand that causal connection, the dependent origination and cessation of all conditioned things, the rejection of every basis of rebirth, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, deliverance. And it was not to people delighting and rejoicing in sensual pleasures that the Buddha’s thoughts first turned. But Āḷāra Kālāma, the teacher to whom Gotama first went for instruction after he had gone forth from home into homelessness, had passed away seven days earlier. Uddaka, the son of Rāma, another teacher to whom Gotama went when he had mastered Āḷāra’s teaching, had passed away that same night. Both had taught him different states of mental absorption (jhāna), Āḷāra up to the plane of nothingness (akiñca) and Uddaka even further up to the plane of neither perception-nor-non-perception (neva-saññā-n-āsaññā: (M. I, pp. 164–5)), but they had not been able to go beyond. To help them might have been easy, but it was too late now. Still there were his former five companions in the ascetic life. They might have been misguided, but they were sincere, so sincere that they refused to recognise and acknowledge their erstwhile leader, who had abandoned them and the ascetic life; who had given up exertion and turned to a life of abundance (bāhulla). Yet when the Buddha spoke to them with an assurance never heard from him before: “Give ear! The deathless has been found! I now instruct! I teach the truth”!, he-was able to convince the group of five who listened and aroused their minds for insight (Vin. I, p. 10).

It is at this stage that the actual discourse begins which has been called in literal translation: “setting rolling of the wheel of the Norm”, or “The foundation of the kingdom of the Norm”, or “The foundation of the kingdom of righteousness”.

T.W. Rhys Davids it in his introduction to the translation of this sutta (SBE. XI, p. 140) says: “It would be difficult to estimate too highly the historical value of this sutta. There can be no reasonable doubt that the very ancient tradition accepted by all Buddhists as to the substance of the discourse is correct, and that we really have in it a summary of the words in which the great Indian thinker and reformer for the first time successfully promulgated his new ideas. And it presents to us in a few short and pithy sentences the very essence of that remark able system which has had so profound an influence on the religious history of so large a portion of the human race”.

As regards the title of the sutta T.W. Rhys Davids continues: “The name given to it by the early Buddhists–-the setting in motion onwards of the royal chariot-wheel of the supreme dominion of the Dhamma–-means not ‘the turning of the wheel of the law’, as it has been usually rendered, but ‘the inauguration, or foundation, of the Kingdom of, Righteousness’,”\footnote{He has stated even more: “The whole phrase means, therefore, ‘To set rolling the royal chariot: wheel of a universal empire of truth and righteousness’,”. (Buddhism, Rhys Davids, 1890, p. 45).

It is our considered opinion that Rhys Davids here is obviously missing the distinctiveness of identity that should be maintained between the cakkaratana or the conquering wheel of a Universal Emperor and the dhammacakka of the Buddha as teacher whose message was expected to reach those who would benefit by the hearing of it. The cakkaratana, on the one hand, is prevailed upon by the king to set out on a round of conquest (pavattatu bhavañca cakkaratanam abhivijinātu bhavam cakkaratananti: (D. II, p. 172), and it comes to rest only after the total conquest of the four quarters of the earth for the king who commissions it (atha kho taṁ Ānanda ckkarātānaṁ samuddhapariyantaṁ paṭhavīm abhivijinitvā kuṣāvatiṁ rājadhānim paccāgantvā rañño mahāsudassanassa antepuradvāre atthakaraṇapamukhe akkhāhataṁ maññe aṭṭhāsi: ibid. p. 174). The king, on his part, follows the lead of the cakkaratana, accompanied by his four-fold army (atha kho tam Ānanda cakkaratanaṁ puratthimaṁ disaṁ pavatti anvadeva rājā mahāsudassano saddhiṁ caturāṇginiyā senāya: ibid. 172). On the other hand, the idiomatically expressed idea of dhammacakkappavattana: setting the wheel of Dhamma rolling is a sequel to the plain and straight forward request that the Buddha should preach and give publicity to the Dhamma for the benefit of those who could comprehend it (desetu bhagavā dhammaṁ desetu sugato dhammaṁ: santĩ sattã apparajakkhajãtikã assavanatã dhammassa parihãyanti: bhavissanti dhammassa aññãtãro ti: (Vin. I, p. 5). Far from the idea of establishing a kingdom, the Buddha in its setting, addresses himself to those alone who have the ability and aptitude to receive his new teaching (apārutā tesaṁ amatassa dvārā ye sotavanto pamuñcantu saddhaṁ: ibid. p. 7).

The request thus made and the actual occurrence of the event of the first preaching of the doctrine by the Buddha is seen converging in the ecstasy of the hosts of heavenly beings who describe it as, “the supreme wheel of the Dhamma has been set rolling, never to be reversed (i.e., its truth never to be controverted) by anyone, by the Exalted One at the Deer Park at Isipatana in Bārāṇasī” (evam bhagavatā Bārānasiyam Isipatane Migadāye anuttaraṁ dhammacakkaṁ pavattitam appativattiyaṁ: ibid. pp. 11–2). This fixes, once and for all, the down-to-earth reality of the Dhammacakkappavattana as the preaching of the newly discovered truth by the Buddha. The remoteness of an idea of founding a kingdom, in like manner, comes to be convincingly established.

Thus, the setting is clear. Siddhattha Gotama had renounced his life of luxury and self-indulgence in the royal palace; he had also renounced the natural, normal pleasures of a home-life and become an ascetic, practising self-mortification. In this last stage he had been joined by a group of five ascetics, Koṇḍañña, Vappa, Bhaddiya, Mahānāma and Assaji, who looked up to him as their leader and who felt disappointed and frustrated not only, when he left them but especially when they heard that he had returned to a “life of plenty”. It became, therefore, necessary to explain to them the correct position, that Gotama’s views about a life of self-indulgence (kāmesu kāma-sukhallika) had not changed: he still considered it as a low practice, unworthy, unprofitable; he also bad to explain to them that by giving up his austerities he had not returned to luxury and devotion to the pleasures of sense. But if he condemned on the one hand self-indulgence as unworthy, he had likewise to condemn self-mortification. (attakilamatha) as painful, unworthy and aimless. And thus, e proclaims a new path, which avoids both extremes and which he, therefore, calls the middle path (majjhimā paṭipadā), which makes vision, which gives insight, which produces calming of the passions, intuitive knowledge awakening to the truth, and realization of Nibbāna.

This middle course is an inward change of heart and mind. Heart with its devotion and mind with its acquired knowledge,–-both have to be freed, which can be done according to the new method through the cultivation of correct views free from superstition and delusion, with a clear perception of their nature (sammā-diṭṭhi), with thoughts of non-violence, loving kindness and renunciation (sammā-saṅkappa), utter truthfulness (sammā-vācā) and purity of conduct (sammā-kammanta), a sinless, harmless occupation (sammā-ājiva), with self-control in duty bound (sammā-vāyāma), and above all, the cultivation of a watchful mind (sammā-sati) and earnnest concentration (sammā-samādhi).

The method is given first, because the object of the search was common to all. Yet, there was a difference, and an essential one, which makes the teaching of the Buddha stand apart. What is common to all is the quest for happiness. The difference is in the concept and in the method of conquest.

All search for happiness, because all experience unhappiness, as sorrow or pain in birth, decay and death, as loss from what is loved, as bodily suffering or metal upset, as worry or unrest. To be associated with things disliked, to be separated from what is liked, to live with wishes unfulfilled, that too is suffering. It is this conflict, in which man tries to conquer he does not know what, and which he either tries to forget in self-indulgence, in pleasure-seeking which is not giving happiness, or which he tries to escape in cutting off all sources of sorrow, i.e., conflict in relationship by seeking solitude, temptations of the body by asceticism, wanderings of the mind by systematic thought-control. And thus his positive search for happiness is a mistaken escape from conflict, and whether the escape is made in self-indulgence or in, self-mortification, the basis of the conflict, viz. “self”, is not understood.

Whether the desire is for more pleasure (self indulgence) or for less satisfaction (self-mortification) it remains desire. And even if the “self” is sublimated, there still remains the desire of the “higher” self as the basis of the conflict. It is the craving for-sense-pleasure (kāma-taṇhā), the craving for existence (bhava-taṇhā), the craving for non-existence (vibhava-taṇhā) which is the cause of conflict (dukkha). For, whatever the form of desire, whether eternalist or annihilationist, its basis is the concept of “self” which is loved and cultivated, or hated and sought to be destroyed. Hence, if the basis of this conflict is no more, conflict itself will arise no more.

To know the “self”, therefore, becomes of the highest importance. And the method of coming to know is the middle path, mentioned earlier.

Thus, this discourse contains the fundamental principles of the Buddha’s teaching, the Four Noble Truths: the universal fact of conflict (dukkha), which is caused (samudaya) by a desire for permanency in the universal flow of the impermanent (anicca). The cessation (nirodha) of such desire must bring about the cessation of conflict. But the cessation of desire cannot be brought about either by satisfying such desires, or by suppressing them, but only by understanding their true nature, the true nature of life, of “self”. This process of understanding, intellectually and emotionally, theoretically and practically, is the middle path, the Noble Eightfold Path, which forms the final of the Four Noble Truths.

Here follows the translation of the text as found in the Vinaya account, dotted lines indicating repetitions:

“These two ends, monks, should not be followed by one who has gone forth. Which two? That which is, among sense-pleasures, addiction to attractive sense-pleasures, low, vulgar, bourgeois, base, leading to no good; and that which is addiction to self-mortification, painful, base, leading to no good. Now, a middle course has been thoroughly understood by me, who has gone that way (Tathāgata) without following either of these two extremes, which leads to insight, which gives understanding, which conduces to tranquillity, super-knowledge, awakening and Nibbāna. And what is this middle course \dots? It is first this Noble Eight-fold Path, namely, right understanding, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration \dots

“And this, monks, is the noble truth of conflict: birth is woe, old age is woe, disease is woe, dying is woe; association with what is not dear is conflict, separation from what is dear is conflict, not getting what one wants is conflict,–-in short the five aggregates of clinging (physical, and mental) are conflict.

“And the noble truth of the cause of this conflict, monks, is craving that leads back to birth, along with the lure and lust that lingers longingly now here, then there, i.e., craving for sense-pleasures, craving for existence, craving for disintegration.

“And this is the noble truth of ending the conflict, the complete and passionless cessation of that very craving, its renunciation and surrender, the release therefrom and the absence of longing.

“The noble truth of the method which leads to the ending of conflict is the Noble Eightfold Path”.

Then the Buddha related to the five ascetics how at the thought of the noble truth of conflict, its arising, its cessation, and the method of ceasing, a vision arose within him of things not experienced before, with knowledge, wisdom and insight. He understood the nature of conflict, the necessity of ceasing; and then he realised that the conflict had ceased. It was that vision of realisation that purified him, awakened him in supreme enlightenment. And he knew that his freedom of mind was unshakeable, that this was his last life, that there would be for him no further birth.

And what was the effect of this discourse on his audience? All five rejoiced in his words and were delighted, but only one had understood that whatever is of a nature to arise is likewise of a nature to cease. It was Koṇḍañña in whom arose the pure and stainless eye of insight which gave him the name Aññā-Koṇḍañña.

Among the salient features of this discourse the following are outstanding: (1) exposition of a middle way; (2) logical application of the law of causality; (3) analysis of the symptom reducing it to its base; (4) methodical solution; (5) comprehensive and all inclusive doctrine.

Only its last feature “all-inclusive” may require some little elucidation. The discourse refers to conflict (dukkha) caused by craving for lasting pleasure; but lasting pleasure is unobtainable owing to the impermanent nature (anicca) of all things; the conflict arises in the desire for a permanent the teaching of “self” in an impermanent world: the teaching of anatta solves the conflict. The doctrine of dependent origination (paṭiccasamuppāda) is here condensed in the law of causality: Whatever arises is subject to decay. Rebirth, based on action motivated by desire, is the outcome of the will-to-become. Cessation of becoming is the goal (attha), elsewhere named Nibbāna, and the toad thereto is the culture of both heart and mind, practice and knowledge.

Certain variations have crept into the story with the passage of years, and thus we find, e.g., in the Lalitavistara (chap. xxvi) that Rudraka, the son of Rāma, had died seven days earlier and Aḷāra Kālāma only three days before the Buddha decided to preach his doctrine to his former companions.

An episode which occurred on his having to cross the Ganges by ferry is not found in the Pali texts. The ferryman refused to cross without being paid his fare; and as the Buddha had no passage-money he traversed the river by air, the ferryman recognising the greatness of the traveller too late. As a result of this incident king Bimbisāra allowed all religious mendicants free passage.

On reaching Bārāṇasī the Buddha does not set out for the Deer-Park immediately, as is related in the Pali Vinaya (Vin. I, p. 8), but makes the tour of the town for alms-food before going to Isipatana (Ṛṣipatana) where the five ascetics dwell. Their reception is equally cool, in Pali and in Sanskrit, although Kauṇḍinya does not express his disapproval in words. Their subsequent discomfort with the Buddha’s approach is vividly drawn in the Lalitavistara (loc. cit.) in a comparison with a caged bird’s desire to fly away when a fire is placed underneath its cage. Soon they throw off all their reserve and receive the Buddha with all the honour and respect due to a revered teacher. Not only do they receive his bowl and robe, prepare a seat and footstool, and water to wash his feet, but they worship at his feet, prepare a full bath for him in a beautiful pond, surrounding him with all their care and attention, love and affection.

Then, on the spot where the Buddha is going to set a-rolling the wheel of righteousness, there appear a thousand seats composed of the seven precious things. The Buddha of the present age, out of respect for those Buddhas who have preceded him in this world-cycle, viz. Krakucchanda, Kanakamuni and Kaśyapa, passes by the first three seats, keeping his right side turned that way, and occupies the fourth seat on which he sits himself cross-legged.

Amidst brilliant light illuminating even the darkest corners of the universe the earth trembles and various celestial phenomena occur, while Brahma, the lord of the suras-devas, entreats the Buddha to set a-rolling the best of wheels. Following this a great being, a bodhisattva named Cakravartin, offers the wheel of the Norm, decorated and embellished with precious ornaments and flower-garlands. And although the sky is filled with all the gods of 3000 worlds, and the earth is covered with asuras, kinnaras and men, yet not a sound is heard; all, hushed and silent, turn their gaze towards the Conqueror (jina), who thus passes the first watch of the night in silence.

Towards the middle of the night he speaks some words of encouragement, and only during the final watch of the night he addresses the five ascetics about the two extremes to be avoided by one who has left home to homelessness, the extreme of self-indulgence and the extreme of self-mortification. He proposes the Noble Eightfold Path as the middle way.

As in the Pali text, now follow the Four Noble Truths; and till the end of the discourse the versions are identical. The miraculous, however reappears immediately afterwards. At the request of Maitreya bodhisattva the Buddha describes the marvellous qualities of the wheel of the Norm; and the Lalitavistara continues with several pages enumerating the many epithets of the Buddha and their meanings, concluding thus: “because the knowledge of the Buddha is infinite, not to be measured like the sky, one could live and speak for a whole world-cycle of the qualities of the Buddha without exhausting their enumeration”.

Whereas the two accounts given in the Pali Vinaya (Mahāvagga: (Vin. I, p. 10) and in the Sanskrit Lalitavistara (Lal. p. 416 ff.) have put this first sermon in its proper place in the consecutive narrative after the enlightenment, the Sanskrit Mahāvastu (Mhvu. III, p. 331 ff.) breaks off the course of the Jātaka narratives and makes a fresh start with the insertion of these first events as an independent chapter, although identical to all intents and purposes with the Pali account. A different way of expressing the same idea may be found, e.g., in the opening phrases, where the Buddha (according to the Vinaya account) speaks of the two extremes, “which should not be followed by one who has gone forth” (dve' me antā pabbajitena na sevitabbā), which is recorded in the Mahāvastu as the two extremes “to which a man who has gone forth is liable” (dvāvimaū pravrajitasya antau). The Mahāvastu also expands the description of the extreme of self-indulgence with “not conducing to a future life of holiness, to disgust with a worldly life, to dispassionateness, to cessation, to aloofness, to enlightenment, to Nirvāṇa”.

The middle path to which the Tathāgata is fully awakened (Vin.) is here (Mhvu.) described as the dharmavinaya. Whereas the Pali account (Vin.) details the four Noble Truths immediately after the enumeration of the eight sections of the middle path, the Sanskrit versions (Lal. and Mhvu.) insert an oratorical question and reply about the Four Noble Truths before describing them each in detail. Likewise the Pali Vinaya in the section on the truth of the arising of conflict (dukkha-samudaya-sacca) merely refers in general to the “five groups of grasping” (pañca-upādāna-khandha), but the Sanskrit Mahāvastu and Lalitavistara mention the five aggregates by name. On the other hand, the three kinds of craving, explained (Vin. and S.) as desire for pleasures of sense (kāma-taṇhā), desire for rebirth (bhava-taṇhā) and desire for non-existence: (vibhava-taṇhā), have been omitted later-(Mhyu. and Lal.).

Again, in the section on the noble truth of cessation of conflict, “the complete and passionless cessation of craving, its renunciation and surrender, the release therefrom and the absence of longing”–-(Vin.) has been re-arranged as “the utter extinction of this craving which is bound up with the passion for pleasure, finding delight in this and that; it is, passionlessness, cessation, self-sacrifice, renunciation and surrender” (Mhvu.), to which two further qualifications of craving are added (Lal.) namely, “which is bearing and productive” (janikā, nivartikā).

Both Mahāvastu and Lalitavistara have inserted “through right reflection” (yoniso manasikāra) in each of the four sentences, where the Buddha speaks of light arising in him on thinking of the four Noble Truths in turn.

All versions speak of the three sections of the four Noble Truths, making twelve modes. The three sections of each truth are the, knowledge (ñāṇa) thereof, its function (kicca) and its accomplishment (kata) with respect to the truth of conflict which has to be comprehended (parññeyya), the cause of conflict which has to be eradicated (pahatabba), the cessation of conflict which has to be realised (sacchikātabba) and the path leading to the cessation of conflict which has to be developed (bhāvetabba). But there is some variation in the Sanskrit version with regard to the internal arrangement of the sections and the modes (tiparivaṭṭa, dvādāsakāra).

Tibetan versions are found in the Kangyur (Dulva IV, folio 64–7 which compares with the Vinaya; Mdo XXX, fol. 427–30 which compares with the Sutta Piṭaka in Pali; and Mdo XXVI, fol. 88–91 which compares with the Sanskrit Abhiniṣkramaṇa Sūtra and Dharmacakra Sūtra, ibid: fol. 431–4) with slight variations. But these differ, much from the Tibetan translation of the Lalitavistara which has been incorporated in the 2nd volume of the Mdo (sūtra) section.

The most notable omission in the Tibetan translation in the sūtras (Mdo XXX) is the third section, i.e., the accomplishment, in respect of each of the four Noble Truths. Thus the truth of conflict is stated, the fact that it has to be comprehended is acknowledged, but not the fact of accomplishment, i.e., of comprehension. Likewise, the truth of the origin of conflict is stated as well as the necessity of the cause to be eradicated, but not the fact that the cause of woe has been uprooted. The truth of cessation of conflict is mentioned together with its need to be realised, but not the fact that it has been realised by the Buddha. And finally, the path is known; known is also the necessity of developing; but the actual progress on the path is not referred to. Thus only eight of the twelve modes are shown, although collectively the four truths are said to be viewed in three ways, forming twelve aspects. Also he final assertion of the Buddha: “Now knowledge and insight have arisen in me so that I know. Sure is my heart’s release. This is my last birth. There is no more becoming for me” reads in its Tibetan version: “This knowledge has arisen in me: I have achieved deliverance as never has been achieved before. I have obtained Nirvāṇa so that there will be no future birth”.

Following the Pali versions of the Vinaya and Saṁyutta-nikāya the Norm had been well set rolling “not to be turned back by any recluse or brāhman, any deva, māra or brahmā, or any other creature in the world”. The Sanskrit Mahāvastu, however, followed by the Tibetan Chos kyi ḥkhor-lo rab-tu bskor-baḥi mdo (Dharma-cakra-prayartana Sūtra), has suppressed the term “brahmās” twice in this context. The repetition of the omission suggests it to be intentional, but the motive is not clear.

A final diversion is provided by Koṇḍañña (Kauṇḍinya) who understands the meaning of the discourse so well that he acquired the unimpaired and unblemished pure insight that whatever is of a nature to arise is likewise of a nature to cease. This is to be understood as his attainment of the first stage of sainthood, the stream-enterer (sotāpanna). But the Tibetan tradition asserts Kauṇḍinya to have become an Arahant (AMG. V, 20, 122), so that the second discourse on “non-self” was preached only to the four remaining disciples.

Name of a school of Buddhist thought, based on the Vijñānavāda (Yogācāra) of Asaṅga. It was Hsüan-tsang, one of the most noteworthy scholars of China, who during his famous travels through India (629–45 C.E.) studied this philosophy under the guidance of Śīlabhadra, and introduced the doctrine by founding the Dharmalakṣaṇa school in China under the name Fa-hsiang-tsung (Japanese: Hossō). Hsüan-tsang’s pupil Kuei-chi (632–82) is also mentioned as a founder of this school, for it was he who actually systematised the school with his two important works, the Ta-ch-eng-fa-yuam-i-lin-chang (Taishō, No. 1861) and the Cheng-wei-shih-lun-shu-chi (ibid., No.1830) which are the fundamental texts of this school.

Hsüan-tsang and his pupil Kuei-chi followed chiefly the annotations and opinions of Dharmapāla of Nālandā on Vasubandhu’s Triṁśikā, which resulted in the Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi in 30 volumes, the fundamental treatise of the school.

A distinction is made between the specific character (lakṣaṇa) and the nature (svabhāva) of the thusness (tathatā) of dharma, thereby separating the fact from the principle. The facts, i.e., the specific characters (lakṣaṇa) of the dharma, are the manifestations of the elements. And it is from this tenet that the school derives its name.

(Pali Dhammuttara, Dhammuttarika, Dhammuttariya), one of the eighteen schools of Buddhism referred to in Buddhist literature. Tradition in the North West considers this sect to be the first to branch off from the Vātsīputriyas (Vajjiputtakas) towards the middle of the third century after the Parinirvāṇa of the Buddha. It should be noted that the Kathāvatthu does not make any mention of this school.

According to Bhavya (cf. also K'uei-chi III, p. 6) this school was founded by a teacher called Dharmottara and hence its name. This is confirmed by the Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā Sūtra (Taishō, No. 468, p. 501). Bhavya mentions also that there are other traditions giving different versions of its origin. Thus, the tradition of Sammitiyas, as quoted by Bhavya, places them together with the Bhadrayāniyas as a sub-division of the Mahāgiriya which, too, is a major branch of the Vātsīputriyas. An inscription, dated from the second century C.E., prove their presence at Kārle, Soparala and Junnar, in the mountain ranges near Bombay.

According to Paramārtha, the Dharmottariyas were one of the four schools who completed the Abhidharma-Piṭaka of the Vātsīputriyas, also called Śāriputra-Abhidharma or Dharmalakṣaṇa-Abhidharma in nine parts, which are commentaries based on the meaning of sūtras (P. Demieville, Origine des Sectes bouddhiques, pp. 23, 58).

Little is known of their doctrine. From available sources it appears that a fundamental teaching of this school is that in birth is ignorance and in arresting of birth is the arresting of ignorance (Rockhill, Life of the Buddha, London, 1907, p. 194). The Dharmottariyas share with the Mahāsaṅghikas, the Sthaviras and several other schools in the doctrine of non-existence of the “soul” or “self” and say that those who teach about the existence of a “self” are merely heretics preaching views similar to those held by the tīrthakas (Rockhill, op. cit., p. 185).

Warder mentions that Dharmottariyas were found in Aparanta on the coast of Mahārāshtra (A.K., Warder, Indian Buddhism, India, 1970, p. 292). According to him this school branched off from the Vātsīputriyas owing to some difference of opinion they held with regard to the Abhidharma (Warder, op. cit., p. 275).

Adhering to false views, the second of the four attachments or clingings, the other three being attachment to the pleasures of the senses (kāmupādāna), to works of righteousness (sīlabbatu°) and to the views of individuality (attavādu°: D. III 230, Dhs. §§ 1215, 1536).

The Cūlasīhanāda Sutta (M. I, p. 66) refers to these four kinds of grasping and mentions that only the first type is known to some recluses and brahmans, to some others also the second (diṭṭhi-upādāna) and even the third, but the adherence to the false view of individuality (attavādupādāna) is comprehended only by the followers of the Buddha.

The false views (diṭṭhi) here referred to, therefore, do not appear to include the false view of individuality.

The origin of this kind of grasping is said to be craving etc. in the usual sequence of dependent origination (paṭiccasamuppāda).

(Skt. dveṣa), hatred, one of the three unwholesome roots which determine the actual immoral quality of volitional states and a conscious thought with, its mental factors.

The three unwholesome roots (akusala-mūla) are greed (lobha), hatred (dosa) and delusion (moha). But, whereas delusion is found in any unwholesome deed or thought (for, evil is essentially a product of ignorance), greed and hatred stand as two opposites, as attraction and repulsion, respectively.

Hatred, then, comprises all degrees of repulsion from the faintest trace of ill-humour up to the highest pitch of hate and wrath (BD. p. 94). Thus, ill-will, evil intention, wickedness, corruption and malice are but various expressions and degrees of dosa (PED. s.v.). Killing is shown (A. I, p. 216); V, p. 261) to be a result of a mind obsessed by hate.

Hate, of course, is inspired by wrong views (micchā-diṭṭhi), for, if things are seen and understood in their proper perspectives, no ill feelings can arise. Envy (issa), selfishness (macchariya) and worry (kukkucca) are always associated with hatred or ill-will (dosa). Sometimes, obduracy (thīna) and sluggishness (middha) are closely connected with certain forms of hatred.

A hateful temperament is said to be due to a predominance of the elements of cohesion (āpo) and oscillation (vāyu) and also to a preponderance of phlegm (semha) over the other humours in the body (Vism. III, § 80–1).

Hatred is paraphrased in Abhidhamma terminology as a disordered temper, getting upset, a feeling of disgust (Dhs. § 418), the throwing off of a normal state and the abrupt reaction of rage (assuropa: DhsA. 258). It is annoyance (āghāta) at the thought of harm done to oneself or to someone dear, or good done to a person disliked. It may spring up as vexation due to climatic conditions which prove a momentary obstacle, such as the wind preventing one to dress (DhsA. 367). This would lead to resentment (paṭighāta) and repugnance (paṭigha), the latter being more a Passive state of sense-reaction.

Synonyms are not lacking: ill-temper, irritation, indignation (kopa, pakopa, sampalopa); antipathy, aversion, detestation (padosa, saṁpadosa, manopadosa); opposition, hostility (virodha, paṭivirodha: Dhs. §§ 418, 1060).

As malevolence (vyāpāda), it is one of the five hindrances (nīvaraṇa), which are so called because they trammel thought; it is also one of the ten fetters (saṁyoyana), Which prevent progress on the Path of holiness (ariya-magga).

All these various terms, though mainly synonymous, have in application of meaning a shade of difference. Thus, the passive resistance which is resentment and repugnance (paṭigha) is a psycho logical reaction to the feeling of hate (dosa), while malevolence, which is malignant ill-will (vyāpāda), is active, volitional and intentional hate. The intensifying degrees of hatred are also shown in the composition of the terms (kopa, palopa, sampalopa; dosa, padosa, sampadosa, manopedosa). But compared with repugnance (paṭigha) which is called a powerful type of anger (balavakodha), dosa is referred to as a weak type (dubbala-kodha: DA. I, p. 116).

Thus, the following gradation would appear: dosa is the root (mūla) of all opposition, which develops into the psychological reaction of repugnance (paṭigha) and is intensified into a malignant obstruction as malevolence (vyāpāda).

As a cause (hetu) of further corruption, dosa has to be put away. The method advocated in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī (Dhs. §§ 1007, 1011) is by means of mind culture (bhāvanā), i.e., by a systematised effort in self-training. Mindfulness in what concerns the body or bodily action (kāyagatā-sati) is said (A. I, p. 43) to be the one thing needful for the perfecting of this culture.

Further it is said by the Buddha: “Give up one thing and I can assure you non-returning. What one thing? Ill-will, monks is the one thing you must give up and I can assure you non-returning”. (It. pp. 1–2)).

On the other hand, if this root is not eradicated, it becomes the foundation (nidāna) for further growth and fruit. “An act performed in malice, born of ill-will, originating in hate, arising from malevolence, has its fruit wherever an individual is reborn. And wherever that act comes to fruition, whether it comes into bearing in this very life or in some other phase of existence, there one experiences the fruit thereof” (A. I, p. 134).

The way of hate is indeed a means to heap up deeds, gathering like a ball (piṇḍakaraṇatthāya: (A. III, p. 338) and commentary); it is the coming into operation of the chain of causal action (kamma nidana-sambhava: (A. V, p. 262); it is likened to an all-consuming fire (dosaggi) in the Buddha’s third discourse, the well-known “Fire Sermon” (Adittapariyāya Sutta: (Vin. I, p. 34), (S. IV, p. 19).

As much as hate (dosa) is one of the roots of evil, the opposite, non-hate (adosa), is one of the roots of good, for although expressed in a negative way, non-hate is the “divine virtue” (brahma-vihāra) of benevolence and loving kindness, (mettā).

Although a full doctrinal discussion on this very important subject will have to wait for an exposition on the technical term Śūnyatā, it will not be out of place to show here already the essential and basic platform of the earliest teaching of the Buddha, as represented in Theravāda as it has survived up to this date, and of the early developments in other Hīnayāna schools, Madhyamaka, Sarvāstivāda and Vijñaptimātratā, covering the first centuries of world-Buddhism leading to Mahāyāna.

Already in the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta (Vin. I, pp. 13–4); (S. III, p. 66) ff.), the second discourse delivered by the Buddha to his newly found disciples, he explains his doctrine of denial of a theory of the permanent nature or of the reality of an “ego” behind the psychical phenomena or of a “substance” underlying the physical phenomena. In a purely analytical argument, the individual is seen as a psycho-physical compound, and whatever there is of body or of mind is further analysed without discovering anything of a permanent nature.

All conflict is based on the delusion of a permanent self, and, therefore, the discovery of the unreality of this delusory self will about the solution of all conflicts. Hence, the teaching of anatta has become the keynote of the entire structure of Buddhist thought. Conditioned existence is impermanent and wrought with woe (sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā, sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā), yet not only conditioned (saṅkhāra) but also the unconditioned (asaṅkhata), i.e., Nibbāna, is without self-entity (sabbe dhammā anattā). And this has never been in doubt with any school of Buddhist thought. This essential emptiness of mere phenomena (physical and mental) was fully understood for all its importance by commentators like Buddhaghosa in his Visuddhimagga (Vism. xix, S 20) where he follows the orthodox tradition of the Mahāvihāra, one of the earliest institutions in Ceylon, dating from the time of arahant Mahinda Aśvaghoṣa in his Saundarānanda (BI. XVI, p. 102), compares Nirvāṇa to the extinction of a flame; and likewise when individuality is extinguished, there is no more conflict.

Nāgārjuna, the great philosopher and founder of the Madhyamaka system of Buddhist philosophy, holding that truth is attainable by synthetic negation, also denied the reality of all physical and mental phenomena (sarva-dharma-śūnyatā). According to the Madhyamaka conception, Nirvāṇa is nothing but Śūnyā (void), which means a state about which neither existence nor non-existence could be predicated, for there is no abiding entity of which such an assertion could be made.

The Sarvāstivādins, although holding that everything exists (sarvaṁ asti), maintained also the essential emptiness of everything that has individual existence (pudgala-śūnyatā). The great commentator, Vasubandhu, in the beginning of the 5th century C.E., formulated an idealism which arose as a reaction against the extreme passivity of Nāgārjuna’s negativism. For him, the middle path lies neither in recognising the reality of all things, because outer things do not exist, nor in recognising the non-reality of all things, because ideations do exist. The Vijñaptimātratā, holding that ideation alone exists, denies the reality of everything else (bāhya-artha-śūnyatā). The reality of a concept, however, does not endow it with an abiding entity. This idealism was naturally opposed to the nihilism of the Satyasiddhi school where Harivarman maintained that truth is attainable by the recognition of non-entity, denying the reality of individuality (pudgala) as well as of matter and mind (dharma). That truth is the void of Nirvāṇa.

Even when the Yogācāras proposed a more positive emptiness with the element of vijñāna in it, and when later still an element of happiness (mahāsukha) was added and when subsequently this emptiness was formulated as the goddess Sūnyā in whose eternal embrace the individual mind (vijñāna) is locked in bliss and happiness, she is still called Nirātmā, the soulless one.

It is the doctrine of no-self which gave rise to the doctrine of compassion with others; and thus śúnya and karuṇā together constitute what is called the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta) in which is realised the true nature, the such-ness (tathatā) of all in the inherent purity of the non-existent, unborn void.

A state of hostility and hatred. An enemy (inimicus) is the opposite of a friend (amicus). But although opposites, they have one common basis, the subjective self. For, it is the “I” which seeks support in friends and which shuns those who do not provide such support. It is, therefore, in a lack of understanding (avijjā) that enmity is born. Hatred (dosa) and its many synonyms of anger, ill-will, malice, are hardly distinguishable from one another except perhaps in the intensity of emotion. As a state of hatred, enmity is naturally far deeper rooted than an occasional outburst of anger. But basically, although perhaps not etymologically, all forms of enmity (dosa, dveṣa) are founded on conflict, opposition and duality (dve). And whereas enmity seeks to solve the conflict of duality by eliminating the opponent, the deeper understanding of the conflict will see its cause in the “I”. Through understanding the emptiness of that “self”, the foundation of all opposition and duality disappears, and therewith the arising of enmity becomes an impossibility.

In Buddhist Psychology, joy, ease and happiness are incompatible with enmity and hate. In enmity (paṭivirodha) life itself becomes sour, “like gruel that has gone bad” (DA. I, p. 211), temper becomes disordered (Dhs. p. 84) and one is thrown off one’s normal state (DhsA. p. 258). It is the cause of mental fetters and moral corruption and cannot be put away by accumulation of good deeds, but only by mind-culture (bhāvanā) and insight (dassana: (Dhs. p. 184), i.e., through a mental awakening, which is an intellectual and spiritual conversion. The hostility (paṭivirodha) of Devadatta against the Buddha forms a point of discussion between king Milinda and Nāgasena (Miln. p. 203), and in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī (Dhs. p. 190) it is shown as one of the 27 manifestations of hate.

Is a detached state of mind which may cause a person to appear disinterested, or rather unbiased, without, however, losing his watchfulness and self-possession. It is an intelligent way of being aware without becoming attached and, therefore, the mind remains evenly balanced. Although this condition of the mind is always there in any stage of mental absorption (jhāna), it is not obviously observable while the mind is immersed in the early stages of concentration (vitakkavicāra) or when it is elated in spiritual ecstasy (pīti), or relaxed in well-being (sukha). And thus it becomes the characteristic of the final stage of mental absorption in the spheres of form (rūpa-jhāna). The commentary (DhsA. p. 177) compares this selection by means of elimination with that of a cowherd who does not attempt to capture directly a particular bull of the herd, but who allows all the animals to come out of the pen one by one, till the bull of his choice presents itself.

It is thus far from that kind of disinterestedness which is prompted by ignorance. Such lack of interest as a result of lack of understanding (aññāṇa) is a false manifestation of loving kindness (DhsA. p. 193). The proper function of equanimity is based on the appreciation of others and is manifested as well as consummated in the quieting of aversion and flattery (loc. cit.). It is, therefore, the intellectual control of emotional feelings which can produce a balanced attitude of equanimity, the acceptance of pleasure and pain, of prosperity and ill fate, when all is seen as the heritage of kamma (loc. cit.).

Equanimity does not always carry an ethical implication, for it may simply indicate a neutral feeling, when it is grouped together with other indeterminate (avyākata) factors, such as contact, sensation and perception (Dhs. 431) to constitute a mental state.

Equanimity is also referred to in Pali as a position and force of balance (tatramajjhattatā) and is as such incorporated in the “other incorporeal, causally induced states” (ye vā pana tasmiṁ samaye aññe pi atthi paṭiccasamuppamnā arūpino dhammā: Dhs. I, p. 9). It is explained by the commentator as a balance of mind which is a neutrality regarding various states; its function is checking deficiency and excess, or cutting off partisanship. By virtue of its indifference regarding consciousness and mental properties it should be regarded as a charioteer who treats with impartiality the well-trained horses he is driving (DhsA. p. 133).

Equanimity or poise (upekkhā) is the development of what are called the infinitudes (appamāṇa or appamaññā) or the four divine states (brahmavihāra), viz., benevolence (mettā), compassion (karuṇā), sympathetic joy (muditā) and equanimity (upekkhā: (D. I, p. 250); (M. I, p. 38); (S. IV, p. 296); (A. V, p. 299). It is through dwelling in these divine abodes that freedom of mind (cetovimutti) can be attained.

In its widest sense is that by which a thing is what it is, in other words, it is the very nature of a thing, and not a mere mode of existence. Any direct knowledge will not give a full comprehension of such reality, which has been given various names. The term “essence” is from the Latin verb “esse” to be; the term “reality” is derived from the Latin noun “res” the thing, meaning the thing in itself (Kant’s “das Ding an sich”), the term “nature” is connected with the Latin verb “nasci”, to be born, and therefore indicates the condition or composition of a thing without subsequent external influences or modifications; the term “quiddity” is formed from an artificial Latin noun “guidditas” based on the interrogative pronoun “quid”, “what”?

The essence, therefore, is the answer to the question: what is the natural state of a thing in itself? In Oriental philosophy this is referred to in Pali and Sanskrit as “tathatā”, that is the “thus-ness” or “such-ness”, the true nature or state of things. The Buddha refers to himself always as the Tathāgata, the one who has gone into the real nature of things, who has come at the essence of things (tathā+āgata) He who has won (through to the) truth: C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Dhs. trsl. 1099, n. 2. One who has come at the real truth: Chalmers, JRAS. 1898, pp. 103–15. Buddhaghosa has eight other interpretations, most of them rather fanciful..

The search for truth which is the basic quest of philosophy is doomed to fail from the very outset when a definition of truth is set up in advance. The method and the goal of search vary with the objects and theories of the many schools of thought who modulate the truth according to their principles, whether monistic, dualistic or pantheistic, idealistic or materialistic, etc. Whenever truth is made an objective goal it becomes a predetermined objective which is not likely to be the thing in itself, the real truth.

And so the search for the essence is not to be a search for a substance hidden among and covered over by phenomena.

Essence is the constant and necessary nature of a thing as contrasted with its accidents. Frequently the term is used with the same meaning as “substance”. “Substance”, however, is the entity which underlies (sub-stare) the properties or phenomena of a thing. The confusion can be traced to Aristotle resulting from his doctrine, conceiving substance as the essential qualities of a thing, distinguished only from their essence by the fact that they exist, a confusion between the logical subject and that which remains permanent throughout accidental changes. It was again Aristotle who first made the distinction between matter and form, for it is the philosophical conception of matter which marks the metaphysics of Aristotle. Matter, for him, is the undifferentiated element, unknowable in itself, but determinable by form through which it becomes knowable and even sensible. These terms, “matter” and “form”, have found a place also in Kantian philosophy, where “form” constitutes the rational and intelligible elements of cognition of “matter” as the “thing-in-itself”.

Unfortunately, writers have sometimes used these very terms in translating the Pali terms nāma and rūpa whereby rūpa, the material element, is presented as the “form” given to matter by the mind (nāma), which gives a “nam” (nāma) to matter.

The essence, the nature, the thus-ness (tathatā) is the actuality, the true (tatha) condition of a thing. And thus, as the nature of all things is conditioned and impermanent, impermanence and conditioned existence form the essence of every component.

Essence, therefore, is the abstract nature of a thing in existence, whether such existence is logical, ontological or metaphysical, being or becoming. This had led to a philosophical distinction between essence and existence, various schools giving their varied speculations, but mostly agreeing in considering “essence” as the abstract counterpart to the concrete entity in existence. Whereas existence, whether actual or potential, real or functional, substantial or phenomenal, is merely an affirmation of what is already, “essence” is the very nature, construction, composition, causation. Essence, therefore, is not merely related to existence, as potentiality to actuality, for in the process of existence which is becoming, there is the nature, the essence of that process. On the other hand, the essence of a thing, of a process, etc. can be thought of, and therefore exists logically, even without that thing or process being or becoming in existence, physically.

When the Buddha gave his solemn utterances that all component things are impermanent (sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā) and that all component things are conflicting (sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā), he gave the essential nature of a complex. Such essence has no physical existence, yet is actual as the only reality, the only truth (tathatā); and as such it is absolute, for its existence does not depend on relationship; it is always true, even if there were no existence, no components, no complexes. Only its actuality, i.e., its existence, in the process of becoming is dependent on the fact of composition (sabkhāra).

It is then the essence of all component things to be decomposable, but this impermanent nature (which is the essence) is in itself permanent, because it is the nature of essence to be unchangeable. Hence truth, Nibbāna, or whatever name may be given to the absolute, is permanent, is non-complex, because it is the essence itself, but it is never to be thought of as a metaphysical entity (sabbe dhammā anattā).

And that is the difference between the essence and the substance, although, loosely used, they appear sometimes as synonyms. For, a substance is a definite entity which is the basis of the dependent phenomena. A substance cannot be thought of without its properties, qualities, or phenomena, and it does not have, therefore, even a logical separate, independent existence. In the teaching of the Buddha on anatta it is totally denied, and in the developed teaching of śūnya the voidness of everything is pursued to its furthest logical conclusions.

Essence, on the other hand, always remains an abstract mental concept and exists only as such. Therefore, we may rightly speak of the essence of the Buddha’s teaching being his doctrine of the unsubstantiality of everything, including Nibbāna.

The unconditioned nature (tathatā-asaṁskṛtadharma) is called by Vasubandhu “the transcendental essence of everything and it is termed ‘suchness’ because its essential nature is real and eternal; but it is beyond reach of human language; it is indefinable” (Yamakami Sogen, Systems of Buddhist Thought, p. 229, Calcutta 1912). The essential nature or suchness is unconditioned, because it does not stand in need of the assistance of any agency. In fact if it cannot manifest itself, it is because it is obscured in the presence of conditions. Hence only in the elimination of conditions the true nature or essence can be discerned. And if in this process of elimination the core proves to be an empty shell, then emptiness (śūnya) will have to be accepted as the essence of all things, and unsubstantiality (anatta) as the essence of all phenomena (dhamma).

The process adopted by the Buddha to arrive at the essence is the process of analysis (vibhajja). The individual, the self, which is an empirical fact from which all investigation must of necessity take an origin, is thus analysed as a physico-psychical component, in which the body with its component parts and the mind with its sensations, perceptions, ideations and thoughts prove to be mere passing events and phenomena without a substance, without a permanent entity. The passing or changing nature of all events is their essential nature and that is based on the unsubstantiality of all. This unsubstantiality, therefore, constitutes the ultimate nature, the essence of all things and events or components, even of the one uncomposed and absolute Nirvāṇa. And this teaching of unsubstantiality (anatta, śūnyatā) is the essence of the teaching of the Buddha, its real nature, not to be found in any religious system which has the search and salvation of a soul as its goal.

A doctrine which believes in a beginningless and incessant existence, infinite both in past and future. This doctrine is rarely found in the full strength of application, but is usually restricted to infinite existence in the future, i.e., immortality, or infinite duration in time. This limitation of eternal existence to the future only has two grounds: a physical ground which sees and experiences the relative beginning and the arising of things around, aṇḍ a psychological ground which refuses to accept the cessation of existence centred round the I-concept.

Yet, logically there should be no greater difficulty in accepting an eternal existence in the past without creation, than an eternal continuation at least of a “soul” in the future. The refusal to accept the former and the insistence on the latter at the same time show already the weak ground on which these dogmas of creation and immortality are founded.

One solution has been tried by the concept of “eternal generation” which, however, is usually confined to the theological view in Christianity of the continuous process of generation of the Son of the Father, opposing the emanation of the same according to the Gnostic view.

Schellings’s definition of eternity as “existence outside time” and Hegel’s “absolute timelessness” point to an enduring and changeless essence without relation to beginning, creation, succession or cessation.

The idea of eternity is, therefore, a negative concept which the imagination endeavours to picture by removing the limits of experience. But, however far the limits are pushed back and forward, no concept is possible without limitation and hence eternity will remain forever beyond experience and it must of necessity be non-actual.

All arguments to prove the existence of eternity either in God or in the soul are but verbal gymnastics and can easily be turned into proofs of the very opposite. E.g., the proof from the law of causation does not lead to an eternal uncaused cause, for that “concept” would upset the very law of causation which is quoted in support.

On the other hand, the refutation of eternalism or absolute eternal existence does not necessarily lead to an absolute origination or spontaneous self-creation. For there is the Buddha’s solution of dependent origination or evolution which does not require an eternal entity to exist as a first cause, but allows for individual origination from pre-existing conditions without an absolute and ultimate origin. In this sense, eternity is a fact, because no beginning in the absolute sense is discernible, but it is an eternal process of evolution and involution, i.e., of constant change, of a permanent impermanence, however paradoxical that may sound.

In this eternal process there is bound to recur a recombination of forces with a cyclical recurrence which has given ground to the doctrine of saṁsāra, in which even the teaching of the Buddha will recur and disappear, without continued existence of a soul, whether ātma or paramātma.

Plato’s eternal ideas, Aristotle’s eternal forms and Whitehead’s eternal objects are but qualitative characteristics of actuality, incompatible with the very nature of actuality. Action is essentially change, and if there be anything of the nature of eternity in action, it must be that of eternal change.

Eternalism is as old as man’s desire for continued existence (bhava-taṇhā) and already during the time of the Buddha a school of philosophy was found who had made this thesis of eternalism the basic tenet of their views (sassata-diṭṭhi). It was this doctrine which Acela-Kassapa, Kassapa, the unclothed, discussed with the Buddha at Rājagaha (S. II, p. 20) who pointed out that the view that it is one and the same person who acts and who experiences the results, which is the doctrine of “suffering self-wrought” (sayaṁkataṁ dukkhaṁ), amounts to the eternalist theory. This theory is further expanded as the belief that this is the self (so attā), this is the world (so loko), this I shall become hereafter (so pecca bhavissāmi), permanent (nicco), everlasting (dhuvo), eternal (sassato) and not subject to change (aviparināma-dhammo: (S. III, p. 98). But this view itself is a compound mental formation (saṅkhāra) which is conditioned. “By what is it caused, from what is it born, by what is it produced? (kiṁnidāna, kiṁsamudayā, kiṁjātikā, kiṁpabhavā). Nourished by feeling, born of contact with ignorance, there arises craving, which produces this mental formation” (ibid. p. 96).

The Brahmajāla Suttanta (D. I, p. 13) ff.) distinguishes four kinds of Eternalists who on different grounds proclaim that both the soul and the world are eternal, and partial Eternalists who maintain that the soul and the world are partly eternal and partly not (ibid. pp. 17 ff.). But the Sampasādaniya Suttanta (D. III, pp. 107–10)) has selected only three classes of Eternalists for reference, who have in common their belief, based on remembrance of previous lives.

The search for Truth, for realisation, emancipation and enlightenment assumes in most people the form of a positive quest. They even personify the object of their search, which becomes a pursuit of God or the Absolute. Though great spiritual men have declared that “the kingdom of God is within thee”, the search becomes a pursuit of an objectified imagination. But a “running after” is also a running-away, an escape. In this pursuit however, and not before, man feels that he is fettered, and his longing to be free, in order to become united with the object of his spiritual desire, becomes stronger. Feeling his impotency to break those chains with which he is fettered–-whence he knows not–-he tries to obtain help from outside. But in relying upon outside help he goes further and further away from the “kingdom” within, and he merely makes new bonds which tie him down even stronger than before.

It is only the man who searches within that feels the weight of his fetters. There are millions who perceive no bond whatever and feel themselves free in the gratification of their sense-desires. Still, their very search for ever greater satisfaction of the sense proves the emptiness of their lives, which are bound by the gross chains of the flesh.

True freedom, real emancipation, cannot be had by running away with the fetters, with which we are shackled nor by amusing ourselves within the prison walls, nor by clinging to them, but by breaking those fetters and prison walls, which have been forged by tradition, convention, society and religion. To break these fetters we must know them, realise that they are fetters and not supports. When this is understood, it produces pure action (kriyā), i.e., not action (kamma) which produces reaction (vipāka), as such action itself is a reaction to an environment which we have not understood. And this pure action without purposeful striving will break the spell of delusion, the fetters which keep us bound.

Delusion is intensified by the abuse of language. Sarcastically it has been said, that words are used to hide our thoughts. If we mean one thing, but we say something else, it can only lead to greater confusion. In the following pages words like “mind” and “cause” have not been used, except in connection with the views of others, because there is nothing corresponding to these sounds. “Mind” is the act of thinking, which may be more or less perfect in awareness, but remains action nevertheless. Mind in the sense of something which can think, is non-existent. Similarly “cause” in the ultimate sense does not exist outside the faith of the pious believer in God. Hence preference is given to expressions like “condition”. It would have been good, if words like “I” and “Self” could have been omitted, for they too represent a non-existing entity; but their avoidance would cripple the language so much that speaking and writing would become impossible.

According to Buddhism there are ten fetters that bind beings to the saṁsāric existence. The texts enumerate them as follows: sakkāya diṭṭhi, vicikicchā, sīlabbata parāmāsa, kāmarāga, vyāpāda, rūparāga, arūparāga, māna, uddhacca, avijjā. The first five of these are called the “lower fetters” (orambhāgiya-saṁyojana) as they bind beings to the sensuous world. The latter five, “higher fetters” (uddhambhāgiya saṁyojana) because they bind beings to fine material and immaterial worlds. These fetters are gradually got rid of with the attainment of four spiritual stages.

The most formidable fetter is not the “I” consciousness or the consciousness of self, but the delusion of self. The consciousness of self would be the awareness of the real nature of ourselves. This is extremely rare, as we are mostly aware only of certain reactions which the environment has caused. Frequently we are not even aware that we react at all, and our actions amount to little more than mechanical responses to certain stimuli. This, of course, can never lead to the understanding of reality for as long as the current thoughts cannot detach themselves and are merely products of the environment, one cannot have a detached view, one but form a part of the mechanistic process of the universe, which one sees from inside, moving with and moved by the current of events without individuality, without the consciousness of self. It is the absence of such consciousness which produces this fetter of misconception of individuality.

The mechanistic world-view does not consider the mind as something separate from matter, and in this the Materialists are quite right. But are they not going too far, when they try to reduce mental reaction to the simple level of chemical reactions? Certainly, matter and material objects form conditions on which depends the arising of thoughts. Again, the grey matter of the brain together with the nervous system form the necessary instruments by which man thinks. And yet, all these materials brought together artificially, i.e., outside a living organism, do not produce thought.

It is with the recognition of these facts that the theory of annihilationism (uccheda-vāda) is rejected. But many, while freeing themselves from the rigid bonds which reduce man to a machine, have run away too far, have gone to the very opposite, which is the fetter of misconception of individuality as a separate I-entity. It is this glorified “self” which becomes a spiritual soul endowed with everlasting life (sassata-vāda). It is the delusion of self.

And how does consciousness become “self”-delusion? Thoughts arise dependent on contact with sense objects. The impressions of the environment on the senses produce reactions in the individual. Repeated reactions are differentiated and classified in different groups according to some common characteristics, in which process many particulars are overlooked, so that finally a sensation is judged as acceptable or not, i.e., agreeable or disagreeable. Subsequent events are similarly judged, compared, registered, by which process the faculty of memory is born.

Memory is thus a retention of past experiences. But those past experiences have been retained only partly to make classification possible. In other words, what the memory has learned from experience is extremely imperfect and entirely based on reactions to a changing environment which was not understood, which was accepted because it was agreeable, or rejected because it was disagreeable. The registration of these reactions, based on half understood untruths, forms the standard by which new experiences are judged and classified. Thus it happens that no event is judged purely on its own merits, for it is always measured according to the old standard. Every new thought is thus guided by past thoughts, conveyed in a direction particular to that individual, shaped and moulded until finally, tendencies are fixed and one’s character stereotyped.

In this process of fixation of character is born a sense of separateness which causes all inner limitations and isolations which form so many bonds and fetters, preventing growth and movement. Where consciousness of self would see a process of action, ever becoming and always new, there the delusion of self, sees a separation, permanent individualism, creating a “self” or a “soul” which is not only the recipient but also the custodian of all past experiences. The retention of past experiences prevents the full understanding of present and new experiences, while even the old ones have lost their value because they are dead and past and were never fully understood. And yet the understanding or rather the realisation of truth is only possible, if the individual process is understood. But as long as the reaction to the past prevents the full comprehension of the present, there cannot be true intelligence, though there may be knowledge.

Naturally, from this unnatural way of living in a dead past, from this lack of understanding the present environment, arises disharmony which is a conflict which only strengthens the opposition based on the delusion of self because this very conflict is classed as undesirable, i.e., not in harmony with the tendencies of “self”. Thus the delusion of self as a separate, isolated, permanent entity, which looks at the environment with the hostile eyes wherewith a house-owner would view a nightly intruder, becomes stronger with each new experience, always withdrawing deeper and deeper into the self-protective shell of its dead past.

Where the delusion of self sees isolation and permanence in individuality, there the consciousness of self sees an ever new becoming process of action. Where delusion of self lives on the past, consciousness of self lives on the present–-and is the present. True and full intelligence shows itself in the perfect action of the present moment, which solves the actual conflict–-not by forcing it into the mould of past experiences, thereby killing the present, nor by projecting it through purposeful striving into a future not yet born–-but by the understanding of “self” as a process of reaction to environment. It is the binding of one’s individuality to the dictates of the environment, expressed as laws of society and convention, religious prohibitions and selfish fears, traditions, habits, and customs–-it is the binding to the environment, which constitutes the fetter of the delusion of self, a fetter which can be broken only through the understanding of that environment of which the individual is a mere product. The understanding of “self” as a reaction makes it one with the ever changing environment, dissolves the delusion of its separateness, dispels the misconception of opposites and thereby ends the conflict.

To seek a method of breaking this spell of self-delusion would amount to the forging of a new fetter. The only thing to do is to live completely in the present, to change over from reaction to action, so that every moment is a new creation, not brought about by reactions like attraction or repulsion, but an independent action which alone is capable of giving true freedom and deliverance.

The delusion of separateness, leads one naturally to perplexity, resulting from that dual world-view. Perplexity arises from not facing the problem wholly; it is a lack of reflection (vicikicchita). Most people either confront a problem with their intellect alone, without consulting their real feelings; or they are guided by their emotions, separate from their understanding. When one enters the conflict with the intellect alone, it becomes like a dissecting knife, analysing, criticising, dislocating, dismembering and even taking away the vital breath of life. Knowledge makes man cold and heartless. And a solution thus forced upon a problem can only have the effect of a psychological suppression which results in the bursting of the bund elsewhere.

None can afford to ignore his feelings and tendencies. But to be guided by emotions without understanding is even worse than calculated crime; it is raving madness; for emotions are blind and none can say where they may lead to.

Perplexity then is due to the fact that brain and heart are in conflict. Reason tries to find motives wherewith to describe itself, but the heart within feels the wrong and cries out-in, protest. If the heart predominates, evil inclinations might try to overcome the resistance of the knowledge of duty, and the conflict is felt as a violation of sacred rights. This takes place in the person who is intellectually convinced of the right course of action, who does not waver in agitation and worry (uddhaccakukkucca), but who feels the lack of strength to act accordingly. This lack of strength is only imaginative; it is due to the tendency to preserve energy, to a certain reluctance to let go completely. The approach is partial, either intellectual, or emotional, and in this vacillation perplexity increases, bewilderment which paralyses action, induces postponement and lets the golden opportunity pass by.

Undecisiveness is such a strong fetter because it is mental inertia, producing unwieldiness of thought, checking all initiative, blocking all progress. Though often cloaked as conservatism, it actually is fear for change, fear to break the routine established by religion and society, fear to differ from others, to appear eccentric. Thus people prefer to embrace a ready made religion which was probably good only for the original founder. People are rather carried away downstream, even if they suspect disaster in the end, than to work themselves across the flood. It is a lack of self-confidence, a secret desire for snug self-security and comfort, which makes man refuse to take risks, to be disturbed even.

All this is due to remembrance of past weaknesses, when trials were made, followed by failures. And thus, even if a new trial is made, it is with much hesitation and diffidence; a back-door is kept open to return to old ways of living, either intellectually or emotionally, and the new situation is never met wholly. Remembrance of the past becomes a fetter on the movement of the present.

In perplexity we run away from discomfort to seek self-satisfaction elsewhere, not realising that “I”–-consciousness is at the root of all sorrow and conflict, we run away from transiency to look for the eternal truth, not realising that the whole significance of truth is in the transient; we run away from suffering to find a possible cure through the help of others to whom we pray, not realising that none can help us but we ourselves; we run away from conflict in the hope that the imitation of others in authority can solve our problems, not realising that by turning to others the problems of duality is made only more complicated and perplexity intensified.

It is this doubt which makes us search for the truth, thereby always missing it. Our search for truth is but a trial to escape from conflict, but it is not a solution thereof. It is this spirit of escapism which makes us study philosophies, practise systems of mind-control, follow codes of ethics, set up a standard of conduct, traditional, conventional, religious, or otherwise. In these, with “ostrich-policy”, we take shelter so as not to see the conflict any more. We have even made for ourselves an idea of truth, and we strive for its attainment. That goal some call “God” or “Brahman”, but others Enlightenment or Nirvāṇa. It is not the truth or its attainment we are disputing here, but the falsity of striving. Striving for a goal we do not know, is like searching for a thing which has not even entered the field of our imagination. But on the other hand, if the goal is known, we are in possession of the truth and searching becomes impossible. Thus all our striving is finally not for attainment but is a search for a shelter to find there comfort, consolation, an escape. As Nirvāṇa is independent from conditions (asaṅkhata) and cannot be produced (akata), all striving must fail and only cause greater perplexity.

We search in the past by means of our memory, recalling previous experiences; and distilling them like some elixir of life, we form with them a standard of living, another prop to support us in our perplexity, wherewith to conform to our daily life. Or we try to penetrate the veil which hides the future, to build up securities in coming lives. Thus our belief in rebirth or our constant questioning of its possibility is but a disguised craving for self- continuance. Rebirth understood as a process of action and effect, of conditioning environment and resulting reaction, will leave no room for enquiries about other spheres, about salvation or damnation. But in perplexity thoughts are ready to follow any lead; they will accept any doctrine which holds out some hope for the future. Then one might think that perplexity has been overcome in faith. In reality those doubts have merely been suppressed. Thoughts are not allowed to run freely and intelligently their natural course; they are submitted to religious authority, and thus blind faith blocks the road to mental development and to the understanding of the truth.

Perplexity should not be confused with the skilful doubt which is even a factor to enlightenment (sambojjhaṅga), namely the spirit of enquiry, of investigation of the nature of things (dhammavicaya). Perplexity has a paralysing influence, but doubt spurs on to investigation, to fuller understanding. To reach the summit of knowing the truth of everything, we have to start at the bottom by doubting everything. Perplexity is scepticism, but doubt is agnosticism. Intolerant denial of every assumption itself becomes dogmatic; but active doubt will solve itself by deeper awareness of actuality. To escape from the bewilderment of perplexity people take their refuge in faith, in authority and in religions based thereon. They mould their lives on revelation which is the experience of somebody else. Thus perplexity is a formidable fetter, preventing intellectual freedom, for truth is in the realisation for oneself.

The long history of the human race is dominated by belief in and servitude to the supernatural. The speculations of the primitive man on the nature of strange forces around him have been replaced by theological arguments; the idol of roughly hewn stone has given room to the spirit of God; but the fear which created the one as the other remains the same throughout. Philosophers have divided themselves into the great camps of Materialism and Idealism, and the line of division remains the unknown nature. Even where we see atheistic systems of thought like the Sāṅkhya philosophy on which both Buddhism and Jainism largely drew, or schools of scepticism which flourished in Greece, in all of them we find a development in a direction not intended by their originator, notwithstanding the growth of experimental science and freedom of thought and expression.

Man is a social animal. His inborn herd-instinct makes him feel uneasy when alone, and this need for comfort and consolation has penetrated his mental as well as physical cosmos. For also in his way of thinking man fears to be alone and in the dark. His different religious systems are merely a reflection of this primitive need.

Few are those who dared to think independently, but in their lifetime they were not universally appreciated. Some, like Gotama the Buddha, were harassed; others, like Jesus, were crucified or those like Socrates poisoned, or, like Mohammed, exiled. After their passing the scene changes, however. Then those who did not have the courage nor the intellect to think independently for themselves, found consolation in following them as their masters. Even though some like Gotama the Buddha expressly declared that everyone has to work out his own salvation himself, still thousands took and will continue to take the opportunity of seeking refuge in him, to rely upon his words without even trying to make those words live within their own lives.

The searching for mediators and comforters has become so essential to religion of any type that those original thinkers would hardly recognize themselves or their doctrine, if they would return to find their images worshipped and their instructions converted into dogmas. The creation of authority is a sign of weakness. But instead of trying to overcome that weakness by inner growth and development, man has made himself crutches on which he can lean, which will give him consolation in the sorrow of his own making, of his own delusion. It is mental weakness which induced man to make spiritual crutches. But weakness is no excuse, it is a defect; and defects are never essential. Religious systems, instead of helping man to grow, keep him down in infancy; instead of giving the truth, they offer a means to escape from actuality by concentrating on a future life. Postponement and evasion are the chief accusations to be levelled against organised religions. They postpone the duty of the present moment by making man live for the future, and thereby they evade the natural conflict, which torments every man who has not realised the truth. Instead of understanding sorrow, they merely point out an escape from sorrow into a supernatural bliss.

To obtain this bliss, much effort is required, much assistance is needed too; and organisations where this striving is done in common and where it is assisted by superior authority, cater for man’s needs. In his desire for security man grasps at the opportunity, thus forging link by link the fetters of attachment to rites, rituals, ceremonies, dogmas, prayers, sacraments, offerings, sacrifices into a chain which no effort can break. For even methodical effort to free oneself is only a new bond, as the method itself becomes a new crutch of delusion, which is more relied on than freedom is sought.

The bondage in which we live is a mere delusion, a dream. And as long as we are in that dream-state no amount of energy, will wake us up, for even that energy will be a delusion. The authority of persons, of dogmas, of religious performances, of the different paraphernalia of religion and devotion, has been set up for our own consolation, i.e., for the satisfaction of our selfishness, to give that sense of security which is a craving for continued existence, for permanence. Thus religions, at the cost of a certain amount of spiritual exercise confer heavenly bliss, forgive sins and provide shortcut to perfection. But that shortcut is really a means of escape. Instead of going to our teacher Life–-even if life means sorrow–-we try to tun away from sorrow, not realising that we cannot-run away from life. Hence religions show another, a better, a supernatural life, and together with that the different means of attainment. Holy vows and ascetic practices (sīla-vata) are frequently observed for the purpose of acquiring merit. But that really means that the good action is not performed for its own goodness, but for the sake of some underlying motive, e.g., to secure heavenly bliss. In that case, the act was not a pure action, was not a complete action, and therefore not a true action. It was an act of self-seeking, a search for security based on ignorance and born of fear. Such actions are only substitutes; and even if they produce the desired effect; that too will be a mere prolongation of the process of delusion. If an action is but a means towards an end, then that action itself has no value. An action is only pure and complete, if nothing further is expected, if that act is performed spontaneously, grown out of the full understanding of the circumstances, which called for such an action. Then there will be no limitation of time, no trying to escape from actuality, and in that full awareness will be the comprehension of reality.

As long as virtuous acts, religious practices, disciplinary regulations, methodical exercises are valued as means of acquiring merit, so long also will religions be commodities of commerce. Social service as a means of acquiring merit is not service of those in need, but an exploitation of them, as they are used as a means to profit ourselves. Prayer is an indirect admission of one’s inferiority and submission. Uttering sacred words without understanding may have a psychological effect, but then they are not better than a drug which temporarily relieves the pain without curing the disease.

To frame one’s conduct according to fixed rules may appear necessary in social life, but that is only in a society which does not understood itself. If life is understood fully, virtue will come automatically; a truly wise man is always a good man. Every moment of life is a fresh one with different conditions, and therefore a rule can never be applied to all similar cases. Ceremonies seem to be good for children, but is it not the duty of a teacher and a parent to see to it that the children grow up? A teaching which becomes a system (and this applies to all organised religions) is a dead authority, which can have no dealing with the living.

The delusion that good works suffice is a contagion (parāmāsa), a moral corruption which affects the very roots of living in the true sense. Without the breaking of this fetter not even a beginning can be made to enter that stream of life’s fullness (sotāpatti), which flows out into the ocean of deliverance.

Of all the problems with which man is faced in this world, the social problem, which is the mutual relation between different sexes, is regarded as the most difficult one. Any problem will arise from a duality, i.e., a division of interests between brain and heart, between intellect and emotion. As long as the intellect sets up a standard to conform with, the natural feelings, which cannot be standardised, because they are reactions to an ever changing environment, will rise in revolt. A standard is something of the past, but reactions are present. Hence a constant conflict which is sorrow, shows every aspect of life as having two opposites.

Sex-relations, too, form a problem on account of the placing of sexes as opposites. But femininity (itthindriya) and masculinity (purisindriya) are expressed in many ways besides the generative organs. Some psycho-analysts have even maintained that a sex problem lies at the bottom of any mental problem. If the problem is a reaction, then sex itself forms the action. To solve the reactionary problem, one has to comprehend the action in its fullness.

Female activity is that which gives form to the formless, which develops, grows and multiplies. But in order to do that there must be the passive attitude of receiving and assimilating; and also the action of expressing. Thus female characteristics are submissiveness, docility humility, generosity, emotional reliability, and a lack of assertion.

Male activity on the other hand, is that which initiates, directs and intensifies. In this is shown the active attitude which gives strength to growth, guidance to sensation, reason to action. Thus male characteristics will be a feeling of superior importance, aggressiveness, rulership, pride, egotism, meanness, stinginess, but also rationality though it often leads to irrational deeds, when emotions are excluded.

From this analysis it will be seen that there is more of complement and interdependence than of opposition. Indeed, to be perfect the passive and active elements should not only be balanced, for that is still opposition, but they should so grow together as to form actually only one whole. To formulate a number of characteristics may simplify the understanding of a thing, but it can never correspond to actuality. For by doing so one arrests a continuous development at a particular point, and this narrows one’s viewpoint to a cross-section, throwing light on the opposing halves, but failing to see the process as a whole. The process is like that of water in a river, naturally flowing down. Yet in its very action of flowing it is obstructed by itself in so far as the different particles cause a friction by their motion. Hence the reaction appears as a certain irregularity, a lack of harmony, owing to undercurrents, forming wavelets and eddies.

So it is with the characteristics of the sexes when taken apart. Then sensual pleasure becomes emotion without intelligence and that is passion, that is the beginning of conflict. What is usually understood by love, is a sensation of incompleteness. Without realising that this feeling of insufficiency is conditioned by an inner discontentment with the surroundings of daily life without realising that this discontentment finds its origin in the lack of understanding of life-sensations grow and stretch their feelers to find something to fill that emptiness. An image or an ideal is formed of what would complete the deficiency. According to this ideal a search is being made, and finally the ideal image is imposed on the selected object. It does not follow that the selection corresponds in full to the imagination. But as the senses seek their own satisfaction, they are more concerned with their need than with reality. Anyhow, love is based on selection, which means agreement with self.

And why is this selection made? Love is not outgoing, except for a few sentimental expressions; and therefore selection is made for obtaining the sole right of possession. If love were truly for the good of the other, unfaithfulness could never change that love into hate. But as things stand, a mere suspicion suffices to make all love fade. Love is greed for possession, and that exclusively. But a desire to possess limits the affection, and will never fill that sensation of emptiness.

Truth, on the other hand, knows no love which is partial, which is a selection, which is an expression of egoism. Truth knows no distinction of sexes, for Truth sees the completeness of life. Truth understands that the formless cannot exist without a form, that intelligence and feeling cannot be separated without causing conflict, that life is only complete with head and heart united in one individual, that in a process of change, growth and evolution there is no real difference between giving and taking, that in the fullness of life there is only action without reaction, that in the completeness of understanding there are no opposites and hence no objects for love. Truth is not concerned with self and others; that is the sphere of delusion.

This may not appear as very practical; but if the world has no place for understanding, who is the loser? The world loves for a purpose, namely for the satisfaction of self. And thus the lust for sensual pleasure becomes an essential element in the emotional attitude of human lovers.

Is there then no altruistic love? As long as love is not altruistic, it is of course pure selfishness. And even when love is altruistic, it is far from perfect, because it is based on a delusive distinction which preserves the separation between self and others. The fact that the motives in the question of others' happiness are so much more complicated than in the case of our own personal interests, shows the presence of the conflict between opposites. Self-love comes spontaneously; it is pure craving. Love for our neighbours, however, does not come so naturally; it needs argument, which is a proof that the division is maintained. In the case of self-love we do not even perceive it as love. The hand brings food to the mouth; the eyes direct the feet on the path; but this is not love, it is the perfect, spontaneous harmony of nature.

A feeling akin to this natural harmony is sometimes experienced at the sight of suffering. It is not sexual love, but compassion, sympathy. Here a liking to help rises spontaneously. As long, however, as this feeling originates in the imagination, which pictures ourselves in that miserable state, compassion again would be self-love. Perfect sympathy feels the sorrow of all without distinction; it is not interested in the individual, but in the cause of suffering. As soon as a particular interest is evolved there must be selection, which is separation, isolation and selfishness. No sublimation of the sex-instinct will dissolve this fetter, but the realisation of the delusion of separation will make all distinctions disappear in the comprehension of the whole process, in which there are no integrating parts of a combination or union, but only different aspects of the fullness of life.

In common parlance we speak of love and hate as emotions, but they are more than that. An emotion is an excitement a passing phase, or as we called it earlier, a reaction. But love and hate–-though they show themselves as reactions each time the beloved or hated object presents itself physically or mentally–-are rather dispositions, i.e., mental attitudes which are the summing up of many reactions. It is again on dispositions that a character is based. Characters can be an irascible disposition which is well expressed by the word aversion (vyāpāda), which indicates a turning away from (viāpajjati). It is a liability to experience emotions of disagreement between subject and object. This emotion may arise and pass off, but the disposition remains owing to the turned-off attitude. This disposition of aversion is due to the mental attitude, which as in the case of love is based on a distinction between self and others. Here too, it is a separation between the intellect and the heart. As a matter of fact, the two sentiments of love and hate, though appearing to the opposites, comprise so many identical parts, that this is already an indication of their common root. Though affection is only proper to love, and aversion to hate, still both attraction and repulsion are the results of an underlying instinctive fear with the “self” as object. The hope of exclusive possession, which is called love, is tinged with fear as much as the repelling instinct in hate. Fear common to both, is conditioned by ignorance; and here again we are back at the very root, viz., the delusion of self. Though love and hate have “others” as their direct object, it is really the “self” as a misunderstood delusion, which is at the bottom of these dispositions. Emotions, like reactions, come and go; characters can be changed and altered; but dispositions are when deluded, and without delusion they are not.

Most of what is called love is actually nothing but predilection, favouring one more than another. But that necessarily results in the exclusion of others who are less favoured. A turning to one naturally comprises a turning away from another, who thereby becomes an object of aversion. Thus particular friendship easily evokes jealousy. It brings about the mistaken idea of exclusive rights, which are rooted not in the other, but in “self”. As long as sympathy and antipathy, conversion and aversion, turn round the centre of self, they are only different in degree, like heat and cold, but not in kind. Both are expressions of selfishness. Agreement with self is love; disagreement with self becomes hate.

It will be seen that there is great conflict which man finds it difficult to solve in himself; and thus he projects himself outside himself as it were and fights his battle there; he wants to possess himself in others. Thus even aversion, or the reaction which is hate, is a kind of desire to thwart any harmful influence. It is a desire to destroy the opposing element, in order to eliminate that which is considered the cause of the conflict. The cause however does not lie in the object, but in the action of turning away. For by that action are created the opposites, which produced the conflict. To eliminate one party does not solve the problem; both parties must go. Then aversion will not become love, but it will become impossible.

But as long as “self” with its imagined exclusive rights of possession dominates the scene, jealousy end envy are bound to appear. Then it is discontent about the prosperity of others. It does not necessarily follow that one wishes for oneself the honour of the gain acquired by someone else. For it may be that one possesses already the object or the title, which was recently obtained by the other. Thus envy is not greed, but discontent and ill-will. It is the feeling that everyone must be the same and have the same, so that no one can put himself forward. Many times it poses as virtue in a demand for equality, or esprit de corps, social conscience, solidarity, etc.

Envy, however, may grow out into a certain satisfaction over the misfortune of someone else, even if that bad luck does not mean gain to oneself. This ill-will may become so active that it becomes cruelty, in the same way as love expresses itself in affection and tenderness. The pleasure derived from cruelty is called sadism. It is of course not the pain inflicted upon others, which is enjoyed, but the accompanying sexual excitement, produced by the success in mastering the object. In this impulsion the behaviour towards the object–-whether in love or in hate–-appears to be a matter of indifference, as long as mastery is obtained. If the object cooperates it is love; if cooperation is lacking it is hate.

Psychology may try to explain sentiments of hate and a disposition of aversion as primary, instinctive fear. Moralists may show means and methods to change hate into love. Rationalists may show the originating conditions of aversion is physical disharmony. All may try to overcome hate, some by war, others by love. But the true solution of this fetter is the solving of the distinction between subject and object.

Hate does not always need to have someone else for object; it may even turn against oneself. It seems strange that the self-preservative instinct can so forget itself, as to develop hate for oneself. But the craving to destroy all objects which are a source of pain, appears sometimes stronger than the sense of loss suffered by the frustration of other desires, like the satisfaction of the needs of self-preservation. Ascetics seeing in their body a source of sin, have inflicted on themselves tortures which appear expressions of hate, but which gave them in reality immense satisfaction, so that they could smile happily in the midst of their self-inflicted mortifications. This pleasure, derived from imposing suffering on oneself, is called masochism.

Hate is a kind of hostility and its origin must besought in conflicting desires. The antithesis of self and non-self forms the basis for the opposites of pleasure and pain. When self becomes identified with pleasure, non-self, i.e., the object, the other one, becomes identified with hate. Hence it follows that the disposition of hate has developed earlier than that of love. And it follows too that love only arises because of the pleasure it gives to self; and hate arises because of the satisfaction it gives through self assertion.

Therefore it is not the object, of hate that should be eliminated, but the selfish action, which produced it. If one tries to overcome feelings of antipathy towards a certain person by sending out thoughts of loving kindness, one is merely heating the emotions, provoking reactions, which make pure action an impossibility. But when both hate and love are understood to be the outcome of false valuations, based on a misconception of self and others, this fetter will have been broken, not by a changed disposition, but by its vanishing in the face of true intelligence.

Lust for rūpa, “World of form”, i.e., rebirth in world of form. Fear and wonder in the crude intelligence of primitive man at the startling and irresistible phenomena in nature gave rise to the belief in the supernatural. By experimenting with the less fearful objects of perception and by succeeding in controlling them at least partly, fear decreased to make way for awe. And finally, even awe had to yield to science, which had only wonder and admiration for the still undiscovered regions of nature, without calling them supernatural. But the primitive instincts in man, which form a part of his nature, cannot be conquered by science, for the mere reason that the child’s intellect is not capable of understanding, when it comes into contact with those phenomena at the time of its greatest mental plasticity. Thus with the disappearance of fear of nature man’s belief in the supernatural did not disappear. And his imagination created the heavens according to the crude conceptions of his childhood.

Religion dominated this world and its politics in peace as well as in war. In our present day we still hear of priests blessing tanks before going into battle, kings are still crowned by bishops; justices open the assizes by prayer in church or temple. So religion will continue to dominate man’s life to come.

Survival is always the main motive in any struggle. If a struggle is not successful in the present, there arises a natural hope to be more successful on a future occasion. This struggle for survival combined with the hope of success in the future thrown against a background of faith in the supernatural, is a sufficient explanation of man’s desire for rebirth, even if his sensual passions have cooled down. To speak of a religious instinct and at the same time to subscribe to the theory of evolution, would force one to admit religious inclinations even in the animals. But religious feelings are not instinctive, not innate, and hence not natural and essential to man. Religious needs, growing out of the instinct of flight, couples with the emotion of fear, give a sufficient basis for religious feelings. Thus it will be seen that the parents of religion are emotional fear married to the instinct to flee from danger which is always lurking in the unknown.

Indeed, religions are mainly a means of escaping from conflict. Conflict being actual and present, an escape is sought in the future. It is thus on the future that religions concentrate. A religion which would deny a future life is unthinkable. On the other hand, it would be too hard for many a religionist even for those with an intellectual bent, to admit that religions are merely the outcome of an intrinsic desire to flee from danger, i.e., that they are purely means of escape. Hence a purposive psychology has been developed in which escape has been replaced by purposeful striving.

The seeking of a goal is an undeniable part played in the process of evolution; and the purely mechanistic viewpoint of a rigid law of cause and effect had to be modified and partly abandoned. Incentives and stimuli are acknowledged side by side with reflexes, so that causality has become conditionality, to allow for the personal element of striving. As this striving in man is largely responsible for man’s success in the material world, any development resulting therefrom is now considered as progress. But it has been completely overlooked, that as soon as man has reached the goal of his striving he sets up a new goal, so that he remains a seeker for ever.

This is also seen in man’s striving for the attainment of spiritual perfection. Even if he has overcome all craving for sensual pleasures (kāmacchanda), his striving does not cease, but is sublimated, transposed to a higher sphere, where the gross carnal joys have been replaced by the refined sense of delight in form (rūpa) and beauty. Craving for form (rūparāga) may have transcended lustful desires, but it remains craving and desire. It may be a more refined craving, but as all craving is a bond, so this too is a strong fetter, stronger perhaps even than sensual pleasures for the very reason of its sublimation. The more subtle and refined the form of craving, the more difficult to recognise it and to uproot it.

In this sense of delight in beauty there will be some reconciliation, a synthesis of the lower sentiments of crude egoism and loftier expression of self-love. Though on a higher plane, felt as \ae sthetic admiration, it remains however egoism. It is not easy to recognise the fact that pleasure obtained from the contemplation of an ideal is not altogether objective, but is dependent on the harmony and just proportion between subject and object, so that the “ego” still occupies a place of honour. Thus a desire to be reborn in happy states which are free from the lust of the senses will appear very virtuous and praiseworthy. A striving to obtain those mental states of absorption (jhāna), where thoughts are submerged in spiritual beauty and joy, may appear as true spirituality and perfection. In reality its only usefulness exists in the weakening of the different obstacles on the road to perfection.

Far from being perfections themselves, these mental states may or may not become helpful means thereto. If skilfully handled they may be a great help in the overcoming of the hindrances (nīvaraṇa), but not more than that. If practised with attachment or sought for the purpose of spiritual delight, they will merely create new obstacles which may prove insurmountable, owing to their subtle and spiritual nature. A discursive tendency (vitakka) may easily become a speculative tendency, where higher truths are merely analysed for one’s intellectual satisfaction without being lived and realised. Sustained application of thought (vicāra) might develop into attachment to one’s own opinion and become stubbornness. Rapture (pīti) is frequently inebriating to such an extent that further progress becomes impossible. The bliss of well-being (sukha) might create the spirit of self-contentment which produces stagnation. One-pointedness of thought (citta-ekaggata) might still fail to see the real nature of the object and thus in the tranquillity of the thought-process create the illusion of attainment, which might be nothing but self-consciousness without having grasped the nature of self. Thus one might be free from sensations, but slave to emotions.

To escape from the fettering influences of the senses and then to be caught in the net of beauty and form by clinging to those delights is a change of prison, but no freedom. Whether one accepts these spheres of form as some kind of heaven in a different place, or as mental states in which the bodily senses do not predominate any more, makes very little difference. The fetter to get rid of consists in the attachment to these mental delights, in whatever environment they may be found.

When all sense-pleasures are excluded and even desires for pure beauty have been overcome, there seems to be no further obstacle in the way of the seeker of truth. Thus a desire for virtue, for perfection, for wisdom, for truth, in short, desire for the formless (arūparaga) seems to be not only quite harmless, but even essential to a spiritual life. But even a desire for what is good, is still a desire and as such it must be a hindrance and a fetter. Desires for virtue, wisdom, or truth, can never lead to those goals, because as long as there is striving for the attainment of a goal, there is acquisitiveness which can only be based on self.

A change of physical desires into emotional desires cannot be called progress in perfection, for though the experiences have changed and have become more subtle, though the objects of desire have become more spiritual–-desire is there all the same. Desire for virtue will never produce goodness, because only that which grows from an inner necessity can be called virtue.

Actions which are produced by striving are artificial, are not natural and cannot be called virtuous. It is a mistake to call nature evil and to practise virtue for the sake of overcoming evil; for that makes virtue a means towards a negative end, and the practice of virtue an incomplete action, or rather a reaction. Desire for wisdom may produce learning and knowledge, but not understanding, intelligence and insight. Desire for truth will emanate thoughts and scatter them in all directions, searching everywhere, but failing to concentrate and to realise the truth in one’s own nature. Through gradual changes of the object of desire, truth will never be found. Increase in virtue and knowledge can never lead to final deliverance, for all ideas of change, of growth, of progress, preserve as their basis the idea of “self”. It is the “I” which wants to acquire virtue, to grow in understanding and to come nearer to the truth. It is this separation of the truth. It is that element of craving, of I-ness, which forms the real fetter here, all the more difficult to overcome, because it is so cunningly concealed and camouflaged.

To unify the “mind” with unbounded space (ākāsānañca) is a delusion, for it brings the uncreated, unconditioned (asaṅkhata) within the limitations of thought. It merely leads to the ecstatic thought of infinite consciousness (viñāṇanañca), which soon will be realised as a delusion in the sphere of nothingness (akiñcaññāyatana). No wonder that thoughts will become suspended, if even “nothing” is taken as an object and a goal. Thought may cease to such an extent that even perception will become imperceptible (n'evasaññānāsañña) and is incapable of effective functioning. All this seems a growth in purity of thought. But in freedom there is no growth. It is, or it is not; and only when all fetters are broken, freedom is there in all its fullness. Whether a bird is tied to the earth with a thread of silk or with a chain of iron, it will not be able to fly, unless the bond is broken. It may be easier to break the silk thread, but unless it is broken, there is no freedom. Similarly, it may be easier to dispel the delusion of “nothing” than to break the spell of “self”; but as long as there is craving, be it only for the formless, there is no freedom possible.

Why then do people have craving for the formless, as there cannot be anything attracting them there? Because they have been disappointed by the world of form. Beauty proved to be impermanent and changing into its very opposite. Delights proved to be reactions to environment, and having realised that, another way of escape is tried instead of facing reality. But this escape can never lead to a solution. People are interested in life hereafter, they crave for rebirth in better spheres, because they do not know how to live in the present. Because they have never learned properly to live in the world of sense, desire arises for spheres of pure form. And because even pure form did not give the answer to their longings, they seek an escape in the formless and even in annihilation, if that were possible. This annihilation, however, they understand secretly as a removal of all obstacles, so that the pure “self” can continue to live for ever in unmarried conditions. The individual, limited “self” is admitted to be a delusion to get rid of. But instead, a universal soul, of which all that lives and breathes and moves, is only a manifested emanation; it forms a new delusion, a stronger fetter. That imagined world-soul, through which each man finds himself even in the smallest blade of grass with the cry: “That am I”, has indeed done away with the separation of an isolated I-ness, but only to make way for a permanent universality in which the dynamic force of nature’s process is viewed as a delusion. If truth is seen as a delusion there then is a fetter indeed. Any delusion would be less serious than the one which sees the truth and turns away from it, mistaking it for untruth. Thus craving for the form-less (arūparāga) is through its very detachment from sense-pleasures and beauty an extremely dangerous obstacle to freedom. It is this fetter which narrows man’s outlook, so that he does not discover the truth within himself, but searches it elsewhere.

In craving for the formless, truth is made an object apart from the individual, who is viewed as the subject. The very methods employed to bring the subject nearer to the objective truth lead only to further estrangement and isolation, binding man to rebirth. But as continuation of life is wished for, this fetter is not understood as an obstacle, but becomes as ornament, a state of perfection, a mental state comparable only with the highest heavens. The objectification of truth makes it something external, worth striving for, worth running after, but in reality it forms a motive for escaping from the complexity of present problems. In the detachment from both sense and form is lessened also the opportunity to understand the environment, which has form to which the senses react. To discard the form from the environment and to seek its real meaning in the formless, is to look for a substance under the phenomena, for eternity in time-concepts, for permanence in a changing process, for an everlasting universal soul in a cosmos, where unity is only one of action, interaction and reaction.

Yet in the transient sensations truth is more evident than in shelter of pure joy, where even suffering ceases to be a problem. For this reason, craving for rebirth–-be it in the spheres of form or in the formless spheres–-is even worse than craving for sensuous joy, because it is less actual. It needs the perfection of an Arahat to do away with this last vestige of possessiveness. A desire for rebirth with better opportunities is in reality an ill-disguised mental laziness, postponing the solution of the problem facing us here. He who craves for another life, is already dead to the present; but for him who lives in the present, which is eternally new because it is always beginning, the hereafter does not exist. Thus craving for a better life becomes a fetter to the present life, which not being understood fully, remains incomplete, and in its incompleteness produce a new conflict with false values, delusions and attachments, perpetuating ignorance and making the chance of deliverance ever more remote.

Even if self-delusion has been, overcome and an individual is fully aware that personality is nothing but a process of action and reaction, conditioned by inner tendencies and outer environment, there may still remain a strong fetter of self-assertion or pride. For, though “self” be recognized as a fleeting process of change, it does not follow that all individual action must be understood as produced by universally common factors. Though a river is a constantly changing current of flowing water without any abiding substance, yet there are different rivers flowing in different directions. Similarly, while denying “self” as an abiding, permanent entity, one should not deny the differences between the changing phenomena of action and reaction, which are the conditions which produce self-delusion.

That consciousness of “self” can become the delusion of “self” was shown in the discussion on Sakkāyadiṭṭhi as due to living in the past, which binds present action to a past experience which is dead. Even when this is not done, the mere comparison between different processes of action may lead to an emotion of elation, when an opportunity offers itself to display one’s skill. Then an ideal self will be set up, elaborated from past experiences, which showed in their failings the weaknesses of the actions of the moment. Self-respect represses those failings, remembering only successes which actually turned out well, or which might have been successes, if action had been more efficient. And thus an ideal standard is erected.

Conceit is a tendency of ostentatiously displaying, like a banner over all other flags, qualities one has–-or perhaps more frequently–-which one presumes to have. In this last case conceit will hide the proper motive of an act with pretension, simulation, deceit and hypocrisy. Its working is many times so subtle that the real motive remains hidden even to ourselves. Then material and personal interest will be disguised as a sense of duty or justice, the right of freedom, the progress of the nation, the safeguard of democracy, etc. Especially the leaders of nations at war are very prone to use similar catchwords to camouflage their less unselfish motives and to sublimate their murderous instincts. Manifestos circulated during an election campaign are usually manifestations of conceit.

Conceit is an idealisation of the subject, which requires sublimation of primitive instincts and fundamental needs, which are not seen as defects, but as high perfection. This is an escape, a way out, by which the claims of nature can be conceded without having to be ideal light; and it measures everything by that ideal. Pride itself, which involves always contempt for another, is by utilitarianism and rationalism considered necessary and inherent in human nature. In the process of sublimation conceit is called the source of many virtues and talents, which only has to be directed to right things. Personal interests present objects to us only under those aspects which it is useful for us to perceive. This ego-centricity leads to the delusion of thinking ourselves to be indispensable, a focus of attention and the centre of society. Even anxiety to help others may easily be a subtle kind of conceit which tells us that we are better, financially, intellectually or spiritually, that nobody else will be able to give this help so efficiently; that we have more experience, a superior position, greater opportunities or stronger karmic tendencies. These subtle considerations may appear and sometimes are partly true. It is exactly this basis of truth, though grossly exaggerated, which makes it so difficult to detect and still more difficult to loosen this fetter. Even when those self-reflections are correct, they are thoughts of possessiveness which is actually craving and clinging. Actions performed in this spirit may appear excellent like social service, preaching, teaching and nursing. But as long as their foundation is self-conceit, however subtle it may be, the effects will suffer thereby and the beneficiary will even be hurt without knowing the reason. Then it becomes a cruel exploitation of an apparently more favourable position. Then the help given to others feeds only our self-love, as it results from an anxiety to give or to share what had been acquired by intense craving to possess.

Subjectively conceit is a certainty and a conviction of righteousness which is fatal to development, because it produces self-contentment and stagnation. Certainty of one’s capacity to attain leads to postponement. Certainty of righteousness is reliance on the past. And thus both miss the unique opportunity of the present. Thus arrogance and presumption seem to contain some kind of regret of having denounced the “self” as a delusion at earlier stage. If once a delusion is understood as such, thoughts cannot go back to it. And therefore another, more subtle view of “self” is introduced under an ideal form, to replace the crude, almost material self, which was abandoned with the first fetter. The idea of a personal soul has been discarded, and its place is taken by whatever in our nature is impersonal, but still distinct from others. Qualities and capabilities are asserted in a bold attempt sometimes to balance inferiority. Therefore it is called conceit which says; “I am” (asmi-māna).

Misconception of self (sakkāya-diṭṭhi)–-conception of an ego-entity was based on a wrong interpretation of the environment by the senses. These produced reactions which developed the memory with its reliance on past experience and incompleteness of action in the present. It is never associated with false beliefs (micchā-diṭṭhi), but has always a grain of truth in it from which it develops. Most people are to some extent honest in their conceit, in so far as hypocrisy and pretension have become a second nature, hiding in the sub-conscious so well, that the real motives are actually unknown.

Now it may be understood that the isolation is “self” delusion was the surface-result of these unknown tendencies, worked upon by, and reacting to an environment which was not understood. Conceit on the other hand, as an idealisation of self, is less closely connected with perception and consciousness. It is frequently the necessity of giving up some object of attachment–-which always quits with some part of self–-which reinstates that self in a sublimed form. Religions especially abound in facts which show the truth of this statement. Like cannibals who ate the flesh of their victim if he had shown much courage, so that they might assimilate his fearlessness, so our modern, civilized faithful go to church to partake in holy communion of the flesh of the son of man.

The sublimation and idealisation of self, not projecting it in some form of existence or other, but establishing it in a super-relationship to others is so tenaciously holding on, that only the perfectly holy one is completely free from this fetter.

Agitation is a lack of understanding of the environment as a constantly changing process in which we are not a fixed entity, but in which we change with and are changed by the different conditions which constitute life. Conflict arises when the world is seen as change and the self as static. In the friction which ensues we try to stop the changing events and cling to them. That struggle is the fetter of excitement which is ceaseless effort to escape from conflict.

Excitement is a fickleness of character, a lack of balance, a disproportion of dispositions, absence of persistence and independence. Its arising is due to a high degree of susceptibility to the influence of pleasure and pain. In other words, agitation is the expression of sensitiveness, leading in turn to elation and depression. Fickleness shows shallowness of thought, high affectability and low intensity. Excitement is always emotional, and never intellectual, hence not a complete action. For where the intellect is excluded, an action can hardly be called human, it becomes an answer to a stimulus which resembles machine-work, unless the intellectual thought-process is able to control the blindfold process of the passions. Thus it becomes a fetter, preventing true action, and production mere reaction.

In a materialistic life agitation shows itself in eagerness to excel in learning, to succeed in business, to make progress in the world, and in short to outdo others. It is the spirit of competition. In a spiritual life agitation shows itself in eagerness to attain perfection soon, in striving for spiritual virtues, in religious zeal to reform social conditions and wrongs of self and others, in employment of methods for spiritual development, in searching for truth by means of reading, learning, questioning and discussing the many problems, which different religions offer. In short, agitation is the intrinsically compelling force, which drives man on in his pursuit; it is the purpose which he sees in life that makes him strive for its attainment.

The purely mechanical world-view is untenable, for in the world of mechanics it is evident that no development takes place, where thought does not drive on to action. On the other hand it must be admitted that thought would not even arise, if not for the working of an external world. In other words thoughts arise as a reaction. The environment acts as a stimulus. Hence, also the purely idealistic view point must be repudiated, that man is free to choose his own way. It is this delusion of freedom which blinds man with the fetter of agitation, which makes him strive after an ideal with means which are truly ends in themselves. It is the mistake of mixing up purpose and method, which is responsible for this delusion. A means is selected, a method is used for the purpose of attaining something better. But by doing so it is overlooked that neither the method nor the end exists already. If the end existed, striving would be superfluous. For, when travelling the object of the journey is not the goal, but the attainment of the object. If attainment is achieved, the journey thereto is impossible. The method or means does not exist either, but is being made every moment. And as every moment brings some new attainment the purpose of striving cannot be attained except in this present moment.

Planning with a purpose follows from the awareness of a need in a certain condition in which man imagines he might find-himself before long. It is like a prediction of a moon-eclipse which is sure to take place, if meanwhile nothing has gone wrong with the sun. But some day something is sure to go wrong even with the sun, the heat of which is measurably decreasing. Thus these predictions based on calculations are reliable only up to a certain extent. How much less therefore, will be the reliability of planning of incalculable thoughts.

This purposeful striving is a silent admission of one’s imagined freedom of will. Free will is of course a gross delusion, for there is no will to be free, as “will” like “mind” is thought arising at the moment of contact, when choice is made possible. But even that choice is not free, as it is influenced and conditioned by the objects of choice. That is why agitation and planning ahead lead so many times to the disillusionment of a wrong choice, when reason was clouded by passion. Planning and purposeful striving are assertions of a separate self which can arrange things for itself and which can modify the environment. It is therefore a lack of understanding the fact that we are rather the ones who are shaped by environment.

To let oneself go without understanding like a piece of machinery, is the other extreme, which never leads to freedom though it does away with individualism. Freedom, and striving for freedom in the absolute sense, requires an absolute being to be free. This is self-delusion. Mechanistic views kill both individual and freedom. But the understanding of the environment leads to the understanding of the delusion produced by it. And that is freedom, because it breaks the fetter of purpose, which drives man on while keeping him bound like a slave. This understanding breaks down the barrier which isolates man from his world, and that is freedom.

But purposeful agitation is a striving in the spirit of possessiveness which can only produce more selfishness, isolation and delusion. For agitation insists on the introduction of a mediating factor which is similar to the employment of tools. This belongs to the region of reason and logic, and involves the desire of attainment as a kind of possessiveness. Religions have always failed as soon as they became organisations. For, organisations are based on methods which are of no value, unless they are an end in themselves. When this principle is reversed however, the goal is reached not by striving but by the setting aside of the obstacles, by the breaking down of prison-walls and fetters. To save a burning house there is only one thing to be done, viz., to extinguish the fire. This action is not concerned with the house but with the fire, which is the immediate obstacle. If that obstacle is overcome, the house is saved naturally.

That many people do not feel that driving force as a fetter, but see it rather as a perfection, is due to their narrow outlook confined to the pettiness of the treadmill which they work as a recreation from the loneliness of life which they dread. It is, however, the same desire for self-realisation which drives some into monasteries and caves, and many others into the whirlpool of the world.

Agitation can never lead to insight because it is a distraction of thought away from the present, and thus it stands opposed to mindfulness (sati). Awareness does not know anything of a “mind”, nor of matter in itself, but only of material qualities insofar as they come within the field of the senses and produce there a process of thought. Awareness, living in the present, without worry about the past, without agitation about the future, prevents a cleavage between matter and mind, which has led some to mechanistic laws which are self-subsisting and absolutely rigid, while it has led others to abstract speculations about the composition, spiritual or otherwise, of a mind like a soul, in idealistic conceptions.

The overcoming of the fetter of agitation must naturally lead to mental rest which is required for the understanding of the situation and the environment, which thus comes within the region of intelligence and insight.

Most forms of ignorance, and certainly all ignorance which forms a fetter, is not a lack of knowledge, but insincerity of thinking. Fear to discover one’s errors, fear that one’s vanity might be hurt and fear to be obliged to change one’s life, are at the root of all mental reservations which stand in the way of an open approach which alone can remove insincerity of thinking. Strong views are not a sign of wisdom, but frequently betray the presence of prejudices which have arisen from experiences in the past. They are therefore views based on the past without containing any understanding of the present. Ignorance is not a lack of experience, but a lack of insight. This lack will mostly be produced by some personal bias; it will be therefore an artificially produced ignorance. People do not want to know, for knowledge is frequently inconvenient. And thus the fetter remains.

It needs indeed immense courage to live in integrity according to one’s understanding. The “bliss of ignorance” and the “folly of wisdom” is more actual than the proverb might suggest. But if one really wishes to realise the truth, one must begin to be true to oneself. Wishful thinking must be replaced by absolute sincerity. Most religions however, though professing to lead to the truth merely show the road to happiness, and frequently truth is sacrificed for the sake of bliss. To overcome this obstacle of ignorance one has to begin with a complete preparedness to accept the truth without any reservation, whenever it may be, wherever it may lead.

The difficulty of the problem is: How shall we recognise the truth when it presents itself to us? Reason is not infallible, and hence the reliance on the authority of others grows almost naturally. But then, if personal reason can fail, there cannot be more security in the reason of others. Ignorance cannot be conquered by reasoning, because the field of ignorance is wider than that of logic. Life, sorrow and their conditions are not logical but facts. We cannot say that facts are illogical, but they are not based on logic. It is rather logic that is based on facts. And thus it happens that the realisation of the truth is something which is entirely individual and which cannot be proved to others. But there will be absolute certainty in the subject, while certain tests may reveal whether or not some degree of delusion is still remaining.

“The knowledge of deliverance will arise with deliverance”. But if this knowledge is entirely subjective, may that not equally well be delusion? This might be so, if this knowledge of the truth would be a recognition. But this understanding is not theoretical or scientific knowledge; it is the actual clearing of all doubts, the actual overcoming of all obstacles. And that can be tested; for if the conditions of ignorance and its effects are still present, ignorance itself has not been expelled.

What is the condition and origin of ignorance? “A first beginning of ignorance is not discernible” and the very question about the origin of ignorance proves its existence. Ignorance has no first beginning, but it is beginning always, as it is a process. The not-understanding of the nature of a process which can have no beginning because it is not an entity, that is ignorance which is always new together with the process which is not understood. In the not-understanding of the environment all action becomes delusion of self. Thus all life which is not lived in the actual present is ignorance and the source of more delusion. The need and the desire to know the beginning of ignorance is ignorance itself, for it ignores the present. Thus it can easily be found out, whether all delusion has been dispersed, by finding out the interest which is taken in, and the place which is occupied in the thought-process by past, present and future.

The passage from ignorance to understanding is not one from mechanistic materialism to metaphysics; it is rather like the opening of a heavy curtain, not revealing something new which was hidden behind it, but admitting more light which enables one to see the objects in the room in a different light. The same world, the same environment, but valued anew.

The fetter of ignorance is the reason of life which is a process of grasping. It is in ignorance that the two factors of life, the objective world and the subjective self, are rooted. It is in ignorance that objective science and subjective self, are rooted. It is in ignorance that objective science and subjective faith are opposing one another. Ignorance is the laying hold of the world and of self in the wrong way. To overcome this ignorance can neither be done by conceiving the truth, for truth is not a conception, and conceptual thinking is still a thought with craving.

Ignorance is life with partial knowledge of it; truth is life with the full understanding thereof. And because ignorance allows one to live only partially, it produces sorrow. And because understanding makes one live fully it produces bliss. But that bliss is no happy feeling or sensation, not even mental satisfaction, but just the fullness, the completeness of life, the rest and equilibrium of perfection. It is the perfection of the opposites as the material from which our fetters themselves will have disappeared with any striving or effort. In ignorance such perception becomes impossible, for in ignorance a solution is sought in past experiences or in future hope with agitation and craving as driving forces towards a goal. But suffering and life and all its problems are neither in the past nor in the future, and they will have therefore to be solved when they arise.

This can be done only by full awareness, by watching our activities and finding out their motives. Through integral awareness the truth of the present will become clear without trying to escape from the world or from life. Renunciation of possessions leads frequently to attachment to opinions and methods, which are self-made values. But in complete discernment of the values of the world and self, of their relation, of their non-opposition, will this process of ignorance be brought to an end.

The fetters themselves are a delusion. To become free is not so much a question of how to become free, how to break those fetters. The question rather is; Why am I bound? If we try to break this fetter, it is only a process of more ignorance, for trying and striving are only other works for the process of obtaining, gaining, accumulating. The question: How to delude a delusion? must necessarily produce more delusion. The problem can only be solved by fully understanding, theoretically and practically, the reason why we are deluded. This can only be answered, if we are fully aware, again theoretically and practically, of the fact that we are deluded. Theoretical knowledge by itself is ignorance. This awareness can only be in the present moment. Here and now therefore, in this present moment we have to face the problem and everyone carries his own key to the solution.

Life should not be a process of learning and accumulating. Life is meant to be lived, to be met in its fullness, every moment anew. The solution once known, must be put in practice. Then with the disappearance of ignorance will have gone also all sorrow, fear, doubt, craving, egoism, wrong views and all fetters; and that is bless everlasting, the final awakening to the Truth.

This is a problem which is not directly connected with Buddhism, which in its doctrines of evolution and saṁsāra does not admit a “first”, and which in its doctrines of conditionality and dependent origination has no place for an “absolute cause”. But as in popular writings on comparative studies of religion this subject occurs frequently, it would be well to give here some brief explanation of its implications and the Buddhist standpoint in this respect.

A cause is that which produces an effect, and a first cause is that which produces an effect without having being produced itself. The production of an effect by an absolute cause is a self-contradictory concept, because there is no cause which is not related to its effect. If it is related, it cannot be absolute. If there is no effect, there is no question of a cause either. Hence there is an inherent contradiction between a cause and the absolute. And yet, to be a first cause, i.e., a cause which is not caused by something else, would necessitate an absolute state without origin.

The Buddhist viewpoint is that in an ever-changing process there can arise a phase of becoming, dependent on conditioned and changing phenomena. This process of change does not contain any substance or entity as the bearer of phenomena, and cannot, therefore, be considered as having a beginning, which is a static point in time. Therefore, the Buddha has said that the beginning of things cannot be known, not because of the enormous time-element which would be involved, but because of the inherent contradiction of a static starting point in a dynamic process of evolution. The process is the action and reaction of phenomena which are non-existent in the absolute sense, but which are arising and ceasing constantly, arising from passing conditions and giving way to new conditions arising from them. In this sense, therefore, there is no absolute beginning, but the process is relatively beginning and ceasing all the time. Similarly, there is no first cause in the sense of an absolute creation, but a conditioned process which has neither beginning nor end, but which is beginning and ending always.

Material or physical food (kabalinkāra āhāra), being a primary need for life itself, constitutes the physical basis of all action. It is food that nourishes the eightfold corporeality namely the solid, liquid, heat, motion, colour, odour the taste and the nutrient essence (Vism. p. 341).

Food is divided into various categories. A basic categorization is into solid and gross food (olārika) and fine and exquisite food (sukhuma). Khajja and bhojja too appear to denote the same division. A further subdivision of this is khajja, bhojja, leyya (to be sipped) and peyya (to be drunk). What is eaten (asita), drunk (pīta) chewed (khayita) and what is tasted (sayita) also 8 a similar division.

From this it is clear that food, in the broader sense, constitute not only of what is eaten, but also of what is drunk. Hence the common term (anna-pāna, food and drink) could be taken as another term for food in general, though pāna by itself could mean water (cf. (Sn. v. 485), 487).

The Suttanipāta aṭṭhakathā explains anna as gruel, rice, etc. (yāgubhattadi: SnA. p. 378). In meaning, anna-pāna is similar to anna-bhojana, bhojana in this instance denoting soft or more liquid like food (Dhp. v. 249), T. I, p. 204).

While food is a basic necessity of life, the Buddha points out that overeating leads to physical discomfort, ill-health and dulling of sense-faculties. Thus, on one occasion the Buddha, observing King Pasenadi Kosala, who came to see him, breathing heavily and puffing after a heavy meal, uttered this stanza:

“To sons of men who ever mindful live
Measure observing in the food they take
All minished becomes the power of sense
Softly old age steals on, their days prolonged”

It is recorded that the King, when he heard this stanza, asked his nephew who was with him to memorize it and repeat it regularly at dinner time. This, it is said, helped the king to moderate his eating-habits and maintain his figure and health. (S. I, p. 81); Gradual sayings, I, p. 108).

Abstemiousness (bhojane mattaññutā) is much emphasised by the Buddha. He strongly recommended the monks to be moderate in eating. The Buddha explains that partaking of alms food should be neither for pastime, nor for indulgence, nor to become beautiful or handsome, but merely to maintain and support the body, to avoid harm and to assist noble life (A. I, p. 114).

The Buddha uses food even as an object of meditation, which we call “the reflection on the loathsomeness of food” (ahare patikūlasaññā). In the practice of this meditation one has to resort to a solitary spot and reflect and review the repulsiveness of food in ten aspects. The process involved in this meditation is elaborately discussed in the Visuddhimagga, chapter xi.

Ancient site with a stūpa, where in 1931 the discovery was made of Buddhist Sanskrit manuscripts, about two miles west of the Gilgit cantonment (35–50 N., 74–15 E.) in N.W. Kashmir.

It was in July of that year that Sir Aurel Stein reported that some boys, who were tending their flocks above Naupur village, cleared a piece of timber sticking out on the top of a mall stone-covered mound. Excavations brought to light a great mass of ancient manuscripts, which pal\ae ographically can be dated back to the sixth century C.E.

These Gilgit manuscripts, as they have been called since then, represent the original Sanskrit canon of Buddhism, and they are some of the earliest so far discovered in India, similar to those discovered in central Asia and Eastern Turkestan. Up to the time of this discovery at Gilgit, these text were known only through their Chinese and Tibetan translations.

The language of the manuscripts is similar to that of the Mahāvastu, Lalitavistara, or Suparṇaprabhāsa, and is really a Prākrit of a peculiar type, using largely Prākrit words with Sanskrit inflections and Sanskrit words with Prākrit inflections, with endless irregularities, lack of sequence of tenses, indiscriminate euphonic combinations, arbitrary conjugations and declensions, which has become known under the name of Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit. The uniformity in these irregularities might indicate that a language of this type had obtained currency at a certain period in the extreme north-west of India.

The Gilgit manuscripts are written on birch-bark in Gupta characters. As is usual in such manuscripts, two laminas of bark are pasted together to make up one folio. In some cases, parts of the lamina of one side peel off, while the corresponding portion of the other side of the folio remains intact. They were kept in Srinagar till 1947 as the property of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, after which they were removed and are now preserved in the National Archives of Delhi. Formal permission for publication was received from the Government of Kashmir and the Central Government of India in 1958 and 1959, respectively.

An interesting fact relating to the site where the manuscripts were found is that they were deposited within the vault of a stūpa. The further fact that sometimes in the colophon the names are given of the donor, his relatives and friends, suggests that the texts were deposited in the stūpa as a sacred object, for the purpose of acquisition of merit through the propagation of the dharmaśastras.

It was only in the third of four stūpas built side by side from north to south that manuscripts have been found. This stūpa has double basements, the lower of which measures 6.6 metres (about 22 ft.) on each side and the next receding about 60 cm. (2 ft.) on all the four sides. The height of this stūpa is 12 to 15 metres (40–50 ft.). The diameter which contained the manuscripts is 2.4 metres (8 ft.). In the centre of the chamber there were five wooden boxes, the fifth containing the other four in which were kept all the manuscripts. One of the manuscripts is the gift of king Śrīdeva Sāhi Surendra Vikramāditya Nanda, who appears to be a son of Vikramāditya, son of Raṇāditya, and reigned over the Dard country during the reign of Bālāditya in Kaśmīra, which gives an additional historical basis for the dating of the manuscripts.

It was through the activities of the Sarvāstivādins, who fanned out from Magadha to the North-west as a sequel to Aśoka’s council at Pāṭalīputra, that Kaśmīra became a centre of Buddhist philosophical studies. They obviously preferred a more Sanskritised version of the Buddhist canon to that in Pali based on the dialect of Magadha.

The texts found in these manuscripts are (1) Bhaiṣajyaguru Sūtra, relating the great resolution (mahāpra nidhāṇa) made by each of the seven Buddhas and the effect of such resolutions, the present manuscript being the last chapter; (2) Ekādaśa-mukha containing two dhāraṇīs; (3) Hayagrīva-vidyā, a magical charm very likely to be used as an amulet to be tied to a part of the body; (4) Sarvatathāgatādhiṣṭhāna-sattvāvalokanabuddha-kṣetra-sandarśana-vyūha, a dhāraṇī, to which several other dhāraṇīs have been added later together with descriptions of their respective rites; (5) Śrīmahādevi-vyākaraṇa, which apart from being expository contains also the Aṣṭottaraśata-vimalaprakhya-stotra in full and a mantra for the worship of the goddess Śrī; (6) Ajitasena-vyākaraṇa-nirdeśa-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra, which appears to be an admixture of Hīnayāna and semi-Mahāyāna concepts, indicating the state of Buddhism where the Mahāyāna ideals of the pāramitās were being included in the earlier ethical code, without the more developed śūnyatā philosophy; (7) Samādhirāja Sūtra, one of the nine principal texts of the Mahāyānists, also known as Candrapradīpa Sūtra, refers to that state of mind in which Buddhas and bodhisattvas realise that all worldly objects, thoughts and deeds, good or bad, are non-existent (abhāva) and it is this knowledge alone which can rescue one from this world of delusion; (8) Bhaiṣajyavastu, belonging to the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya, giving only those parts containing stories of the avadāna type with a mere fourteen pages giving some information about medicines with another twenty of monastic rules of discipline relating to the acceptance by monks of molasses, meat, fruits and uncooked food; (9) Vinaya-vastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya Piṭaka, of which only a little more than a half of the original has been salvaged, showing a general agreement between the Sanskrit and Pali versions, although the manner of putting the topics is different.

\bibentry{Nalinaksha Dutt, Gilgit Manuscripts, Srinagar, 1939; Raghu Vira and Lokesh Chandra, Gilgit Buddhist Manuscripts (Facsimile edition), International Academy of Indian Culture, New Delhi, 1959; M. Hackin, JAS. Vol. 220 (1932), pp. 14–5; N. Dutt, IHQ.
XIV (1938), pp. 409–24.)}

(var. kukkulika, kukkuṭika) is the name of a sect that resulted from the first schism within the Mahāsaṅghika in the second century after the Buddha’s passing away. Two other schools the Paññattivādins and Bāhulikas (or Bahussutikas) are said to have sprung from this (Mhv. V. v. 4 f.; Dpv. v. 40 f.).

According to the Kathāvatthu-aṭṭhakathā the view that “All conditioned things are absolutely cinder heaps”–-a view referred to in the Kathāvatthu (Kvu. p. 208)–-was held by the Gokulikas. This, the Aṭṭhakathā says, is due to their misunderstanding of such suttas as Ādittapariyāya sutta (Vin. I, p. 34 f.; (S. IV, p. 19) which the Gokulikas considered as teaching that “All conditioned things are without qualification no better than a welter of embers (kukkula), whence the flames have died out, like an inferno of ashes” (see Points of Controversy, A. IV, p. 26). The Kathāvatthu (Kvu. p. 208) f.) records how the Theravāda countered this proposition by pointing out various forms of happiness.

Kukkulika and Kukkuṭika are its variant names, and perhaps their view that “all compounded things are absolutely cinderheaps” (kukkula) is responsible for their name Kukkulika, which may have been misconstrued as Kukkuṭika. While one of the Chinese rendering of the name “Ch-in” points to the original Kukkuṭika, the other version Huei-chan indicate that it could be from Kukkulika. Malalasekera is of the view that Kukkulika could be the original name of which Gokulika was either a corruption or a derivation from the name of one of their teachers (DPPN. p. 783).

K'yeu-chi suggests that it might be a brahman clan name and rejects Paramārtha’s interpretation, “those who live on the cinderheap”. The Mañjuśrī-paripṛcchā Sūtra says that name originated from a famous Vinaya-master. Thus it is not possible to see the original form of the name.

This school maintained that of the three Piṭakas only the Abhidharma was important, for that contained the real teaching of the Buddha, whereas the sūtras and the vinaya-rules were more preparatory teachings. Thus they considered themselves not to be bound by any rule of discipline and interpreted the vinaya-rules according to their own particular convenience, professing that the Buddha had allowed their transgression. They fostered only logic, believing that too deep a study of the sūtras would lead to pride and become a hindrance in attaining deliverance. They declined to preach in order to devote themselves to meditation.

Nothing is known of their residence, nor of their writings. While Vasumitra attributes to them the same theses as those of the Mahāsaṅghikas, Bhavya makes a distinction without, however, mentioning their specific doctrines. Bhavya also mentions the two schools originated from them, viz., the Bahuśrutiyas and the Prajñāptivādins.

They are not heard of after the 9th century C.E., and it is probable that they were completely absorbed into Mahāyāna.

(A. Bareau, Les Sectes Bouddhiques du petit véhicule (Saigon, 1955); P. Demieville, L'Origine des Sectes bouddhiques d'apres Paramārtha (Bruselles, 1932); A. Schiefner, Tāranāthas’s Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien (St. Petersburg, 1869).

(Pali: Hemavata), one of the schools of early Buddhism, making its appearance in the third century after the Buddha’s parinirvāṇa. Haimavatas find no mention in the Śārīputra-paripṛcchā Sūtra which is no doubt one of the earliest sources of information regarding the branching out of the various schools of early Buddhism, while other sources provide no coherent testimony. The Dīpavaṁsa (V, 54) refers to them as Hemavatika, arising first after the original branching off of seventeen schools (vāda) during the second century after the parinibbāna. And then they are lined up with the Rājagirikas, Siddhatthas, Pubba- and Aparaseliyas, all of them grouped together by Buddhaghosa as Andhakas (Kvu. i, 9).

Somewhat later, Vasumitra identifies them with the Sthaviras who remained orthodox after the schism which gave birth to the Sarvāstivādins. According to the tradition of the Sammitīyas the Haimavatas are the first school detaching itself from the Sthaviras. From all this, at least so much will be clear that the Haimavatas are a subdivision, which later on is grouped among the Mahāsaṅghikas, according to Bhavya and Viṇītadeva and more precisely among the Andhakas by Buddhaghosa. Vasumitra attributes to them also the five theses of Mahādeva which formed the basis of the doctrine of the Mahāsaṅghika.

Commenting on Vasumitra, who dates the appearance of the Haimavatas at the beginning of the third century after the Buddha’s death, Paramārtha relates that the conservative Sthaviras reacted against the influence of the Kātyāyanīputras, who gave over much importance to the Abhidharma by breaking away on the pretext of a return to the teaching of the sūtras alone, and established themselves in the Himālayan regions from where the name of their school was derived, according to the orthodox tradition (P. Demieville, L'Origine des Sectes bouddhiques, pp. 23 and 53–4).

Przyluski has attempted to identify the Haimavatas with the Kāśyapīyas (Concile de Rājagṛha, pp. 317–8), but this is contradicted by the fact that all sources make a clear distinction between these two schools (N. Dutt, Early Monastic Buddhism, II, pp. 170–1).

It does not appear, however, that the Haimavatas were considered as a separate school before the end of the fourth century C.E., for even at that time it had been observed that a group of Sthaviras residing in the Himālaya had preserved an archaic form of doctrine, probably owing to their isolated position in the mountains. At least that was the view of Vasumitra and the Sammitīyas. When it was found later, that their doctrine was strongly influenced by the Mahāsaṅghikas, they were accommodated with them.

There is no extant inscription, nor any testimony of the Chinese travellers, regarding the places of residence of the Haimavatas, but their name gives us a sufficiently clear indication thereto.

A Chinese translation of the Vinaya-mātṛkā, entitled Pi-ni-mu-ching, (Taishō, No. 1463; Nanjio, No. 1138), appears to be a text belonging to this school; for, the recital of the Council of Rājagṛha terminates with a reference which indicates the origin of this text: “This is the canon which five hundred monks reassembled in the Himālaya”. In this text special reference is made to the Himālayan region, to the necessity of warm clothing for the monks who dwell there and to Kāśyapa, the apostle of the Himālaya. It contains also a description of the canon of which this text forms part. The canon is here (op. cit. p. 818) divided into three collections (piṭaka) of five sections each:

But elsewhere (op. cit. p. 820) a slight difference can be observed in the division of the Sūtra-piṭaka, where not only the order of the first four āgamas varies, but also the Kṣudrakāgama is omitted. The reading Saṁyuktā-piṭaka (Chinese: Tsa-ts'ang) seems to be preferable to Kṣudrakāgama, the restoration of Przyluski who appears to have been guided by a similarity with the Pali Canon. One would do well to remember here, that the Mahāsaṅghikas and the Bahuśrutīyas possessed a fourth collection in their Canon, entitled the Saṁyukta-piṭaka.

Further, the scheme of the Abhidharma-piṭaka is identical with that of the Dharmaguptakas and the one mentioned in the Sāriputra-Abhidharma-śāstra, but for the amalgamation there of the third and fourth divisions into a Saṅgraha-saṁyukta.

This last thesis which is typical of the Pudgalavāda, being attributed to this school by the Sammitīyas who were Pudgalavādins, is for that reason extremely suspicious, especially when Vasumitra notes that the other theses of the Haimavatas are similar to those of the Sarvāstivādins.

According to Tāranātha, this school had ceased to exist during the time of Dharmapāla and Dharmakīrti, that is during the seventh century C.E. (Schiefner’s translation p. 175).

(N. Dutt, Early Monastic Buddhism; Andre Bareau, Les Sectes bouddhiques du petit Vehicule; Przyluski, Le Concile de Rājagṛha; P. Demieville, L'Origine des Sectes bouddhiques. Schiefner, Tāranāthas Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien.)

Is the theory that pleasure is the chief goal and that pleasure should be the aim of human endeavour. Psychologically, it is the theory that every action is motivated by men’s desire to be happy. Ethically, it is the doctrine that every man ought to aim at securing for himself and others the greatest possible sum of pleasure. The psychological theory and the moral doctrine need not necessarily go hand in hand.

Popular among Greek philosophers (Aristippos, Eudoxos, Epikuros), Hedonism was alien to the spirit of Christianity, but was revived by the 17th century materialistic philosophers, Hobbes, Lock and others, and in the 19th century remodelled as Utilitarianism by Bentham and John Stuart Mill.

Several sayings of the Buddha would make one think of him as a hedonist. With Nibbāna as the goal of his doctrine he describes it as the highest bliss (Nibbānaṁ paramaṁ sukhaṁ: (Dhp. v. 203). Happiness is the result to be expected from a pure mind (ibid. v. 2). This happiness, however, is not pleasure but arises in a serene mind (sukhaṁ seti vippasannena cetasā: ibid. v. 79); it is synonymous with the calm of peace (upasanto sukhaṁ seti: ibid. v. 201). Happiness is the relief from all conflict (ibid. v. 331); It exists in the attainment of wisdom and the avoidance of evil (loc. cit.). To be happy is to be content whether one has much or little (loc. cit.). An occasional note of utilitarianism is struck, e.g., when friends are said to be a pleasure when one is in need (ibid. v. 330). All these quotations are intentionally culled from one single text, the Dhammapada, which has no philosophic build-up and has therefore, the most practical value. They all point to happiness as distinct from pleasure or pleasurable feeling (sukha-vedanā).

Pleasurable feeling is a sensation, but is, according to Abhidhamma, experienced only in the sensation of touch, “This exceptional distinction is assigned to the sense of touch, because the impact between the sentient surface (pasāda-rūpa) and the respective objects of other senses, both sets of which are secondary qualities of body, is not strong enough to produce physical pain or pleasure. But in the case of touch there is contact with one, or other, or all the three primary qualities (locality, temperature, pressure, i.e., paṭhavī, tejo, vayo); and this is strong enough to effect those primary qualities in the percipient’s own body” (Shwe Zan Aung, Compendium of Philosophy, Introductory Essay, pp. 14–5).

In a way similar to the distinction between the hedonistic feeling of pleasure and the intuitional experience of bliss, one should distinguish in upekkhā the hedonic neutrality or indifference, which is neither pleasure nor pain, from that equanimity which is balance of mind (tatra-majjhattatā), implying a complex mental state.

Hedonistic pleasures are so varied that they are obviously not homogeneous and can, therefore, not be estimated quantitatively. Thus, to speak of the greatest possible sum of happiness as the aim of ethical living is rather meaningless. Pleasure may be an object of desire, but when a continuous state of happiness is shown as the goal it is not a sum of pleasures. And so it happens that many pleasurable feelings cannot produce happiness. E.g., a distinction is made (M. III, p. 62) between the feeling of pleasure (sukha) and the joy (somanassa) resulting as an associated mental state, both of which are grouped as feeling (vedanā).

That there are kinds of happiness which are not to be classified under pleasurable feeling is shown in the Abhidhamma groupings of the mental factors (cetasika), where pleasurable end non-pleasurable feelings are grouped under sensations (vedanā), whereas joyful interest (pīti) is a mental factor grouped under the karmic formations (saṅkhāra), or accidental properties (pakiṇṇaka).

Neither this joyful interest (pīti) nor the bliss of well-being (sukha), which are stages in the development of mental concentration and absorption (jhāna), falls under the category of pleasure, association with which, however, is not excluded. For, happiness is clearly distinguished as sensuous feeling (pleasure) and spiritual emotion, even when a common term sukha is used.

But the spiritual emotions of joyful interest (pīti) and the experience of the bliss of well-being (sukha) are always shown as transcending all sense-pleasures (kāmasukha). That a happy rebirth is often shown as a legitimate end profitable (ānisaṁsa) quest for the simpler-minded layman (e.g., (A. I, p. 58), that meritorious deeds are encouraged as carriers of happiness (sukhāvahāni: (S. I, p. 2), and that conduct which leads to profit and happiness (hitāya sukhāya samvattanti: (A. I, p. 190) is shown in the well-known advice to the Kālāmas as a guide-stone for ethical behaviour, point to the hedonist tendency in Buddhist morality. But, as in the ultimate sense not only immorality (akusala) but also merit (puñña) has to be left behind to effect a successful crossing of the stream of saṁsāra, it is also in the ultimate psychological sense, that the teaching of the Buddha cannot be called either hedonistic or utilitarian.

Consists essentially of an erroneous interpretation of some external object which is then mistaken for something other than it actually is. It seems probable that certain illusions are generated by conscious wishes, and that the error of mistaking one object for another is due to the desire to see some specific object. But when an experience in the senses is not based on an external factual object, it is called a hallucination. An illusion, therefore, is a deception which has its basis in actuality and which may be a misinterpretation of a fact, e.g., a fata morgana or mirage, an optical illusion, a misinterpretation of an actual experience.

But if the imposition is without physical or imaginary ground, one speaks of a delusion, e.g., the illusion that all phenomena are based on a substance (noumenon), that all living beings are individual entities with a permanent soul (atta) etc.

Heretical views and speculations (miccha-diṭṭhi) are usually based on delusion (moha), particularly on the erroneous view of self-delusion (sakkāya-diṭṭhi). Whereas an illusion can easily be rectified by a correct interpretation of fact or experience, a delusion, being a view which is baseless, blocks the very entrance to the path of perfection and is one of the cardinal mental states lying at the root of all unskilful action.

A mental faculty forming images of external objects which are not present to the five physical senses. It is sometimes called, though not quite accurately, the creative faculty of the mind. Creation in the fullest sense is origination without precedence. And, as there is no idea in the mind which was not prior in the senses (nihil in intellectunis prius in sensu), mind cannot be called creative in the fullest sense, although images perceived in the senses may be regrouped by the mind which thereby forms new mental images, which is imagination, or new mental concepts, which is ideation.

The process of formation of images or concepts is referred to in Buddhist psychology as “mental formations” (saṅkhāra), the fourth of the five aggregates (pañcakkhandha) which constitutes the individual process of conscious living. It follows immediately after impressions (feelings or sensations: vedanā) and perceptions (saññā), all of which are highly complex processes. Colour is not perceived without form, but imagination can either retain the form and change colour, or vice versa, or change both.

The main difference, therefore, between impressions and ideas is that impressions are reproductions and ideas are reconstructions, re-formations, compositions. Imagination, then is a reconstructive process of earlier impressions, a process of association and dissociation of ideas, in which memory, recollection and reflection play an important part. It is an aspect of actuality, which is individualistic, for it is an individual reaction to an individual process.

Perception (saññā) is not preceded by any conscious process. This can be experimentally proved in perceiving ambiguous figures, in which either the black or the white areas can be seen as the figure, the other forming the background, without any process of rationalisation. The perception is conditioned by sensations, but imagination or formation of images is subsequent.

When an interpretation of perception, i.e., a concept of the sense-impression, is not obvious, a probable and familiar solution or explanation will be adopted, and thereby one may not perceive the event as it occurs, but as “it makes sense”. And that is imagination.

Such imaginative interpretation is primarily a memory-image, although not a mere revived impression. The newly received sensation (vedanā), after it has been cognized through perception (saññā) in a general way, is now being conceived and formed (saṅkhata) in which presentation the old and the new are blended in cognitive representation and reconstruction.

In fact, all recognition involves a high degree of imagination, for without the recall of an earlier image-formation, called grasping the past (atītaggahaṇa), it would be impossible to classify and name any new impression. Classification is the grouping into a higher order or class, on the collective grasping of what belongs together (samudayaggahaṇa or samūhaggahana), by means of which clearer understanding of the individual object is obtained. It is this grasping of the meaning or essential nature (atthaggahaṇa) which leads to the naming (nāmaggahaṇa) of the object.

This entire process of recollection, association, classification, discrimination, judging and identification lies between perception (saññā) and consciousness (viññāṇa) and is so complex that it is rightly called saṅkhāra or ideation or image-formation.

Of the six particular concomitant mental factors pakiṇṇakacetasika it is initial application (vitakka) or direction of mind which operates most actively in the process of imagination and is found indeed in 55 various classes of consciousness. It greatly contributes to reasoned thinking in such processes with its characteristics of directing and guiding the imagination in its image and name-finding process.

Name of a school of early Buddhism, considered as an offshoot of Sthaviras, and had arisen shortly after the break away of the Sarvāstivādins from the parent body. They are usually placed in the end of the third century after the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha and are said to have originated in the north-western regions of India.

Vasumitra identifies this school with the Suvarśakas. Both names are derived by Paramārtha and K'uei-chi from the names of sage (ṛṣi) Kāśyapa and a brahmin Suvarśa.

Kharoṣṭhi inscriptions indicate their presence in the third century C.E. in Takṣaśilā and Bedadi and towards fifth century in Paiatu Dheri near Peshawar. But in the seventh century, Hsüan-tsang and subsequently I-tsing found their descendants gone over to Mahāyāna doctrines in Uḍḍiyāna and, outside India, in Kharacher and Khotan.

According to certain texts (Śārīputraparipṛccha: Cho-li-fu-wen-ching, Taishō no. 1465, p. 900 c; and the Ta-pi-k'ieu-san-tst'ien-wei-yi, Taishō no. 1470, p. 926 a) they dressed in purplish red robes.

Of their literature only a short treatise on discipline is known, a Prātimokṣā Sūtra (Kiai-t'o-kiai-ching: Taishō no. 1460; Nanjio No. 1180) by Gautama Prajñā-ruci. It would appear that they had a Vinaya Piṭaka of their own, while their doctrines were close to those of the Dharmaguptakas. The Vinaya-matṛkā, which is usually ascribed to the Haimavatas (because of frequent references to the Himālaya), may have been a text of the Kāśyapīyas, for its authors had a canon very similar to that of the Dharmaguptakas. Their Sūtra-piṭaka is practically identical with that of the Dharmaguptakas, and as regards the Abhidharma-Piṭaka it is very probable that the Kāśyapīyas borrowed the Śārīputrabhidharmaśāstra from the Dharmaguptakas. The few doctrines on which the two schools disagree are found only in post-canonical works.

Vasumitra and Bhavya mention that their other propositions greatly resemble those of the Dharmaguptakas.

Dialectical. The many systems of religion and philosophy throughout the ages would seem to have had but one single goal which is both their final cause and the cause of their origin: to find a satisfactory explanation of, and a solution to, the problems and conflicts which constitute human life. The age-long conflicts between man and man, between man and his surroundings, between man and the universe, have, of course, been observed from time immemorial. Explanations have been offered, such as natural selection, struggle for survival of the fittest, but they have not tried to solve the problem. There have been attempted solutions, which did not offer explanations as they were not based on understanding; these solutions were not to be sought in this life itself, as they were said to form part of a greater supernatural plan. “It is the function of religion”, said Roger Lloyd, Canon of Winchester, “to provide an explanation of the wholeness of man’s experience of the universe, and of his life, and to relate it to the essential mystery which underlies it all” Revolutionary Religion p. 63.. This inclination to see “mystery” in daily life is both a refusal to understand the problem and also an a priori rejection of the possibility of a solution. And yet such is the idealistic explanation of man’s relation to the universe. “In the plan of the Creator, society is a natural means which man can and must use to reach his destined end ... Man’s obligations toward society are divinely imposed” Pope Pius XI Encyclical Letter “Divine Redemptoris” 1937.. Here, no solution is offered, the problem is merely shifted to a higher plane, the supernatural, where it remains shelved for an eternal future, above the reach of any human understanding and natural solution, based on an equally mysterious and supernatural origin like revelation and divine authority, manifested in further mysteries, miracles and prophesies.

The materialistic viewpoint tries to explain and solve life’s greatest problem of conflict in this life itself, by showing the origin thereof to lie in material conditions where actuality conflicts with reality, and by pointing out to a solution through realisation of actual world–-and self value. This is done, although in different terminology, by Dialectical Materialism as well as by Buddhism. And hence a short comparative study of their main tenets must find a place here.

We are here, therefore, concerned only with a comparison of two ideologies and not with comparing the two actual systems as they are found in practice in different parts of the world. Neither ideology is at present fully practised; one has seen already periods of decay and revival, and the other is not full grown yet.

It is perhaps the most controversial point in a comparative study of Buddhism and Materialism that Buddhism with all its distinctive marks which set it apart from all other religions, is still considered a religion, whereas Materialism definitely rejects the need of religion as a mere ideological theory which has grown out of conditions of life, fear, ignorance and suffering together with a desire to find a rational justification therefore. It is, of course, willingly admitted, that ignorance and fear are frequently employed both in religious and other connections for the purpose of maintaining a state favouring the selfish purposes of a small minority. In Buddhism, however, ignorance is recognised as the root of all evil conditions, the closing link in the fetters, saṁyojana of saṁsāra, the most effective hindrance to progress (nirvāṇa), the most stupefying of all drugs (āsava). And fear is shown to be self-reproach (hiri), scare of public opinion (ottapa), dread of consequences, anxiety of the way of woe A. IV, p. 13, Sutta 121.. Instead of trading on these existing conditions as is done in other religions, where “fear of the Lord” is shown as “the beginning of wisdom” Proverbs, IX, 10., the chief concern of Buddhist ethics is the total and final eradication of these fundamental errors which are the roots of all conflict and suffering in the world. For Buddhism, as well as Materialism, is primarily concerned with the ending of conflict.

The credit for discovering the existence of struggle in society is due neither to the Buddha nor to Karl Marx. The latter clearly wrote: “No credit is due to me for discovering the existence of classes in modern society. Long before me, historians and economists had described the development of this class struggle and the economic anatomy of the classes. What I did was to prove that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical phases in the development of production; that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat; and that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society” Correspondence of Marx: Letter to Weydemeyer, 5 March, 1852..

Likewise the Buddha does not claim to be the discoverer of the true facts of conflict (dukkha-sacca). These were proclaimed by many previous pathfinders (Tathāgata) and sages of old. But he does claim to have found anew the psychological causes with which the conflict within the individual and of the individual with society are bound up (dukkha-samudaya); the relationship between the individual and society which leads necessarily to conflict as long as the individual does not visualise himself as a product of society rather than the creator thereof; and the cessation of this conflict (dukkha-nirodha) which can be brought about only through the abolition of that individuality distinction which is the root-cause of all opposition, conflict and struggle. It is this abolition of individuality-distinction which forms the basic goal of both systems, conveniently referred to as Buddhism and Communism. It is this individuality-distinction and the endeavour to abolish it which form, therefore, the first and most essential points of contact.

“Men begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence” Marx and Engels: The German Ideology, p. 7.. The manner in which these means of subsistence are produced is, of course, not the same as the process of individual reproduction of physical existence, and depends on the nature of the actual means at their disposal. Individual productivity, both the actual product of existence and the means of production, is dependent on the material conditions in which individuals have to express their lives. And so we find in Buddhist Philosophy a large volume, the Paṭṭhāna, devoted to conditional relations in 24 modes, such as causal relation (hetupaccaya), dominance (adhipati-paccaya), contiguity (anantara-paccaya), co-nascence (sahajāta-paccaya), reciprocity (aññamañña-paccaya), dependence (nissaya-paccaya), antecedence (purejāta-paccaya), consequence (paccajāta-paccaya), presence (atthi-paccaya), continuance (avigata-paccaya) etc. The entire Paṭṭhāna is devoted first to an enquiry into these 24 ways in which A is related to B, and secondly into illustrating how in things material or mental each kind of relation and groups of relations originate B.C. Law, A History of Pali Literature, pp. 334–5.. From this two conclusions are evident, first according to Buddhist as well as Marxist philosophy whatever arises, arises in dependence on conditions (ye dhammā hetuppabhavā tesaṁ hetu Tathāgato āha) DhpA. I, p. 75; A. IV, p. 26), and second, that whereas the Buddha always speaks of mind and matter (nāma-rūpa), to the Marxist there are only material conditions. Material does not mean made from or composed of matter, for purely material conditions in that sense would be purely mechanical and become absolute causes instead of influencing conditions. Under purely mechanical conditions, history could be written in advance, whereas the most we can do is to point to some driving force which largely determines the course of history. “Even the most thorough and extreme materialist will never maintain that a thought is a composition of chemicals, or of physical elements. But he will hold that force and matter are intrinsically linked up, interchangeable, and even identical, although understood from a different viewpoint. There can be no matter which does not exercise some energy by pressure, resistance, extension, and which, therefore, in that sense is energy. Likewise there can be no energy separate from matter” Bhikkhu Dhammapāla: Burning Questions p. 24..

“Violence, war, pillage, rape and slaughter, etc., have been accepted as the driving force of history” Marx and Engels: The German Ideology pp. 10–11.. But conquest in itself is not a driving force, for conquest itself is forced upon the group by its need of finding new means of existence for its increasing population. Conquest as a result of war is, therefore, only a symptom of the prevailing conditions in which the group can express its means of production. It is therefore, not correct to write history in terms of warfare. History should be the story of human development, of the development of its means of existence, and the development of its means of production, from private property of feudal ownership of land and corporative property of trades. The chief prerequisite to history is life, and life involves before anything else, food, clothing and shelter. It was the Buddha who pointed out, however, that although all life subsists on food (sabbe sattā āhāratthitikā) D. III, p. 211., this nutriment is not strictly material (kabaliṅkāra), as there is also the nutriment of contact (phassa), of volition (cetanā) and of consciousness (viññāṇa) M. I, p. 261..

Lenin too realised that materialism must have its boundaries and he treated this problem exhaustively in his chief philosophical work, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, which are critical notes concerning the reactionary philosophy of the Empirio-Criticists such as Mach and Avenarius. There he draws the dividing line between materialism and idealism, “as a wall which separates the mind from the outer world”. A materialist is one who “takes matter as the primus, regarding consciousness, reason and sensation as derivatives”. The idealist point of view is shown as inclining to the opposite, taking sensation as the primary entity. The Empirio-Criticists hoped to establish a synthetic point of view.

Buddhist philosophy does not see the problem from the same angle. There is no mind as an opposite to matter. But there is a physical action on a physical organ of sense. The reaction, which comes into play, is called sensation. When this reaction becomes divorced from the action, i.e., when ideations or mental concepts are formed, or in other words, when sensations are moulded in the classifications of a deluded individuality or ego-experience, then such concepts begin to assume a self-acquired reality of their own, whereas they are only aspects of actuality, of an actual process without any real entity, either of matter or of mind. This agrees with Lenin’s definition of matter as “that, which acting upon our sense organs, produces sensation” As quoted in Moscow Dialogues p. 122., but not with the same author’s: “matter is the objective reality given us in sensation, existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it” Materialism and Empirio Criticism, 1908, Collected Works, X. p. 116..

It is this actuality of the materiality process and the mental reactionary process, which form the basis of Buddhist philosophy. All things are in action, although not all action is mechanical. Action is reaction, and that means interpenetration of the opposites, which presents the appearance of unity, of individuality, of entity, of substance. It is only through analysis of this apparent unity that reality will be understood as mere actuality. Such analysis will even reveal the basic laws of the evolutionary process, the arising of the I-concept from the opposition to the flow of impermanence through the grasping of and clinging to sensations in the process called memory, the retentive process by which a passing experience can be appropriated. In recognising the actual factors of this process, one may even forecast certain events as resultants from existing conditions; or by influencing these conditions it would be possible to some extent to control and direct these future events, due to the interpenetration of “matter” and “mind”.

But it is impossible to draw sharp lines of demarcation; for which reason, however, it cannot be correct on the other hand to completely ignore the mental aspect of the problem and call the entire process material unless the word is used in a very special accommodating sense. “Mind” and “Consciousness” are used in Buddhist terminology not in the sense of a spiritual or immaterial entity, for they are never treated in an absolute sense. There is no mental process apart from the material one, and frequently nāma-rūpaṁ is treated as one compound: mentalised matter. It is on this mind-body that the six bases of sense depend (nāma-rūpapaccaya salāyatanaṁ). And again the mind is one of those senses. Sight is not possible without a reflecting thought-process. This, however, does not make the mind an independent organ, for no thought arises which has not entered through one of the five sense doors (pañca-dvār-āvajjana). The treatment of the mind in Buddhist psychology does not detract from its materialism on the one hand, as the mind is not considered as an immaterial entity, but is supplements on the other had the mechanic world-aspect, providing the driving force of volition which not merely sees to nature’s reproductivity, but also to the many and complicated social relationships which are at the bottom of every conflict and struggle. “For the animal, its relation to others does not exist as a relation” Marx and and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 19., unless in a very undeveloped form, as the herd-instinct, which even than is largely, if not exclusively, self-centred. It is the mental grasping of the environment which forms the food and gives the driving force to the continuation of the process which cannot be explained on purely mechanistic lines. Pure matter is even more fictitious than Kant’s pure consciousness (Kritik der reinen Vernunft), for pure matter cannot have any relationship with thought and cannot be known, whereas matter which is being thought about becomes food for thought and is thereby subject to the process of assimilation: mentalised matter (nāma-rūpa), or matter conditioned by thought, and thought conditioned by matter. The two, as separates, are unknown and unknowable. Only the conditioned effect is the world as known to us. A supernatural order, believing in mind as separate and independent from mater, is denied by both Buddhism and Materialism, which have no room for the ideas of God and Soul, make no attempt to deify man’s own nature, and are hence opposed to all idealistic systems of thought or religion.

Materialism in Buddhism, however, does not give to matter an independent status either. It does not recognise a substance in matter any more than it would accept a soul in mind. This view is corroborated by the latest findings of experimental science, where mater is proved to be essentially motion. Motion, however, means essentially change. Matter is not a substantial being to which change comes as something accidental, leaving the intrinsic thing-in-itself identical and eternally the same. Matter is not a static entity with a mechanical equilibrium at absolute rest. For this concept would lead to a motionless state of matter, which again would require some external force by which motion was introduced. Motion, however, need not be introduced, for it is inherently present in matter, while remains static only for so long as its dynamic force is counteracted; and even then its state of suspended energy is only relative.

The many modes of relationship between individual events greatly influence, condition and modify the effects resulting from such relationship. Engels reduced these general laws of dialectics to: (1) the law of transition whereby a change of quantity affects the quality. Mass-production reduces the value. The individual behaves differently from the group. (2) the law of interpenetration of opposites, which is the law of life, in which life and death are inseparable. Production and consumption form such a unity that a disturbance of their equilibrium seriously affects social and international relations. (3) The law of the negation of negation, which is the law of higher synthesis in mathematics, in logic, as well as in the reproductive process of organic life, where the seed has to die in order to produce more seeds. A double negation constitutes an affirmation in logic, a positive in algebra.

Now these laws are applicable equally to the working of the mind and were as such formulated by the Buddha about 25 centuries before Karl Marx discovered that “my relation to my environment is my consciousness” Moscow Dialogues p. 100.. For the Buddha said: “that which we will and that which we intend to do and that with which we are occupied–-this becomes an object for the support of consciousness. If there is an object, there is a foothold for consciousness” S. II, p. 64.. Consciousness arises as a resultant of contact with the environment, for “dependent on contact arises sensation” (phassa-paccayā vedanā) Formula of Dependent Origination (paṭicca samuppāda).; and sensation (vedanā) is the embryonic stage of the receptive thought-process, which must evolve through perception (saññā) and conception (saṅkhāra) to the state of full grown consciousness (viññāṇa).

Thus far we find perfect agreement between Buddhism and Dialectical Materialism. There is, however, a difference in the way in which it is thought that matter is presented to become a mental object. “Matter is the objective reality, give to us in sensation. There is nothing in the world but matter in motion, and matter cannot move save in space and time”, said Lenin Materialism and Empirio Criticism 1908, Collected Works X p. 116., for “the fundamental forms of all being are space and time; being outside of time is just as mush an absurdity as being outside of space”. Thus it would appear that Dialectical Materialism is based on a clear and definite conception of matter. However, space and time are mental concepts into which the mind categories certain experiences as events. An event is conceived of as a personal experience and thereby mace static and localised in time and space. Thus the process of experiencing is killed for the purpose of retention which is a strengthening of the self-misconcept. Time and space are not forms in which beings move, but forms in which the mental process moulds its experiences, a device to retain selected effects of experience, as we endeavour to retain or call back a pleasurable feeling by giving it a name. Hence it is not matter, which moves in space and time, but space and time are mental concepts recording the movement of matter. This process of conception is not to be understood as another “form” or matrix, which finally will produce the formed product, for there is no “mind” apart from the process of thinking which is conditioned in its arising and cessation by the many factors which range from cause to influence.

If there is nothing but matter, it is impossible to define matter, for no other inclusive generic concept would be found. Yet, if “matter is the objective reality, given to us in sensation”, as Lenin said, it is not matter which is known, but only the sensation, which again cannot tell us anything of this objective reality. Hence, that “matter is all that exists” is from its very nature a categorical statement, not less imperative than Kant’s concept of God.

In Buddhism matter is materiality, i.e., a characteristic state proper to whatsoever has the characteristic of being affected (ruppana) Vism. III, 14, 34., i.e., an objective actuality.

In Dialectical Materialism matter is “a philosophic category for designating objective reality” Engels, Anti Dühring, 4th Russian ed. p. 39.. It is nature acting upon the senses and calling forth perception, which does not mean that it must be tangible matter as popularly understood. Hence any change or new discovery bearing on the nature of matter may be accepted so long as its objective existence is not denied.

Process: What Marx understood as the chief defect of all materialism, viz., that the object, apprehended through our senses, is understood only as an object, and not as sensuous human activity Julius F. Hecker, Moscow Dialogues p. 722, quoting Lenin., is not found in the materialistic ontology of the Buddha. For here the constant stress is laid, away from the thing-in-itself, on the action of the object together with the reaction of the subject. It is the comprehensive knowledge of this mutual subject-object activity, which constitutes actuality. The thing-in-itself, substance, essence soul and similar terms do not find a place in Buddhist terminology, where the accent throughout is on non-entity (anatta) and action (kamma).

Objective truth, therefore, is eschewed in Buddhism as much as subjective truth. Truth is not static, is not theoretical, but is a “practical question” 1st thesis on Feuerbach.. Truth is a fact, an event, which arises and ceases, which is not a static reality, but an actual process, the truth of which lies in its contradiction. “Contradiction is what actually moves the world”. This central idea of Hegel’s dialectical logic became the weapon of his revolting pupils, first of Feuerbach, then of Marx and Engels.

Ludwig Feuerbach in his treatise Das Wesen des Christentums (The Essence of Christianity) advocates a frank religious humanism, or materialism, in which there is nothing outside nature and man. All religious values are human values, and the beginning of philosophy should not be “I”, but “I and You”. But in breaking away from idealism, one should equally avoid that kind of materialism in which the old metaphysics are presented as physics. Feuerbach was not a mechanistic materialist of the type which flourished in France in the age of physics and which knew little of the biological sciences. “French materialism in general was incapable of representing the universe as a process, as one form of matter assumed in the course of evolutionary development” Ibid., 2nd thesis.. In other words, it was still metaphysical and static. Feuerbach preferred to call his philosophy “organistic”. It is a dialectical naturalism in which there exists only organic life, organic activity, organic thinking. Man himself is a part of nature and is controlled by the same laws as those which govern the processes of nature. Yet Karl Marx refused to follow Feuerbach’s abstract cultus of man which was the kernel of his religion. “Feuerbach does not see that the religious temperament itself is a social product and that the abstract individual whom he analyses, belongs to a definite form of society” Engels as quoted in Moscow Dialogues, p. 80..

“Marx grasped the important truth that history is a process, that all phenomena of nature, including man and society, are interrelated, that nothing is permanent, that every thing moves and continually changes” Seven theses on Feuerbach.. The important question at this stage becomes whether this universal process, this continuity of evolution, proceeds according to set laws. Hegel saw in these dialectical laws the absolute spirit of the universe, the unity of Espinoza’s substance (or nature torn away from man) with Fichte’s self-consciousness (or human mind tom away from nature), the unity of these two contradictories: actual nature and actual mankind. Hegel accepted the absolute principle, existing from the beginning of time and composing the true life-giving soul of all beings. Passing through all the stages of development contained within itself, it appears unconsciously in nature, assuming the guise of natural necessity. In man it again becomes conscious and proceeds upwards until the absolute concept finally returns to itself. This is the typical idealist attitude, reading and projecting its own thought process in the universal process of evolution.

Engels turned Hegel’s dialectic upside down. Real things are not pictures of the absolute idea, but ideas are pictures of real things and hence materialistic. The dialectics of the idea is merely the conscious reflex of the dialectic evolution of the real world. It is knowledge of the universal laws of motion, of the outer world as well as of inner thought, which accomplish themselves unconsciously in nature and in history in the form of external necessity through an endless succession of apparent accidents.

The Buddhist attitude towards existence is not a mere denial of real things, of being, substance, soul, entity, which would be its opposite, i.e., non-existence, nothingness, void. The thesis of being and its antithesis of nothingness are united in the synthesis of becoming. For becoming (bhava) is of the nature of a process which neither is nor is not, which essentially is arising, and in arising also ceases. This process of arising and ceasing is the basic conception that underlies the philosophies of the Buddha and of Marx. It is this process of becoming which gives rise to conflict: a psychological conflict between the ever-changing process of life as a whole and the desire for permanency of the individual resisting the passing flow; an economic conflict between the owners of the means of production, and those who by selling their labour have become part of those means of production; a historical conflict between individuals and various classes of society in their endeavour to retain or acquire the means of production, slaves, lands, tools or modern production-plants.

The solution of this conflict, which is one and the same although apparently fought on such different battlefields, is offered in Buddhism and in Dialectical Materialism in the only possible way by removal of the dialectical nature of the conflict. In the psychological realisation of the non-existence of an “Ego” the foundation of the conflict is removed. In the acquisition of the means of production by the entire community the distinction and opposition between classes will have been abolished. In the absence of opposition, this process of becoming or historical dialectics will continue without being a conflict. Whether either ideology will ever be completely successful in its achievement is a fruitless speculation. All one can do is to take the road that leads to the goal, once that has been clearly discerned.

As regards the main philosophical problems we may summarise that Buddhism ontologically has taken the side of materialism against idealism, which is clearly proved by its denial of substance, soul, entity, ultimate cause, absolute existence, reality of time and space, eternal life, and by its substitution of these by a process of becoming, evolution, dependent origination, conditioned arising and ceasing of phenomena only, dependence of the mental process on material environment and its definite and uncompromising doctrine of no soul.

Epistemologically the cognitive activities are not taken by themselves, and are not separated from the other experiences inseparably bound up with them. The knower is above all an intelligent act of volition he acts upon the thing known, moves and moulds it, and is at the same time moved and moulded by it. There is no knowledge without feeling and experiencing the effects upon ourselves and our object. Knowledge is action and reaction, and all the factors of this activity form together the act or process of cognition. Feeling, perception, ideation together with the material impression are essential constituents in the process of consciousness whether this be in its simplest possible position as awareness, or in more complex processes as ratiocination, whether the main spring of action is simple emotion, or the involved course of volition. This process is kept alive by its intrinsic dialectical nature of attraction and repulsion, love and hate, desire and fear, projection into a permanent self and rejection of the impermanent stream of life. And this dialectical process of the delusive thesis of a permanent “self” and the antithesis of the impermanent process of becoming is dissolved in the synthesis, is “withering away” in the realisation of “no-self”, as the withering away of the state in a class-less society.

Psychologically the mind is not treated as an entity but as a forming process, subject to a conditioning environment and reflecting the absorbed tendencies acquired from those surroundings.

Ethically also Buddhism avoids the usual foundations of idealistic religions such as eternal reward or punishment, salvation of an individual soul, etc. by its doctrine of action and reaction which is not individualistic, Moral law does not derive its sanction from a divine lawgiver, but from society and life in community.

Yet this ethical system as a practical application of a religious ideology seems to fail in all its attempts of approach of these two schools of thought. Even religions with such vastly different theological bases as Hinduism in its purest Vedantic form and Christianity as developed in Paulinian dogmatism, still find a common ground and many points of contact in the ethical field. But Dialectical Materialism does not seem to have an ethical problem at all and certainly does not seem to feel the need of stimulating an ethical consciousness. Comparing this with Buddhism one may equally wonder whether this stimulation of an ethical consciousness is an essential part of early Buddhism, although, no doubt, the present religious practical attitude in this respect is not very different sometimes from that of theological religions. In the original text, unadorned by commentarial “improvements”, we find hardly a trace of an ethical code, apart from advice to avoid evil and to do good Moscow Dialogues, p. 88.. Even the so-called precepts are no commandments forming part of an ethical law. They are rules of conduct which do not require a supernatural sanction either as to origin or to application, for they are natural rules following from a natural environment in a normally developed society. The laws of karma are not laws of retribution or destiny, sentences of judgement with reward or penalty, but formulas of actuality, constituted in much the same way as the laws of science, which do not bind but which generalize individual behaviour with regard to cause and effect. The law does not make society, but social life makes the law. And the development of social life in its various aspects will thereby produce corresponding laws of behaviour, of morality, of ethics which are, therefore, not divinely inspired, but dictated by one’s own conscience which is another word for public opinion.

Engels is quoted Julius F. Hecker, quoting Engels in Moscow Dialogues, pp. 65–71. as having said: “As a matter of fact, every class as well as every profession has its own system of morals, and breaks even this when it can do so without punishment. Religious feeling is itself a product of society”. There is no doubt that the great world teachers and reformers were thrown up by the need of the times in which they lived. Their movements were like avalanches, starting perhaps from a most insignificant event which necessitated action. But once that action, which was, therefore, a product of society at the time, was initiated, its ideological notions developed immensely, gathering material on the way while retaining its conservative force. And so it happens that those great religious movements after some time become out of date and lose their vitality, until a revival or reform becomes necessary, another symptom of the dialectic nature of the process. Religions which refuse to grow are dogmatic and dead, and will never be able to give the eternal life they promise. Buddhism has no dogmas, and its standards of morality are only fixed in so far as they are based on the natural exigences of the human constitution, physically and socially. Society is the extension of the individual, and is, likewise, as a living organism in a continuous process of growth. Such growth may be viewed by some at certain times as progress, by others at other times as a cankerous excrescence, but it can never be a mechanical sequence of arbitrary combinations of social elements. In other words, morality may grow, for better or for worse, but cannot be made. Morality must be an expression of life and not a mould into which life is impressed and suppressed. Such natural morality without any shadow of the supernatural is found in Buddhism. There are no commandments, no supreme lawgiver, no threats of punishments, but only appeals to reason, to one’s social obligations, to one’s natural, not acquired conditions. In this light, acts of murder, theft, debauchery, untruth and intemperance become unnatural and are, therefore, shunned by any reasonable individual. Summing up, such a life will be harmless, incapable of exploitation, and viewing others as having equal rights. It is a morality of action and not of dogmatic standards.

This Buddhist morality of action or karma does not make an exception to the law of dialectics. In Hinduism and in Buddhism as it is misunderstood in countries which have not fully arisen from the feudal conditions of living, the teaching of karma received mostly the interpretation of fate and destiny. It was and still is the interest of the ruling class or caste to perpetuate the prevailing state of affairs, preventing less fortunate ones to advance. A typical illustration is the strong Opposition of denominational schools against free education which would result in greater influence (or as they call it, interference) by Government. The teaching of karma, interpreted as a rigid law of cause and effect, naturally produced in the masses that apathy which would retain everybody in his place. It is true, Buddhism teaches that karma is the cause, an action in some past life, producing effects in this present life. But it is not said that this is an external cause unconnected with the effect. Neither did Karl Marx say that economic forces are the only ones which rule social life. “According to the materialistic view of history, the factor which in the last instance is decisive in history is the production and reproduction of actual life. More than this neither Marx not I have ever asserted. But when anyone distorts this so as to read that the economic factor is the sole element, he converts the statement Dhp. xiv, 183. into a meaningless, abstract, absurd phrase”.

Similarly the view that life is inexorably regulated by the laws of karma, makes of life a mechanistic process. Karma, however, was never meant to be the feudal vassal of the lord of Fate. Karma is action, i.e., the controlling power in the present, but that controlling power is controlled itself or, as we say, conditioned by previous actions, the material forces of the past, which make their presence felt as results (vipāka) and which are, therefore, the generators of the present environment and social atmosphere. Karma is new action, but it will work according to individual tendencies. Thus the present is conditioned by the past, and contains elements of the past. That does not mean that the present is a mere development of the past, which would be an effect from a cause as found in idealistic theism. Buddhism teaches conditionality instead of causality. The actions of the past are important influences; they do not, however, necessarily produce the effect, but only if the social conditions are favourable. Thus there will be the constant struggle of action (karma) to produce its natural reaction (vipāka) according to its own nature, which reaction, however, is subject to external conditions which may be favourably supporting (upatthambhaka), adversely counteracting (upapīlaka), or even destructive (upaghāthaka). In this we see the dialectic elements of karma, which are tendencies grown from conflict and which produce in themselves further conflict of attraction and repulsion, of greed (lobha) and aversion (dosa).

Karma or man’s action is essentially a social and cooperative process because action is conditioned in its arising and cessation. Hence it is impossible to say what and how much any single individual has produced in a single individual act. It is evident that man acts not always mechanically, but intentionally, whether his intentions are good or bad. It is this intention (cetanā) which makes his action moral or immoral. But in order to explain such an intentional act, it is not enough merely to state the fact of his evil intention. A man steals, because he wants to steal. The problem, however, is: why should he want it? Obviously, to satisfy some internal need. Thus the existence of that need will be the real cause of his act. And whoever has produced that cause is partly at least responsible for the evil act which finally followed. If a man steals to satisfy his craving for pleasure, which he cannot do with his honestly earned income, then all those who have created in him that hunger by advertising pleasure, by setting him an example of sense satisfaction without giving him the means thereto, by refusing to impart to him that knowledge of pleasure which is not craving of the senses, but leads to understanding and insight of the truth, all those are responsible for the evil deed. An immoral act should not only be condemned in the culprit, but blame should go to the whole society which produced him. Crime, poverty and illiteracy are not just individual shortcomings, but slurs on the reputation of the nation, of society, of the whole human race.

The doctrine of karma, if well understood, does not lead to individualism. If there is no “self” (anatta), action cannot be individual, and hence the effect of such action, merit or demerit, will not be individual either. All action bears a social responsibility; the effect or the produce belongs to the community. Like the economic system, so the moral system is essentially one. Like economic profit should go to the community of workers instead of being withheld from them by exploitation, so moral profit or merit should not be a personal reward as is promised to individual souls in an eternal heaven according to idealistic theistic religions, but moral profit too should be owned by the community. That is the Buddhist doctrine of morality, where virtue is practised for the sake of virtue, for the sake of the good of all, not for the purpose of acquiring merit for oneself, just because there is no “self” to reap the fruits in another life. Rebirth there is, but a soulless one. It is the rebirth of action under the influence of conditions, the present being the father of tomorrow. The yield of present action is having made the future. Having obtained the satisfaction of having done one’s duty towards the community, the sum-total of the good effect will go to the moral, social or economic improvement of the society with whose operation the good action was performed.

An objection is sometimes raised that in a classless society, where all men will have not only equal opportunities, but even equal remunerations according to their needs, the law of karma as moral retribution will have no field of application. In other words, the Buddhist doctrine of karma giving to everyone according to his deeds, seems to contradict the communist ideal of giving to everyone according to his needs. In answer it may first of all be pointed out that the very fact of a group of certain people striving together towards a common ideal indicates equality of action, which, therefore, will yield equality of effect. The firm establishment of an ideology all over the world would then merely indicate that the common action of millions had produced an effect, affecting all. And that would be quite according to the law of karma. Yet, even a solution of the class conflict by the institution of a classless society, even the eradication of disease by scientific progress, will not abolish the disease of old age which, however much deferred, finally must end in death. And the more comfortable life is being made, the more difficult it will be to part with it, the greater will be the mental conflict. It is then that the inequality of mental action will find a most fruitful field to harvest retribution according to one’s deeds, according to the law of karma.

It is an injustice to Buddhism to point to the law of karma as a law of predestination. That may by the idea of karma in Hinduism with its many gods, with its reincarnation of souls, with its unknown and unknowable Brahman. That might still have been the necessary outcome of an India in bondage, economically enslaved by foreign exploitation, politically fettered by a feudal system of princely rule, intellectually shackled by a degrading caste-system, religiously trammelled by superstition and priest craft. But Buddhism which does not acknowledge caste-distinction, which has no priests and sacrifices, which condemns blind faith and encourages free thought–-Buddhism with its selfless doctrine of “no-soul”, where even action is not of self, where heaven and hell can be made and unmade in this world itself, where the highest freedom of Nirvāṇa must be sought in freedom of mind in a human form–-that Buddhism is free from superstition, free from fear, free from serfdom in any form.

(Marx and Engels: The German Ideology; Marxist-Leninist Library, volumes 1, 9, 17, London, Lawrence and Wishart; Friedrich Engels, Anti-Dühring (Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science); Marx and Engels, Correspondence; Julius F. Hecker: Moscow Dialogues, London, Chapman & Hall 1993; V.I. Lenin, Selected Works Volumes 1–12, London, Lawrence and Wishart, translated from Russian, as issued by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, Moscow, U.S.S.R.)